Period of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine: 1922-1948

This section contains forty-three documents covering the period of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine,July 24, 1922, to May 15, 1948. These documents present the positions and recommendations of key political bodies at the time: Great Britain, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the League of Nations, the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and various Zionist organizations.

In 1919, following World War I and the break-up of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations established a system of mandates that allowed certain Western governments to administer former colonies and territories in Africa and Asia as “trusteeships.” This mandatory system was predicated on the theory that developed Europeans nations should assist less-developed African and Asian communities in governing their populations and in advancing toward national independence. The mandatory system was unprecedented in the history of international relations. It was a new form of colonialism that had the appearance of international legitimacy.

The League of Nations established mandates for three territories in the Middle East: Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. On July 24, 1922, Britain was handed formal control over Palestine as a Class-A Mandate. This designation meant that Palestine was deemed close to achieving independence and that all attempts should be made by the mandatory power to “encourage local autonomy” in the territory. The mandate also included a clear commitment to Zionist goals in Palestine as its preamble reproduced passages of the Balfour Declaration.

The period of the mandate was fraught with conflicts between the indigenous Arab population and the increasing number of Jewish immi­grants to Palestine, boosted by tragic events taking place on the world stage—first in Russia during the anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1821-1917 and then in Nazi-occupied Europe under the program of systematic, state- sponsored persecution and murder of Jews and “undesirables.” Perse cution and political instability spurred Jews from numerous nations to immigrate to Palestine between 1939 and 1947.

Exacerbating tensions between local Arab and Jewish communities, the British Mandatory Power issued conflicting and inconsistent policy statements during this period. Policies regularly favored one side over the other depending on Britain’s immediate political interests, routinely causing alarm and frustration among the newly disfavored group. Britain, thus, managed to alienate both sides of the conflict in Palestine.

Despite the backdrop of colonial occupation and unrest, Jews and Arabs in the region made progress toward their respective nationalist goals. The Jewish community in Palestine engaged in intense political development, forming the nucleus of an army (hag^anah) and establishing major social institutions such as the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1925) and the Hadassah Hospital (1939). In 1944, the independent states of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon joined together to form the League of Arab States, a regional multilateral organization for addressing Arab concerns.

AlthoughPalestinianArabsweretheoverwhelmingmajorityinPalestine at the start of the mandate (representing 92 percent of inhabitants), their national goals were incoherent in comparison to those of the Zionists, their efforts to engage in political organization were consistently weak, and they were opposed by the British who had reservations about establishing an independent Arab state in Palestine. Dissatisfied with British policy and trying to stop further Jewish immigration, Palestinian Arabs in 1936 began a three-year struggle to effect governmental change. In response, Britain expelled the Palestinian leadership, leaving the primary Arab political role in Palestine to the Hashemites of Transjordan.

Divergent and competing interests in the region gradually engendered an unworkable political situation. British attempts to reign in the increasingly violent Arab and Jewish communities and stabilize Palestine had little or no lasting effect.

Relevant documents in Section 6, Jerusalem and the Holy Sites, should be consulted.

Document 24: Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the League of Natiocns (July 24, 1922) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617 b006d88d7∕2fca2c68106f11ab05256bcf007bf3cb! OpenDocument]. The League of Nations awarded Britain the Mandate for Palestine at the San Remo Conference in 1920; however, its terms of reference were not ratified until two years later. Drawing text directly from the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the mandate determines that Britain is to be responsible for establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Document 25: Palestine Order in Council Issued by Great Britain (August 10, 1922) [The Laws of Palestine 2569-89 (R.H. Drayton ed., 1934)]. The British government issued the Palestine Order in Council, which established a temporary government in Palestine under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. It outlines the framework of a local government, constitutional development, and an election process.

Document 26: Memorandum by the British Representative on Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate (September 16, 1922) [1922, Cmd. 1785, at 11]. In this memorandum, the British government claims full responsibility as a mandatory power for Transjordan, the kingdom it created on the east bank of the Jordan River.

Document 27: Resolution of the U.S. Congress on Palestine (September 21, 1922) [Res. 73, 67th Cong., 42 Stat. 1012 (1922) (enacted)]. This congressional resolution, approved by the senate and the House of Representatives, throws the political weight of the United States behind the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Document 28: Excerpts from the Report on Palestine Administration, Submitted by the United Kingdom to the League of Nations (December 31, 1922) [available at http://domino. un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/a682cabf739febaa0525 65e8006d907c!OpenDocument]. The United Kingdom presented this report to the League of Nations following its assumption of mandatory control of Palestine on July 24, 1922. The report details progress made in Palestine since the start of the mandate, including economic growth, agricultural recovery, railway improvements, increased tourism, and a program for opening new elementary schools. According to the report, 8,128 immigrants had entered the country in 1922, 7,844 of whom were Jews—and a consensus was taken in the month of October, showing a total population of 757,182, of whom 78 percent were Muslim, 11 percent Jewish, and 9.6 percent Christian.

Document 29: Mandate for Palestine Questionnaire Intended to Assist the Preparation of the Annual Reports of the Mandatory Powers (December 31, 1922) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/ 73d84c3e3fce1f46052565f700573a64!OpenDocument]. The League of Nations drafted this questionnaire to assist Britain, as the mandatory power in Palestine, in preparing its annual reports on Palestine. It lays out the primary concerns and issues that should be reviewed and reported on each year.

Document 30: Excerpts from the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) [Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, arts. 1, 16, 17, 19, 28 L.N.T.S 701, 13-113]. This treaty—signed by the British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey in the ceremony hall of Lausanne University, Switzerland—was a revision of the Treaty of Sevres. It sets the boundaries of modern Turkey, drawing its borders with Iraq and Greece, following the Greco-Turkish War.

Document 31: Convention between the United States and Great Britain on Rights in Palestine (December3, 1924) [U.S.-Gr. Brit., 44 Stat. 2184]. This convention, signed in London by U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellog and British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, defines American rights with regard to Palestine. It provides that the United States will give its official approval to and recognition of the British mandate—this was necessary as the United States was a world power that was not a member of the League of Nations. In return, U.S. citizens would enjoy the privileges of the mandate. It also requires that the United States approve all proposed changes to the mandate. The convention was ratified by President Calvin Coolidge on December 5, 1925.

Document 32: Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1929 (December 31, 1929) [available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/181c4bf00c44e5fd85256cef0073c426/ 38bed104db074b49052565e70054eb22!OpenDocument]. Britain’s 1929 Report to the League of Nations details the many disturbances that occurred between Arab and Jewish groups in Palestine. The so-called Wailing Wall Dispute is treated at length. The report includes a summary of the prosecution of cases arising out of the disturbances.

Document 33: Excerpts from the Statement of British Policy in Palestine (Passfield White Paper of 1930) (October 21, 1930) [1930, Cmd. 3692, at 12-23]. The Passfield White Paper, issued by the British government following two investigations of the Arab Riots of 1929 (i.e., the Shaw Commission, led by Sir Walter Shaw, and the Hope- Simpson Expert Investigation of Land Capacity Issues), finds that riots occurred due to Arab disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future.

Document 34: Letter from British Prime Minister James Ramsey MacDonald to Dr. Chaim Weizmann (February 13, 1931) [58 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1931) 751-57]. After the Zionists mounted a well-organized campaign against the Passfield White Paper, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald wrote Chaim Weizmann this letter effectively reversing its position. Zionists regarded the letter as a restoration of the status quo. Arabs, who had greeted the immigration limitations set by the Passfield White Paper with satisfaction, were disappointed.

Document 35: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission Report) (July 1937) [1937, Cmd. 5479, reprinted in 3 The Arab Israeli Conflict 150-183 (John Morton Moore ed., 1974)]. The Peel Commission—named for commission chairman the Honorable Earl Peel—was established by the British government to investigate the causes of the 1936 riots. Its report recommends both the termination of the British mandate in its present form and the partition of Palestine into two parts: a Jewish state and an Arab territory that would become a Palestinian state. It also proposed the massive transfer of Arabs from the territory of theJewish state in order to make sense of the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The commission also called for the creation, under Britain’s control, of a special zone that would include Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and a corridor from Jerusalem to the Mediterranean. Upon its publication, the British government declared support for the report’s conclusions and promised to take the necessary steps for its implementation. Arab Palestinians rejected the proposal.

Document 36: Political Resolution of the Twentieth Zionist Congress Concerning the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (August 3, 1937) [The New Judea, August-September 1937, at 227]. The Twentieth Zionist Congress, held in Zurich, Switzerland, was called to discuss the political implications of the Peel Commission Report and its proposed partition of Palestine, with the creation of a British-controlled corridor from the coast to Jerusalem. The resolution rejects the plan’s proposed boundaries, but agrees in principle to partition.

Document 37: Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations Concerning Palestine (September 30, 1937) [League of Nations OJ. Spec. Supp.168, at 28 (1937)]. This League of Nations resolution expresses the Assembly’s confidence in Britain’s administration of the Mandate for Palestine and its conviction that the problem of Palestine will be equitably settled in the best interest of all involved parties.

Document 38: Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (November 1938) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/074941922311b4 e3c58525 6d17004bd2e2?OpenDocument]. Anticipating the Palestine Partition Commission Report (Woodhead Report), this statement considers the possible technical difficulties in the implementation of a partition plan and concludes that partition is not practicable. It proposes three alternatives, all of which leave Jerusalem under British mandatory control.

Document 39: Statement of British Policy in Palestine (MacDonald White Paper) (May 17, 1939) [1939, Cmd. 6019, available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/ bc8b0c56b7bf621185256cbf005ac05f/eb5b88c94aba2ae585256d0b00555536!O penDocument]. The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 marks a significant shift in Britain’s position on the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. It proposes that Palestine become an independent, binational Arab-Jewish state, with Arabs dominating the national government. It limits Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years, with further immigration subject to Arab “acquiescence.” The decisions set forth in this paper were largely determined by British interests in World War II, as Britain needed the support of oil-rich Arab nations to win the war against Germany. Britain risked alienating the Jewish world community because it knew that Jews would not support Hitler over the Allies.

Document 40: Statement of the Jewish Agency Concerning the Statement of British Policy in Palestine (May 17, 1939) [The New Judaea, May-June 1939, at 173-74]. The Jewish Agency issued this statement in reaction to the MacDonald White Paper, expressing anger and frustration with Britain’s new position against Jewish immigration and the creation of an independent Jewish national homeland in Palestine. The Jewish Agency regarded the White Paper as a “breach of faith.”

Document 41: Excerpts from the Report of the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission to the League of Nations Council Concerning the Statement of British Policy in Palestine (June 29, 1939) [reprinted in 3 The Arab Israeli Conflict 225-29 (John Morton Moore ed., 1974)]. In this report, the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission asserts that the policy set out in the MacDonald White Paper is not in accordance with the commission’s interpretation of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. It also notes that Britain’s continuing policy shifts are undermining the effective functioning of the mandate. The commission concludes that the only relevant consideration is the establishment of two independent states in Palestine.

Document 42: Record of the Conversation between the Furher and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, a Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister’s Secretariat (November 30, 1941) [published in 13 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945: The War Years, Series D 881 (United Nations Government Printing Office, 1964)]. In this record of the meeting in Germany between the Furher and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem during World War Il, the Mufti thanks the Furher for his support of Arab independence and the Palestinian cause. The Mufti expresses his belief that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would consequently benefit.

Document 43: Biltmore Declaration of the Extraordinary Zionist Conference (May 11, 1942) [Jewish Agency for Palestine, Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People 226-27 (1942)]. In this Declaration of the Extraordinary Zionist Conference, AmericanJewish organizations throw their weight behind the creation of an independentJewish state in Palestine, given the severe persecution ofJews in Nazi occupied Europe. The declaration was signed in the Biltmore Hotel in New York by 800 delegations. The conference was dubbed “Extraordinary” because it substituted for the recurrent World Zionist conference, which could not be held in Europe due to the state of war.

Document 44: Alexandria Protocol ofthe Pan-Arab Preliminary Conference (October 7, 1944) [16 Dep’t St. Bull. 411 (1947), available athttp://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ mideast/alex.htm]. In the Alexandria Protocol, leaders from Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt form a unified stance against the intervention of foreign powers in the Middle East. In particular, they express concern about Palestine becoming a Jewish homeland. This document became the basis for the formation of the League of Arab States.

Document 45: Charter of the League of Arab States (March 22, 1945) [available at http:// www.yale.edu/lawweb/ avalon/mideast/arableag.htm]. This charter creates the League of Arab States, a voluntary association of independent countries whose peoples are generally Arabic speaking. The league’s stated purpose is to strengthen ties among member states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests. It was signed in Cairo by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen.

Document 46: Letter from U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to King ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia (April5, 1945) [A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents (1941­1949) 623 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950)]. In this letter, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt promises King ibn Saud that the United States will take no hostile action against the Arabs and that it will not change its basic policy toward Palestine without prior consultations with Arabs and Jews. This plan, made a week before Roosevelt’s death, was reversed by Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt’s successor.

Document 47: Excerpts from the Report of the Anglo-Ameiican Committee of Inquiry (April 20, 1946) [available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/anglo/angpre.htm]. The Report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry is a review of the policies governing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Requested by U.S. President Harry S. Truman, the commission was created to examine the political, economic, and social conditions in Palestine as they affected Jewish immigration and the well-being of indigenous groups in Palestine. The report recommends the continuation of the mandate, the preservation of a unitary state in Palestine, the repeal of restrictions on land sales, and the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The report also recommends that Zionist underground forces be disarmed. Members of the commission includedJoseph C. Hutcheson, the American Chairman, Frank Aydelotte, Frank W. Buxton, Bartley C. Crum, James G. Mcdonald, and William Phillips.

Document 48: Statement of the Jewish Agency Concerning the Report of the Anglo-American Committee (May 1, 1946) [The New Judaea, May 1946, at 149-50]. This statement by the Jewish Agency begins with a thankful acknowledgment of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry’s recommendation that 100,000 Jews be immediately allowed entrance into Palestine. It charges, however, that the commission’s report does not adequately address the “homeless and stateless” condition of the Jewish people, given that, in its opinion, the establishment of a Jewish state is the only way to improve the condition of the Jewish people. It further contends that when Britain established Transjordan as an exclusively Arab state, it “precluded itself from denying to the other section the right to become a Jewish state.”

Document 49: The Grady-Morrison Plan (July 24, 1946) [reprinted in A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Charles L. Geddes ed., 1991)]. Through examining recommendations by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, the Grady-Morrison Plan offered solutions to the problems in Palestine and to issues surrounding Jewish immigration. The Grady-Morrison Plan begins with recognizing the resettlement in Europe and the emigration to countries outside of Europe as the two aspects of the problem of displaced persons and the position of European Jews. Because resettlement in Europe is deemed inevitable, one of the plan’s objectives is to create conditions for resettling a substantial number of displaced persons, including many, but not limited to Jews.

The plan also states that althoughJews can resettle in Europe, new homes must be found elsewhere, and Palestine cannot accommodate the number. Therefore, the plan encourages the British and U.S. governments to support the establishment of an international refugee organization to deal with problems of refugees and displaced persons. It further calls for the next General Assembly to ask all U.N. member states to take territories under their control for displaced persons. The plan states that even with Jewish immigration into Palestine the country cannot be a Jewish or Arab state and neither group should dominate the other. In securing self-government for the inhabitants it is important to maintain a form of government that protects the interests of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in the Holy Land.

To achieve this, a plan for provincial autonomy was developed which divided Palestine into four administrative areas with local legislature: an Arab province, a Jewish province, a district ofJerusalem, and a district of the Negev. The provincial autonomy allows the Jewish province to regulate and control immigration into their designated area of Palestine and extinguishes, for the majority of Arabs, the fear of further Jewish immigration into the Arab province. This unitary binational plan attempts to segregate the two groups enough to reduce violence. Additionally, the Grady-Morrison Plan recommends methods for improving the economic and educational standards of Arabs. The plan recognizes that the proposed boundaries given to the Jewish area are superior in land and economic resources, but it explains the role of the central government to make grants to the provinces and whose general powers and aid will help overcome this disparity. This central government, with most of the powers over immigration, can allow any amount of Jewish immigrants into the country, implicitly recalling the 1939 White Paper.

Document 50: British Letter to the United Nations (April 2, 1947) [reprinted in A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Charles L. Geddes ed., 1991)]. A letter was written to Dr. Victor Chi Tsai Hoo, the assistant secretary-general of the United Nations from Alexander Cadogan, the British ambassador to the United Nations. In it Sir Alexander Cadogan requested the United Kingdom government to add the issue of Palestine on the agenda for the following annual session of the General Assembly. In addition, a request was made that the secretary-general call for a special session of the General Assembly to create a specific committee that can prepare the issues and possible solutions for the Palestine Question before the discussion of the issue at the annual session.

Document 51: Statement by U.S. President Harry S. Truman Concerning Immigration into Palestine (October 4, 1946) [available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ decade∕decad163.htm]. In this statement, U.S. President Harry S. Truman expresses his deep concern for the welfare ofJewish communities displaced by the war. Truman calls on Britain to approve the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. He further argues that the immigration laws of other countries, including the United States, should be liberalized with a view to the admission of displaced persons.

Document 52: CulturalTreaty of the Arab League (November20, 1946) [available at http:// faculty.winthrop.edu/haynese/mlas/CulTreaty.html]. The Arab League’s Cultural Treaty establishes a system of formal exchange and cultural cooperation between Arab states in order to create a close network of intellectually linked communities. The treaty calls on member states to take all necessary measures to approximate their legislative trends and to unify as far as possible their laws. The treaty lent itself to establishing a sphere of Arab influence and cultural homogeneity.

Document 53: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 106, Establishing the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) (May 15, 1947) [G.A. Res. 106, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/106 (S-1) (1947)]. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 106 establishes the UNSCOP, to be composed of delegates from Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly requests that the special committee prepare a report on the question of Palestine with proposals for a solution to the problem. It also decides that hearings should be granted to the Jewish Agency for Palestine and to the Arab Higher Committee.

Document 54: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 107, Calling on the Inhabitants of Palestine to Refrain from the Threat or Use of Force (May 15, 1947) [G.A. Res. 107, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/107 (S-1) (1947)]. In Resolution 107, the General Assembly calls on all governments and peoples, particularly the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain from the threat or use of force or any other action that might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.

Document 55: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Summary Report (August 31, 1947) [1947-48 U.N.YB., U.N. Sales No. 1949.I.13]. In its 1947 summary report, UNSCOP recommends the termination of the Mandate for Palestine. The majority proposal is for a “Plan of Partition with Economic Union.” The minority proposal advocates the creation of an independent federal state.

Document 56: Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty’s Government Presented in 1947 to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Political History of Palestine under British Administration (July 1947) [G.A. Res. 107, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/8 (1947)]. This memorandum by the British government provides a thorough history of Palestine under British administration. It treats in depth: the attitude of Arabs and Jews, the attempt to create self-governing institutions (1922-23), the development of the country from 1922-29, and the disturbances that began in 1929.

Document 57: Excerpts from the Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (September 3, 1947) [U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/364 (1947)]. In this report, the Special Committee on Palestine resolves to terminate the Mandate for Palestine, but fails to reach a workable future settlement for Palestine. The majority recommends the partition of the territory into two states, with special international status for Jerusalem. The minority (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) proposes the creation of a federal state with Jerusalem as the capital of the federation.

Document 58: U.S. Position on Palestine Question, Statement by U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations Herschel V Johnson (October 11, 1947) [available at http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad164.htm#1]. In this statement, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations supports the Plan for Partition in Palestine. It argues that certain amendments and geographical modifications will be required, however, to achieve the principles on which the plan is based (such as including Jaffa in the Arab state because of its predominantly Arab population). The United States pledges to assist both parties in implementing a revised partition plan.

Document 59: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, Recommending a Plan of Partition with Economic Union for Palestine (United Nations Partition Resolution) (November 29, 1947) [G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 128th plen. mtg., at 131-132, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1948)]. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 calls for the partition of Palestine into two independent states—one Arab and one Jewish—which would remain economically unified. Under this plan,Jerusalem and its environs are to be internationalized to form a corpus separatum. The plan also includes steps to be taken prior to independence and offers solutions for issues of citizenship, transit, economic union between the two states, access to Holy Places, and religious and minority rights. The United States played a decisive political role in marshalling the General Assembly’s votes in favor of the partition, which passed with a vote of thirty-three in favor and thirteen against. Arabs were outraged by the plan because while they constituted a clear majority, they were granted only 45 percent of the land. Britain refused to forcefully implement the Partition Plan because it was not accepted by the Palestinians. Ironically, a two- state solution has now become the prevailing Palestinian national goal.

Document 60: United Nations Security Council Resolution 42, Appealing to Governments and Peoples to Prevent or Reduce Disorders in Palestine (March 5, 1948) [S.C. Res. 42, 3 U.N. SCOR, Nos. 36-51, at 43, U.N. Doc. S/691 (1948)]. As violence mounted between Arab and Jewish groups, the Security Council passed Resolution 42, appealing to governments and peoples in and around Palestine to take all possible measures to prevent or reduce disorders from occurring.

Document 61: Excerpts from the Statement by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, Recommending Placing Palestine under United Nations Trusteeship (March 19, 1948) [available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/ decad166.htm]. The United States was the first to endorse partition as expressed in Resolution 181. But, the war that was started by the Palestinian Arabs immediately after the General Assembly’s vote, a war that developed into a bloody civil war between Arabs and Jews, put in jeopardy the two-state idea as manifested in Resolution 181. The Jewish side was seen at that stage as losing the war. It was at that crossroads that America seemed to change its position and withdrew its support for partition. The Zionists reacted in two ways. In the war front they moved to an offensive strategy to show to the Americans that partition can work because the Zionists were perfectly capable of securing the boundaries of the state they were offered by the international community. And in the diplomatic front, they lobbied President Truman until he thwarted the initiative of the State Department that, concerned with the violent opposition of the Arab world to partition, promoted the idea of placing Palestine under temporary international trusteeship. It was President Truman that made the difference, and reiterated America’s support for the two-state idea. It asserts that a short-term solution would provide Arabs and Jews in Palestine with an opportunity to seek a long-term settlement. The United States also recommends that the Security Council suspend the Palestine Commission’s efforts to implement the Partition Plan.

Document 62: Statement by U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Concerning Palestine (March 25, 1948) [18 Dep’t St. Bull. 451, 457 (1948)]. In this statement, U.S. President Harry Truman concedes that the partition plan is no longer a viable option. He instead recommends establishing Palestine as a trusteeship, “not as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15.” Without this temporary measure, Truman predicts, “open warfare is just over the horizon.”

Document 63: United Nations Security Council Resolution 43, Calling for a Truce between the Arab and Jewish Communities of Palestine (April 1, 1948) [S.C. Res. 43, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 52, at 33-35, U.N. Doc. S/714 (1948)]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 43 calls for an immediate truce in Palestine and requests that the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee send representatives to the Security Council to arrange it.

Document 64: United Nations Security Council Resolution 44, Requesting the Secretary­General to Convoke a Special Session of the General Assembly to Consider the Future Government of Palestine (April 1, 1948) [S.C. Res. 44, U.N. SCOR, 277th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/714 II (1948)]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 44 requests the secretary-general to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of the future government of Palestine further.

Document 65: United Nations Security Council Resolution 46, Calling on Groups to End Military Activities and Build-Up (April 17, 1948) [S.C. Res. 46, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 52, 283d mtg., at 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/723 (1948)]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 46 calls upon persons and organizations in Palestine to immediately cease all military activities, as well as acts of violence, terrorism, and sabotage. It demands that all groups refrain from any actions that might endanger the safety of the Holy Places in Palestine. The British government, as the mandatory power, is asked to supervise the execution of these measures and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly informed on the situation.

Document 66: United Nations Security Council Resolution 48, Establishing a Truce Com­mission for Palestine (April 23, 1948) [S.C. Res. 48, U.N. SCOR, 287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/727 (1948)]. In Resolution 48, the Security Council appoints a Truce Commission for Palestine following reports from the UNSCOP that it is unable to effect partition due to violence, the lack of cooperation from the mandatory power, and the disintegrating security situation. The Security Council requests that the Truce Commission assist in supervising the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 46.¹²3 The Commission is composed of the Consuls of Belgium, France, and the United States in Jerusalem.

3.