On 4 February 2005, military guards welcomed guests arriving at the Livadia Palace near Yalta, as they had done sixty years earlier on the first day of the Yalta Conference, which brought together Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin to discuss the shape of the world after the Second World War.
Aside from the guard of honour and the return to the Livadia Palace of some of the former Soviet soldiers and waitresses who had provided security for the conference and helped assure its smooth progress sixty years earlier, there was little resemblance between the events of February 1945 and those of 2005.
The organizers of the 2005 Yalta Conference - a symposium entitled 'Yalta 1945-2005: From the Bipolar World to the Geopolitics of the Future' - anxiously awaited but never received greetings from President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, to which Yalta and the Crimea now belong, or from President Vladimir Putin of Russia, the legal successor to the Soviet Union, which hosted the Yalta Conference in 1945. Nor were there greetings from the leaders of Britain or the United States.1 Every political leader whose greetings never reached Yalta on 4 February 2005 had his own reasons to overlook the anniversary of the conference that shaped the modern world and plunged it into almost half a century of cold war.In the opinion of the Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki, the twentiethcentury history of Eastern Europe is 'a perfect laboratory to observe how the genuine or apparent remembrances of the past may aggravate current conflicts and how they themselves are modified in the process.' According to Jedlicki, the most intriguing question that the study of Eastern Europe can help answer is 'what factors activate historical reminiscences, and what circumstances would rather allow them to remain dormant and apparently forgotten. In other words, collective "memories" may become "hot" or "cooled," and the course of events may often depend on their emotional temperature.'2 This chapter examines patterns of collective remembrance and forgetting of historical events of international importance by analysing public debates on the legacy of the Yalta Conference in Russia, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, and the United States.
It looks into interrelations between politics and historical representations in each of these countries. It also discusses the impact of the changing international situation on the ways in which intellectual and political elites interpret the importance of the Yalta agreements. Finally, it looks into the narrative strategies employed by the 'winners' and 'losers' of Yalta in representing their vision of the past.Since the end of the First World War and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, Eastern Europe has been an arena for the competing interests of new nation-states and the ambitions of great powers. After the German vision of Mitteleuropa as a Berlin-dominated space between Germany and Russia evaporated in the wake of the German defeat in the First World War, and the Bolshevik revolutionary advance on Europe was thrown back in 1920 by the 'miracle on the Vistula,' the territory between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas became a contested ground between the capitalist West and the communist East. While Britain and France regarded the newly independent countries of the region as a 'cordon sanitaire' against Bolshevik expansion, the Soviets tried to undermine some of the new regimes by turning their republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia into a socialist Piedmont for the national minorities of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Eventually Stalin used the irredentist argument to divide Eastern Europe with Hitler in 1939. As Britain and France entered the Second World War over the German invasion of Poland, London considered the restoration of Poland's independence and British interests in the region one of its main objectives in the war. The Yalta Conference effectively put an end to those plans, since Soviet armies occupied most of Eastern Europe, and Churchill failed to persuade Roosevelt to back British policy in the region. Yalta initiated the era of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, which lasted until the end of the Cold War and left bitter memories of Western betrayal and Soviet dominance in the collective memory of the region.3
Historians have often treated the events leading to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, and the emergence of new nation-states on the ruins of the communist empire as a manifestation of 'the revenge of the past.'4 It would be difficult indeed to exaggerate the role of history in the rearticulation of national identities in post-communist Eastern Europe.
The recovery of collective memory suppressed by authoritarian regimes and recollections of the region's traumatic experiences during and after the Second World War not only helped boost the national pride of the newly freed nations but also fuelled ethnic and sectarian conflicts from the Balkans in the west to Nagornyi Karabakh in the east.5 The European borders established at Yalta generally survived the historical and national resurgence of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Germany was reunited, but there was no adjustment to its eastern border as of 1989. Czechoslovakia split into two states, but their borders remained those established immediately after the Second World War. Nor was there any change in the borders of Poland or the former Soviet republics of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, all of which 'inherited' part of Poland's interwar territory. Does this mean that the new national elites are satisfied with the map of Eastern Europe as drawn at Yalta, or do they still harbour grudges against the authors of the Yalta agreements? The historical 'amnesia' of the world leaders who forgot to send their greetings to the Yalta symposium in February 2005 indicates that while the Yalta borders generally remained intact, the historical and political consequences of the decisions made at Yalta in 1945 continue to haunt the world's political elites.