Crime without Punishment

Most of these executioners from the NKVD survived the 1941–1945 war between Germany and the USSR. In August 1942, Korablev was sent from camp imprisonment to the front and was captured in February 1943 before being liberated from a prisoner-of-war camp in May 1945.

In 1942, Butenko was serving as the chief of artillery supply for the 142nd Sapper Division on the Southern and Stalingrad Fronts. He was demobilized on account of his health. He then served from April 1943 to April 1950 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from which he was eventually furloughed due to a disability. He lived in retirement in Odessa and “took an active role in public work [obshchestvennaia rabota].” Between 1955 and 1957, he was the secretary of the party committee of the housing management [domokhoziaistva] of the Oblast KGB Administration and Administration of Internal Affairs (UVD).⁶¹

The first stage in the rehabilitation of those individuals who had fallen victim to repression commenced following the death of Stalin.

During the renewed investigations, Prishivtsyn confirmed that the arrests of party workers in 1938 were sanctioned by the Ukrainian republic NKVD and the orders of Korablev. He did not deny his presence at the interrogation of one P. Iur’ev, but asserted that Iur’ev confessed without torture. He noted in particular the role of Maistruk as the most developed and literate worker, who led the Fourth Department of the Vinnitsa UNKVD after Shirin. For example, because Maistruk sent the case of the former secretary of the Vinnitsa City Party Committee, D. Lun’ko, to the troika before the decree of 17 November 1938, Privshivtsyn claimed that he was allowed in February 1939 to order the examination of the case by a military tribunal.⁶²

On 27 March 1957, the Chief of Police for the Savransk District Police Department in Odessa Oblast, F. Reshetilo, presented a formal explanation to the Deputy Chief of the Administration of Internal Affairs (UVD) of the Odessa Oblast Executive Committee, Styrov.⁶³ Reshetilo was accused of illegal physical coercion against the former head of the personnel section of the Vinnitsa Oblast Executive Committee, P. Bondarenko, and the instructor of the Organizational Department of the Oblast Executive Committee, D. Solonenko, both allegedly recruits of a Right-Trotskyite Organization.

On 14 August 1957, the Senior Plenipotentiary of the Internal Inspectorate of the Personnel Department of the UVD of the Odessa Oblast Executive Committee, Major Samgin, signed the indictment on the criminal activity of the former employees of the Vinnitsa UNKVD, Reshetilo and Butenko. The phrasing closely followed the formulas of the earlier accusations against them. Samgin proclaimed that Reshetilo and Butenko ought to be brought to the strictest justice on account of their crimes. However, he took into account that Butenko had not subsequently violated the law and took an active role in public life; further, Reshetilo was in the period 1937–1938 a young and inexperienced worker and is “at the present time ill and slated for dismissal [predstavlen na uvol’nenie].” On 16 August 1957, Butenko was dismissed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on account of his health and classified as an invalid of the second group with rights to a pension.⁶⁴ On 4 January 1958, the Bureau of the Savransk District Party Committee examined the materials regarding Reshetilo and ultimately decided to limit the scope of its actions to his removal from his post as Chief of the District Police.⁶⁵ The Bureau of the Stalin District Party Committee of Odessa did not issue any party reprimand against Butenko.⁶⁶

Meanwhile the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine prepared a new indictment regarding the case of Butenko, Prishivtsyn, and Reshetilo.

On 19 May 1958, the indictment was forwarded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and on 4 July 1958, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, K. Cherniaev failed to confirm the recommendations of the Republic-level Ministry. Cherniaev stated that these former security police operatives did much work “for the good of the motherland [na blago rodiny].” All charges against the NKVD perpetrators of 1937–1938 were dismissed.⁶⁸ Justice was not served.

Over the course of a relatively extended period, the NKVD sentenced hundreds of thousands of people to concentration camps and the death penalty. The Soviet everyday (povsednevnost’), at least during the 1930s, became entwined with mass murder; the “normal” became an absolutely anti-human “abnormal.” The “purge of the purgers” at the end of the 1930s did not alter this basic fact.

While it is clear that the Great Terror came from above, it was enacted by a chain of command that began with Stalin and Ezhov and continued down the hierarchy to Uspenskii and his oblast NKVD chiefs. It was the latter, however, who specifically directed the course of the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of people. The heads of the oblast NKVD administrations and their subordinates, young and newly promoted to their positions, were to one degree or another loyal to the Communist Party, to Stalin and Ezhov, and ready to fulfill any assignment.

Members of the NKVD felt an acute sense of belonging within a special caste. They had special privileges and worked within a corporate culture all their own. This esprit de corps reproduced itself over and over again as the Cheka evolved into the GPU/OGPU, then the NKVD, and finally the KGB.⁶⁹ Moreover, during the Great Terror, personal connections were extremely important. Uspenskii brought many of “his people” with him when he went to Ukraine. The connections among these Chekists fostered opportunities for these ambitious young men to build their careers. Their extreme cruelty was served by lawlessness, Soviet indoctrination, and a polarized worldview in which the “enemy” was removed from the ranks of human society.

The purge of the purgers had limited results. Notable is the fact that prior to the German-Soviet War, only individual “symbolic figures” who had conducted mass repressions were convicted and punished. They were all accused not only of the violation of socialist legality but also of connection with the previous, treasonous leadership of the NKVD organs. Some cadres were sent to Western Ukraine to fight against the OUN and UPA and were not subjected to punishment.⁷⁰ Others were arrested and served time in labor camps; very few were executed. Later, in the course of “destalinization” in the second half of the 1950s, when many of the victims of political repressions were rehabilitated, some NKVD operatives were again subject to investigation. Again, most avoided punishment. In the end, the fact that the Soviet security police served as a primary support for the Communist regime prevented any real coming to terms with the Great Terror. Notes

Vinnytsia: zlochyn bez kary. Dokumenty, svidchennia, materialy pro bol’shchevyts’ki rozstrily u Vinnytsi v 1937–1938 rokakh, ed. Ievhen Sverstiuk (Kyiv: Voskresinnia, 1994), 95–97.

For an interesting analysis of these reports see John-Paul Himka, “Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakivs’ki visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation,” in Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, and Ottoman Borderlands, ed.

Pravda (12 Aug. 1943), 1.

P. M. Kravchenko, “Dokumenty pro areshty svidkiv rozkopok 1943 roku u Vinnyts’komu parku,” Politychni represiï na Podilli v XX stolitti: Materialy mizhnarodnoï naukovo-praktychnoï konferentsiï (Vinnytsia, 23–24 lystopada 2001 r.) (Vinnytsia: Veles, 2002), 198.

US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, “The Crimes of Khrushchev” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).

On the use of these new sources, see Chervoni zhorna: spohady repressovanykh chleniv ïh rodyn, svidkiv represii, ed. S. K. Hirenko (Vinnytsia: TOV “Vinnytsia,” 1994); A. Malyhin, Chervona akula: ezhovshchyna na Vinnychchyni: dokumental’no-publitsystychni narysy (Vinnytsia: TOV “Vinnytsia,” 1995); Iu. Shapoval, V. Prystaiko, and V. Zolotar’ov, ChK-GPU-NKVD v Ukraïni: osoby, fakty, dokumenty (Kyiv: Abrys, 1997); O. Loshyts’kyi, “ ‘Laboratoriia’: Novi dokumenty i svidchennia pro masovi represii 1937–1938 rokiv na Vinnychchyni,” Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB, tom 1–2 (1998), 183–227; O. Loshyts’kyi, “‘Laboratoriia-2’ Poltava: Dokumental’ni materialy pro masovi represiï v Poltavs’kii oblasti u 1937–1938 rr.,” Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB, tom 2–4 (2000), 129–78; V. Vasylyev, P. Kravchenko, and R. Podkur, Politychni represiï na Podilli (20–30-ti rr. XX st.) (Vinnytsia: Logos, 1999); Roman Podkur, “‘Dytiachyi GULAG’ v konteksti polityky derzhavnoho teroru (1937–1939 rr.),” Z arkhiviv VUChk-GPU-NKVD-KGB, tom 1 (2007), 189–204; V. Vasylyev and R. Podkur, Radians’ki karateli: Spivrobitnyky NKVS—vykonavtski “Velykoho teroru” na Podilli (Kyiv: NAN Ukraïny, 2017). These studies are freely available online at www.reabit.org.ua. Further, in the years since Ukrainian independence, five books on Vinnytsia Oblast have been published as part of the state’s “Rehabilitated by History [Reabilitovani istoriieiu]” project: Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Vinnyts’ka oblast’ 1–4 (Vinnytsia: DP “DKF,” 2006–2012).

V. M. Nikol’s’kyi, Represyvna diial’nist’ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky SRSR v Ukraïni (kinets’ 1920-kh–1950-ti rr.): Istoryko-statystychne doslidzhennia (Donetsk: DonNU, 2003), 119.

Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov, ChK-GPU-NKVD v Ukraïni, 173–74.

N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934–1941: Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven’ia, 1999), 270.

V. Litvin, ed. Politychnyi teror i teroryzm v Ukraïni XIX–XX st.: Istorychni narysy (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2002), 476.

V. Zolotar’ov, Oleksandr Uspens’kyi: osoba, chas, otochennia (Kharkiv: Folio, 2004), 49.

RGASPI [Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History], f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, ll. 113–14. This decision became the basis of NKVD USSR decree 233 signed by Ezhov. See Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov, ChK-GPU-NKVD v Ukraïni, 175–76.

RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, l. 127.

Taken from the interrogation of A. Volkov on 10 May 1939 in HDA SBU [State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine], Poltava, spr. 19533, tom 1, ark. 65.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) affirmed Korablev’s appointment on 28 February 1938. See: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 997, l. 7; and Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 242–43.

M. A. Tumshis, 1937. Bol’shaia chistka. NKVD protiv ChK (Moscow: Iauza Ėksmo, 2009), 454–55. Korablev’s letter was first published in Ukrainian in Zolotar’ov: Oleksandr Uspens’kyi, 102–5.

Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 242–43.

RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, l. 161.

Loshyts’kyi, “ ‘Laboratoriia,’ ” 215; P. P. Liubchenko—a former “Borot’bist” (i.e., a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries) who served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR from 1934 to 1937—committed suicide on 30 August 1937. V. A. Balitskii served as NKVD Ukraine Commissar from July 1934 to May 1937.

HDA SBU, f. 12, spr. 31025, ark. 18 zv.; S. Bohunov et al., eds., Ukraïna v dobu “Velykoho teroru”: 1936–1938 roky (Kyiv: Lybid’, 2009), 129.

HDA SBU, f. 12, spr. 31025, ark. 17. For a detailed treatment of Prishivtsyn’s work at the helm of the Mariupol group see Zolotar’ov, Oleksandr Uspens’kyi, 107–8. Prishivtsyn’s award citation is published in V. Zolotar’ov and V. P. Stepkin, ChK-GPU-NKVD v Donbasse: Liudi i dokumenty, 1919–1941 (Donetsk: Aleks, 2010), 430–31.

HDA SBU, f. 12, spr. 31025 ark. 4–4 zv.

Bohunov et al., eds., Ukraïna v dobu “Velykho terroru,” 130.

HDA SBU, f. 12, spr. 31025, ark. 2.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66937, tom 1, ark. 105.

Zolotar’ov, Oleksandr Uspens’kyi, 295.

Loshyts’kyi, “ ‘Laboratoriia,’ ” 192–93.

Malyhin, Chervona akula, 25. The cited text is from a pronouncement of the Chief of the Investigatory Department of the Transportation Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Bogdanov, delivered at a gathering of the Zhmerinka active-investigatory group.

Loshyts’kyi, “ ‘Laboratoriia,’ ” 210.

RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 23, l. 32; d. 24, l. 2. The “album method” was used in the national operations and created on 11 August 1937. Lists of arrested individuals were sent from the provinces to Moscow for confirmation. The “special troika” was an extrajudicial body under the authority of the oblast NKVD administrations established on 17 September 1938 to pass judgment in the national operations following the elimination of the “album method.”

A. Amons, “Diial’nist’ pozasudovykh orhaniv na Vinnychchyni u period masovykh politychnykh represii 1937–1938 rr.,” Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Vinnyts’ka oblast’, 2:15–19. The high duumvirate was an extrajudicial body under NKVD USSR and the Procuracy of the USSR created on 11 August 1937 to deal with people arrested in the national operations and listed in the provincial “albums” sent to Moscow for confirmation by the leadership.

Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 106–7.

Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 106–7.

S. V. Mironenko and N. Werth, eds., Istoriia stalinskogo GULAGa: konets 1920-kh-pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov, 7 tom (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004–2005) 1:311.

Uspenskii spent half a year in hiding in Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Kaluga, and Murom. He was arrested in the city of Miass in Chelyabinsk Oblast in April 1939 and shot in January 1940. See Nikita Khrushchev, Vremia. Liudi. Vlast’: Vospominaniia (Moscow: Moskovskie Novosti, 1999), 1:172–73; Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 417; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 123; Zolotar’ov, Oleksandr Uspenskii, 206–21.

Mironenko and Werth, eds., Istoriia stalinskogo GULAGa, 1:305–8.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66937, tom 9, ark. 165.

HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 31, spr. 39, ark. 51–52, 55–56, 58–59, 61–62.

Mironenko and Werth, eds., Istoriia stalinskogo GULAGa, 1:309–12.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66927, tom 5, ark. 219.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66927, tom 5, ark. 27–28.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66927, tom 8, ark. 179.

HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 31, spr. 39, ark. 114.

HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 31, spr. 39, ark. 188–89, 191–92, 194, 197–98, 202.

Petrov and Skorkin, eds., Kto rukovodil NKVD, 439.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66927, tom 25, ark. 4, 7–8, 11–13.

Loshyts’kyi, “ ‘Laboratoriia,’ ” 221–22.

DAVO [State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast], f. P-136, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 23.

DAVO, f. P-136, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 93.

HDA SBU, Ukraine, f. 5, spr. 66927, tom 24, ark. 1–3.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Vinnyts’ka oblast, tom 2, 316–17.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66937, tom 5, spr. 201, 203–4, 207–8, 224–25, 231, 234–35, 243–45, 252, 256.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66937, tom 1, ark. 58; tom 4, ark. 300–7; tom 5, ark. 103, 105, 109, 245.

These included former NKVD operatives F. Maistruk, G. P. Danileiko, A. Ia. Prishivtsyn, N. S. Butenko, D’iakov, and Babinko.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66937, tom 8, ark. 257.

HDA SBU, f. 12, spr. 207, ark. 36.

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