Competing Identities
The autobiographical narratives published in the Zaporizhia collection demonstrate that Ukrainian identity, if not the Ukrainian language, managed to overcome its largely peasant character and orientation in the USSR.
This is particularly apparent in the memoirs of Mykola Molodyk, who, like Vasyl Rubel, reacted positively to the Ukrainization of the 1920s. Molodyk's personal story, like the life histories of Yaroshenko and Cipko, is that of Ukrainian urbanization of the 1920s and 1930s: the decay of the village, which was ruined by collectivization, and the migration of the Ukrainian peasantry to the towns, which were industrializing. In Yaroshenko's case, as initially in Molodyk's, it was Zaporizhia, with its dam on the Dnipro and its accelerated pace of industriaization, that became the urban magnet. Yaroshenko managed to buy a house in a suburban village and effectively combine features of urban and rural life, working now in an agricultural cooperative, now in an urban brick factory when village occupations did not suffice for survival. Most peasants, however, found themselves in town with no prospect of returning to the village and were obliged to live either in overcrowded collective apartments or in earthen dugouts. Alekseev, who visited Zaporizhia in 1934, described his brief call on a former fellow-villager in the course of the 'phenomenal' first five-year plan: 'And I went to Nove Zaporizhia to search for people from Petrovka. And whom should I come upon but Egor Rodionovich Tutov? He had a dugout in a gully, one side of it in the earth. He invited me in. I entered. I had a look: there was snow on the inside walls, and I could not stay the night because it was damp and cold. And I went off to the Zaporizhia railway station and rode to Petrovka.'56 Living conditions in the village, destroyed by collectivization and ruined by hunger, struck Alekseev as preferable to conditions in the socialist town.57Molodyk enjoyed a measure of luck, as his personal 'urbanization' began before the mass collectivization of the village, the industrialization of the towns, and the influx of tens of thousands of unfortunate peasant migrants into Zaporizhia.
Even so, the peasant boy's encounter with the city was by no means easy or free of drama. As noted above, Molodyk, who came to Zaporizhia to study at a vocational school in 1922, had to switch from the Ukrainian language to Russian - a shift that would lead to an unconscious change of language in his memoirs decades later. He also had to cope with the condescending attitude of city boys - former gymnasium students - towards peasants. Molodyk would long remember their 'mean questions': 'You're so interesting: what sort of backwoods did you come from? How many cows are there on your farm, and what do you do with them? Have you started chasing girls yet?' Only the extensive knowledge that Mol- odyk possessed made it possible to change the city schoolboys' attitude towards him and make the gap between rural and urban culture less apparent. Ironically, the authorities' new social policy, oriented towards restricting the rights of the former 'lords,' including representatives of the upper and middle classes from which most of the gymnasium students came, not only did not promote but, on the contrary, actually impeded the capable peasant boy's climb up the social ladder. For example, Molodyk was denied enrollment in the 'prestigious' industrial vocational school, for it accepted only children of workers and farm labourers, while Molodyk's family belonged to the 'prosperous peasants.' Molodyk was obliged to return to the village and put off his further education for three years.58Not until 1926 did he move to Zaporizhia again, this time to enroll in the less prestigious pedagogical training school, which accepted peasant children, clearly without regard to their financial circumstances. By that time Ukrainization was under way, and the language of instruction in the training school was Ukrainian. A capable student, Molodyk was also in charge of courses intended to Ukrainize the government apparatus. It fell to him to teach courses in the Ukrainian language to staff members of the newspaper Selians'ke zhyttia (Peasant Life), whose readership was the Ukrainian-speaking village.
It may be assumed that the staff members either did not know Ukrainian at all or spoke it poorly; had it not been for the Ukrainization of the 1920s, they would have continued to Russify the Ukrainian village, intentionally or not. It is clear that even though Ukrainization was defeated in the towns, partly as a result of the change in official policy, it managed to protect the Ukrainian village from Russification and propagate the Ukrainian national project there to a considerable degree. Molodyk associated the end of Ukrainization (according to the official party line, it was never terminated and continued successfully throughout the 1930s) with actions of the authorities. Referring to his career as a Ukrainizer, he noted (in Russian): 'Later all those Ukrainization courses were broken up and their organizers arrested.'59Molodyk, who taught Ukrainian and Russian in the 1930s, as well as mathematics in primary and secondary schools, was fortunate enough to escape the fate of many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of that day and avoid imprisonment. But he was not spared that fate in the mid-1940s, when Soviet forces returned to eastern Ukraine. In November 1944 Molodyk was arrested by agents of the MGB (Ministry of State Security, the successor of the GPU and predecessor of the KGB) in Dnipropetrovsk on a charge of belonging to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The charge was completely false, and the arrestee did not even know what the OUN was. To all appearances, the investigating officer did not remind him of his activities during the period of Ukrainization. But Molodyk was sentenced to long years of imprisonment, as was his wife, who was also completely innocent. Naturally, the bitter experience of the camps could not fail to infuse Molodyk's later recollections with an oppositional attitude. Nor could he avoid contact with actual OUN members from western Ukraine in the camps, although there is no mention of this in the memoirs.
What one does find here, however, is a positive assessment of the western Ukrainian resistance movement - quite rare for an eastern Ukrainian - that is sharply at odds with the view promoted by Soviet propaganda and the official historiographic discourse of the age. Although Mol- odyk confuses certain historical facts, he gives a generally accurate depiction of the followers of Stepan Bandera as proponents of an independent Ukraine who hoped at first for German support but then, having become disillusioned with the Germans, who had no use for an independent Ukraine, turned their weapons against them. Molodyk explained their struggle with the Soviet authorities by citing their desire to establish an independent Ukraine. 'Although the Banderites are considered a band of some kind and every effort is made to shame and slander them,' he wrote, 'this was a struggle of Ukrainians for national liberation, and I consider that there was nothing shameful about it. It is another question whether it was appropriate at the time or not, but history will decide that in the future.'60The notion that the very idea of Ukrainian national liberation was legitimate and that there was, consequently, nothing 'shameful' about fighting for it is present directly or indirectly in Molodyk's view of Ukrainian history in general. At times he interprets even the Soviet historical narrative of the 1950s and 1960s in a manner that allows him to leave space for the idea of Ukrainian independence. In Molodyk's memoirs, Ukrainian history begins in 1654, but the 'reunion' of Ukraine with Russia, glorified in Soviet historiography of that day, was not intended, in his opinion, 'to abolish the independence of Ukraine.' According to Molodyk, after 1654 there remained a Ukrainian state whose attributes were a government, the Ukrainian language, and an army. In defining the territory of that state, Molodyk included not only the Hetmanate per se but also the latter-day Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk oblasts, thereby legitimizing Ukraine's historical claim to those lands.
Speaking of the 'free and prosperous' life of the Ukrainians of that time, Molodyk refers to the works of Nikolai Gogol, who is thus transformed from a symbol of pan-Russian identity into a pillar of the Ukrainian historical narrative. The question of Mazepa's 'treason,' a complicated matter for traditional Ukrainian historiography, was one that Molodyk resolved by means of a compromise. In his version, Mazepa was indeed a traitor - not to the Ukrainian people, as official propaganda had it, but only to Tsar Peter I. It is Peter who becomes the truly negative figure of Molodyk's historical excursus, since he inflicted cruel punishments on the Cossacks and curtailed the rights of the Ukrainian government. Another negative figure is Catherine II, under whose rule the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed. After that, according to Molodyk, 'Ukraine was given the name "Little Russia," the Ukrainian language was prohibited, the het- mancy abolished, and Cossackdom abolished as well. They began to take young men into the Russian army, only now they were called soldiers. In a word, Ukraine lost its independence completely, and the word "Ukraine" was forbidden.'61Molodyk's assessment of the course of Ukrainian history is only partly reminiscent of Vasyl Rubel's no less patriotic synthesis dating from the 1920s. What they have in common is the representation of Ukraine as a victim of the policies of Russian ruling circles, as well as attention to the history of Left-Bank Ukraine and of the Zaporozhian Sich - the native grounds of both authors. What sets them apart is the absence in Molodyk's brief synthesis of Ukrainian history of the primacy of the social factor, so important to Rubel. Molodyk presents a narrative of Ukrainian history somewhat adapted to official historiography but clearly national in character. The poetry of Taras Shevchenko, with one of whose verses Molodyk concluded his memoirs, could have been only a partial source for that narrative.
Shevchenko did indeed cast the Russian tsars in a negative light - Catherine and Peter above all - but he was far removed from the spirit of Ukrainian statism with which Molodyk's historical excursus is thoroughly imbued. (Hru- shevsky, whose work Rubel used, was no less distant from the statist spirit, at least in his Illustrated History.) It is quite apparent that Molodyk's 'synopsis' was influenced by the ideas of the Ukrainian statist school, which was dominant in western Ukrainian historiography until the Second World War and in Western emigre communities thereafter. Molodyk does not say how he became acquainted with these ideas. One may assume, however, that he encountered them either in Stalin's camps or by listening to programs broadcast by the Ukrainian bureaus of Western radio stations. What is important in this case, however, is the irrefutable fact that the ideas of Ukrainian statist historiography, which constituted a well-developed alternative to the official historical narrative, were known in southern Ukraine in the 1960s and considered perfectly legitimate by certain people.62As far as one can judge from the memoirs of Serhii Cipko, he was more influenced by a populist than a statist conception of history. For him, the leitmotif of Ukrainian history was the martyrdom of a peasant nation oppressed by a national and social yoke that ultimately turned into collective-farm slavery. The prophet of that kind of history was Cipko's beloved Taras Shevchenko, whom he cites at the beginning of his memoirs. Generally speaking, that idea was inherent in the Ukrainian national narrative of the early decades of the twentieth century and was employed and adapted according to circumstances, both by promoters of Ukrainization in the 1920s and by leaders of the Ukrainian national movement outside the USSR. Undoubtedly, the transformation of the ethnocultural identity of Cipko's parents, whose national consciousness, by his account, 'was on a very low level,'63 into the author's own modern national identity began in Ukraine. It most probably culminated in the Displaced Persons' camps, where members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia worked actively to create a common allUkrainian identity for Galicians and Dnipro Ukrainians.64 That consciousness was tempered in the emigre community in Great Britain, where Cipko headed a local Ukrainian school in his spare time. A distinguishing feature of the postwar Ukrainian emigration in Britain was a considerable preponderance of men over women and a much higher incidence of inter-ethnic marriage than in other countries. Serhii Cipko was one of the Ukrainian boys who married non-Ukrainian women, but the national feeling awakened in him by the events of the 1930s and reinforced by years of emigration proved so strong that he managed to maintain a Ukrainian spirit in his family and bring up his children accordingly. Since it is usually women and not men who act as guardians of family tradition, Serhii Cipko was extraordinarily grateful to his wife for her understanding and support.65 In his memoirs, Cipko interpreted his past in Ukraine through the prism of the Ukrainian idea; hence Ukraine's achievement of independence and the author's visit to Ukraine after 1991 figure as the climax of his narrative.66
How unique or, conversely, typical of southern Ukraine were the views of Molodyk and Cipko? A general knowledge of the situation in that region during the final decades of Soviet rule suggests uniqueness as the likelier characteristic. Molodyk was schooled not only by the Ukrainization of the 1920s but also by the camps. Cipko wrote his memoirs in the emigration after Ukraine's achievement of independence. The existence of very different attitudes in the southern Ukrainian society of Soviet times is indicated by the memoirs of the ethnic Russian Alekseev, which are extraordinarily rich in detail. Reading them, one becomes aware of a 'contextualization' of personal, family, and local history very different from that of Molodyk, Cipko, and Rubel. For Alekseev, history begins not with the heroics of Cossack- dom, as it does for Rubel and Molodyk, but with the conquest of the southern Ukrainian steppe by the Russian Empire during the rule of Catherine II.67 It emerges from Alekseev's memoirs, however, that in southern Ukraine Ukrainian identity competed not so much with a well-developed Russian identity as with the muted but nevertheless influential all-Russian project. As regards nationality, the Russian selfidentification of Alekseev, who grew up and lived his life in close contact with Ukrainians, remained less than fully formed. He is perfectly aware of the differences between Russians and Ukrainians but does not regard his Ukrainian neighbours as 'other' and, as noted earlier, refers to Russians from Russia as katsapyr thereby setting himself apart from them. Towards the end of his life, listening to Western radio broadcasts, Alekseev is pained by the prohibitions on the Ukrainian language and associates himself with the Ukrainians when it comes to Stalin's crimes.68 Alekseev uses the term russkie to denote both nationalities, employing it when Eastern Slavs are contrasted with other ethnic groups, such as Germans.
Zamrii's memoirs exemplify similar thinking, considering that he constructs his identity as that of an ethnic Ukrainian. Alekseev and Zamrii share a greater preponderance of social concerns over national ones than one finds in the other authors: both are seekers after truth, formerly poor peasants who hate the rich but are also dissatisfied with the Soviet-era bosses and outraged by the cynicism of the communists. Like Alekseev, Zamrii is a bearer of all-Russian consciousness. For him, the Soviet troops are 'liberators, glorious warriors of Mother Russia.' Just like Alekseev, Zamrii uses the collective term russkie when both ethnic groups are contrasted with a third - in Zamrii's case, with Jews. Zamrii is the only author in the Zaporizhia collection who comes across as an anti-Semite. For example, he explains his dismissal from the post of prison-camp guard by the appointment to the prison administration of Jews who began 'to throw out us Russians, including me, for no reason at all.'69 Alekseev describes his own participation in the mass robbery of Jewish shopkeepers in Berdychiv in 1914 but expresses no anti-Jewish sentiments, blaming the whole incident on the encouragement of an unidentified warrant officer in charge of a detachment of recruits being shipped to the front.70 Although the available sources are not comprehensive enough to warrant any conclusions about the spread of anti-Semitic sentiments in southern Ukraine, it is noteworthy that anti-Semitic statements and/or descriptions of pogroms are encountered in the works of authors who shared prerevolutionary types of national identity.
The roots of the all-Russian identity assimilated by Alekseev and Zamrii should naturally be sought in the achievements of the allRussian project in the years preceding the Revolution of 1917, but its vitality can be explained above all by the authorities' termination of the Ukrainization policy of the 1920s, residual elements of Russian nationalism in official propaganda during and after the war, and the advance of the Russocentric Soviet project during the final decades of Soviet rule. In southern Ukraine, the idea of one Soviet people, propagated in the 1970s and 1980s, amounted to little more than the camouflaged idea of one Russian people that predated the revolution.
Most of the material presented in the Zaporizhia collection attests to the inarticulateness of the national identities of Ukrainians and Russians in their mutual relations over the greater part of the twentieth century. The authors of diaries and memoirs who internalized Ukrainian identity rarely considered it exclusive. In formulating that identity, they did not 'other' Russians in general but only greedy Russian tsars, or Stalin. Southern Ukrainian Russians, for their part, lacked the possibility of counterposing themselves to Ukrainians even in this fashion. The inadequate articulation and non-exclusive character of national identities in southern Ukraine led in the 1960s and 1970s to the formation of a common field of identity in which the Russian language and culture were dominant but still allowed for the existence of a distinct Ukrainian historical, ethnic, and territorial identity. The existence of Ukraine as a separate republic of the USSR created conditions favouring the retention of a distinct regional identity attached to that territory and of certain republican institutions. The distinct republic also provided an umbrella for remnants of Ukrainian identity in the sphere of high culture and education: in eastern Ukraine these remnants were a legacy of the Ukrainization of the 1920s that no longer threatened the regime, while in the west they were a concession to the 'nationalist' sympathies of the population. In southern Ukraine, the new identity encompassing both Ukrainians and Russians included certain elements of both cultures. As the cases of Yaroshenko and Zamrii indicate, not only did Ukrainians read Tolstoy, but Russians, as one may deduce from Alekseev's memoirs, knew Ostap Vyshnia. It was this combination of contradictory but not mutually exclusive loyalties and cultural orientations that created the basis for the identity with which southern Ukraine entered the age of Ukrainian independence.