Did Western diplomatic mediation assist in the de-escalation of the conflict in the Donbas?
The West first attempted to mediate when the clashes began in April 2014. Meeting in Geneva on April 17, the foreign policy chiefs of the European Union, the United States, Ukraine, and Russia agreed on a statement calling for a halt to the violence, disarmament of all illegal paramilitary formations, and initiation of a process for constitutional reform.
Undefined in the text, the latter was a reference to the decentralization of power in Ukraine, which would give more power to the regions. Both Ukraine and Russia found this treaty wanting, and neither side applied efforts toward its implementation. In addition, Russian decision-makers were uncomfortable with the American presence at the table and complained about the interests of the Donbas not being represented. The so-called “Geneva format” proved unproductive, and the military showdown ensued in the Donbas.When a number of world leaders arrived in Normandy, France, in June 2014 to celebrate the anniversary of D-Day, a brief meeting on the margins of these celebrations established a new diplomatic format: the heads of state of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine. The “Normandy format" involved rare meetings but more regular telephone consultations, as well as meetings of the foreign ministers of the four countries.
With prodding from the Normandy group, the conflict's direct participants also entered into negotiations under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The talks took place in Minsk, Belarus, where Ukraine was represented by former president Leonid Kuchma; Russia by its ambassador to Ukraine; and the two breakaway republics by their leaders. The latter had no official status and neither did Kuchma, at least not on paper, precisely because the Ukrainian authorities did not want to legitimize the separatists by sending an official plenipotentiary.
It was in Minsk that the first ceasefire was signed on September 5, 2014, in the wake of a successful counteroffensive by the pro-Russian forces. The agreement also called for the release of all hostages, a prisoner of war exchange, an amnesty for arrested separatists, and the removal of heavy artillery from a 30-kilometer-wide buffer zone between the sides. Ukraine also promised to pass a law on self-government in some districts of the Donbas, which it later repealed when the ceasefire failed.The first Minsk agreement collapsed as intense fighting at Donetsk International Airport broke out in December. The fall of the airport, the last Ukrainian-held point in the environs of Donetsk, which acquired a Stalingrad-like status in the Ukrainian media, underscored the impossibility of winning the war by military means. This event coincided with the deepening economic crisis in Russia and intense Western diplomatic pressure for peace. The Normandy group also realized by then that it needed to be directly involved in negotiating any prospective settlement. On February 11, 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Frangois Hollande, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko arrived in Minsk for a marathon 17hour negotiating session that lasted all night and which resulted in the second Minsk agreement. They did not sign it, however, leaving this task to Kuchma and his negotiating partners, who also held a simultaneous meeting in Minsk.
Minsk II called for an unconditional ceasefire supervised by the OSCE starting on February 15 (Putin bargained for the delay on behalf of the pro-Russian forces, which were hoping to liquidate the large Ukrainian pocket around the railway hub of Debaltseve). Ironically, then, the nominal peace agreement was followed immediately by intensified fighting that ended only on February 18 with a Ukrainian withdrawal. Only afterward did the two sides start decreasing the intensity of fire and, later in February, withdraw heavy weapons from the contact line as specified by the agreement.
Both sides also pledged to exchange all POWs, grant amnesty to prisoners, and enable the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region. Occasional firefights continued at some points along the frontline, but in late February 2015 a day could go by without reported losses on either side for the first time since the previous summer.Experts saw as more problematic the long-term road map to peace specified in the agreement. According to this plan, Ukraine pledged to restore the law on self-government in the Donbas and specify the exact area it covered. It also promised to resume financial transfers to the Donbas, including pensions. The weightiest promise of all, however, was decentralization of power in the form of a constitutional reform by the end of 2015. On the other hand, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics—and implicitly Russia, operating on their behalf—agreed to some conditions that they are unlikely to implement: the withdrawal of all foreign military troops and mercenaries and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the state border with Russia. Ukraine, Russia, and the breakaway republics started arguing almost immediately about the exact meaning and sequence of these steps. They disagreed in particular on what the agreement meant by local elections in the Donbas: was it a restoration of the Ukrainian political system, or a legitimation of the two republics, neither of which is mentioned in the agreement's text?