the Mazepist interlude in Europe
Although Orlyk and his companions left Ottoman territory with a sigh of relief, their departure would have been less gratifying had they known that what they left behind—bitter as the disappointments of the Bender period had been—was better than what awaited them in the future.
No matter how tenuous the Mazepists’ position may have been in Bender, during their stay there they had at least a measure of political and military influence on the course of events. Orlyk was acknowledged as a commander of a sizable body of troops; he and his heneralna Starshyna concluded international treaties (the last Cossack leaders to do so); and the cause they represented— that of an independent or autonomous Ukrainian Cossack state—was of interest and relevance to the great powers involved in the Northern War, especially in its eastern theatre. However, with their departure from Bender, the Mazepists began a new phase in their careers—that of powerless, wandering, penniless and insecure political emigres.The small cohort of Ukrainians stayed in Sweden from 1715 to 1720. In political terms, their sojourn was of no political consequence. As he turned his attention to North Germany and other areas closer to home, Charles XII could not help but consider the Cossacks and their cause to be, for the time being at least, of little relevance. Nonetheless, the King’s strong sense of honor prevented him from completely ignoring the commitments he had made to the Ukrainians. He continued to treat Orlyk as a bona fide political leader (to bolster this image, the Hetman maintained, and when this was impossible, pretended to maintain a correspondence with “his army,” that is, the Zaporozhians).3 Moreover, a modest sum of 13,000 talers annually was assigned for the support of the emigres. Because these funds were woefully inadequate, Orlyk spent most of his time bombarding the Swedish government with appeals for more aid.4 Matters turned from bad to worse when, on 30 November 1718, during the siege of Frederisten fortress in Norway, a stray bullet ended the life of the “Lion of the North.” With their patron gone, it became increasingly evident to the Ukrainians that any financial or political support from Sweden would s∞n run out.
At this critical juncture, a ray of hope appeared on the European diplomatic scene. On 5 January 1719, the so-called Vienna Alliance was concluded between George I, acting in his role as the Kurfiirst of Hannover, Emperor Charles VI of Austria and, most importantly for the Ukrainian emigres, August II as the Elector of Saxony. Completely reversing his recent diplomatic ties, the Saxon ruler joined an alliance whose avowed purpose was to block the alarmingly aggressive designs of Peter I. To Orlyk and his colleagues it seemed that this turn of events would certainly provide the Mazepists with a political role again.
During the early months of 1719, the Ukrainians busily prepared to leave Sweden and move eastwards where the anticipated clash between the European powers and the “Muscovite menace” was most likely to occur. While Hertsyk, Nakhymovskyi and Myrovych departed on missions to the Zaporozhians and Khan Saadet Girei,5 Orlyk resumed his correspondence with August II and his ministers.
After reminding the Poles of his past services to the Commonwealth (his refusal to accept the Right Bank from the Ottomans), Orlyk tried to convince them of his and the Zaporozhians' potential usefulness in the looming confrontation with the Russians.6 Specifically, the Hetman pointed out the role that he could play in mobilizing the Tatars and Ottomans to come to the aid of the Commonwealth. In elaborating on this theme, he sketched an imaginative if somewhat unrealistic project.7 Because of his alliance with the Muslims, Orlyk argued that he was in a position to organize a grand alliance of Muslims, stretching from Constantinople to Kazan. To prove that such a project was feasible, he described an incident which he witnessed in Adrianople in 1713. That year a delegation of Tatars from the Volga region appeared before the Sultan. Complaining bitterly about the religious oppression of all Muslims in the Tsar’s realm, it fervently requested the Porte’s aid against their oppressors.
Although it was graciously received, the delegation was informed that the Muslims along the Volga would have to be patient and wait for the moment when the Porte found a promising opportunity to help them. According to Orlyk, this incident demonstrated that there was a Muslim feeling of community which could be utilized against Moscow in much the same way as Peter Γs defense of the Orthodox in the Balkans was being used against the Ottomans.In addition to religious motivations, the Ottomans had commercial reasons for going to war with Russia.8 Analyzing Peter Γs drive into the Caucasus and towards Persia, the Hetman argued that the Tsar’s goal was to reach the Caspian Sea in order to obtain a terminus for the great canal which he was building. This would provide the Russians with a water-route from the Baltic to the Caspian Seas which, in turn, would give them control of the great East-West trade route. Thus, income which once flowed into Ottoman or Safavid coffers would now be diverted to Russian hands. TheTsar would grow richer while the Sultan would be threatened with the loss of a large portion of his income. Such a threat, in Orlyk’s opinion, would certainly rouse the Porte into a war against the Russians.
In case of war, the Hetman and his Zaporozhians would provide the perfect link between the Poles and the Ottomans. Orlyk went on to present a plan of a grand offensive against the Russians.9 It called for the Ottomans to launch an attack from the Caucasus, Iirtk up with the Muslims of the Volga and strike at the soft underbelly of the Russian defenses. Meanwhile, Orlyk and his men, after uniting with the Bucak Horde, would move into Ukraine. Finally, the coup de grace would be administered by Polish and Swedish attacks from the west and north.
Another of the Hetman’s gambits was to point out the benefits which would accrue to the King and the Commonwealth if Cossacks, under Orlyk’s leadership, were granted autonomy on the Right Bank.
Such a step would be pleasing to the Ukrainians everywhere and it would lead to the retrieval of the Commonwealth of Kiev, Smolensk and its lost provinces on the Left Bank. Moreover, the King, who always had great difficulties in raising an army among the szlachta, would have 100,000 (!) Cossacks ready to serve him at no expense to the Crown. All this could easily be achieved if only August II would bypass the opposition of “certain parties,’’ i.e., of the eastern magnates.10The response of August II and his chief minister, Flemming, to these proposals was noncommital.11 (Perhaps they recalled another imaginative plan, one concerned with the supposedly easy conquest of Livonia, which was presented to the Saxon court by the Livonian emigre Johann Reinhold von Patkul in 1699 and which led August II into the disastrous Northern War.) Undaunted, Orlyk proceeded with his preparations to leave Stockholm. The Swedes, anxious to rid themselves of a burdensome guest, went out of their way to be helpful. On the condition that the Ukrainian emigres not return to Sweden, they provided Orlyk and his family with funds for their journey. Moreover, King Fredrick presented Orlyk with letters of recommendation to a number of European courts as well as to the Sultan and the Khan.12
On 11 October 1720, the Hetman and his party left Sweden. As they departed, the emigres were unaware that the very basis of their plans and hopes—the Vienna Alliance—was already beginning to crumble. Under the pressure of his English subjects, George I was forced to seek a rapprochement with Russia. Soon Charles VI and August II would have to do likewise. It was not, as Orlyk would soon discover, the best time to play on anti-Russian themes in Europe.