OUN-UPA in 21st Century Ukraine

Entering the 21st century it might have been feasible for historical narra­tives to have advanced beyond the Soviet/nationalist perspectives or that his­tory could be divorced from politics and the impact of political thinking and political views on past events.

Another writer who joined the OUN in 1931 calls on the Ukrainian Su­preme Soviet to recognize the OUN and UPA as combatants in the Second World War, and to grant participants the honorary rank of officer in the cur­rent Ukrainian army corresponding to the rank of company commander in the UPA.

Serbyn then elaborates on his comments with reference to modern-day Ukraine. Gerasimov was the editor of a Book of Memory, and in the preface he has written that “OUN and its armed formations developed and fought as mercenaries of Fascist Germany against the countries of the anti-Hitler coali­tion, and established themselves as Fascist collaborators.” According to Ser- byn, President L. D. Kuchma was a supporter of such views. The key problem here was that Kuchma had linked Ukrainian statehood directly to the victory of the Red Army, since this victory signified a return to Ukraine of a Commu­nist regime that had committed crimes against the Ukrainian people.

From a different perspective, some people were irked by the way historians who wrote in the Soviet period appeared willing to change their opinions. On the pages of The Day Digest, for example, Ivan Khmil devotes his attention to Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, an historian he incorporates into the title of his out­burst “Hucksterish circumlocutions of the OUN-UPA apologists.” In order to undermine Kul'chyts'kyi he begins by attacking his credentials, noting that his candidate's dissertation was in the field of economics, and that one of his main research papers from the past was entitled “The economic development of Soviet Ukraine.” But since Ukraine became independent, writes Khmil, Kul'chyts'kyi has changed with the political wind and taken positions that are antithetical to what he wrote in the Soviet period.

The controversial article by Kost' Bondarenko, which has been cited ear­lier, appeared in the Ukrainian media in the spring of 2002. He focuses ini­tially on the confusion around the various Second World War organizations, commenting that the average citizen was unable to differentiate between the ideas of the OUN, the Halychyna Division, the UPA, Nachtigal or Roland. Consequently parliamentary deputies try to rehabilitate OUN-UPA, even though these organizations are different and the approach to them cannot be identical. In his view the OUN could be rehabilitated without delay and its contributions to the struggle for independence recognized. Also, by focusing on these two organizations exclusively, the contributions of many others tend to be overlooked among those resistance movements that fought both the Na­zis and the Red Army.

Since the mid-1990s the Ukrainian government especially has been deeply involved with changing political interpretations of the Second World War and the formation of a new historical narrative applicable to Ukraine. On 10 July 2002, five years after the creation of the State Commission (the task force was under the leadership of Kul’chyts’kyi) for the study of the OUN and UPA by President L. D. Kuchma, it approved a draft law “On the restoration of his­torical justice toward the fighters for Ukraine's freedom and independence.” The Commission's statement was much criticized by members of left-wing political groups, but others defended its position. In general, the period since 2001 has seen the creation of a new narrative that rejects completely the for­mer Soviet version of the war and accepts much, if not all, of the narrative that perceives the OUN and UPA as heroes and freedom fighters. What is notable is that the history produced, as in the past, is based largely on black and white perceptions.

Thus shortly after the draft law was issued, several articles appeared in the media supporting its main goals in the strongest manner, directing attacks against “Communist myths” about the OUN and UPA. The language em­ployed by the writers often militates against an objective appraisal. For exam­ple, Oleh Hryniv, having denounced the “semantic nonsense” of the term OUN-UPA, turns to the issue of war crimes, and says that the biggest question is who is defining the crime, and on this issue he sees a direct lexical link be­tween past Soviet propaganda and current propaganda emanating from the Russian Federation. Both refer to UPA insurgents and Chechen separatists as “bandits.” Does this signify, he asks, that anyone opposing Russian domina­tion is a bandit? Even Russian intellectuals think in this way, he feels, and Vladimir Putin called “our great Hetman Mazepa” a villain. Like others, Hryniv blames the population outside Galicia for its lack of enlightenment. He declares that the history of the OUN and UPA should be studied in his­torical context. The OUN appeared as a reaction to the failure to attain a Ukrainian state in 1918-21. Similar movements appeared elsewhere in a European continent disillusioned with democracy. The UPA was not a Ger­man ally, he continues, but an instrument to protect the Ukrainian population from the Germans and Poles who collaborated against Ukrainians, and that is why the UPA attacked Poles in Volhynia. Two final points made by Hryniv are that it should be accepted that Moscow occupied Ukraine after the war, as is demonstrated by the famine that occurred in 1946-47 (the logic of this statement is unclear) and the events of the 1940s-50s were not a civil war, as is often written, but a war between a people and a foreign occupier that made use of Eastern Ukrainians to subdue their compatriots.⁴⁶

A similar tone is adopted in an article by Anatolii Fomenko, who states at the outset that his intention is to comply with the goal of the State Commis­sion and inform the public about the activities of the UPA. He does so by cit­ing the work of one of its main apologists, Volodymyr Kosyk. Fomenko agrees that a majority of Galicians might have welcomed the Red Army in Septem­ber 1939, but states that their attitude changed after the start of Soviet depor­tations and reprisals. The NKVD murder of political prisoners in June 1941 is linked directly to what is described as a brief period of nationalist collabora­tion with the Germans. The nationalists rejected such a program of action immediately once the Germans had refused to countenance an independent Ukraine and arrested OUN-B leaders. The OUN, writes Fomenko, and also following Kosyk, did not collaborate. He cites several German documents that describe the OUN-B as the most dangerous of the anti-German units. He also quotes an OUN document that threatens members with the death penalty for collaborating with the Germans. In Fomenko's view this is sufficient evidence that the OUN never collaborated. Concerning the NKVD-UPA conflict, he takes issue with accusations that the UPA killed civilians. Though some mur­ders were committed, he says, the NKVD killed more people, and often did this under cover and dressed as UPA insurgents. Besides, the UPA fought for freedom and the interests of the Ukrainian people. He emphasizes that it was a multi-ethnic organization comprised of many different nationalities. But in Ukraine, he says, an abnormal situation has existed for 11 years in which those who destroyed the Ukrainian people have enjoyed the status of war vet­erans and receive benefits, while the “freedom fighters” are deprived of this same status. He concludes with an appeal for unity on the basis of the recog­nition of UPA.⁴⁷

While the Working Commission was fulfilling its task, the Ivan Franko Drohobych State Pedagogical University held its 6th International Scientific Conference entitled “The National-Liberation Movement in the West Ukrain­ian Lands in the 1920s-1950s." It was organized by the history faculty of the Drohobych University and L'viv National University, with the participation of Drohobych city council, and invited speakers from Ukraine and Poland. In a public statement about the event, the local political leaders outlined the role of the UPA in the “struggle of Ukrainians for freedom and their own state" and expressed the wish that “the conference will restore historical reality"! By this phrase they signified the recognition of UPA combatants as official par­ticipants in the Second World War. Among the papers presented, one by M. S. Savchyn, Dean of the Faculty of History, outlined the essence and the con­tent of the “national revolution of the OUN" in the 1930s, and showed how it developed and changed in the 1940s from “elements of totalitarianism” to democracy. K. H. Kondratyuk, head of the department of the contemporary history of Ukraine at L'viv National University, discussed how the UPA was formed, and the various forms of its struggle against the German occupiers in Volhynia, Polissya, and Galicia. Two other speakers were Volodymyr Ser- hiichuk (Kyiv) who examined national formations in the composition of UPA, and S. I. Makarchuk (L'viv) who spoke on “Soviet methods of struggle with the OUN and UPA,” based on materials from Drohobych and L'viv re­gions in 1944-45.⁴⁸ In this same month of October 2002, Den' featured an interview with Yurii Shukhevych, son of the UPA leader, Roman Shukhevych, who was asked why nothing had been done to date to recognize the UPA offi­cially. Shukhevych responded that the attitude toward the UPA had developed over several decades, with a hostile attitude toward everything linked to the struggle for national liberation. The truth would be known within one or two decades, he added, “It must be and it shall be.”⁴⁹ Implicitly therefore there is a correct version of these events that must be elaborated, and the duty of histo­rians is less to ascertain information than to propagate the new version.

Another conference in October 2002 took place in the village that was the birthplace of Stepan Bandera, Staryi Uhryniv, in Kalush region, Ivano- Frankivs'k oblast under the title “UPA as a Phenomenon of National History.” It was organized by the Subcarpathian University and the Institute of Ukrain­ian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and attended by schol­ars from Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Kryvyi Rih, Ternopil', and Chernihiv, as well as by UPA veterans. Conference participants were greeted by the president of the Ivano-Frankivs'k branch of the Brotherhood of UPA soldiers, Fedir Volo- dymyrs'kyi, who expressed his certainty that the gathering would contribute to the search for “historical truth about the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in the 1930s-1950s and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.” Eight papers were presented and covered such topics as the problems of national history in the 20th century, methodological approaches to the study of the Ukrainian national movement from the 1930s to the 1950s, contemporary national his­toriography of UPA, and the various stages of the struggle between the “Soviet totalitarian regime” and the insurgents in the postwar period. As the confer­ence ended, participants visited the Stepan Bandera Museum in the village and listened to a talk by Taras Fedoriv, head of the village administration, about the main episodes in the life and career of Bandera. Next the famous local singer Mykhailo Kryven' performed a number of UPA songs that were “received emotionally by the audience.” It can probably be assumed therefore that the conference's final recommendations—for intensification of research directed at “an unbiased portrayal of UPA”—would be somewhat more diffi­cult to attain given the setting and conditions in which this gathering was held.⁵⁰

In an article on the 61st anniversary of the creation of UPA, Roman Zaho- ruiko, an UPA veteran, places this event in the context of an age-old Ukrain­ian struggle against “foreign conquerors-enslavers” of Ukraine, which included Poles, Romanians, Magyars, Germans, Slovaks, and Russians. The struggle of the UPA was the most intense of all because of the way it had united the Ukrainian people. He refers to the insurgency as “the awakening of the spirit of the nation.” The UPA was a phenomenal army made up of “enthusiastic patriots and idealistic fanatics.” It was an army without a state and without a uniform, and no salary was required for serving in it. As an army, it may have left something to be desired, but its shortcomings were compensated for by qualities such as dedication, patriotism, and the commitment of its members. Sometimes, in his view, literature about the UPA is too romantic: the reality was a permanent lack of sleep, constant hunger, and always the danger of the enemy. There was also constant uncertainty concerning who was a friend and who was an enemy. Insurgents were never sure whether or not someone would betray them to the NKVD for a financial reward. The heavy casualties eventually convinced the UPA leadership that the struggle was lost, but Ukraine was an “El Dorado or Klondike” for which foreign conquerors—very similar in outlook even though they were opposed to each other—were fight­ing. The UPA was the “third force” that battled only for freedom and the in­dependence of Ukraine on its native land. He concludes by denouncing the Ukrainian state that has failed to recognize its heroes: the world has recog­nized OUN and UPA insurgents as heroes, but the state, like a stepmother, which acquired independence thanks to the blood shed by these people, does not.⁵¹

Zahoruiko's hyperbole, particularly regarding “world recognition” is more than matched by an article by Yevhen Sverstyuk that appeared in late 2003. The author analyzes social processes in contemporary Ukraine in the context of the debates over the status of UPA. The question of who supports recogni­tion and who is opposed, he writes, defines who is who today. Looking into this historical mirror, everyone can see their own reflection. However, the whole issue is misguided and senseless, because the phenomenon of the UPA towers over the debate. The UPA is the “tributary of the river of the Ukrainian people that flows from primordial foundations. This river was raging during the times of the Cossacks, and although its flow was at times impeded, it was always a river of the independence struggle.” He cites heroes such as Myroslav Symchych, whose entire life was a struggle, and who even changed the face of the Gulag, transforming it into a hotbed of resistance to both Stalinism and the criminals in the camps. That, for Sverstyuk, is UPA. But what of those who do not wish to recognize or oppose it? The failure of the Ukrainian gov­ernment to recognize the UPA is a symptom of the lack of identity of the country's new rulers. They are “spiritually alien and nationally empty post­Communists,” whose lives are distant from those of nationally conscious Ukrainians. The achievement of independence, in Sverstyuk's view, was a re­sult of UPA's struggle. He recalls his own career and interrogations during his arrest, and how he would be comforted by remembering the OUN Decalogue while in prison. The idealism of the Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960s, he writes, was motivated by UPA's battles and inherited from the insurgents. It was an honest struggle that could not be controlled by Communist propa­ganda and repression. People must remember the heroes and victims of the liberation struggle, the article concludes.⁵²

Idealizing the UPA in this way served as a contrast to the former Soviet writ­ing that demonized the insurgents, though it may have proved equally unhelpful in the quest for a dispassionate assessment of this organization. Den' newspaper focused on this negative image in an article by Serhiy Stepanyshyn, issued to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the conference of captive nations in Eastern Europe and Asia. Stepanyshyn considers that this type of propaganda served to separate people from their historical roots and to consolidate hostile regimes in power. Regarding UPA, he remarks that Bolshevik propaganda never used the correct acronym in the official media but always replaced it with phrases that used the name Bandera, which equated insurgents with an image of a murderer or bandit; or a follower of the Nazis; or a “bourgeois-nationalist,” etc. The falsehoods about the UPA and who it served were easily propagated in the Soviet Union and even in Ukraine, since people were completely unaware of the situation in Western Ukraine. To be a follower of Bandera—or Banderite— was the worst designation possible, and was adopted by people in Russia and Eastern Ukraine as a general term to depict Western Ukrainians. To some ex­tent such stereotyping could be advantageous, and Stepanyshyn comments how as a Western Ukrainian being conscripted into the Soviet army, he was treated with some respect and not subjected to the bullying that was the common prac­tice. Yet apprehension about Banderites is still enough to intimidate people and make it difficult for them to accept that insurgents of the UPA deserve the same respect as that accrued to any Second World War veteran. They were not brutes, but rather “heroes who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of their native land from the aggressors.”⁵³

At the end of the Kuchma era, the issue of full recognition of the OUN and UPA as participants in and veterans of the Second World War had not been resolved. As the narratives illustrate, those supporting such recognition were becoming more insistent in their demands, and the portrayals were linked consistently to a centuries-long struggle for independence on the part of the Ukrainian people. Conversely, those who did not support recognition and those in other parts of Ukraine generally were often branded as ignorant or dupes of Soviet propaganda, and as people who did not know their own his­tory. Aside from some qualified remarks—such as the warning not to roman­ticize the UPA by the former insurgent—the depiction generally to this point was idealistic and always employed a national, rather than regional back­ground. That comment applies not only to UPA, but also to accounts of the interwar period and the rise of the OUN, the earlier years of the war, and the postwar period. Historical memory takes on a singular and narrow image of selfless warriors fighting only for their native land and independence. In 2004, following the Orange Revolution, the Kuchma regime was replaced by a presidency, won over the course of a frenzied election campaign (eventually entailing three rounds of voting) by the leader of the opposition, Viktor Yu­shchenko, as noted above. The new government, which began with a remark­able degree of unity and international acceptance of change in Ukraine— particularly a move away from the Russian orbit and toward Europe and Euro­Atlantic structures—immediately faced the question of recognition of the na­tional insurgents. The first summer of the Yushchenko government also marked the 60th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War. Thus we will examine in turn the narratives around this event and then ana­lyze the attitude of the post-Kuchma government toward the question of rec­ognition and how the issue stands today in contemporary Ukaine.