New Conflict with the Polish Commonwealth

Sahaidachnyhad convinced the Cossacks that the way for­ward for their rights and liberties was cooperation with the Pol­ish King and the Commonwealth, to show the government they were indispensable in the wars against the major powers such as Sweden, Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire.

Was Sahaidachny planning to establish the embryo of a Cossack state in Ukraine, with himself as the ruler directly re­sponsible to the King? Perhaps, but with his death even in the service of King and the Commonwealth, the relationship be­tween the Cossacks and the nobility returned to its hostile state.

The causes for the hostility lay directly with the nobility, ever distrustful of the Cossacks—what they stood for, and their military prowess. Following the end of the Ottoman war the Cossack regiments returned to southern Rus and Ukraine, di­minished in number and suffering from lack of supplies. In a written petition to King Zygmunt III they reminded him of his verbal commitment and contractual obligation to pay their wages, provide the necessary supplies and respect their rights and liberties. The petition, together with the negotiations, pro­vides a clear illustration of the issues involved. It begins with a reminder of Cossack services: “A message of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to His Majestythe King and the Commonwealth; re­quests for a reward for the blood services, renowned in the entire Christian world and evident to all pagans.”³⁴ Then follows a concession in view of the peace treaty signed between the Commonwealth and the Porte, and a reminder of their unpaid wages.

We shall not make war on the state of the Turkish Emperor either by land or by the Black Sea... and we definitely wish to give up (campaigning on) the Black Sea. We only wish to know with what we are to stay in our usual places in service to the Com­monwealth, and at what salary. The previous (royal) commis­sions earmarked 40,000 zlotys as our annual payment, but that has not been fulfilled. Now we, putting the commission’s resolu­tions aside need, it seems, to ask the King and Their Graces to earmark for us an annual payment of 100,000 zlotys, which should come to us every year at a set time. Now... the emissaries are to ask His Majesty the King kindly to pay a just remuneration promptly for our blood services and the losses we have suffered in horses and in all kinds of other things in that (Khotyn) expedi­tion, as the Lords Commissioners also promised us by their let­ter.

Following a request for the accommodation of “our ancient Greek religion and... Ihelibertiesgrantedtousbyhis predecessors and by the King (Zygmunt III) himself, for our blood services in time of war,” the petition lists the Cossacks’ need for upkeep and livelihood to replace war booty.

—The King is asked to make available income from a town in Ukraine for the upkeep of invalids, provide for the hospital and return Boryspil and its surroundings to them.

—Free accommodation for Cossacks on royal, princely, nobil­iary, and clerical estates... with their liberties preserved, without any oppression by officialdom.

—Some of our comrades have no home or property and no source of livelihood. Let them be allowed to work in the hunting and fishing trades, if any are able and desire to occupy themselves with such.

—Even those who have homes have not prepared—because of their absence from home—stocks of provisions for them­selves, their wives and their children. And those who have no homes have done this even less. Hence the request for placement and supplies in towns, by regiments, for the resting and feeding of the horses that still remain.

—And in those towns where we reside, especially in the Kyiv palatinate, no soldiers shall have their quarters or stations.

The main Cossack army resting in Podilia soon heard the king s reply through a commission charged in 1622 to settle the “Cossack problem.” A sum of50,000 zlotys would be forthcom­ing, but all other Cossack demands were rejected. Only 3,000 would be Officiallyrecognized as Cossacks and placed on a reg­ister with pay; all remaining veterans were to lose their liberties and be placed in the landlord s service to become peasant serfs; the Cossack commander was to be appointed by the King and not elected as custom demanded; and they were not to go to sea on raiding expeditions. The Cossacks pointed out that they had a contractual right to go to sea if they did not receive pay­ment, or were denied the right to commandeer provisions and military supplies. Although the commission agreed that the late Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski had indeed entered into such a contractual agreement it nevertheless refused to recognize these rights, fearing another war with the Ottoman Empire since a peace agreement had not yet been signed. Needless to say, the Cossacks took the King s conditions as ludicrous, pointing out that even the 50,000 zlotys promised them were meaningless.

What will they eat there (in the steppe) given that the 3 or 4 zlo­tys that they are to get per sword are not enough even for food and clothing, because they are ragged and hungry?... They keep asking where the invalids who cannot earn their bread and salt will go, or those who have no homes, have no skill in digging up the ground (farming), or are ashamed to beg. If they get the same amount of money as those who did not fight much... they will have no money to acquire homes and homesteads, for a few zlo­tys will not buy these.³⁵

With the King lacking sufficient strength to enforce his orders— the crown troops were also not paid and had withdrawn their services—the “talks” ended, and the commission withdrew.

Failing an agreement with the Commonwealth the Cos­sacks resumed their Black Sea raids on the Ottoman Empire. Stubborn fighting broke out in 1625 with an engagement in the mouth of the Dnipro River involving 43 Ottoman men-of-war and about a hundred Cossackvessels. This time the battle did not go well for the Cossacks, who lost a number of boats with casualties and 270 men taken prisoner. Nevertheless the Turk­ish fleet was forced to withdraw, and the captives were taken to Constantinople and exhibited in a triumphant procession as was witnessed by the French delegates to the Porte. Cossacks who chose not to participate in the sea campaign headed to the settled regions of Rus and Ukraine, where they began to make their presence felt by challenging official authority and expro­priating much needed provisions and supplies. A new source of friction had also arisen between the Rus population and the Commonwealth, one which would play an increasingly impor­tant role. Due to the persecution of the Orthodox Church under King Zygmunt III the “Faith of Rus” was beginning to come under the protection of the Cossacks, with cases of retaliation for Catholic attacks becoming more frequent. As noted by the Catholic Prince Zbaraski: “How much is under the control of those people? AllthelandofRus... Intheirfoolishobstinacy (they) consider themselves oppressed by the nobilities’ laws... and complain about the Church Union and religion, and would then undoubtedly rise, wishing to take revenge.”

A more complete report was provided by yet another royal commission sent to settle the “Cossack problem,” which was beginning to assume an Increasinglypolitical dimension.

Domestic unruliness is gaining the upper hand... they have or­ganized a sovereign state for themselves.

This was a direct challenge to the authority of the Com­monwealth state, and the nobility—Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant—reacted with a zeal which they had not shown even during the Ottoman invasion. By the summer of 1625 a Crown army had been assembled and in September an 8,000-man force moved from Podilia into Ukraine under the command of Het­man Stanislaw Koniecpolski. As he moved through the Ros River valley to Bila Tserkva he was joined by detachments led by Prince Potocki, which had been gathered by the members of the royal commission. His force was still not strong enough to confront the Zaporozhian army which, he knew, would be reinforced by the town Cossacks. To avoid conflict he resorted to subterfuge, sending messages announcing that he was coming “in friendship and respect—because carrying a sword by my side I am able to respect military men”; this being addressed to people who were usually referred to as “scum” and “rabble.” He was there Simplyto make sure that the King and the Common­wealth were obeyed, but the Cossacks knew different.

Koniecpolski had chosen his timing well. Many of the Za- porozhian Cossacks already left for a third sea expedition of the year against the Ottoman fleet that had appeared in the mouth of the Dnipro. As was pointed out later by the Cossacks: “The Army was not in one place; some were at sea, others on the Don and other rivers.”³⁷

On 11 October Koniecpolski reached Kaniv garrisoned by 3,000 Cossacks, who decided to withdraw in spite of the Hetman s soothing assurances that he wished no harm to “hon­est military men who by their blood had earned a good repu­tation in foreign countries.” No harm would come to them or to their rights, estates, and their Orthodox faith.

The Zaporozhians who had remained in the Sich in the meantime elected a new hetman, one Marko Zhmailo, and began to move out to join the town Cossacks with the intention to BlockKoniecpolskis army, which continued to be reinforced by fresh troops supplied by the wealthy magnates. These were reinforced by non-serf armed serving men recruited from the villages. The Hapsburg Emperor Ferdinand II also sent 3,000 “German” infantry giving Koniecpolski a total of 33,000 men and ample artillery, while the Cossack forces led by Hetman Zhmailo and colonels Doroshenko, Olyfer and Pinsky num­bered no more than 20,000, were not as well equipped as their opponents and lacked some of the best men who were out to sea.

As the two armies approached each other, the first few days were spent in the usual talks and “negotiations” which were cut short when on the night of 29 October, crossing the marshy Tsybulnik River, Koniecpolski launched a surprise attack on the Cossack camp. The Cossacks were quickly driven from their positions and retreated to the wagon “tabor,” which began to be shelled by Koniecpolski s artillery. A Cossack cavalry attack to silence the guns was beaten off but forced Koniecpolski to pull his men back to a more secure position. Realizing they were outnumbered the Cossacks also abandoned their camp, and during the darkness of the night began to retreat to a site well known to them, an old fort at Medvezhi Lozy on the banks of Lake Kurukove. A cavalry regiment was dispatched under Stefan Chmielecki in pursuit but by then the main Cossack army had crossed a small river leaving rearguard detachments to ambush the Polish cavalry, 1,500 men hidden in the reeds to defend the shallow crossing point, 2,000 Cossacks half a mile further with a similar purpose, and 2,000 men set up a third defensive wagon semi-circle on the edge of Lake Kurukove where the main Polish army had to pass. This was a common Cossack defensive strategy and was also intended to inflict ca­sualties on the enemy, to cut their numbers down to size and force it to either withdraw or face annihilation.

In the meantime the Cossack army advanced along the other side of the lake to set up a wagon “tabor” consisting of several semi-circular lines of wagons with the lake at their backs. The three rear-guard detachments fulfilled their mission as planned since Chmielecki s cavalry suffered high casualties and had to be reinforced by two more regiments led by the Princes Stanislaw Potocki and Janusz Tyszkiewicz. When unable to hold out much longer the survivors of the first group pulled back to join the second line of resistance and so forth, until all detachments reached the main Cossack camp, having suffered light casualties.

As the avant-garde of the Polish army arrived it found the Cossack camp was not yet completely fortified, and Zamoyski promptly ordered an attack probably to test the Cossack de­fenses. Zhmailo, however, had placed men outside of the camp perimeter concealed in the reeds and the tall prairie grass, and as the Polish and German infantry advanced they were met with musket-fire from both inside and outside of the wagon circle. Not pausing to reload the hidden detachments drew sabers and charged, taking the enemy completely by surprise. Prince Zamoyski was surrounded and almost killed as he was forced into a marsh but was rescued by his men, and the rest of the at­tacking force retreated in utter confusion. In fact, the Polish avant-garde was only saved by the arrival of Hetman Koniecpol- ski with the main Polish army. A second and more powerful as­sault on the Cossack camp now took place on 31 October as waves of cavalry and infantry attempted to penetrate the Cos­sack lines of defense. Theywere again met with deadly musket and artillery fire, and suffering heavy losses, Koniecpolski called off the attack, himself coming close to being killed. As noted in the royal Polish records, “many German infantry perished and a large number of horses were shot, and many distinguished cavalrymen also fell.”³⁸

Realizing that the Cossacks could not be easily defeated, Koniecpolski swallowed his pride and dispatched one Chmi- elecki with another captain to the Cossack camp to discuss terms. The outnumbered Cossacks had also suffered casualties in the bloody fighting, some 8,000 killed or wounded in the campaign, and they had lost valuable supplies in the hurried re­treat to Lake Kurukove. The final agreement represented a com­promise by which the royal commission gave up its demand for the extradition of Cossackleaders, the Cossackregisterwas to be increased to 6,000 men, and a payment of60,000 zlotys was to be made to the 10,000 man strong Cossack army. In return those who were denied Cossack status were to become serfs, and all Cossacks were to leave land claimed by the nobility after selling their property to those who were willing to serve a lord. They were to abstain from entering into foreign treaties, the Black Sea raids on Ottoman property were to cease, and only 1,000 Cossacks were to be stationed in the Sich. The Cossacks decided to agree to the conditions realizing that the royal com­mission had to save face before their peers. As in the past, Com­monwealth agreements with the Cossacks had always been made largely for the sake of appearance since the government did not always have the means to enforce them.

The Cossack challenge to the Polish Commonwealth at Kurukove was understood by the government to be of a serious nature and the Polish army commanded by Konicpolski was kept in southern Rus and Ukraine to make sure that three points of the agreement would be adhered to: only 6,000 Cossacks to be recognized as such and put on a register, all others to lose their status and become peasant-serfs; all Cossacks were to sell their homesteads and vacate the land if it was claimed by a noble or the Catholic Church; and Cossack elections for hetman or chief ataman to be confirmed by the King. In several weeks 6,000 Cossacks were indeed placed on a register and it wasn’t long before their services were needed when in February 1626 a major and unexpected Tatar invasion took place led by Khan Mehmet Giray III himself. In the autumn of the same year an­other large Tatar horde invaded the Kyiv region and southern Rus, led by the Nureddin Sultan, the prince second in line after the “qalgha” or the heir to the Crimean Khan. When the hordes dispersed into smaller raiding parties in the usual fashion the main Tatar camp at Bila Tserkva was attacked by 3,000 Crown troops under Chmielecki and the 6,000 registered Cossacks led by Hetman Doroshenko. On the day of the attack on 29 September it began to rain, rendering firearms useless, and all fighting was done hand-to-hand and with bow and arrow.

Other Cossacks not on the register went “Down Under” to resume the Black Sea naval expeditions. Not all were suc­cessful, as reported by the French envoy to the Port, the Count de Cesy Some 300 Cossacks in 12 “tchaika” boats were inter­cepted by a Turkish fleet off the coast of Georgia and had to seek refuge on shore. Their fortified camp was overrun by Janis­saries and all died fighting. Others were more successful, for example those led by the colorful Ataman Oleksa Shafran. He had been captured by the Tatars and spent seven years in Kaffa as a Turkish prisoner. Organizing a revolt, Shafran and other prisoners destroyed the jail and most successfully escaped to the Don Cossacks. He now led 400 Zaporozhian and Don Cos­sacks in 8 boats to Trebizond where he looted the surrounding countryside. On another occasion he took 100 men in two “tchaikas” on a raid which also ended successfully. Sent by his Cossacks to deliver ten pounds of silver to the Church of St. Sophia in Kyiv, he apparently lost his way and was arrested in Muscovite territory and banished to Siberia.

Cossackraids against the Tatars continued, but now took a different turn. Taking advantage of the civil war which was going on in the Crimea, Zaporozhian and registered Cossacks attacked and destroyed the mighty Ottoman fortress of Aslan Kerman which stood on the west bank of the Dnipro River bor­dering Cossack and Tatar territory. Next Hetman Doroshenko took 4,000 hand-picked Cossacks and marched into the Crimea to support the Khan s heir Shahin Giray against the nobleman Cantemir. The Cossacks were met by Cantemir s army and in a series of hand-to-hand six-day battles the Tatars were routed, and the wounded Cantemir fled to Kaffa under Turkish pro­tection. One thousand Cossacks, however, were also killed, in­cluding Hetman Doroshenko who was shot in the chest by a Janissary sharpshooter. The grateful Shahin showered the Cos­sacks with a rich reward of 5 pieces of gold per man provided by the Tsars diplomat to support Shahins anti-Ottoman effort. Cantemir was pursued to Kaffa where new fighting broke out outside of the thick walls of the port. Cantimir was wounded again, most of his men killed and his captured son was executed before the walls on Shahins orders. Alarmed at the turn of events the Ottoman Sultan sent a strong force to the Crimea, most of Shahins men switched sides, and the Cossacks left for home while they still could. They brought back rich spoils of war including the nine Polish cannon which Zolkiewski had lost in the defeat at Tsetsora.

Meanwhile in Ukraine, Podilia, and Volin the social situ­ation was heating up again with the Cossack military class now finding itself at the crossroads. While many registered Cossacks began to seek an accommodation within the Catholic Com­monwealth, the remaining Cossacks—who were now techni­cally outlaws—thought otherwise. Most realized their predica­ment was due to the increasingly oppressive demands made by the nobility, and the Onlywayoutwas to establish an independ­ent society free of king and noble; yet they still lacked the strength to overcome the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, one of the most powerful states in Europe. The large increase in the Cossack register also introduced a conflict of interest amongst their ranks. The agreement signed at Kurukove was pitting Cossack against Cossack and Seriouslyinterferingwith their liberties. Most of their military activities to earn a liveli­hood were condemned by the King and the Sejm; they were harassed by local authorities when they went to hunt and fish, and the nobility claimed an exclusive monopoly for the brewing and selling of beer and mead. The nobility was also attacking Cossackhomesteads and driving them from land they claimed as their own, citing the agreement of Kurukove; and justice was always denied when a Cossackwas killed by a nobleman, while widows were being deprived of their inheritance.

Many of the non-registered Cossacks saw no other way to earn a livelihood than to campaign against the Ottoman Empire, which still maintained a treaty with the Commonwealth. While persecuted for the attacks, at the same time the Cossacks were indispensable, since Tatar raids into the southeastern part of the Polish Commonwealth continued. Viewed as “scum” on the one hand, whose unruliness had to be controlled, on the other some could see them as heroes who defended the land against the Tatars and the Turks. A Polish commander in Ukraine, a commoner by the name of Chmielecki who had made a name for himself at Khotyn, left an account of the Cossacks under Ataman Hryhory Chorny of the registered Cossacks, who had fought by his side in the battle of Burstyn against a major Tatar campaign. On this occasion the Cossacks once again destroyed a large Tatar force, resulting in the freeing of some 10,000 pris­oners, amongst them many noblewomen. According to Chmi- elecki the Victorywas made possible by a single Cossackwho fell into Tatar hands while foraging for food. Suspecting a Cos­sack army nearby, the Tatars began to interrogate their prisoner, who though badly tortured kept on repeating that there was no Cossack army in the vicinity. His refusal to break under torture lulled the Tatars into a false sense of security, allowing the out­numbered Cossacks to attack and destroy the Tatar force and to free the perhaps exaggerated large number of prisoners.

Unrest amongst the Cossacks and the enserfed peasants was growing as the Polish Crown Hetman Koniecpolski de­cided to billet Polish troops in parts of Ukraine where they had never been seen before, encouraging the rumors that the Com­monwealth was plotting a religious war against the Greek Or­thodoxpopulation. Koniecpolskis sword was Supposedlyseen being blessed by Dominican monks at a Sunday mass, so that it would “serve against the heathen, against Rus, in order to ex­tirpate it,” according to the Lviv Chronicle. In defiance of the King the Zaporozhians elected a militant Hetman, Taras Fe­dorovich, better known by his Cossack Brotherhood handle as “Triasylo” (“The Shaker”), who sent Cossacks to arrest the Het­man of the Registered Cossacks, Hryhory Chorny, who was tried and executed for collusion with the enemy. Alarmed at the execution, many Registered Cossacks joined the Polish army in Korsun for safety, and when the Zaporozhians* demands for the extradition of their officers and the removal of the Crown army from Korsun were rejected, the town was attacked by a Zaporozhian force. Theywere joined by most of the registered Cossack rank-and-file, the townsmen rose in revolt against Koniecpolski, and after suffering heavy casualties the Crown troops abandoned Korsun leaving behind much needed sup­plies and valuable belongings of the nobility.

Now the atrocities began, in the spring of 1630 when Samuel Lashch entered a town called Lysianka on Orthodox Easter in March and ordered that all despised inhabitants be slaughtered—men, women and children. Next the town of Dymerwas wiped out; They killed innocent people just as long as they were Rusins.”³⁹ The response was a general rising of the peasants supported by Cossack fighters, which in turn provoked more retaliation, as recorded by the Polish chronicler Piasecki: “They attacked the royal troops stationed in the winter billets, especially the troops of Lashch, Lankoronski and Sladkowski. They killed many people among them, forced the rest to with­draw to other locations, and captured their whole trains.”⁴⁰

The main Cossack army in the meantime, led by Taras Tri- asylo, had installed itself on the east side of the Dnipro River at Pereiaslav, and waited for Koniecpolski s next move. The no­bility was still in the process of mobilizing although some had already joined the Polish army, and rather than wait Koniecpol- ski decided to cross the Dnipro and attack the Cossacks. This would prove to be a strategic error but as a contemporary participant observed, he was “in great anger against the Cos­sacks, and all the Rusins.” The first attempt to cross the Dni- pro at a ford south of Kyiv did not go well. Koniecpolski was blocked by a Cossack cavalry Companywith light artillery and suffered defeat, with himself almost taken prisoner. As he admitted later the crossing was “not without difficulties and with no little bloodshed.” The Crown army then moved to Kyiv in early May, where it managed to get across and reach Pereia- slav.

A contemporary transcript written by the Muscovite bo­yars Buturlin and Liapunov, based on a report by the Tsar s spy Gladky who was in Pereiaslav at the time, puts Koniecpolski s army at 12,000 men, which we know from other sources in­cluded German regiments and some 2,000 Ukrainian Regis­tered Cossacks. As Koniecpolski reached the city, a two-day battle broke out in which Koniecpolskiwas badly beaten, losing some 1,000 men on the first day and 2,000 on the second. The Cossacks then retreated to Pereiaslavwhere they were already dug in. Gladky reported, “They are said to have sat in Pereiaslav, with the Cherkasians (Ukrainian Cossacks) besieged by the Polish men for three weeks.”⁴¹

Buturlin and Liapunovs transcript puts the Cossackforce in Pereiaslav at 40,000 men, a Veryunlikelynumberwhich must have included not only Taras Triasylos besieged army but also the Cossack detachments and peasant rebel bands which were operating in Ukraine and Southern Rus at the time. Not only could such a large number of men be accommodated in the confines of the town but a force of 12,000 men could hardly have been able to besiege such a large force for three weeks without itself being destroyed.⁴² The probable number for Taras Triasylos men is 10,000 regular Cossacks, mainly Zaporozhians, and several thousand Cossacks on the King s register, if even that.⁴³

Following their initial defeat, Koniecpolskis men dug trenches and the siege continued for the next three weeks, as the Polish hetman waited for reinforcements from the nobility s militia and a German force of 10,000 men he was seeking to hire. In the meantime the battles continued as Cossacks launched sorties or were in turn attacked by the Crown Troops. As noted by Gladky, “the Polish men fought many battles with the Cherkasian men (the Cossacks), and in those battles the Cherkasians were victorious over the Poles.”⁴⁴

Koniecpolski decided to launch a final assault—this also went badly. His lines of communication were cut, and hopes of receiving reinforcements were fading with every day. After the Crown army crossed to the left bank a great insurrection had broken out behind its lines, and many government troops and militias were destroyed even before they could reach the Dnipro, their captured weapons and supplies feeding the fires of revolt. There was no other option left but to open negotia­tions. Gladkygives a brief description of the hopeless situation in which Koniecpolski found himself: “...the Cherkasians seized Hetman Koniecpolskis artillery from the encampment, killed a great many Poles... occupied the crossing points on the Dnipro, and burned the ferry boats at the crossings; and after that battle Hetman Koniecpolski made peace with the Cherkasians.”⁴⁵ Gladky^,s account is corroborated in greater detail by a Kyiv chronicler:

The great battle took place on Saturday (22 May, old calendar).

Lord Lashch spied the Cossacks who were riding out to post sen­tries. Taking, it is said, 500 mounted soldiers he attacked them, but (was) unable to “take” them. The lord hetman (Koniecpol- ski) took with him 2,000 good soldiers... (and) came upon oth­ers who were arriving to help the first group. They say there were not many of them, only about 200 horses.... Those Cossacks, locking themselves in a shed, fought so hard that not a single one was captured alive, only one captain, and a wounded one at that. Then the Cossacks fell upon the encampment.... They fought hard there, slashing away! As many as 2,000 men on both sides perished there. While some Cossacks were fighting, others took three of the largest cannons and two long guns, transporting them to their encampment. The Lord Hetman (Koniecpolski) arrived at that moment. Then they fought for six hours; if a tremendous rainfall had not intervened, they probably would not have left anyone alive. Finally the hetman (Koniecpolski) dis­played a sign of surrender.⁴⁶

Following the surrender the Cossacks withdrew and pro­tracted negotiations began, which were terminated by the signed agreement of 29 June 1630. The Cossacks realized that a victory in battle, no matter how great, did not mean the defeat of the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their de­mand, as formally worded following standard convention, was that the concessions which they had made at Kurukova be re­scinded and essentially all Cossacks were to maintain their status on their homesteads as free men... That your Grace (Koniecpolski) show himself to us as our Gracious Lord and deign to leave us, his servants, in possession of our ancient free­doms.”⁴⁷ This was largely granted, and the register expanded to 8,000 paid Cossacks in return for a formal declaration of loyalty. As admitted by Koniecpolski in his face-saving “report” to the Sejm; “I admit that I myself was not very satisfied with its (the agreement’s) result, for satisfaction was not given for such an insult to the king’s majesty.”

The agreement and treaty following Pereiaslavwas a mere formality, and did not remove the deep distrust which con­tinued to prevail between nobleman and Cossackwith the serfs siding with the latter. To the great alarm of the Polish Govern­ment, the Cossacks renewed their Black Sea raids on Ottoman military installations and other property. Also a Polish army, billeted anew in Ukraine, was harassed to such an extent that it abandoned the towns, leaving the territory in the grips of “Cos­sack unruliness.” Thus in practice the Polish Commonwealth relinquished control in the settled areas where “the Cossacks were permitted everything,” so long as they abstained from the Black Sea campaigns. The government, however, dragged its feet when it came to the full implementation of the agreement, for example expanding the royal register to 8,000 Cossacks. Zygmunt III died in 1632 at the age of 53 following a long reign. Fond of feasting and drinking, as was the common norm of the day amongst the nobility, he ironically died from an overdose of a medicine prescribed by his doctor for kidney stone pains.

He was succeeded by his 37-year-old son, who was elected and crowned as Wladyslav IV. No sooner was he King than Wladyslav renewed old conflicts with Muscovy and Sweden, and once again Cossack regiments were in demand. His pre­vious campaigns with his father against Sweden had convinced him that the Polish Crown army had to be reformed on a new pattern, which had emerged during the Thirty Years’ War. His model was the Lutheran King of Sweden Gustav Adolphus whose new army gained such renown against the Catholics in the Thirty Years’ War. Crowned on 31 December 1611 at the age of 17, Adolphus would prove himself to be one of the most innovative monarchs of the age. Before his untimely death at the age of 38, he mastered 7 languages, wrote history, and rev­olutionized infantry warfare. Until then the main defensive for­mation against cavalry were pikemen, formed in a square to provide protection musketeers in the center. The young king’s idea was to introduce heavy firepower against both infantry and cavalry. For this purpose he borrowed the Dutch mortar, and introduced standardized light field artillery, 3 and 5 pounders, at times concentrating 150 pieces against the enemy. Another innovation was the introduction of the linear firing line con­sisting of six ranks of matchlock musketeers, which could main­tain a constant rate of fire. The first rank would retire to the rear, to reload after firing its volley, and was replaced by the sec­ond rank which would also retire to the rear of the first and so forth. By the time the sixth rank had discharged its volley the first would be ready to fire. Such continuous volleys could de­stroy an attacking enemy force before he could even reach the Swedish lines.

An integral part of this tactic was drill and discipline, with­out which it could not succeed. The firing line was responsible for destroying the Polish cavalry in the great Swedish victory at Wallhof in Livonia in 1626, as well as in the battle of Breit­enfeld against Marshall Tilly’s Catholic forces on 17 September 1631. GustavAdolphus was killed in the battle of Lutzen in April 1632 when he was shot in the back at close range. Inter­estingly, the Swedish king had concluded what Cossacks had known for some time, that concentrated and sustained fire­power could compensate for smaller numbers provided the musketeers held their ground. Also, like the Cossacks, Adolphus preferred smaller tactical formations, which traveled with light baggage trains for maneuverability and speed. Unlike most Eu­ropean (and Ottoman) armies, which used matchlock muskets, the Zaporozhian Cossacks preferred wheel-lock and flintlocks which were beginning to make their way from western Europe towards the end of the 16th and the early 17 th centuries. Unlike the matchlocks they did not need a rest when fired, and the smoke of lit fuses did not give away the intention to begin fir­ing.

While pursuing his campaigns in the north, King Wla- dyslav had to content simultaneously with the Ottoman and Crimean attacks in the south, and to pacify the Ottoman Sultan he decided to take measures against the Zaporozhians as de­scribed in a 1635 declaration:

... we wish to show the whole world that we are ready and will­ing to keep our word in a treaty with our enemies. And to that end, by the authority of the present Sejm, we resolve that the Cossacks, neither on land or sea, must not furnish the slightest grounds for breaking this peace, under threat of forfeiting all rights, freedoms and privileges granted to them by our ancestors and the Commonwealth. Moreover, we order that our Starostas... not permit the preparing and readying either of wood for boats or foodstuffs, gunpowder, bullets or other supplies in their districts, without which Cossack sea campaigns cannot take place....⁴⁸

To this end the Polish nobility voted the sum of 100,000 “zlotys” to construct a fort on the Dnipro River, even while the Cossacks who had served the King went largely unpaid. The idea was to cut all lines of communication between the Cossack towns and “Down Under” and thus put a stop to the Black Sea raids which were resuming again following peace with Muscovy with Zaporozhians sailing their remarkable “tchaikas” all the way to Constantinople. An Ottoman complaint to Wladyslav for example, described how in the spring of 1635 seven boats of “the Dnipro Cossack bandits” arrived at the Bosphorus, taking advantage of the fact that the Sultan’s fleet had sailed to the Mediterranean. “They caused a great deal of harm... and took a considerable amount of property.” Two of the seven boats, however, had gone aground and were captured by the Turkish men-of-war stationed in the straits.

The fort on the Dnipro was mainly Hetman Koniecpolskis project and he had just the man to design and direct construc­tion—the French mathematician/engineer Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, who was in Koniecpolski s service at the time and who left us with such detailed and interesting obser­vations of “Ukrainie.” The site selected was near the first rapid known as Kodak, on the Dnipros high right bank promontory jutting into the river which provided natural protection on three sides. Workwas begun almost immediately and when finished in the summer of 1635 it was an imposing stone and brick struc­ture; a mile in perimeter, walls 7 feet high, and surrounded by a deep trench on the land-side. Kodak, as the fortress became known, was garrisoned by 200 dragoons under the command of a French officer, CaptainJean de Marion. He quickly estab­lished control of the region, even forbidding hunting and fishing by the Cossacks. Angered by Kodaks presence, a detachment OfZaporozhian Cossacks led by their Hetman Ivan Sulyma cap­tured Kodak in August of 1635. Beauplan had underestimated the Cossacks in his design, forgetting that they routinely cap­tured and destroyed Ottoman and Tatar fortifications. We have the comments of the Lithuanian Prince Radzivill who was well acquainted with the event.

The Cossacks, not accustomed either to patience or evangelical forbearance, under the command of Sulyma, having observed that the soldiers on guard were asleep, quietly crept up ladders onto the walls of the fortress in the middle of the night. And al­though the sentries awoke, it was too late. By the time (the de­fenders) rubbed their eyes heavy with sleep, seized their weapons... the fortress was already in the hands of the Cossacks.⁴⁹

Most of the garrison was killed and the unpopular captain de Marion was shot. Radzivills claim that the sentries were asleep may not be exact, since capturing enemy fortresses by sending select men over the walls to overcome the sentries was a com­mon Cossack practice, and allowed a relatively small force to capture a strong installation. The fortress was destroyed and not rebuilt in that year although only a part of the 100,000 “zlo­tys” voted by the Sejm was used in its construction, the rest of the money being spent elsewhere.

Next, Sulyma and his men continued along the Dnipro River taking control of Chihirin, Cherkassy, and Korsun. The Prussian war had just ended and their advance was blocked by a newly arrived force led by Koniecpolski, which included sev­eral thousand Registered Cossacks. Under circumstances which are not clear to this day, Sulyma and his five commanders were lured into the Polish camp by Registered Cossack officers, ar­rested and handed over to the “Liakhs.”⁵⁰ It seems as if bribery and promises of future benefits were involved, initiated by the Royal Commissioners Zolkiewski and Kysil. Brought to War­saw, Sulyma and his officers were tried by a court of the Sejm and condemned to death, in spite of Sulyma s stated intention to convert to Roman Catholicism. He was a well-known anti­Ottoman campaigner and had received a gold medal from the Pope in recognition of his exploits. As described by Prince Radzivill:

This subterfuge (Sulymas defense) was not accepted and they were sentenced to death in order to strike fear into other unruly Cossacks. Many people pitied Sulyma who after defeating the en­emies of Christians, the Turks, so many times and never even re­ceiving a wound in battle against them, was now to die a shame­ful death.⁵¹

The shame, however, was with the Sejm of the Polish Commonwealth. The Cossacks’ sentence was apparently due to the presence of Ottoman envoys, and the Polish Government took the Opportunityto show that they were serious about rein­ing in “Cossack willfulness.” Radzivill continues in a poetic mode, and with some sympathy: “Thus he who had risked his neck so often in Asia, whom the enemy could not touch with its resolve to expose him to the danger of Mars, now in Warsaw had to stick out his neck to an infamous executioner, his strong hands tied behind his back.” Two of the Cossack officers were handed over to the Ottoman envoy, and Sulyma with the re­maining three were beheaded, drawn and quartered, and their body parts hung in various locations of Warsaw for public dis- play.

The registered Cossacks had impressed Koniecpolskiwith their loyalty, and the Polish Hetman realized that they were not only valuable in foreign wars but could also be used to keep “law and order” in Ukraine itself. The 7,000 Cossacks who were placed on a royal register were reorganized into seven regionally based regiments of 1,000 men each, from Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Cherkassy, Korsun, and Chihirin on the right bank, and Pereiaslav and Mirhorod on the left bank of the Dnipro. Each regiment commanded by a colonel was subdivided into 10 companies and led by a captain. Hetman Koniecpolski was also instructed by King Wladyslav IV to select an individual who, when registering new Cossacks, would not be “avid for bribes.... The previous registrars got this wrong, and because of that most meritorious Cossacks have become unruly.”

In spite of the Cossackvictory at Pereiaslav over Hetman Koniecpolskis Crown army and the nobility, very little changed for the peasants’ general condition or the rights of the Cossacks. The agreed upon Royal registry of8,000 Cossacks went unful-

filled, and business went on as usual for the local “starosta” ad­ministration. Cossacks were still being harassed for taxes and other contributions, particularly those involved in hunting and fishing, and the nobility’s immunity meant that a nobleman could literally get away with the murder of a serf or a Cossack; and the unpaid 150,000 zlotys for two years of back-pay for services rendered was an ongoing issue. Alist of particular griev­ances was presented by Cossack envoys to the Polish Sejm, held in March 1636 in the simple and straightforward Cossack man­ner.

As though it were not sufficient that our comrades have been driven out of the nobility’s estates and swindled, now they are not allowed to live on the royal ones either. Our comrade is not permitted either to buy or sell in royal cities, this is strictly for­bidden but they give their leaseholders (“orendari”) the right to ban the production of either beer or liquor for personal use, for weddings or christenings. Theyviolate the rights and freedoms conferred by the king, who extended those freedoms to Cossack widows surviving their husbands killed in service to the Com­monwealth. What a pitiful thing it is! Our comrades will perish in service to the Commonwealth but on the very next day they will take away all the cattle from his widow and will even order her to be thrown into prison! As for those of our comrades who have spent their entire lives in the service of the state (there is) no regard for their merit and old age, have robbed them and placed them under their control [sic]. We endure great injustices. They (the “starostas”) refuse to mete out justice to the guilty on our behalf. Insulting and ridiculing our emissaries, they send them away with nothing. In conducting raids in their disputes over land, they have killed several of our comrades and confis­cated their property. People have been driven to despair by all this, and God in heaven sees what a large number of our com­rades have already been accepted by the Muscovite land. With their wives and children they are settling in Belgorod.⁵²

The estates referred to in the petition were the vast stretches OfUkrainian land which were claimed by the nobility and the crown, on the pretext that they were “uninhabited.” Much of the land had been secured against the Tatars by the Cossack frontiersmen, many of whom had established home­steads and ranches on the wide Ukrainian steppe. In times of peace, however, the Cossacks were “personae non gratae,” strangers in their own land as determined by a foreign and cul­turally alien society. Cossackpetitions and complaints fell on deaf ears, and the cavalier treatment of Ukrainians by the Polish state continued. The Cossacks were also officially prohibited from acquiring war booty from their Black Sea raids on Ottoman territory, which meant that many were condemned to poverty and unable to provide clothing and ammunition for themselves or to replace damaged or destroyed weapons.

Great dissatisfaction was also felt by the peasants in the Kyiv province. Following Nalyvaikos rebellion Ukraine con­tinued to undergo population increases and as the steppe was becoming more secure from Tatar attacks thanks in no small part to Cossackvigilance most of the land was “granted” to the nobility, particularly a few influential families. Thus by the early 17th century the Vyshnevetsky family had been awarded almost the entire area on the left bank of the Dnipro, which was ap­proaching 230,000 inhabitants where few had lived a few decades before. But the granted lands were worthless without peasants producing agricultural goods. Wheat was especially in high demand during the Thirty Years’ War, and the steep price increases of the Price Revolution was gaining large fortunes for the nobility, who were luring serfs from other parts of Rus by promises of freedom. During the first years—up to 15,20 and even 30 years—the peasants were exempt from taxes and forced “corve” labor, so that unlike in other parts of the Commonwealth there was very little serfdom in many parts of Ukraine in the first few decades of the 17 th century. As the pe­riods of exemption from taxes and other forced contributions began to expire a free peasantry found itself increasingly en- serfed. Now it was not just the town and homesteading Cossacks who found themselves hemmed in and exploited by the arbitrary, self-serving laws of the nobility. Although enjoying a luxurious lifestyle very few of the landowning nobles possessed the ability or the interest to manage their estates, and began to lease their properties and monopoly rights (such as milling flour and brewing alcohol) to professional managers. The most efficient leaseholders and managers turned out to be German and Polish Jews, who were also given the right to collect taxes and other fees. This would not endear them to the Greek Orthodox population.

With the creation of Registered Cossacks the movement began to fragment into distinct, and at times hostile, strata. This was noticed by the Rusian and Orthodox magnate Adam Kysil when he was negotiating with Cossacks on behalf of the Polish Commonwealth.

One must treat this foolish rabble (the Cossacks) in three ways. For the officers, gifts. For the virtuous (i.e., law abiding) Cos­sacks and those who have homes (homesteads, ranches) and manage them, favor. Remind them of the integrity of the father- land, the freedoms that will be enjoyed (by promise) not only by them but also by their heirs. As for the wild rebels, the have-nots who live from booty like the (Tatar) Horde—these must be curbed by annihilation and fear of the sword.⁵³

Fear, however, was far from what the “have-nots” were ex­periencing. Some of Szmailos officers had been pardoned, one of them known as Pavliuk (Pavlo But), Szmailos close compan­ion who by 1637 was calling for war; not only against the Crown and the nobility but also against the officers and their supporters which included many of the Registered Cossacks. Most of the officers were either killed or driven to join Koniecpolskis Crown army, which had just been mobilized and was entering Ukraine from the Moldavian border where it was stationed to block a possible Ottoman attack. Peasants in large numbers began arriving at the Sich unarmed and were joining Pavliuks "have-not” Cossack rebels, but about 4,000 of the regular Za- porozhian Cossacks were leaving to support the Don Cossacks in the siege and the spectacular capture of the great Ottoman fort at Azov, defended by 200 cannons. A great anti-Polish revolt was brewing in Ukraine around the Dnipro River, with Cossacks and peasants joining forces. As reported by Potocki himself:

The knavery is growing very strong beyond the Dnipro—it is in­deed true that every peasant is a Cossack. One after another of Skydans (Pavliuks second in command) proclamations are fly­ing around the large and small towns and villages, for those on horseback and on foot, everywhere to rally day and night and join him... to obtain their freedom from us... the enemies and foe of their faith, as they call us.⁵⁴

Roving bands were attacking noble estates, and the Polish army some 6,000 strong supported by several thousand registered Cossacks was put in readiness. The Crown Hetman Koniecpol- ski had fallen ill and had appointed Mikolaj Potocki to replace him as commander of the army.

Potocki proved to be a highly competent strategist. After settling a disagreement with his troops, on 10 December 1637 he proceeded to move from Rokytne to Bohuslav and Korsun, and crossing the Ros River entered territory controlled by Pavliuks insurgent army. Potockis Crown army and the regis­tered Cossacks were outnumbered by the 12,000 strong rebel force, which consisted mainly of poorly equipped peasants and other "instant Cossacks,” with very few Zaporozhians. As ob­served by Potocki; "not all have muskets, some have only boar spears, scythes and axes,” although all approached "very boldly and fiercely.” As Pavliuk s army advanced, the Polish forward regiments commanded by the notorious Lashch retreated and pitched camp on Potocki s right flank to prevent Pavliuk from crossing the Ros River and strike the main Polish army in the rear. In the meantime Potocki moved his men to higher ground behind a marsh that blocked any frontal assault and sent Lashchs regiments to engage Pavliuk s advance units with the instructions to retreat and lure the rebels into a prepared trap.

Pavliuk took the bait, and engaging Lashch at daybreak on 6 December "forced” him to retreat towards the main Polish army, which was stationed on higher ground. After an exchange of gunfire from the field artillery the rebels broke into a charge towards the Polish ranks, "with a terrible din, curses, terms of abuse, shameless and bad words,” as recorded demurely by Adam Kisil, then the Subchamberlain of the Polish Common­wealth. The attack took them past the not yet frozen marsh and the village of Kumeiky, a dangerous diversion which exposed their flank to an enemy cavalry charge. All might have turned out well but for a stroke of good luck for Potocki s strategy. The peasants of Kumieky, noting that the Polish army would have to pass through their village if it was forced to retreat, set fire to their houses and prepared an ambush. This had a totally un­foreseen outcome, as the thick smoke descended on the ad­vancing Cossack and peasant force, acting as a smoke screen for the Poles. Seizing the opportunity, Potocki ordered his dra­goons to charge the blinded rebels, cutting through their ranks with the infantry following to "mop up” the disoriented rebels. Manywere poorly armed and fell before the waves of Potocki s cavalry charges. The survivors fell back to their wagon forma­tion and opened fire with the camp artillery, and it was the Polish dragoons and the registered Cossackcavalrywho began to suffer casualties. Pavliuk now called up the regular Cossack infantry, armed with muskets and pikes, to block Potocki s cav­alry. More misfortune lay in store for Pavliuk s men, as for some reason the wagons carrying the Cossacks’ gunpowder supplies blew up, causing much damage and cutting off the supply to the artillery and the musketeers. Potocki recalled in his report a year later: "That peasantry was so stubborn and zealous that none of them would call out, 'Peace!’ On the contrary, they merely shouted that they should die one on top of another... those who ran out of ammunition and weapons would beat the soldiers with the wagon shafts and poles.”⁵⁵

The fighting continued late into the night and began to die down as many of the peasant and Cossack survivors melted into the darkness, seeking refuge. Pavliuk and several of his offi­cers also abandoned the battle and fled, with command passing to the battle-hardened Zaporozhian Dmytro Hunia who, leading his Cossacks, managed to close the breach punched by the Poles and began an orderly retreat. Potocki had won a victory and proved himself to be the better strategist, and the peasant and Cossack army suffered heavy casualties. In the camp itself there were at least 3,000 dead and several thousand bodies Iaybeyond the camp in the field, the roads, and marshes. The Polish losses are not known and were not reported (fol­lowing policy), but they were Certainlyhigh since Potocki re­fused to pursue Hunias retreating men and settled down to a two-day rest. Pavliuk in the meantime was arrested by orders of a Cossack council and was handed over to Potocki, as pun­ishment for his abandonment of the battlefield. The peasant insurgents dispersed throughout Ukraine, while a 4,000 man Cossack army was convened to a meeting with Potockis brother. All colonels and captains were deposed, and new officers elected on an oath of loyalty to the Crown.

A new register of6,000 Cossacks was drawn up, with each rank-and-file Cossackreceiving 10 zlotys per year, as compared to between 124 and 132 zlotys for a Crown soldier. Since Reg­istered Cossacks were permitted to own land and homesteads or ranches, the pay was mainly intended for supplies such as clothing, ammunition, and weapons. Following the victory, the Polish Commonwealth saw an opportunity to subjugate the Cossackmovement. All permitted Cossack formations were to receive Crown appointed officers, and the ruined Kodak fortress was restored, this time garrisoned by 600 infantry and IOO spe- Ciallyhired Cossacks whose Ioyaltywas not in doubt. A strong guard consisting of Registered Cossacks was also to be main­tained close to Zaporozhia, with two regiments stationed at the southern border to guard against Tatar attacks. Anyone attempt­ing to go “Down Under” without an official pass would be ar­rested and face execution, town burghers were not allowed to join Cossackunits, and their daughters were forbidden to marry Cossacks. In the same year a joint force OfRegistered Cossacks and Crown troops was sent to attack and occupy the Sich but it was easily beaten back by the Zaporozhian garrison. It seems as if the Registered Cossacks were not very keen with the cam­paign, as was noted by a Polish participant—“It is hard to use the Cossacks against their own people—like forcing a wolf to plow.”

A new revolt broke out in the spring of 1638 when, led by the Hetman Ostrianin, the Zaporozhian Cossacks attacked Pol­ish forces. Sailing up the Dnipro River they quickly annihilated the garrisons along the Dnipro towns and established defensive fortifications between the Hatva and Psiol tributaries. It seems as if the Zaporozhian Cossacks were still thought to practice witchcraft due to the remarkable accuracy of their musket and artillery fire, and some of their other tricks. A Polish participant Szymon Okolski wrote, with the usual exaggeration of their numbers: “They (the Zaporozhian Cossacks) positioned men by the thousands on the ramparts, displayed cannon along the trenches, manned the towers and gates by the hundreds, and placed witches and sorcerers on the high roofs to keep a lookout from there, and cast spells for accurate aim, pestilence, and fire.”⁵⁶

Potocki arrived with the Crown army but, unable to take Ostrianin s stronghold, he also dug in and laid siege to the Cos­sack positions. He was constantly harassed by nightly attacks in which the German infantry suffered heavy losses. Then a Cossack detachment managed to make its way behind the Polish position undetected, and when dawn broke they struck the Polish army from both the front and the rear. The result was a complete rout of Potocki s men and the survivors headed towards Lubny in a disorderly retreat. News of the victory spread like wildfire throughout east bank Ukraine, sparking peasant uprisings and defections of several companies of Reg­istered Cossack cavalry. It was now Ostrianins turn to commit a strategic error. Underestimating the size of Potocki s army he decided to advance on Lubny, and as the Cossacks approached they were attacked by a strong force. After hand-to-hand fighting they were forced to retreat and dig in. Both sides had suffered casualties, and as night fell Potocki decided to pull out, leaving Registered Cossack cavalry and German mercenaries to cover his retreat.

Still confident of victory, Ostrianin continued his pursuit of the Polish army, leading him further away from the Dnipro River and any reinforcements by the peasant bands which were forming on the right bank of the Kyiv province. More impor­tantly, a force of 2,300 seasoned and well armed Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks were advancing from Azov to join his men. Not receiving word as to the location of the main Cossackforce, the newly arrived regiments were taken by surprise and attacked by Potocki s men on the open steppe. Potocki had succeeded in Outmaneuvering the Cossacks and preventing the merger of the two forces, which would have spelled the doom of the Polish army. The Polish surprise attack on the Cossacks was certainly unusual, they who were expert at reconnaissance with highly skilled “plastuns” (scouts) who were able to make their way close to enemy positions and bring back valuable information, reputedly “turning into wild animals.” Potocki ordered an all- out assault on the Zaporozhian wagon “tabor” but at the end of the day he was forced to withdraw leaving many men on the field. The Cossacks had been taken by surprise and surrounded in the middle of a dry steppe, and soon their water supplies ran out. Promised safe conduct they had no choice but to comply with Potocki s condition that they first surrender their leaders, Putyvlets and Ripka.

Now a cowardly (but typical) atrocity occurred, one which had not been seen since Nalyvaikos surrender at the Solonytsia River. Enraged by so many of their comrades’ deaths, the soldiers attacked the disarmed Zaporozhians and proceeded to slaughter the defenseless men. Only a bare IOO managed to escape with their lives, shielded by the registered Cossacks. Pol­ish records indicate that this was a spontaneous attack by the troops themselves, but it is difficult not to assume that the attack occurred with Potocki s connivance, he having developed a deep hatred for the Cossack movement and everything it stood for. The loss of the crack Zaporozhian force, together with Ostri- anins poor strategy, doomed the uprising to its second defeat of 1638.

The fighting continued for several more months. The Dnipro region was rising up again against the landed estates and Potocki s army, and thousands of peasants were flocking to Ostrianin s banners. On the east bank the vice-starosta of Cher­nihiv came out against the peasant rebels but was defeated, and he himself was killed in the battle. The peasants had improvised a simple weapon, of which they could not be deprived by the landlords. By straightening out a scythe, they converted a har­vesting implement into a deadly steel “pike,” which could easily bring down a horseman. The Vyshnevetsky family, which had been granted virtually all the land east of the Dnipro River, had assembled a large private army at their own expense, and began to march to Lubnyto join Potocki.⁵⁷ Now Ostrianin committed another strategic blunder. Instead of keeping his force intact he divided the army into two groups, with one sent to occupy Lubnybefore Vyshnevetsky s arrival. The Prince, though, had arrived sooner than expected and Ostrianin s divided forces were attacked and defeated. The situation was now hopeless and with a 900-man Cossack cavalry force Ostrianin headed east towards Slobody Ukraine, which was under Muscovite con­trol. The remaining rebel forces managed to regroup, and led by the newly elected Hetman Hunia they moved towards the Dnipro River to maintain contact with Zaporozhia and the west bank, from where they were expecting reinforcements. The site chosen was an old Cossack stronghold in the Starets (“Old Man”) Valley, ironically dating to Baida Vyshn evetsky’s days, and still had some ramparts intact. More importantly, it was protected by marshes on the north and the Dnipro to the south, with a plentiful supply of timber, water, and pasture for the horses. As remarked by Shimon Okolski after the battle:

More than one engineer examining the layout of the ramparts, trenches, batteries (artillery) and screens marveled at the work and fine ingenuity of the coarse peasant. If the crown army should manage to negotiate their pits, cross-ditches and craters, shatter the oak stakes and palisades with their chests, negotiate the smaller and larger ramparts, then even more bravery would be required to overcome them in the center.⁵⁸

The defenses were of course established by experienced Cos­sacks and not peasants, a term which was used by the Poles for everyone except for the Registered Cossacks who were the only ones officially recognized as such.

As Hunia took up his positions in the Starets Valley, he was reinforced by a unit commanded by Skydan, whose irregu­lar Cossacks had been defeated in the west by the nobles and units of the Crown army. Potocki in the meantime had also gone to the west bank and had brought up a regiment of fresh troops. Seeing that a frontal assault—the only one possible— was out of the question, Potocki settled down to a siege. To cut Hunia s access to fresh supplies of food he ordered the Crown army to implement a scorched earth policy by burning down the villages in the region after looting all their food. He had also constructed an artillery redoubt, out of reach of the Cossacks’ field artillery but within range of his own big guns, and began shelling the Cossackcamp, causing damage and casualties. Still the defenders hung on. Hunia was placing his trust on the last trump card available to him, the arrival of a Cossack fleet of 2,000 men led by one Fylonenko, which was bringing supplies to the besieged camp. Again Potocki was informed of the rein­forcements and staged an ambush on the Dnipro River. To pre­vent Hunia from a sortie to meet Fylonenko he ordered a frontal assault on the Cossack defenses led by the Registered Cossacks, while Crown men and artillery were sent to stop the Cossack flotilla. Not suspecting the enemy nearby the Cossack fleet sailed into an ambush, and was met with heavy artillery and musket fire. A few boats managed to get through by taking refuge in the reeds behind the islands, reaching Hunias camp under the cover of darkness. Only several companies of men had made it, bringing only a few days of supplies. The angry defenders promptly arrested Fylonenko for “treason” and clapped him in irons, after subjecting him to a public caning. Once again a Cossackrelief force, which would have turned the tide of battle, was apprehended and suffered defeat.

Hunias situation had become hopeless. The Polish barrage was taking its toll, and with most of the food gone his men were facing starvation. The Polish camp was also short of supplies, and some of the nobility had begun to take their men and head home. Potocki could not have held out much longer himself, and a common agreement was signed on 28 July 1638, to come into effect on 16 August 1638.

The Cossacks swore loyalty (a usual formality), and Po- tocki promised safe passage for all and the restoration of their “liberties and privileges.” The peasants and serfs, however, were to be returned to their lords and masters. Soldiers and Cossacks emerged from their camps and mingling with each other began to trade whatever goods they could spare. Potocki s men were particularly fascinated by the Cossack defensive positions, by “the artifices, defenses, traps and entrances.” Seasoned Polish officers agreed that these trenches could not have been taken by any frontal assault, expressed amazement at the Cossacks’ and peasants’ endurance and stamina which it took to construct the whole defensive system in only a few days.

The following day the Polish army set out to their assigned postings and the non-registered Cossacks dispersed to various parts. The capitulation in the StaretsValleyrepresented a defeat for the Cossack and peasant movement, of which the Polish state took advantage and began to implement the repressive measures voted by the Sejm in the previous year.