Nationalism
All commentators felt that right-wing nationalism at the present time did not represent a significant threat. However, there were differences in tone and emphasis, and in concern for the future.
When the term “nationalism” was used, almost all commentators focused exclusively on the Svoboda party and the Right Sector, although some spoke more broadly of radical populism in the early twentieth century or among contemporary politicians such as Oleh Liashko of the Radical Party (Zhadan). Every person interviewed thought these that these groups were marginal in the political process, and Svoboda was described as an already discredited force.The attitude toward the Right Sector was more complicated. It was pointed out that the group contained both Russian and Ukrainian speakers, and was united primarily by the desire to fight Russian aggression. The view was expressed that it did not produce “texts” and was therefore
“silent” (Hrytsak), that it was ideologically incoherent (Zhadan), and that when it did voice opinions, these were outlandish, even barbaric (Finberh, Zhadan). The consensus was that the group had gained popularity in the last days of the Euromaidan and in the first months of the war, but that it had no support as a political party. Some individuals felt that it could pose a danger after the war ended (Hrytsak). The general view was that any group beyond society’s control, especially one that used weapons outside the war zone to resolve conflicts, posed a threat (Finberh).
Concerning radical nationalism in general, every commentator pointed out that this kind of current, which often exploited the hot-button issues of immigration or ethnicity, had far more support in every other European country. Right-wing nationalism in Ukraine was primarily focused on defending and consolidating the country in a real war. Inasmuch as people joined the Right Sector to fight on the front, this was viewed as acceptable, even laudable.
Various commentators pointed out that most people who joined the battalion organized by the Right Sector were not ideological, came from various ethnic groups, and spoke both Russian and Ukrainian (Zhadan, Zakharov). The same was said of the Azov battalion. The ideological problem, if it exists in these military formations, it was argued, concerns a very small number of people who hold extremist views (such as Andrii Biletskyi, the original founder of the Azov battalion) (Zakharov).Several commentators described both Svoboda and the Right Sector as Russian “information projects” (Zabuzhko, Shevchenko, Stiazhkina). It was pointed out that the project to create extremist groups dated back to the 1990s, when Dmytro Korchynskyi was recruited by the allied Putin- Yanukovych political operators in an attempt to attract the most radical youth. Zabuzhko linked the creation of these extremist groups directly to manipulation by Russian intelligence and described what she called a “special innovation,” namely the use of “postmodern” tactics:
The project was first Korchynskyi, then Svoboda, then the Right Sector. These initiatives were created to initially recruit and then manipulate people. [Vladislav] Surkov uses the stylistics of postmodernism to introduce the fake, to contaminate reporting with the inauthentic. He mixes the tactics of the old Soviet special services with innovations, old Chekist tactics (which have never been adequately analyzed) with the technologies that are used in the marketplace, show business and Hollywood. Today we have what Peter Pomerantsev has called a “postmodern totalitarianism.” Hybrid war has changed things. We now no longer have old style meetings, parties and so on. Instead, we have information wars, hackers, and new technologies used by totalitarians.
(Zabuzhko)
One commentator pointed out that Korchynskyi had been his fellow student at Kyiv State University:
The Right Sector is not a freak organization; it was created artificially.
The population only learned of it in January 2014, when the first Molotov cocktails began to fly. Russian TV made a great effort to publicize the existence of this group. As a student in Kyiv State University in the late 1980s I was an “oppositionist” or “free thinker.” At this time the KGB worked hardest to recruit the most radical students. Dmytro Korchynskyi was in the same class with me. He was extremely radical and anti-communist. Later, in the 1990s I began meeting him again in Kyiv. Although a fanatical nationalist and anti-communist, he was never persecuted, and appeared to be a KGB agent. Working with extremely radical elements is a basic task of the special operations run by intelligence services. In Europe the radicals on both the left and the right are closest to Russia. The FSB [the successor to the KGB] needs them. Why should the organization’s tactics in Ukraine be any different?(Shevchenko)
In spite of these comments, all interviewees were careful to distinguish between patriots who had joined Right Sector in order to fight on the front and leaders or propagandists who were trying to manipulate various grouplets within the organization or who were being manipulated by others. To quote one commentator:
The Right Sector is not the same as the FSB. Radicals in Ukraine have support because many people in the broader society are dissatisfied with the government. Not everyone who supports the radicals is an agent of the FSB. But the Russian secret services has definitely played a role: there are people from the Russian secret services within these organizations.
(Shevchenko)
A similar view was expressed by several individuals (Zabuzhko, Stiazh- kina, Zakharov, Finberh).
The psychology of “paternalism” as a political problem was mentioned by some commentators (Stiazhkina). The paternalist analysis argues that the Soviet authoritarian system had been built around an unspoken agreement, according to which citizens allowed the regime to make decisions on their behalf without any questioning.
In return, the individual was supposed to do his or her job obediently, as a servant or subordinate. One product of this system had been vozhdism, or the leader cult. Several individuals commented that, like Soviet-era communists, contemporary radical nationalists exhibit a faith in paternalism. However, it was indicated that the best example of this attitude is provided by the current leadership and much of the population in the occupied Donbas. A paternalistic system is evident when a leadership expresses an idea and the population obediently repeats it, thus allowing the vozhd (leader) to decide everything. The psychology of paternalism is closely related to statism, the idea that the state decides for everyone, solves all problems. Whether we are talking about Putin, the tsar, or the empire, the structure of thinking is the same. Today, although only 10-15% of the population of Ukraine might adhere to this way of thinking, they represent a vocal minority. According to this view of paternalism, such a minority, if provided with weapons and wartime experience, could become dangerous, as the whipping up of “separatism” in the Donbas had demonstrated (Holovakha, Stiazhkina).