The “Akt” of 30 June 1941
Easily the most controversial episode to this point in the war from the perspective of the OUN was the declaration of independence by supporters of the Bandera faction which had entered L’viv with the Nachtigal unit, accompanying the German army into Ukraine.
That the announcement was premature seems self-evident looking at the event from the perspective of 65 years. Equally controversial is the aftermath to the declaration, with the eventual arrest of the OUN leaders, including Bandera who did not enter Ukraine; and the rapid demise of the period of cooperation between the OUN-B and the German authorities. Among Ukrainians today, one finds a broad range of views on the significance of the Akt from those who regard it as one of the most important events in the history of Ukraine—the prelude to what occurred in 1991—to those who maintain that independence was announced without popular support and under the auspices of Hitler, hence a signal of the close links between the OUN-B and the German High Command, if not the Nazi regime itself. Here we will look more or less chronologically at a sampling of writings on this event and its consequences, based both on scholarly research and more popular writings in the Ukrainian media, in order to assess the importance of the Akt for the modern state, and its place in the minds of residents of Ukraine, as well as being a symbol of national aspirations for an independent state during the anticipated opening of Ukraine and defeat of the Soviet forces.In an article published in May 1988, V. P. Troshchyns’kyi writes that just a few days after the attack on the Soviet Union, the Germans demonstrated definitively their negative attitude to the notion of creating even a fictional, puppet “Ukrainian state.” Berlin regarded the announcement of an independent Ukraine in L’viv “under Fascist occupation” as inexpedient.
However, the Ukrainian nationalists continued to perceive their future through the instrument of Germany. That is why the Akt included the statement that the Ukrainian state would be closely linked with National Socialist Greater Germany which, under the leadership of Hitler, “is creating a new order in Europe and the world.” As to the immediate task, together with the independence declaration, the nationalists gave priority to the creation of a Ukrainian army, which would assist the German army and enter immediately into battle. When the Akt was announced, texts of the statement by acting premier Yaroslav Stets'ko were telegraphed to Hitler, Goering, Mussolini, Spanish dictator Franco, and other Fascist leaders. Troshchyns'kyi remarks that the telegram to Hitler referred to him as “our Fuehrer.” He concludes that the declaration of an independent Ukraine on 30 June was a propaganda action carried out by the German leaders through their agents, “the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.” However, it was never approved by Hitler. Despite such reticence, the collaboration continued, and according to some spokespersons among the nationalists, the lack of approval from the German leadership did not have great significance and the subsequent arrest of Stets'ko was nothing more than a temporary misunderstanding.64On 30 June 1990, activists from the Ukrainian Rukh and the Ukrainian Republican Party organized a meeting in the market square of L'viv. To commemorate the declaration of 30 June 1941, the black and red flag of the OUN was hung on a house in front of the tribune. Author L. Chishkun took exception to what he termed the “nationalists' open-air history lesson” and accused them of falsifying history. He expressed surprise that one of the speakers at the meeting, Y. Nikols'kyi, should characterize the Akt restoring the Ukrainian state as an unknown page of Ukrainian history. In fact, he pointed out, the speakers took care to ignore “the treacherous essence” of the independent government of Stets'ko.
In future writings, the “nationalists” omitted the third point of the Akt, i.e., the words pledging loyalty of the new government to the Third Reich, which is building a new order in Europe and the world, “and helps the Ukrainian people to liberate themselves from the Moscow occupation.” One of the major Nationalist myths, continues Chishken, is that of OUN resistance to the Nazis. He doubts that an independent Ukrainian state could have been proclaimed without the prior knowledge of the Germans and he accuses leaders of Nachtigal, like the future UPA leader Roman Shuk- hevych, of murdering Polish scholars in L'viv. Such distortions of history, in the writer's view, had a clear political objective, namely to elicit Nationalist sentiment. He quotes one of the youth leaders among the Ukrainian nationalists as referring to a “struggle to the death with Moscow” and urging his compatriots not to get carried away with support for democracy or a parliamentary system.65 The purpose of this article seems clear: to equate the OUN-B closely with Hitler's Germany, dispense with the notion that the Ukrainians only allied with the Germans in order to attain an independent Ukraine, and to undermine the emerging sentiment that the OUN-B represented interests that had come to fruition in modern Ukraine, now on the verge of independence. This was a fairly typical propagandistic piece of the late Soviet period. But how was the Akt portrayed in subsequent discourse?One rejoinder appeared in mid-1992, a time when many of the more controversial issues of Ukraine's recent past were questioned. The author, R. Rakhmannyi, attempts to make sense of the Second World War through the prism of the “Ukrainian Question.” In the author's view, the date of 30 June 1941 ranks as the most important in 20th-century Ukrainian history, because it was on this date that the Ukrainians unambiguously charted their future path in the struggle for liberation. He perceives the war as the struggle of Western democracies to re-establish state borders as they existed in 1935, and to restore the Versailles system, which had ignored the principle of selfdetermination.
The Atlantic Charter, he observes, speaks only of the restoration of states destroyed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. To the cohort of these states, belongs the “aggressive state” of Poland and “destructive” Russia, signifying that all those people “melting away in the Russian pot” were supposed to do the same in the future as they had done after Versailles, thus forming a single Soviet people. In this way, the war was completely anti-popular and totally unnecessary. Implicitly Rakhmannyi appears to be arguing that the war might have been just if the Ukrainian question had not been ignored. The importance of 30 June 1941 is that it revealed the real strivings of the Ukrainian people and augured the creation of the armed resistance in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.66A more detailed account of the events behind the Akt is offered by Myk- hailo Koval'. He writes that on the night of 29 June 1941, the OUN-B leadership took control of the city of L'viv in order to carry out the declaration of independence. Within seven hours after the German occupation of the city, the battalion Nachtigal, together with underground resistance fighters, fought with the retreating Soviet army, which departed from the city in panic and chaos. On 30 June, the OUN-B leadership met in secret, but with the knowledge of the German authorities, and declared Ukrainian independence in order to confront the Germans with a fait accompli. However, Koval' writes, such insubordination elicited a sharply negative reaction in Berlin. It became clear that Ukraine had a new and uncompromising enemy that would adopt an imperialistic policy toward it. This reaction led to a crisis in GermanOUN-B relations both in Berlin and with the occupation authorities. The message given to Bandera was that only the Fuehrer could lead the fight against Moscow, and Ukrainian allies were not needed. Therefore relations between the OUN-B and the Germans deteriorated and links between the two wings of the OUN also became more complex.
The Mel'nyk wing was permitted to exist legally and collaborated openly with the occupation authorities, even though some rank-and-file OUN-M did carry out some acts of resistance against the new occupants. The OUN-B, on the other hand, suffered as a result of the Akt. Bandera and Stets'ko were arrested and sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and they were later joined by several hundred OUN members arrested in July. In consequence, the OUN-B ordered its units to go underground and added the Germans to its list of irrevocable enemies.67Koval's namesake, Viktor Koval', provides a succinct account of this same event. On 30 June, Banderites entering L'viv ahead of the main German forces announced the L'viv Akt of the rebirth of the Ukrainian state and created a government. On 5 July, the members of this government were arrested by the Gestapo. On 15 September, before the capture of Kyiv, the Germans shot many OUN-B members, and Bandera and many of his supporters were taken to a concentration camp. On 25 November 1941, a German report was issued that warned of OUN-B preparations for an uprising in the Reichskom- missariat Ukraine with the goal of establishing Ukrainian independence. It was therefore necessary to arrest all Banderite activists immediately and exterminate them in secret as thieves. Thus in December a new wave of executions began. The followers of Mel'nyk, on the other hand, operated freely on the territory of Galicia and in the Generalgouvernement, created on former Polish territories by the German administration.68 This account elevates the OUN-B to the main resistance force among the Ukrainian activists, and the OUN-M as the collaborators. A former member of the Nachtigal battalion, taking issue with a hostile account of the OUN-B written by Wiktor Polisz- czuk, writes that although Poliszczuk has tried to implicate OUN-B in collaborating with the Germans, the two battalions formed, Nachtigal and Roland, did not commit a single crime against either Communists or the Polish population of Western Ukraine.69 Reviewer Stepan Zlupko, citing a book by V.
Kosyk on Ukraine and Germany in the Second World War, likewise comments approvingly on the author's contention that the OUN-UPA was a more dangerous enemy of the Germans than the Soviet Partisans. This same author evidently cited the OUN-B Memorandum of 15 June 1941 that an alliance with Germany could be possible only if the interests of both sides were re- spected.70 Both these sources offer a strongly slanted perspective of history.A more academic analyst, Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, for his part observes in a 1999 article that the OUN tried to embellish the Akt by removing the words expressing allegiance to Nazi Germany, which opponents of the OUN subsequently used as evidence of collaboration. However, the OUN-B, in this writer’s view, may have had little choice and it would be naive to think that the Akt heralded anything other than a puppet state. Nationalists proclaimed the state, in other words, so that they could ascertain Germany’s intentions, and the German response accordingly deprived them of any illusions. As for the long-term consequences of the Akt, it convinced the Western allies that the OUN was indeed a firm supporter of Hitler, and this belief was supported by the barrage of Soviet propaganda that followed. However, the Germans came to realize that the OUN (he does make any distinction between the two branches) was the enemy and began repressions.71 A year later, the same author offered a more lengthy espousal of his views on the Akt in an article written for Ukrainian schoolteachers. In this article he states that between September 1939 and June 1941 relations between the Nazi officials and Ukrainian nationalists were practically problem-free. Since the OUN members were the enemies of the Poles, they were ipso facto the allies of the Germans. Although there was a formal ban on activities of non-German organizations on territories occupied by the Third Reich, the OUN leadership (Provid) in Krakow began to prepare the way for creation of future state structures in Ukraine. The OUN-B thus created the State Commission of the OUN, while the OUN-M established a Commission on State Planning. It was evident to both groups that a German-Soviet war would break out in the near future. The OUN believed that the Germans would support an independent Ukraine as it was in their strategic interest, and after the expected destruction of the USSR there would be a union of Germany and the enemies of Russia.72
Kul’chyts’kyi notes the similarities between the ideologies of German National Socialism and Ukrainian integral nationalism, and also the interest of the German special services in deploying the OUN forces on the territory of Ukraine. He adds that Ukrainians took part in preparatory work at instruction centers of the German Abwehr, as well as in specially created police schools and OUN organizations in Krakow. By the end of 1940, units of the Ukrainian auxiliary police had been created. Subsequently, in March-May 1941 two battalions—Roland and Nachtigal—were created in special detachments of the Abwehr. Clearly, Kul’chys’kyi believes, the Germans were exploiting the Ukrainian nationalist forces, but the latter were quite genuine in their desire for cooperation. He cites an NKVD document of 31 May 1941, stating that “the Mel’nyk faction openly supports links with the Gestapo.” On 22 June 1941, the leader of the diversionary administration of the Abwehr, Captain E. Stolz, instructed Bandera and Mel’nyk to carry out provocative actions in the rear of the Soviet army. These actions were reportedly carried out by Bandera’s forces in Galicia and Volyn, and by Mel’nyk’s troops in Bukovyna. Soviet sources, writes Kul’chyts’kyi, interpreted this cooperation in only one way, that of actions against the true interests of the Ukrainian people. This perspective was heightened following the 2nd Great Assembly of the OUN in Krakow in April 1941, which elaborated the tactics of the OUN-B for the immediate future, with the primary goal of establishing Ukrainian independence. Both wings of the OUN sought that same goal, but as German archival materials demonstrate, Kul’chyts’kyi writes, OUN-M wanted to expand Ukrainian lands at the expense of Russia, and with German support, whereas the OUN-B wanted to use its own forces to create the independent state. To the West, such distinctions were unclear, and the Western democracies did not generally see beyond the obvious: that the OUN as a whole was standing behind the forces of Hitler. In Kul’chyts’kyi’s opinion, the attitude of the West toward the nationalists did not change much even when the Cold War started; a statement that would not be accepted everywhere.73
Kul’chyts’kyi goes on to detail the specific events surrounding the Akt. On 30 June, Stets’ko, speaking on behalf of his absent leader Bandera, announced the Act of Independence, which was broadcast twice on a L’viv radio station, on the evening of 30 June and the early morning of 1 July. For several days afterward the Stets’ko government operated legally.74 This time was used to prepare the administrative apparatus and to form a Ukrainian nationalrevolutionary army. On 3 July, the author reveals, Stets’ko declared that the Ukrainian state was part of a “new European order subordinate to the great Fuehrer of the German army and the German people.” To this point evidently the reader should consider the OUN-B as close partners of the occupants. However, on 2 July the Gestapo in L’viv informed Berlin about the formation of a Ukrainian political government, as well as its organization of a militia and a magistrate’s office. So, Kul’chyts’kyi asks: should we consider the Akt of 30 June 1941 one of the episodes marking state-creation activity of the Ukrainian people in the 20th century? Such a view is expressed quite often in certain literature, he adds. But the real goal was to force the hand of the Germans, who were not allies of the Ukrainian nationalists, but the conquerors of Soviet Russian territory. At the same time, Kul’chyts’kyi indicates that events happened with almost painful slowness—at least from the Ukrainian nationalist perspective. It took three weeks before Bandera refused to reject the declaration of independence, at which point he was sent to a concentration camp.
Only on 5 August was the order given by the German army commander in Ukraine to arrest Bandera's followers. At that time Roland and Nachtigal were disbanded. Yet the first mass arrests and executions of OUN-B members did not begin until mid-September, and the wholesale crackdown on them began only after 25 November, five months after the original declaration.75
Ukrainian writers continued to struggle with the events of this period, ostensibly in an attempt to reconcile a period of cooperation with the Germans and the short-lived Akt. The reflective and intelligent article published by Kost' Bondarenko under the title “The history we don't know or don't care to know” has been cited above. Bondarenko rationalizes that after Poland surrendered, the OUN faced a situation in which one harsh ruler was replaced by an even more ruthless one. The Ukrainian peasants had long recognized two clearly delineated enemies: the Polish and Soviet authorities, but the new situation brought just one enemy: the USSR. Hence it became necessary to use the assistance of Germany to defeat this oppressor. He describes the beginning of the split in the OUN and how the dissenting group formed under Bandera was unable to reach a compromise with the forces of Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, he observes, both OUN factions hoped for a military victory by the Germans, and each branch cooperated with different sections of the German authority: Mel'nyk had close links with the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht, whereas Bandera maintained contact and worked with the Abwehr. He provides perhaps the key point in this whole debate, namely that Hitler's state was far from monolithic and agencies could operate independently. Other historians have pointed out Hitler's policy of “divide and rule” among his minions. Ukrainians benefited from such disorder but ultimately suffered for it as well. Even prior to the formation of the two battalions, one of Mel'nyk's followers, Roman Sushko, formed a military unit called the Bergsbauernhilfe, which advanced as far as Stryi but had to leave the town in September 1939 as it had been designated as Soviet territory according to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.76
Bondarenko acknowledges that the Nachtigal and Roland units were accused by both Polish and Soviet historians of wartime atrocities after they entered Western Ukraine, including the execution of Polish officials and subse- quently—in July 1941—taking part in pogroms against L'viv's Jewish population. He notes that none of these accusations has ever been convincingly proved and that those who took part in these campaigns have been consistent in their avowals of innocence. He states that the battalions were disbanded in 1942—which is quite different from the August 1941 date cited by Kul'- chyts'kyi. They were dispatched to Belarus, but most of the troops deserted and eventually found their way into the UPA. Concerning the Akt, he outlines the tactical differences between the two branches of the OUN at this time. The OUN-B's plan was to accompany the Germans through Ukraine and to declare independence as they moved from one town to another. The OUN-M, on the other hand, considered the Akt premature because the declaration of an independent Ukraine could only take place in Kyiv. Both plans proved to be pipedreams because the Germans did not take such programs seriously. After the arrest of the 29-year-old Stets'ko in early July, the occupier concealed as far as possible the events of 30 June. Such a decision ran counter to the plans of Hitler's associates such as Alfred Rosenberg, who considered that an independent Ukraine might supply some 4 million troops that could assist the German army in its push eastward. Bondarenko notes that the OUN-M leaders suffered dreadful fates and several were executed at Babyn Yar in February 1942. Like Bandera, Mel'nyk was eventually transferred to the Sachsenhausen camp.77
Finally, an account of the happenings of late June 1941 was provided in a scholarly account in Ukraine's main historical journal by I. I. Il'yushyn. He lists the main events: Stets'ko's proclamation of a Ukrainian state after a 23year hiatus; the formation of a revolutionary army by Ivan Klymiv (Lehenda) on 1 July for the protection of the new state; and Stets'ko's 3 July decree about the creation of a Ukrainian state administration. Despite the apparent initial success of the new government, he notes, the attitude of Ukrainian groups was mixed and dramatically different. The Banderites offered unequivocal support, while the OUN-M was strongly opposed. The supporters of the Hetmanate of Skoropads'kyi were also hostile not to the creation of a state per se, but to the way that the OUN-B had tried to bring it about. Many Ukrainians of the older generation were of the opinion that a long-term administration could only be constructed with the aid of the Germans. Documents indicate that a considerable portion of Ukrainian society of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia regarded the Akt positively, but the same cannot be said of Central and Eastern Ukraine, where the basic mass of the population felt that independence could better be attained by a struggle with, not alongside, the Fascists. What was the attitude of the German leadership, Il'yushyn asks? The German reaction was extremely negative. The Nazi leadership did not consider the Ukrainian people suitable for independent statehood. That is why on 3 July members of the Ukrainian National Committee and leaders of the OUN-B were brought to Krakow to explain their actions to the Understate Secretary of the Generalgouvernement, Kundt. A week later, a directive was issued by Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the non-recognition of the Ukrainian government.78
According to Il'yushyn, however, the mass arrests occurred mainly among the OUN-B, as the OUN-M managed to get its representatives into key leadership posts in the organs of civil government in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and other towns and smaller settlements of Central and Eastern Ukraine. Following the German occupation of Kyiv, the OUN-M, together with local Ukrainians, created on 5 October 1941 a Ukrainian National Council led by Professor Mykola Velychkivs'kyi. However, Hitler never agreed with Slavic peoples holding significant positions, and the Council proved short-lived despite protests from the Ukrainian leaders.79 This account provides some new insights into the thorny issue of the OUN and the Akt of 1941. Clearly its importance has been emphasized over those actions that were conducted in Ukraine's capital by the followers of Mel'nyk. It is the Akt that is becoming recognized in modern Ukraine as the forerunner of the declaration of independence of August 1991. Yet the episode represents no more than a small footnote in the horrific events of the German-Soviet war. The overwhelming impression from the overall discourse that has pervaded Ukraine since the late 1980s is of the naivety of the youthful nationalists who clearly misread German intentions regarding the establishment of the future state. Of unspoken significance is the fact that no Ukrainian state could in reality be announced from L'viv, which at best was the unofficial capital of Western Ukraine—and indeed only recognized as such by the Soviet creation of the People's Assembly in October 1939. However, the ramifications for the future do not represent the most discussed issue: that position belongs to the alleged collaboration with a regime that has been consigned to infamy, riddled with war criminals, and forever linked with the events of the Holocaust and its death camps scattered across Central and Eastern Europe. This same issue was to plague the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as well.
Notes
1 Nikolai Romanchenko, “Plamya,” L’vovs’kaya pravda, 16 February 1988, p. 3.
2 Myron Sluka, “Palacha k otvetu,” L’vovs’kaya pravda, 12 March 1988, p. 3.
3 P. Maksimyuk and G. Slivka, “Ispytannym oruzhiyem pravdy,” L’vovs’kaya pravda, 20 February 1988, p. 3.
4 V. Zarechnyi and O. Lastovets, “Banderovshchina,” Pravda Ukrainy, 9 August 1989, pp. 3-4.
5 Ibid., Pravda Ukrainy, 9 August 1989, pp. 3-4; 10 August 1989, p. 4; 11 August 1989, p. 3;
17 August 1989, pp. 3-4; and 19 August 1989, p. 3.
6 A. Gorban', “Krovavyye sledy banderovtsev,” Pravda Ukrainy, 11-12 October 1989, p. 3.
7 Visti z Ukrainy, No. 3 (January 1991): 1.
8 V. Maslovskii, V. Pomogayev, “OUN-UPA: Dokumenty svidetel'stvuyut',” L'vovs'kaya pravda, 11 June 1991, p. 2.
9 V. P. Troshchyns'kyi, “Proty vyhadok pro tak zvanyi ‘antyfashysts'kyi rukh oporu' Ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 5 (1988): 77-78.
10 S. Makarchuk, “OUN: Metamorfozy voennogo vremeni,” L'vovs'kaya pravda, 27 November 1988, p. 3.
11 Wiktor Poliszczuk, Legal and Political Assessment of the OUN and UPA (Toronto, 1997), pp. 13-26. For a more objective account, see Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: the Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1980), pp. 142-143.
12 Roman Holovyn, “Pomsta za smert' Ol'hy Basarab,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 13 February 1999, p. 2.
13 Mariya Bazelyuk, “Zaplatoyu nam radist' borot'by,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 11 February 1994, p.
2.
14 Mariya Bazelyuk, “Z rodu Kravtsivykh,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu,” 22 February 1994, p. 2.
15 Leonid Cherevatenko, “Heznanyi voyak,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 10 June 1994, p. 2.
16 Roman Pastukh, “Za narod poklaly molodi zhyttya,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 23 December 1995, p. 2.
17 Roman Pastukh, “Dva portrety narodnykh heroiv,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 22 December 1998, p.
3.
18 Peter J. Potichnyj, ed. Litopys UPA: Underground Journals from Beyond the Curzon Line: 1945-1947, Vol. 16 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1987), p. 112.
19 Myron Kuropas, “Free at last! Free at last!” The Ukrainian Weekly, 8 December 1991, p. 7.
20 Viktor Koval', “Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya: Dovidka Instytutu istorii AN URSR dlya Komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan' bezpeky vid 1 lypnya 1991 roku,” Ukraina i svit, No. 35 (18-24 September 1996).
21 Stepan Mudryk-Mechnyk, “OUN—kermanych nashoi borot'by,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 5 February 1998, p. 2.
22 Mykhailo Koval', Ukraina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznyanii viinakh, 1939-1945 rr. (Kyiv: Vydannyi Dim Al'ternatyvy, 1999), p. 144.
23 Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, “Za Ukrainu, za ii volyu,” Ukraina moloda, 31 August 2000, p. 10.
24 Kost' Bondarenko, “Istoriya, yakoi ne znayemo, chy ne khochemo znaty?” Dzerkalo tyzhnya, No. 12, 29 March-5 April 2002 [http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/index/387/].
25 I. I. Il'yushyn, “Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni prahnennya ukrains'kykh ta pol's'kykh samosti- inyts'kykh syl za chasiv Druhoi svitovoi viiny,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 1 (2003): 82-96.
26 “Yevhen Konovalets': do natsional'noho kalendarya,” Literaturna Ukraina, 28 May 1992, p. 7.
27 Ihor Hulyk, “Yevhen Konovalets'—za Ukrainu i za ii idei,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 14 June 1991, p. 2.
28 Ibid.
29 Volodymyr Yavors'kyi, “Vin ne vpadav u vidchai. Vin borovsya,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 22 May 1993, pp. 1-2.
30 Mykola Oleksyuk, “Ubyvtsya Konoval'tsya vidomyi,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 19 September 1992, p. 1.
31 Mykhailo Yatsura, “Vidlunnya zlochynu,” Za vilnu Ukralnu, 23 May 1998, p. 2.
32 N. Karpova, “Vybor,” Pravda Ukrainy, 4 January 1990, p. 4.
33 V. Dovgan', “Kem byl Bandera: shtrikhi k politicheskomu portretu,” Pravda Ukrainy, 13 December 1990, p. 3. In another article of this same period, S. Karnautska cites the proceedings of the interrogation of the Abwehr colonel, Erwin Stolz. Stolz states that in September 1939, after the defeat of the Polish army, the Germans released Stepan Bandera from prison and recruited him as an agent. S. Karnautska, “Portret bez retushi,” L'vovs'kaya pravda, 8 May 1991, p. 2.
34 Ibid.
35 Ol'ha Ivanova, “Kto vin, Stepan Bandera?” Samostiina Ukraina, No. 15 (April 1992): 4.
36 Roman Pastukh, “Rodyna Stepana Bandery,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 13, October 1994, p. 2; 14 October 1994, p. 2; 15 October 1994, p. 2; and 18 October 1994, p. 2.
37 Roman Pastukh, “Sestry Stepana Bandery pereizhdzhayut' do Stryya,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 18 January 1995, p. 2.
38 Ivan Krainii, “Vo im'ya ottsya Andriya Bandery,” Ukraina moloda, 28 October 1999, p. 10.
39 Omelyan Kushpeta, “Znav ioho osobysto,” Literaturna Ukraina, 23 January 1992, p. 6.
40 Yaroslav Kitura, “Stepan Bandera—symvol svobody,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 4 January 1996, p. 2.
41 Petro Duzhyi, “Borot'ba za derzhavu tryvaye,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 1 January 1997, p. 2.
42 Nataliya Khramamova, “Rol' Bandery: bez pyshnykh vusiv ta ek'zal'tovanoho patriotyzmu,” Ukraina moloda, 23 July 1996, p. 8.
43 Yuri Kril, “Stepan Bandera is back home,” Den'; The Day Weekly Digest, 15 October 2002 [http://www.day.kiev.ua/259594/].
44 See, for example, the vitriolic article by Nikolai Shybyk, “Porkhavka,” Pravda Ukrainy, 21 November 1989, p. 4.
45 Mariya Bazelyuk, “Khto vidvazhnyi, nekhai ide z namy,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 28 January 1994, p. 2.
46 Ivan Krainii, “Nevidomyi Yaroslav Stets'ko,” Ukraina moloda, 1 February 2002, p. 4.
47 Vasyl' Marochkin, “Trydtsyat' dniv z Mykoloyu Lebed'em,” Visti z Ukrainy, No. 27 (June 1991): 3.
48 Mykola Lebed', “My znaly-nas chekae Ukraina,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu (22 August 1992): 1-2.
49 Halyna Hordasevych, Stepan Bandera: lyudyna i mif (L'viv: Piramida, 2001).
50 Transcarpathia was incorporated in June 1945, by agreement with Czechoslovakia, and the Crimea was transferred from Russia to Ukraine as a “gift” in 1954 to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Otherwise the boundary changes that occurred in September 1939 basically were adhered to in the formation of the modern state.
51 Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: the Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
52 S. Makarchuk, “Volya naroda,” L'vovs'kayapravda, 26 October 1988, p. 2.
53 Cited in V. Bondarchuk, “Velichiye oktyarbrs'kikh dnei,” L'vovs'kaya pravda, 28 February 1991, p. 2.
54 V. Kovalyuk, “Zakhidna Ukraina na pochatku Druhoi svitovoi viiny,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1991): 36.
55 Yurii Shapoval, “Komunistychno-fashysts'kyi ‘roman.' Podii 1939 roku ochyma komunistiv todi i teper,” Ukraina moloda, 22 October 1999, p. 4.
56 Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, “I znovu pro 17 veresnya 1939 roku,” Istoriya Ukrainy, No. 38 (October 2000): 9.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Koval', Ukraina vDruhii svitovii ³ Velykyii Vitchyznyanii viinakh (1939-1945 rr.) p. 146.
60 Ibid.
61 Yurii Shapoval, “Skazaty vsyu pravdu: do 50-richchya UPA,” Literaturna Ukraina, 1 October 1992, p. 7.
62 Larysa Hupalo, “Vony polehly na Kulebakh,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 7 March 1991, p. 4.
63 “Tsya pamyat' rozstrilyuye hrudy,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 16 January 1999, p. 3.
64 V. P. Troshchyns'kyi, “Proty vyhadok pro tak zvany ‘antyfashysts'kyi rukh oporu' Ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 5 (May 1988): 79-80.
65 L. Chishkun, “Ploshchad' Rynok 10, 30 yunya 1941-90 gg.” L'vovs'kaya pravda, 6 July 1990, p. 4.
66 R. Rakhmannyi, “Vyznachnyi Akt istorii,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 30 June 1992, p. 2.
67 Koval', Ukraina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznyanii viinakh, p. 148.
68 Viktor Koval', “Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya: dovidka instytutu istorii AN URSR dlya Komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan' bezpeky vid 1 lypnya 1991 roku,” Ukraina i svit, No. 55 (18-24 September 1996).
69 Myroslav Kalba, “Hirka-pravda—zlochynnist' OUN-UPA,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 25 June 1996, p. 2.
70 Stepan Zlupko, “Ukraina v svitli nimets'kykh dokumentiv,” Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 28 June 1997, p. 2.
71 Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, “Kolaboratsionizm OUN-UPA: derzhavnoi zrady ne bulo,” Ukraina moloda, 8 December 1999, p. 7.
72 S. Kul'chyts'kyi, “Akt 30 chervnya 1941 roku,” Istoriya Ukrainy, No. 23-24 (June 2000): 69.
73 Ibid.
74 Of course the question of what was legal is surely up for debate. The city had been under Austrian rule until the outbreak of the First World War; Polish after the Treaty of Riga; Soviet from September 1939; and was now Ukrainian under German auspices!
75 Ibid.
76 Bondarenko, “Istoriya, kotoruyu ne znaem, ili ne khotim znat',” Zerkalo Nedeli, No. 12 (29 March-5 April 2002).
77 Ibid.
78 Il'yushyn, “Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni prahnennya ukrains'kykh ta pol's'kykh samostiinyts'kykh syl za chasiv Druhoi svitovoi viiny,” pp. 88-89.
79 Ibid., p. 89.