COSSACK UKRAINE’S LINKS WITH THE,TSARS

In view of the Tsars’ recurrent problems in Ukraine during the latter part of the 17th century, the question arises of the means which they had at their disposal to exercise their authority in that land.

The agency which maintained contact between the Tsar and the Hetmanate was the Malorossiiskii Prikaz (hereafter: MP).¹⁶ An integral part of the Muscovite prikaz system, it operated as a sub­section of the Posolskii Prikaz_f that is, of that agency which dealt with the foreign affairs of the Tsar. Established in 1663 (up to that time it was the Posolskii Prikaz itself that maintained ties with Ukraine) the MP existed until 1717. Throughout this period, the prikaz was staffed, on the average, by about twenty diaks_t scribes, translators and guards. These men were based exclusively in Mos­cow where they were housed in a separate building along with the Hetman’s representatives who happened to be in the city.

In its dealings with Ukraine, the MP carried out three basic types of activity: (1) Communication and information gathering. It was the MP which drafted and transmitted the Tsars’ wishes to the Het­mans and passed on the latters’ requests and reports to the tsars. The prikaz also dispatched the Tsars’ confirmations of Cossack elec­tions and of decisions reached in Cossack councils. Gathering in­telligence was another important and difficult part of the MP’s duties. The prikaz attempted to gather information about all as­pects of Ukrainian life from Muscovite envoys returning from the land, from voevodas stationed there, from Russian and Ukrainian merchants, and from Ukrainian delegations. But these efforts did not always provide an accurate picture of the actual situation in the south.

In addition to the MP, the Ukrainians had their own means of maintaining contact with the Tsar. In 1669, after a series of violent anti-Russian uprisings in the Hetmanate, the Cossack Starshyna obtained the right to maintain one of its members in Moscow as its permanent representative. Among the most important of this offi­cial’s duties was the transmission to the Tsar of complaints about the behavior of Russian garrisons in Ukraine. The Tsar’s rescript in this matter stated that this official “whom the Hetman, the star- shyna and the entire Host in Left Bank Ukraine are to elect, is to live permanently in Moscow in a special residence, along with five or six other men, so that the Hetman can write to the one elected about various matters and about his complaints against the voe- vodas and the troops. And the one elected will take these letters to the prikaz people and they will pass them on to the Tsar.”¹⁷ Thus, the Ukrainians obtained a means of voicing their dissatisfaction about Russian behavior in their land.

While relatively systematic contact was maintained between the Tsar and Ukraine, it was obvious that the Malorossiiskii Prikaz could not, in and of itself, enforce the Tsars’ orders in the Het- manate.

At first glance, it would appear that the Tsars had a direct and effective coercive capacity in Ukraine. According to the Pereiaslav Treaty, Russian voevodas and garrisons could be stationed in cer­tain Ukrainian towns. Initially, it was agreed that Kiev and Cher­nihiv were to have the garrisons. However, neither Khmelnytskyi nor his successor, Ivan Vyhovskyi, ever allowed a voevoda in any town except Kiev. Later, under weaker Hetmans, the number of towns with voevodas was enlarged to five—Kiev, Chernihiv, Pereia- slav, Nizhyn and Oster. The total number of troops in these garri­sons fluctuated greatly during the latter part of the 17th century. In the mid 1660s it reached a high of about 12,000 men but later it fell to as low as 1,900 men.¹⁸

For the most part, the Ukrainian Cossacks did not find the voe­vodas and garrisons to be especially intimidating. Khmelnytskyi agreed to their presence because he believed that the Tsar, as Ukraine’s sovereign, ought to participate in the defense of the land. But neither he nor his immediate successors would allow these garri­sons to interfere in Ukrainian internal affairs. And while the voe- vodas and garrisons did strengthen the Tsars’ authority in the Het- manate, they by no means assured Moscow that its wishes would be obeyed there.

The coercive impact of these garrisons was limited by their rela­tively low numbers. Even at peak strength, their ratio to combat­ready Ukrainian Cossacks was 1:4, and at times this ratio sank to 1:20.¹⁹ Thus, since the discipline and military technology of the Ukrainian and Russian troops was roughly equal in the 17th cen­tury, the Tsars and their voevodas could not count on force to impose their policies. For example, when Hetman Vyhovskyi re­jected the Tsar’s suzerainty in 1658 and Aleksei Mikhailovich raised a levee of 150,000 men to crush the Hetman, the Cossacks and their Tatar allies decimated a greater part of the Russian force at Kono- top in June, 1659.

It was clear, therefore, that neither bureaucratic institutions nor Russian garrisons could guarantee Ukrainian compliance with the Tsars’ wishes. What, then, were the primary means by which Moscow sought to impose its will on Ukraine? To a great extent, this was achieved through the use of astute political tactics. Speci­fically, a policy of divide-et-empera was applied to pit, on the one hand, the Starshyna against the rank-and-file Cossacks and peas­ants and, on the other hand, to create tensions between the star­shy na and the Hetmans. In both cases, the Tsars played the role of arbiters and herein lay the real basis of their influence in Ukraine. However, for such a policy to succeed, Moscow had to see to it that Hetmans were elected who were committed to the Tsars. Thus, throughout the latter part of the 17th century, the election of a new Hetman could have a crucial effect on the nature of Russian- Ukrainian relations.