THE OTTOMAN-POLISH DEBATE OVER THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE

In March 1713, the Ottoman-Polish talks commenced.²² It was a shaky start. Issues such as those of sending Charles XII back to Sweden by way of Poland and of removing Russian troops from Poland did not pose major difficulties.

In the weeks that followed, several developments occurred which seemed to strengthen the Ottoman hand. During its talks with the Poles, the Porte was simultaneously negotiating with the Russians. After some bickering, on 5 June 1713, the Russian envoys agreed once more to give up any claims to the territory between the Samara and Orel Rivers, i.e., a large part of the Right Bank. Actually this was just a minor adjustment of the Ottoman-Russian agreement concerning Ukrainian territories which had been signed in Constantinople in 1712.²⁴ Nonetheless, with the Ukrainian issue finally settled with the Tsar, the Ottomans felt more confident about demanding similar concessions from the Poles.

Concessions were made by the Poles—but not by those Poles who mattered. Stanislaw Leszczynski and his adherents were in desperate straits in Bender after the Kalabalik. Unable to count on Charles XII for support, they realized that their only hope of re­gaining their positions in Poland depended on the aid of the Porte and the Khan. So desperate were they for this support that they literally threw themselves at the feet of the Khan and begged for his backing. In return, they promised that which they knew both the Khan and the Porte wanted most—Right Bank Ukraine.²⁵

The response to this offer was mixed.

Although his relations with Stanislaw were g∞d at Bender, Orlyk received his fellow emigres’ offer of the Right Bank with a notable lack of enthusiasm.²⁶ A major reason for this reaction was his completely pessimistic view of Stanislaw’s chances of regaining the Polish throne. Furthermore, the Ukrainian emigres were se­cretly trying to gain the confidence of August II and the official Polish government. Therefore, it made little sense for them to support Stanislaw.

On 3 August 1713, a combined force of Poles, Tatars, Ottomans and some Cossacks under the command of Abdi Pasha, the serasker of Khotyn, set out toward the Polish borders. A brief panic broke out in Poland, but August II, after arresting some of Stanislaw’s major supporters within the country, managed to restore control. Moreover, his troops appeared ready and able to face up to the invaders. This was enough to persuade Abdi Pasha that Stanislaw’s cause was hopeless and he ordered the expeditionary force to re­treat. In effect, this meant the withdrawal of Ottoman support for Stanislaw who was now left with no choice but to follow Charles XII to Europe and exile.

After Stanislaw’s failure, Ali Pasha resumed negotiations with Chomentowski. Again agreement was quickly reached on the issues of Charles XIΓs transit, of Russian evacuation of Poland and of amnesty for Stanislaw’s supporters. And again the Porte left the most difficult point—the matter of Ukraine—until the very last. This time, however, the Porte’s demands were better prepared and more cogently argued.

At first, the Grand Vizir tried to place Ottoman demands on a legal basis. He argued that the Porte had gained a legal right to Ukrainian territory both by right of conquest and because this right had been acknowledged by its treaty with the Russians.²⁷ Chomentowski replied that the Tsar had never meant to keep the territories on the Right Bank permanently: “His Majesty the Tsar had issued several ukazy that the land should be returned (to the Poles), but Mazepa, the betrayer of his master, did not obey them and wanted to keep it and place it under the Swedes.”²⁸ The Rus­sian envoy, Shafirov, was called to testify in this matter. His testi­mony, which infuriated the Grand Vizir, supported the Poles. The Russian went so far as to state that, since the original concessions in Ukraine had been imposed on the Tsar under duress, they could not be considered binding.

The Porte tried a different approach. Maurocordato, the Chief Dragoman, was sent to reason with the Poles.²⁹ He first stated that the Poles should allow the Porte to have the Right Bank out of gratitude for the Ottoman refusal to support Stanislaw further. When this brought no reaction, Maurocordato assured Chomen- towski that the Porte did not want the Right Bank for its own en­richment since there would be little benefit from such a ravaged land. Nor were Ottoman demands motivated by a desire to expand their borders since the empire already had enough provinces. It was to save face that the Porte wanted Ukrainian land. However, Cho- mentowski adamantly refused to budge.

But Ali Pasha was remarkably persistent. Orlyk and his Cossacks were now brought directly into the negotiations. The Grand Vizir stated that actually the Porte desired Ukrainian territory not for itself, but for Orlyk and his men.³⁰ This was hardly a more attrac­tive argument for Chomentowski who had been personally in­volved in the bitter Cossack-Polish conflicts in the Right Bank some ten years earlier.

Exasperated, the Grand Vizir made his final offer. He proposed that a stretch of land between the Dnieper and Dniester rivers be set aside in Ukraine for Orlyk and his Cossacks. But, instead of being under Ottoman sovereignty, the Cossacks were to accept the pro­tection of the Polish King and the Commonwealth. Should this proposal be acceptable, the Porte would officially recognize August II and renew the Treaty of Karlowitz.³¹

Caught off guard by this unexpected variation in the Porte’s demands, Chomentowski replied that he could make no decisions and proposed that special envoys be sent to August II and to the sejm (parliament) with the new proposal. At the end of September, Ottoman and Tatar envoys set out for Poland and on 17 October, in Warsaw, the following proposal was presented to August II:

Orlyk’s Cossacks, of which there should be about twenty thousand, should live in the land set aside for them in Ukraine and they (should) not be dependent on the Porte, or on the Khan, or on the Tsar... but only on the King and the Com­monwealth.³²

The King and his advisors responded cautiously. They stated that no decision could be taken in this matter until the electoral sejm convened and order was restored in Poland.³³ This reply did not satisfy the Porte and it seemed that only war could decide the issue of the Right Bank.