The Rebirth of Ukraine as a Nation

A short resume of Drahomanov^,s views on the history of Ukraine is the best introduction to his Ukrainian political program.

As for the period antecedent to the thirteenth century, it [the his­tory of Ukraine] reveals the federation of free cities, particularly of the cities of southern Rus’, which were grouped around Kiev.

Drahomanov believed that up to the time of the downfall of the Cos­sack state Ukraine, although perhaps retarded in its development, was still an organic part of the European world.

Most of the national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century Ukraine was linked to Western Europe. In spite of the handicaps caused by the Tatar invasions, Ukraine participated in Western Europe’s social and cultural progress.⁸³

This can be demonstrated by many details. For instance, in its own way Ukraine experienced the Renaissance and the Reformation. The great Cossack rebellion against Poland in the middle of the seventeenth cen­tury came close to giving Ukraine not only national independence, but also political and social institutions which could stand comparison with those of the most civilized European states.

[The frustration of these potentialities] was chiefly due to the devastation of Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century, when it was divided among Muscovy, Poland, and Turkey. Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate) then fell victim to the centralism of Mus­covite tsardom and the Petersburg Empire.... In the nineteenth century our Ukraine became a “province.” It was farther behind progressive Europe than it would have been if it had gone its own way from the seventeenth century on. In fact it was even more backward than Muscovy, which, in the seventeenth century, had been more retarded than Ukraine or Belorussia.⁸⁴

The retrogression of the Ukrainian people becomes evident when one compares the Cossack revolution of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the peas­ant revolts (haidamak movement) of the latter half of the eighteenth cen­tury. Both were mass movements of elemental force, but the leaders of the former were men with a European outlook and far-reaching plans. The uprising of the haidamaks was only a jacquerie.

[In the time of Khmelnytsky] the close relationships among all the classes of Ukrainian society—the nobles, Cossacks, burghers, priests, and peasants—made possible the emergence of men who could formulate their freedom-loving, democratic, and almost purely republican ideas in writing, and support them with argu­ments drawn from the history of their own and other lands.... The basic ideas of the last great Ukrainian mass movement, the haidamak revolt of 1768, under the leadership of Zalizniak and Honta, were scarcely more clearly expressed than those of the Stenka Razin and Pugachev rebellions [in Muscovy].⁸⁵

Drahomanov was firmly convinced that Muscovite Russia’s pro­tectorate had had an unfavourable effect on the political, social, and cul­tural development of the Ukrainian people. Socially, Russian domination led to the re-establishment of serfdom, which had previously been abolished in Dnieper Ukraine by the Cossack revolution. It is true that the Cossack state had been moving toward social stratification, the elders becoming a sort of new nobility.

Drahomanov’s acute historical perception did, however, lead him to see the obverse side of the problem. The union of Ukraine with Muscovy was no accident.⁸⁸ Cossack Ukraine had been faced with two major prob­lems of foreign policy, the conquest and colonization of the Black Sea coast and the expulsion of the parasitic Polish oligarchy. The continual raids of the Turks and Tatars, for whom Ukraine was a sort of “White Africa’’ and a favourite ground for slave-hunting, made an orderly, settled life almost impossible there. The eyes of the Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks turned longingly toward the fertile southern steppes, made uninhabitable by the Tatar menace. The harbours of the Black Sea were also necessary for commerce and contact with the outside world.

After the Union of Lublin (1569), the question of Polish-Ukrainian re­lations became equally pressing. This union separated Ukraine from the so-called Lithuanian state, which in reality had been a federation of the Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, and made Ukraine subject to Poland. The boundless greed of the Polish magnates, the fiercely resented Polish social system, and the militant Catholicism of the Polish Counter-Reformation all led to an elemental reaction on the part of the Ukrainian people; this came to a head in the revolution of 1648.

Countless folk songs show how deeply the Ukrainians were aware of their two national tasks: the battle against the Turko-Tatars and the struggle against the Polish nobility. By taking the initiative in this dual struggle, the Cossack military organization, which after 1648 developed into the Cossack state, became tremendously popular among the Ukrain­ian people. But the young Cossack state was unable to withstand the pressure of its three neighbours—Poland, Turkey, and Muscovite Rus­sia. Polish pressure drove Ukraine into the arms of Moscow, and by the Articles of Pereiaslav (1654), Ukraine accepted the protectorate of the tsar of Muscovy. Of course the Cossack leaders very soon realized the extent to which Muscovite centralism menaced them. Khmelnytsky’s im­mediate successor, Vyhovsky, tried to free Ukraine from Moscow’s suzerainty. Several of the more important later Hetmans, among them Doroshenko, Mazepa, and Orlyk, followed the same policy. However, a Ukrainian orientation toward either Poland or Turkey would have been necessary for a break with Moscow, and the people were not ready for ei­ther of these unnatural combinations.

Russian tsardom has done us much harm.... But it has also ful­filled our national tasks from the time when history took such a turn that we were unable to do so ourselves.⁸⁹

Drahomanov believed that in his generation, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Russian-Ukrainian relations were beginning to take a decisive turn, though as yet this might scarcely be noticeable. The Polish uprising of 1863 was the last attempt to re-establish Polish domination in Right-Bank Ukraine. The failure of this uprising, which the Ukrainian peasants and the young Ukrainian intelligentsia had united in opposing, and the succeeding agrarian reforms destroyed the last prospect for the success of the “historical” claims of the Polish nobility. From then on the acute form of the Polish-Ukrainian problem was to be limited to Austrian Galicia. A few years later the Balkan War of 1877-8 sealed the fate of Turkey as a European great power. With these two events the tra­ditional grounds for the dependence of Ukraine on Russia were shaken. Drahomanov foresaw that the time was approaching when the Ukrainian people would redefine its relation to the centralized Russian state.

It is only now that the problem can be posed: how is Ukraine to be freed from Muscovite bureaucracy, how can the Ukrainian intel­ligentsia unite its forces with those of the people, how can Ukrain­ian national culture be regenerated, etc.?⁹⁰

During the seventeenth century and even the first half of the eighteenth century, Ukraine possessed autonomous statehood.

He made a sharp distinction between the right to separation and its practicality.

Of course we would not think of denying the right of all the na­tionalities to complete separation from the Russian state. But it is advisable to reflect that states are particularly sensitive on the question of separation. States offer a much more vigorous resis-

tance to the separation of a province than to the granting of per­sonal rights to the inhabitants, or even to the granting of a certain degree of autonomy. Very great power is needed to put through the right of separation of a part of a state from the whole. The real question is not that of the legality, but that of the feasibility, of sep­aratism.⁹²

Drahomanov believed that very sound arguments of foreign and inter­nal politics militated against the possibility of Ukrainian statehood.

The Ukrainians have undoubtedly lost a great deal owing to the fact that, at the time when most of the other European peoples founded national states, they were not in a position to do so. A state of one’s own... is, after all, a form of social organization suited to defence against foreign attacks and to the regulation of af­fairs in one’s own land.... [But] a rising against Austria and Rus­sia similar to that staged by the Italians, with the aid of France, for the unity of their state is impossible for us.... The Ukrainians will have better prospects if they strive for their political and social freedom within the states in which they live, with the help of the other peoples also subjugated by these states.⁹³

Drahomanov pointed to the fact that all the new states which came into being in nineteenth-century Europe needed foreign military and di­plomatic aid. Italy received help from France, and the various Balkan states were aided by either Russia or England. Even the great uprisings, such as those of the Poles in 1830 and 1863 and of the Hungarians in 1848, failed without outside support. The Ukrainians had no protectors among the great powers, and Drahomanov felt that they should not hope for any. In his mind an even more conclusive argument against sepa­ratism was the immaturity of the Ukrainian national movement, shown in the denationalization of the upper classes and in the inadequate national consciousness of the masses.⁹⁴

Drahomanov believed that only the transformation of the Russian regime into a constitutional one with the greatest possible degree of regional and communal self-government would create the conditions necessary for the advancement of the Ukrainian movement. For example, the abolition of preventative censorship would automatically remove limitations on Ukrainian literature. Then, with free competition between Ukrainian and Russian publications, the former would soon replace the latter in the Ukrainian villages. If private schools were permitted, Ukrainian would be used in these schools at least, even if at first Russian remained the language of the state schools. Making the local institutions of self-government responsible for school administration would soon bring about the “Ukrainization” of at least the folk schools, and within a few years the question of Ukrainian secondary schools and of courses in Ukrainian in the universities would arise. Such a program of consti­tutionalism and decentralization required the co-operation of the Russian opposition, and would have much better chances of success under the banner of autonomy and federalism than under that of separatism.⁹⁵

It seems certain that Drahomanov analyzed correctly the practical pos­sibilities open to the Ukrainian movement of his time. His analysis was vindicated by the fact that it was only after 1905—after the introduction of a certain, though very limited, degree of constitutionalism—that the momentum of the Ukrainian national movement increased. Drahoma- nov’s attitude toward the question of independent statehood for Ukraine was thoroughly compatible with his attitude toward the socialist maximal programme. In both cases he was sceptical of utopias; he preferred to seek a strategic plan which would point the way forward from the status quo. But there was another element, besides this pragmatic one, which figured in his rejection of separatism. As we have seen, Drahomanov had a very individualistic conception of freedom. His ideal was freedom/rcw? the state rather than freedom through the state. He considered concentra­tion of power and power politics bad in themselves. But the foundation of a new state, even of a thoroughly democratic one, is impossible with­out power and power politics, without the creation of authority and of a hierarchy. It is easy to understand that Drahomanov instinctively shrank from seeing the Ukrainian movement go in this direction. He hoped that the political freedom of the Ukrainian people could come from a gradual decentralist and federalist transformation of the existing powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Thus, at a time when there was neither a Ukrainian state nor even a modest practical basis for a Ukrainian separatist policy, a man such as Drahomanov, whose nature it was to think in terms other than those of states, was particularly fitted to render service to the Ukrainian cause.

How can we make Drahomanov’s bitter criticism of Russian socialists and revolutionaries jibe with his plea that the Ukrainian movement co­operate with them? Drahomanov believed that the struggle against tsarist absolutism was the primary practical task; everything else depended on the weakening of this absolutism. At the same time he was well aware that the Russian revolutionaries made very questionable bedfellows. He was certainly not naive enough to be willing to have the Ukrainian cause depend on the good will of the Russian democrats. To secure the Ukrain­ians from surprise attacks from this quarter, he demanded the complete organizational independence OfUkrainian political parties and groups. It must be remembered that until 1917 Ukrainians usually participated in Russian political organizations, so that in this respect Drahomanov was far in advance of his time.

No Ukrainian group can unite with any Russian group or party—not until the Russian groups are ready to renounce the theory of “Russian unity,” to acknowledge the Ukrainians as a na­tion on precisely the same footing as the Great Russians, Poles, etc., and to accept the practical consequences of this recognition.⁹⁶

When a St. Petersburg newspaper spoke of Drahomanov as an al­leged leader of the “Russian Social Revolutionary Party” (as a matter of fact there was no such party at that time), Drahomanov replied in a pamphlet published in Geneva:

I request you not to consider me a member of the “Russian So­cial Revolutionary Party” or of any other Russian party. It is true that I was born a subject of the Russian tsar, but I am not a Rus­sian.... As a Ukrainian I belong to a nation which in Russia is op­pressed not only by the government, but also by the dominant Great Russian people. The Ukrainian nation extends beyond the boundaries of the Russian state into Austria-Hungary. My chief aim is to strive for the well-being of our people to the best of my ability. I can take a stand on “Russian” affairs, both (Great) Rus­sian in the ethnic sense and Russian in the political sense, only in so far as they affect our people. By the same principle I can of course have dealings with the Russian parties, but I cannot join any of them.⁹⁷

The independence of Ukrainian organizations which Drahomanov urged was undoubtedly a good way of resisting the menace of the cen­tralist and levelling tendencies of the Russian revolutionaries.

Drahomanov was not an advocate of independent Ukrainian statehood. Nonetheless, at a time when most members of the upper classes in Ukraine felt that they belonged to the Russian nation, and when the mass of peasants were without a crystallized modern political consciousness, Drahomanov did regard Ukraine as a nation. This led to two important political postulates. He felt that the estranged upper classes should be­come nationally integrated with the Ukrainian people, and that a unified national consciousness and co-ordinated political will, cutting across po­litical frontiers, should be created on all ethnically Ukrainian territory.

Our people suffer injustice not only socially and politically, but also nationally. This injustice arises in part from the fact that our nationality and our language do not enjoy the same rights as do the Russian, Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian. However, a far greater injustice arises from the fact that on all the territory where our people live, at most five per cent of the intelligentsia acknowl­edge their national solidarity with the people. Therefore the people do not receive the cultural services they need from the intelligent­sia, which lives directly or indirectly from the people’s labor. This disgrace reaches so far that even men of democratic convictions living among the Ukrainians turn from them and dedicate their work, their gifts, and their money to the service of other peoples.... Arrange things so that a part of the French elite con­sider themselves English, a second part German, a third Italian, and a fourth Spanish, and you will soon see what will happen to French literature and politics and even to the French socialist movement.⁹⁸

Drahomanov’s belief that a Ukrainian’s loyalty belonged to the Ukrainian cause was dramatically expressed to Zheliabov, leader of Narodnaia volia. Zheliabov, who was of Ukrainian origin, moved in Ukrainian circles as a young man. At that time he met Drahomanov, and apparently personal trust and friendship developed between them. Some years later, when Drahomanov had gone abroad as representative of the Kiev Hromada, Zheliabov became the leader of that revolutionary orga­nization, whose foolhardy terrorist struggle against tsarism made Russia and the whole world hold its breath. In 1880 Zheliabov sent a confiden­tial representative to Geneva to ask Drahomanov to be the political repre­sentative of Narodnaia Volia in Western Europe and the guardian of the party’s archives. In the same message Zheliabov used the weakness of the Ukrainian movement to excuse his going over to the all-Russian revo­lutionary movement:

Where are our Fenians, where is our Parnell? The truth of the matter is... that while one sees salvation in the break-up of the Empire into autonomous parts, one must work for a [pan-Russian] constituent assembly.⁹⁹

Drahomanov’s answer did not reach Zheliabov, but after Zheliabov’s death Drahomanov published an account of the episode and his reasons for turning down this offer.

This sceptical expectation of the time when Ukraine might pro­duce its Fenians and its Parnell comes from the pen of a man who was born in one of our Ukrainian provinces. Nothing prevented him from becoming, in his own way, a Fenian. Imagine that the Irish leaders were to wait passively until the advocates of home rule appeared in their land, until that moment conducting them­selves as Englishmen and as followers of British centralism. In that

case Ireland would also have to wait a long time for its Parnell!¹⁰⁰

Drahomanov believed that in Ukraine it was impossible to be an honest democrat without being a Ukrainian patriot, for the people were Ukrainian, not Russian or Polish. However, many members of the upper classes in Ukraine did not recognize this duty, and joined the ranks of the Russian intelligentsia. This desertion estranged them from the people and nullified their abstract democratic ideals; this was one of the chief causes of their political weakness. Drahomanov himself had evolved from an all-Russian radical position to a Ukrainian national consciousness, and hoped that sooner or later the intelligentsia living in Ukraine would ad­here to the cause of the national and social emancipation of the people.

It is time to put an end to this nomadism of educated people from “the cold Finnish crags to burning Colchis” [a quotation from Pushkin] or from “sea to sea” [from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the battle cry of Polish “historical” patriots]. As a nomad, one can serve every cause imaginable except that of the people, of the peasants. For peasants are a settled and deeply rooted people, and therefore different in every land.¹⁰¹

Drahomanov declared that each Ukrainian intellectual must settle him­self in a specific community and grow into a definite social milieu.

[The intellectuals] must settle down in communities of our people and use their forces to fulfill the needs of the social organism. This will enable them to spread sound ideas by word and deed.... All of Ukraine must be covered by a network of indi­viduals and groups linked with one another.¹⁰²

Drahomanov’s call to the denationalized intelligentsia to join the Ukrain­ian national cause was most movingly stated in these pathetic words:

Educated Ukrainians usually work for anything in the world ex­cept Ukraine and its people.... They must take an oath to them­selves not to desert the Ukrainian cause. They must realize that every educated man who leaves Ukraine, every cent which is not spent for Ukrainian purposes, every word that is not spoken in Ukrainian, is a waste of the capital of the Ukrainian people, and that with things as they are, anything lost is irreplaceable.¹⁰³

No less serious than the problem of the denationalization of the elite was that of the isolation of the Ukrainian regions from each other. Drahomanov pointed to the abnormal condition that Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, Galicia and Subcarpathia-all of Russian and all of Austro-Hungarian Ukraine—had very little contact, and were even very incompletely informed about each other.¹⁰⁴ In his scholarly works Drahomanov had shown the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the Ukrainian people from the Kuban region at the foot of the Caucasus to the Subcarpathian region in the Hungarian state.¹⁰⁵ He felt that this ethnic unity should have political consequences. Although he did not propose as a practical goal the unification of the whole Ukrainian area into one state, he aimed at close political and cultural collaboration and mutual aid among the various parts of the Ukrainian territory. For instance, he advised that all democratic propaganda destined for the population of the Kuban should begin by reminding the Kuban Cossacks that they were the descendants of the glorious Zaporozhian Host.¹⁰⁶

Drahomanov did the work of a true pioneer in Subcarpathia, the most backward and remote of the Ukrainian regions. This was the land which, before the First World War, was known as Hungarian Rus’. In the inter­war period it was called Subcarpathian Ruthenia and belonged to Czechoslovakia. Since 1938 it has been called Carpatho-Ukraine. Drahomanov probably became the first leader of the Ukrainian national movement to penetrate into this land when he made two visits there in 1875 and 1876. He was deeply shocked by the misery of its oppressed and exploited people. In later years he never lost sight of the plight of this land and tried to turn the attention of other Ukrainians toward it. Shortly before his death he once again reminded the Ukrainians of their duty to­ward Subcarpathia.

I was the first Ukrainian to visit Hungarian Rus’. I saw that spir­itually it is farther separated even from Galicia than Australia is from Europe. I swore to myself an “oath of Hannibal” to work for the integration of Hungarian Rus’ into our national democratic and progressive movement, in which lies its only salvation.... I have not been able to fulfill my oath, but now... I dare to lay down this oath upon their [the Ukrainians’] heads.¹⁰⁷

Drahomanov was able to make use even of the division of Ukraine into Russian and Austro-Hungarian parts in his Ukrainian strategy. The sys­tematic persecution of the Ukrainian movement by the tsarist govern­ment, particularly the scandalous prohibition of printing in Ukrainian, limited the possibilities of work in Russia. In this difficult situation some Ukrainian patriots felt that the only solution was to convince the Russian government of the harmlessness of the Ukrainian movement by re­nouncing all political aims and limiting themselves to cultural regionalism, in the fashion of the Plattdeutsch (Low German) literary movement. Drahomanov did not agree with this idea of separating politics from culture; he also doubted that such concessions would lead to the alleviation of tsarist pressure. He feared that such a cowardly attitude would repel young people—and all courageous and freedom-loving men—and that thus their energy would be lost. He advised that the na­tional movement give up its attempts to come to an understanding with the government. Within the Russian Empire its members should concen­trate on strictly academic work (of necessity publishing in Russian) in Ukrainian history, ethnography, economic problems, etc. This research might later serve as the basis for political activity. At the same time, while of course preserving its organizational independence, the Ukrain­ian movement should seek to collaborate with the various Russian move­ments of opposition, from the zemstvo constitutionalists to the revolu­tionary underground. However, the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian movement should be shifted to Galicia, where, in spite of Polish hegemony, Austrian laws did provide a modicum of freedom. Drahomanov hoped that there Galician and Russian Ukrainians together could create a focal point for Ukrainian activity. Then, until the weaken­ing of tsarist absolutism untied the hands of the Ukrainians in Russia, vitality from this centre could radiate back into Russian Ukraine.¹⁰⁸

Drahomanov doubted that the elder generation of the Galician intel­ligentsia could be converted to his program of joint action. Therefore he went over their heads, appealing directly to the young people. Of course this was a long-range project, but Drahomanov did not let himself be dis­couraged.

Gutta cavat Iapidem non vi, sed semper cadendo. [It is not by force that the drops of water wear away the stone, but by always falling.] This has always been my motto; it the best political motto.¹⁰⁹

Some years after Drahomanov’s death one of his disciples, the eminent Galician writer and scholar Ivan Franko, evaluated his influence in the following way:

Truly our teacher, he was completely selfless. He did not spare either himself or us in his efforts to turn us—his lazy and uneduca­ted followers, who had grown up in the slavish tradition of our nar­row [Galician] provincialism—onto the better, more enlightened path OfEuropean civilization. One might say that he dragged us by the ears along this way. If any contribution to the world or to our national cause comes from the generation which was influenced by him, it will have been the work of Drahomanov.¹¹⁰

The continuing results of Drahomanov’s far-reaching vision helped Galicia become the Piedmont of the Ukrainian national cause before and during the First World War.

How could Drahomanov reconcile his ardent patriotism with his cos­mopolitan convictions? He believed that the universal ideal of mankind was a synthesis of the best characteristics of each people. His realization of the relationship between the general and the particular also made him see that a humanist who wanted to work for the well-being of mankind had to have a specific point of application.¹¹¹ The Ukrainian people could be one such point. Humanity could but gain if, among the peoples of the earth, there were “one Soullesscorpse less, one living nation more.”¹¹²

A humanistic and cosmopolitan foundation for the national idea in­volves the duty to combat all forms of narrow, exclusive, backward na­tionalism among one’s own people. Drahomanov did this con­scientiously. Here, to complete the picture of his Ukrainian political pro­gram, we must glance at his fight against the excesses of Ukrainian na­tionalism.

During Drahomanov’s lifetime the Ukrainian movement was too weak to be able to harm any other people. Nonetheless, Drahomanov was very sensitive to all the symptoms of national hatred and resentment among the Ukrainians, which, in different circumstances, could turn into a destructive force.

Our nationalism is not nearly so pacific [as its apologists say]. Only listen to the hate with which our people sometimes speak of the Russians, Poles, and Jews. Reflect on what might happen to men of these races living on Ukrainian soil if our nationalists should come to power. What sort of forcible Ukrainization would be prescribed for them! This misanthropic nationalism is also harmful to us, for it aggravates the hostile feelings of our neigh­bours. Nowadays one must try to lessen hatred among nations even during wartime, as the Red Cross organization does within its sphere.¹¹³

Drahomanov⁵S intellectual conscientiousness made him an uncom­promising opponent of all national illusions and patriotic superstitions.

I am disgusted with myself because my patriotism induces me to write on all possible subjects, from archaeology to painting, only in order to be able to proclaim the existence of a Ukraine in the tenth and fifteenth centuries as well as in the nineteenth century, in prehistoric excavations as well as in modern opera. But my love for my own people does not give me the right to attack Russians, Poles, or Jews.¹¹⁴

Two examples of Drahomanov⁵S struggle against the prejudices of his compatriots are his attitude toward the Shevchenko cult and his stand on the usefulness of Russian literature to Ukrainians.

The untutored genius and revolutionary poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-61), had a tremendous influence on the development of Ukrain­ian national consciousness. The Ukrainians honoured him as a prophet, and soon a cult grew up around his name and memory. Each Ukrainian faction, from the clericalists to the socialists, projected its own ideas into its picture of Shevchenko, and disregarded those aspects of his life and work which did not fit. Drahomanov was certainly not opposed to hon­ouring the memory of Shevchenko. In later life he tried, in vain, to have published in Geneva a complete and unexpurgated edition of Shev­chenko’s poems. However, he did protest against the canonization of Shevchenko, which hid the true man and poet behind a halo. Drahomanov felt that a historical and critical attitude, which would also take cognizance of Shevchenko’s limitations, was needed. In particular he warned against regarding his poetry as a consistent political programme.¹¹⁵

It may seem strange that both during his lifetime and after his death Drahomanov was often accused of being a Russophile. The reason for this was his frequently expressed conviction that Ukrainians should not shy away from Russian literature. His arguments were simple: first, Rus­sian literature undoubtedly included the greatest artistic achievements of all the Slavic literatures; second, by turning their backs on Russian litera­ture, Ukrainians would increase their provincialism rather than their cul­tural independence. Drahomanov answered the reproach that he was a slavish devotee of Russian literature and culture in the following manner:

Personally, since my early twenties I have been able to read five European languages, not including antique and Slavic ones. Of these I most love English literature, as I do the cultural and politi­cal life of England. With the exception of technical books in my field, I should be ready to live the rest of my life without books in Russian. But in Ukraine I see the following state of affairs: only two or three intellectuals out of a hundred use European books, and most of these are technical. Even most writers do not know a single European language. Under these conditions what would be the level of Ukrainian men of letters if they should also give up Russian literature? I should not waste another word on the cultural value of Russian literature if in Ukraine I saw energetic efforts to obtain spiritual nourishment directly from Western Europe, and if I did not see that our modern Ukrainian authors lack a basic Euro­pean education.¹¹⁶

Thus Russian literature was indispensable in Dnieper Ukraine because the numerous Russian translations of Western European writings were necessary. The situation was somewhat different in Galicia, where a knowledge of German was widespread. But Drahomanov was afraid that the German cultural influence tended to produce bureaucrats, and be­lieved that Russian literature could play a positive role in Galicia too. He thought that the spirit of social criticism prevalent in the best Russian lit­erature was a means of drawing the attention of the backward Galician in­telligentsia to the needs of its own people. According to Drahomanov, such a feeling for the people was the best stimulus for the Ukrainian na­tional movement. Moreover, acquaintance with reality in Russia was a sure means of destroying the illusions which the conservative “Old Ruthenians⁵’ had about the tsarist empire. Drahomanov maintained that he had distributed more Russian books in Galicia than all the Muscovite Pan-Slavists together, and that as a result of this very fact the younger generation had gone over to the camp of the Ukrainian national move­ment.¹¹⁷

Drahomanov could permit himself such a dispassionate, utilitarian at­titude because he was convinced of the vitality of Ukrainian culture, and because he was free from a feeling of national inferiority. Many of his compatriots, who compensated for their dependence on Russian culture by bleating abuse against Russia, could not forgive this attitude. Drahomanov remarked that those who criticized him as a “Russophile” were the very ones who in practice were ready to make much greater con­cessions in the use of Russian in publications and even in private corres­pondence. The difference was that Drahomanov believed that the only honourable thing to do was to “admit in theory a part of the concessions which the others make in practice.”¹¹⁸

In the history of Ukrainian political thought Drahomanov stands half­way between the generation of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society of the 1840s—the first expression of a modern Ukrainian national conscious­ness—and the generation which was called upon to construct an indepen­dent Ukrainian democratic republic in 1917. Of course Drahomanov was not the first participant in the Ukrainian national movement to reflect on political problems and to work out programs. But in volume of writ­ing and diversity of questions handled, and in profundity of thought, none of his predecessors or contemporaries can be compared with him. To the present day, in the field of political theory, Ukraine has produced but few men of the same stature. Drahomanov⁵S reputation has suffered from the fact that he was a pioneer in so many respects. For the next gen­eration many of his hard-won achievements were already self-evident, while the points in which his views had been surpassed by historical developments (e.g., Ukrainian statehood) were immediately obvious. This is one of the reasons for the lessening of Drahomanov⁵S influence on Ukrainian political thought in the inter-war period. But an examination of Drahomanov⁵S heritage which endeavours to distinguish the living ideas from the dead ones must acknowledge the richness and fertility of his contribution.

Ivan Franko said:

Clear, incorruptible, and uncompromising, he will continue to be the conscience of our nation for a long time—a true compass for the coming generations, showing them how they should live and work.¹¹⁹

Drahomanov’s Program for Russia and Eastern Europe Drahomanov believed that the federalization of the Russian Empire would bring freedom to the Ukrainian people.

The independence of a land and people can be achieved either by secession and the creation of an independent state (separatism) or by winning self-government without separation (federalism).¹²⁰

It should be noted that here federalism is contrasted with separatism, but not with independence. Drahomanov was probably thinking of Switzer­land, where the French- and Italian-speaking cantons, though in the mi­nority, are no less “independent’ ’ than are the German-speaking ones.

For details of Drahomanov’s constitutional program readers may refer to “Free Union,’’ his draft constitution for a reconstructed Russian Empire.¹²¹ Here we will only direct attention to a few especially interest­ing points.

A federalist structure presupposes the existence of the constituent units which compose the whole state. Drahomanov felt that the administrative divisions of tsarist Russia (provinces or gubernii), with their arbitrarily drawn boundaries, were not suitable as units for a system of vigorous self-government. On the other hand, he did not insist that the Russian Empire be divided strictly according to the ethnic principle, as the size of the single “cantons” would be too disparate. Drahomanov proposed that a new territorial unit, the oblast (region),¹²² be created. In fixing the boundaries of these regions, ethnic, economic, and geographic factors should all be considered. Some composite regions would have to be formed; the Latvians and the Estonians might form a single region, as might the various national groups in the Caucasus. The territories of the more numerous peoples, such as the Russians and the Ukrainians, should be divided into several regions. In the case of the Ukrainians Drahomanov proposed three regions: Kiev, or Right-Bank Ukraine; Kharkiv, or Left-Bank Ukraine; and Odessa, or southern Ukraine, in­cluding Bessarabia and the Crimea. In mixed regions national equality would be ensured by the self-government of communities and districts, and by the inviolability of personal rights (including free use of the mother tongue) of all citizens. Drahomanov cited Switzerland, where there are several bilingual cantons.¹²³

The most distinctive feature of Drahomanov⁵s draft constitution was that (as in the constitutions of the United States and of Switzerland) the member states (regions) were to have a sphere of competence inviolable by the federal government. Jurisdictional disputes were to be decided by the supreme court (Senate). What Drahomanov proposed here was not simple administrative decentralization, but rather—though he did not use these words—the division of sovereignty between the federal union and the regions. This conception was further implemented by two other pro­visions. First, the regions were to have the right to conclude agreements with one another for special purposes. Second, in the case of a usurpation of power on the federal level, full authority, including the command of the armed forces, was to pass automatically into the hands of the regional governments. What actually happened on the territory of the former Rus­sian Empire in 1918 approximated the sequence of events which Drahomanov had imagined. After the Bolshevik coup d’etat various regional governments, which at first regarded themselves as autonomous, but still as parts of a democratic Russia, took full authority into their own hands.

The eminent German sociologist Max Weber considered Drahomanov⁵S constitutional project brilliant. Weber wrote:

Drahomanov⁵S great strength lies in his synthesis of economic with national ideals and in his strong sense of what is possible, given the ethnographic conditions of Russia and the economic cir­cumstances of the present.¹²⁴

Weber agreed completely with Drahomanov⁵S thesis that the unitary structure of the Russian Empire was the chief obstacle to a liberal trans­formation and organic “Europeanization” of that country.

What were the forces on which Drahomanov counted in the struggle for the realization of a federalist program? He thought that the natural al­lies of the Ukrainians were all the other non-Russian nationalities in the Empire, from the Finns in the north to the peoples of the Caucasus in the south. Among the Great Russians there were also some groups with a vigorous feeling of local patriotism and a tradition of opposition to the centralism of Moscow and St. Petersburg: the Don Cossacks, the Siberians, the inhabitants of the Volga and Ural regions, and the in­habitants of the far north.¹²⁵ Drahomanov⁵S ideas were proven correct during the revolution of 1917-20, when these were the only ethnically Russian areas to resist the communist wave coming from Central Russia.

It is a well-known sociological rule that a revolutionary movement is apt to imprint its organizational pattern on any regime it creates. Not only Drahomanov⁵S aims, but also the means he proposed, were decentralized and federalist. He hoped for the creation of a series of regional revolu­tionary organizations which would co-ordinate their activities voluntarily, not just follow the dictates of a central authority.¹²⁶ This conception contrasted sharply with the idea, widespread in Russian revo­lutionary circles, that a strongly centralized revolutionary organization was necessary. When victory had been achieved, its central committee would be the basis for a provisional government with unlimited powers. Completing the centralist chain, this provisional government would then preside over the elections to an all-Russian national assembly.

Drahomanov warned that in reality this program could only mean the conveyance of centralized power into other hands, and would bring with it an acute danger of a dictatorial coup d’etat from either the right or the left. He contrasted this idea of an all-Russian national assembly with that of regional constituent assemblies. An all-Russian assembly “would, I am almost sure, preserve the hegemony of the Great Russian people and the central Great Russian regions over all others, particularly in questions of education and economics.’’¹²⁷

This brings us to the question of methods in the political struggle.

Basically the theory of liberalism goes hand-in-hand with the idea of gradual reforms in political, social, and cultural matters, and not with the idea of revolution, understood as a forceful over­throw of the existing order. Liberal theories only approve political revolutions when they are the only means to remove oppressive regimes that block reforms which a self-governing people would in­troduce.¹²⁸

Depending on the general political situation, Drahomanov several times altered his opinion as to what were the most advisable tactical methods. In his youth he hoped that peaceful progress would be possible on the basis of Alexander ITs reforms—the emancipation of the serfs, the new judiciary system, and the zemstvos.¹²⁹ The reactionary turn taken by the Russian government, particularly the repression of the Ukrainian move­ment, made his attitude more warlike. During the Balkan War of 1877-8 he edited pamphlets to be distributed among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army, summoning them to armed rebellion.¹³⁰ He hoped that once again the army would rebel, as had the Decembrists after the Napoleonic wars, but that this time the military action would be sup­ported by public opinion focused in the zemstvos. Later, in the 1880s, having lost his illusions about the possibility of rapid improvement of the Russian regime, he again regarded the matter more coolly. He then directed his eyes toward the zemstvo, an island of local self-government in the midst of the absolute and bureaucratic regime. He drew hope from the examples of France and Prussia: in France the initiative of the provin­cial assemblies led to the convocation of the Estates-General in 1789; in Prussia the action of the provincial diets caused the convocation of par­liament in 1847-8.¹³¹

Drahomanov reproached the Russian opposition with the narrowness of its views: as a consequence of centuries of absolutism and centralism, it could imagine political change only as the result of violence—

of imperial decree, a la Peter I, or of a massacre, a la Pugachev. Either is a thunderbolt striking society, not a voluntary, co­operative action undertaken by the best elements of society—either in a peaceful or a revolutionary way.¹³²

Drahomanov did not make maximal demands. He believed that it was less important for reforms to be introduced rapidly than for them to take deep root once introduced (as they had in England).¹³³ This gradualism paralleled his doctrine on compromise in politics. He felt that com­promises were necessary, but that only “quantitative,” not “qualita­tive,” ones were admissible.

If the body cannot digest a whole quart of milk, then give it half a pint, but give it milk, not ink, or a mixture of milk and ink.¹³⁴

Drahomanov’s biographer Zaslavsky asserts that Drahomanov was the only revolutionary author in Russia to treat problems of foreign policy fully and intelligently.¹³⁵

It was Drahomanov⁵S Ukrainian perspective that led his eyes beyond the boundaries of the Russian Empire. His concern for Galicia brought him to a general interest in the affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Looking at the Polish question, the Jewish question, and the questions arising from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire from the standpoint of Kiev instead of St. Petersburg brought these problems nearer and made them more concrete. Drahomanov⁵S ideas on the relations of the Ukrainians to their western and southern neighbours, and to the national minorities living on Ukrainian soil, were a counterpart and complement to his Russian program. Here internal and foreign policy met.

For Drahomanov the kernel of the Jewish question in Ukraine was the fact that the Jews were at the same time a nationality, an economic class, and a religion. As a nationality they were isolated from the rest of the population by their language and customs. In the economic sphere, the vast majority of the Jews were employed in certain occupations of a middle-class nature. Ritualistic observances carried over into daily life intensified the isolation of the Jews from the Christian population.¹³⁶ Drahomanov feared that the resentment which the Ukrainian peasants felt against the Jewish innkeepers, usurers, and Cirendatory (tax-gatherers for the State and the nobility) might easily turn from social protest into anti­Semitism. He felt sure that the Jewish question would not be solved by the laudable liberal formula: abolition of the legal limitations imposed on the Jews in Russia, e.g., their artificial concentration within the “pale of settlement’’ (in Ukraine and Belorussia). Drahomanov saw the solution in a schism between the Jewish workers and the exploitative elements in the Jewish community, and in the development of a feeling of solidarity between the Jewish and non-Jewish workers. This would require the founding of a Jewish socialist organization and a Yiddish socialist press. In this program Drahomanov anticipated the later Bund. The first appeals for the founding of a Jewish socialist organization came from the press of Drahomanov’s Hromada in Geneva. This initiative encountered the open hostility of the Russian socialists, including the Russified Jews.¹³⁷

Drahomanov saw the “egg of Columbus’’ solution of the Polish ques­tion in the making of a sharp distinction between the territory that was ethnically Polish and that which, though ethnically Lithuanian, Belorus­sian or Ukrainian, was claimed by the Poles. In these non-Polish lands, which had once belonged to the Polish Commonwealth, the Poles com­posed a minority of the total population, but the majority of the landlord class. “Nowadays, for people of sound mind there can be a question of the independence only of ethnic Poland.’’¹³⁸ Of course Drahomanov be­lieved that ethnic Poland had an unquestionable right to independent statehood, but he felt that a federalist policy of co-operation with the other peoples of Eastern Europe would be in the Poles’ own interest. As for the Poles living outside ethnic Polish territory, they should have cul­tural autonomy and of course equality as citizens, but not a dominant position. The Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine, a relatively high percentage of which was educated, would have been able to render a great service to the cause of freedom if it had been willing to unite with the Ukrainians in the fight for the self-government of the land, rather as the Swedes in Finland had co-operated with the Finns. During the nine­teenth century a few Poles in Right-Bank Ukraine were ready to take this road because of their democratic convictions or local patriotism. But the mass of the Poles, including those of democratic and even socialist opin­ions, were not able to free themselves from their hypnotic belief in Poland’s “historical frontiers.’’ Drahomanov was convinced that these Polish imperialist dreams were a source of disaster for the Polish people, who let themselves be seduced into policies of adventure, and a source of disturbance for all of Eastern Europe.¹³⁹

Unlike the Russian Slavophiles, Drahomanov desired not the demoli­tion, but the federalization, of Austria-Hungary. The organization of the Empire into historic crownlands, in which an aristocratic nationality usu­ally oppressed the plebeian peoples, should be replaced by a system guaranteeing genuine equality, on the basis of universal suffrage, to all the peoples. Drahomanov advised his Galician friends that the struggle for universal suffrage was their most immediate political task.¹⁴⁰

He took a lively interest in the fate of the Balkan Slavs, whom he be­lieved to be the natural allies of the Ukrainians. He felt it was through the union with Ukraine that Russia had become interested in the Balkan and Black Sea regions and that the Russian Empire’s conflict with Turkey had been inherited from Cossack Ukraine. However, Russia’s imperialist tendencies made it incapable of being an honourable ally in the struggle of these regions for their independence. “A despotic state cannot be a liberator.”¹⁴¹ Drahomanov warned his Bulgarian and Serbian friends against expecting true help from Russia.

Drahomanov’s East European program was completed by his ideas on German-Russian relations.¹⁴² He felt that these two aggressive great powers formed a pincers enclosing Eastern Europe. Of the lands caught between them, those which were more immediately menaced by Ger­many placed their hopes in Russian strength, and those menaced by Rus­sia relied on Germany. Opposing both opinions, Drahomanov maintained that Russian and German imperialisms supported each other, and that it was a fundamental error to believe that Germany and Russia would stalemate each other. He believed that an enduring peaceful order could be created in Eastern Europe only by the emancipation and federal union of the peoples living between the Russian and German ethnic blocks. This would check both the Russian and the German imperialists. The thwarting of these imperialists would then strengthen the hands of the liberals within these two nations, in which the authoritarian form of government was a function of expansionist foreign policy. In the long run, the federation of the peoples between the two blocs would benefit the Germans and Russians as well as all the smaller peoples in between.

As we know, Eastern Europe took a course directly opposite to that which Drahomanov had mapped out. Nonetheless, there can scarcely be any doubt that he saw clearly the great issues in this part of the world. And the sad course of events since 1914 justifies the conviction that Drahomanov’s ideas may still have some normative value in the future.

Notes

1. M. Pavlyk, ed., Perepyska Mykaila Drahomanova z Melitonom Buchynskym 1871-1877 (Lviv 1910), 72.

2. Arkhiv Mykhaila Drahomanova (Warsaw 1937), 1:320.

3. Ibid., 245-6.

4. M. P. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka. Opyt ukrainskoi politiko- Sotsialnoi programmy,” in Sobranie politicheskikh Sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova, ed. B. A. Kistiakovsky, 2 vols. (Paris 1905-6), 1:329.

5. M. P. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo” to Hromada, in M. P. Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory, v. 1 (all published) (Prague 1937), 1:120.

6. Ibid., 115.

7. Cf. P. Fedenko, “M. Drahomaniv ³ Pier Zhozef Prudon,” in Drahomanivskyi zbirnyk, ed. V. Simovych (Prague 1932), 271 ff.

8. M. P. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha ³ Velikorusskaia demokratiia,” in Sobranie politicheskikh Sochinenii, 1:124.

9. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,’’ in Vybrani tvory, 118.

10. M. P. Drahomanov, “K biografii A.I. Zheliabova,” in Sobranie politicheskikh Sochinenii, 2:435.

11. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polska,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:124.

12. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 115.

13. M. Drahomanov, Lysty do Iv. Franka ³ inshykh, 1881-1886, ed. I. Franko (Lviv 1906), 138-9.

14. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:194.

15. M. Pavlyk, ed., Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Mykhailom Pavlykom (1876-1895), 7 vols., numbered 2-8 (Chernivtsi 1910-12), 3:382.

16. M. P. Drahomanov, “K voprosu î natsionalnostiakh v Rossii,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:865.

17. M. P. Drahomanov, “ ⁴Narodnaia volia’ î tsentralizatsii revoliutsionnoi borby v Rossii,” 'm Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:397, n.

18. M. P. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu (Vienna 1915), 76-81.

19. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:259.

20. Ibid., 318-19.

21. Cf. Kh. Sliusarenko, “Studii Drahomanova z istorii Rymu,” in Drahomanivskyi zbirnyk, 243 ff.

22. M. P. Drahomanov, Perepyska, ed. M. Pavlyk (Lviv 1901), 123.

23. M. P. Drahomanov, Vopros ob Istoricheskom znachenii Rimskoi Imperii ³ Tatsit (Kiev 1870), 36-7.

24. M. P. Drahomanov, Rai ³ postup (Vienna 1915), 64.

25. Cf. V. Doroshenko, “M. Drahomanov ³ ioho dumky pro relihiini ³ tserkovni spravy,” Vira ³ ïàéêà, no. 6 (Kolomyia 1926).

26. M. P. Drahomanov, “ ‘Mariia’ poema T. Hr. Shevchenka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:756.

27. Cf. M. Drahomanov, “Vira ³ hromadski spravy,” in Pamiaty Mykhaila Drahomanova, 1895-1920:Zbirnyk, ed. la. Dovbyshchenko(Kharkiv 1920), 89.

28. M. Pavlyk, ed., Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z drom Teofilom Okunevskym (Lviv 1905), 208.

29. M. P. Drahomanov, Opovidannia pro Zazdrisnykh bohiv (New York 1918).

30. Drahomanov, “‘Mariia’ poema,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:757.

31. Doroshenko, “M. Drahomanov ³ ioho dumky,” Vira ³ ïàéêà, 9.

32. See Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahamanova z Pavlykom, 6:184. These principles recog­nize the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of all men, and the self-government of all communities of three or more members of the Brotherhood.

33. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Okunevskym, 209.

34. M. P. Drahomanov, “Otpovidi ³ zamitky,” Hromada 4 (1879):350, 356.

35. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:256.

36. M. P. Drahomanov, “Novyia russkiia stati po polskomu voprosu,” in Sobranie Politicheskikh Sochinenii, 2:558.

37. Drahomanov, Rai ³ postup, 61.

38. Cf. Drahomanov, “The Program of the Review Hromada," in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, ed. I. L. Rudnytsky, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1952):206-8.

39. M. P. Drahomanov, “Les paysans russo-ukrainiens sous les Iiberaux hongrois,” cited in D. Zaslavsky, M. P. Dragomanov: Kritiko-Mograficheskii ocherk (Kiev 1924), 100.

40. M. P. Drahomanov, “Absoliutizm ³ kapitalizm,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:573.

41. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 122.

42. M. P. Drahomanov, Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu (Vienna 1915), 38.

43. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky, 13.

44. Ibid., 16.

45. Cf. Drahomanov, “Political and Social Ideas in Ukrainian Folk Songs,” in My- khaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 209—13.

46. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:151-2.

47. Arkhiv M. Drahomanova, 308.

48. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:350.

49. M. P. Drahomanov, Avstro-ruski spomyny (Lviv 1889—92), 445.

50. Drahomanov, Perepyska, 22-3.

51. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:348.

52. Drahomanov, “Free Union: Draft of a Ukrainian Political and Social Program (Part 2, Section 5),” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 204.

53. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 119.

54. Drahomanov, “Absoliutizm ³ kapitalizm,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:572.

55. Drahomanov, Avstro-ruski spomyny, 356.

56. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:151.

57. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:29.

58. M. P. Drahomanov, “Shevchenko, Ukrainofily ³ sotsiializm,” Hromada 4 (1879):199-200.

59. Ibid., 206-7.

60. Ibid., 212.

61. Drahomanov, “Otpovidi ³ zamitky,” Hromada 4 (1879):313.

62. M. P. Drahomanov, “Terrorizm ³ svoboda,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:289 and 301.

63. Cf. Zaslavsky, M. P. Dragomanov, 100.

64. This is the basic idea of M. Hrushevsky’s study, Z pochyniv ukrainskoho so- tsiialistychnoho rukhu: Mykh. Drahomanov ³ zhenevskyi Sotsiialistychnyi hurtok (Vienna 1922). From the official Soviet Russian standpoint the theory of the inde­pendent origin of Ukrainian Marxism is of course a capital heresy. Charges of this nationalist deviation played a role in the liquidation of the native Ukrainian commu­nist leaders in the 1930s.

65. Drahomanov, Perepyska, 122.

66. Drahomanov, ¹¹Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh Sochinenii, 1:350.

67. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:143.

68. Drahomanov, “ Istoricheskaia Polsha, ” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:137.

69. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:344.

70. Ibid., 342-3.

71. M. P. Drahomanov, “Obaiatelnost energii,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:385.

72. Ibid., 384.

73. Drahomanov, ¹¹Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:216.

74. Drahomanov, ¹¹K biografii A. I. Zheliabova,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, TATl.

75. Drahomanov, ¹¹Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 130, n.

76. This is the general thesis of Drahomanov ^,s Istoricheskaia Polsha.

77. M. P. Drahomanov, ¹¹Estestvennyia oblasti ³ propaganda Sotsializma na plebeis- kikh iazykakh Vostochnoi Europy,” InSobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:330 ff.

78. Zaslavsky, M. P. Dragomanov, 109.

79. Drahomanov, ¹¹Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:145.

80. Ibid., 49.

81. Ibid., 220.

82. M. P. Drahomanov, La Litterature Oukrdinienne proscrite par Ie Gouvernement Russe (Geneva 1878), 8.

83. M. P. Drahomanov, ¹¹Avtobiohrafiia,” in Vybrani tvory, 70.

84. Drahomanov, “Shevchenko, Ukrainofily ³ sotsiializm,” 195.

85. Ibid., 215-16.

86. Cf. Drahomanov, “The Lost Epoch,” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 153-60.

87. M. P. Drahomanov, ¹¹Pismo V. G. Belinskago ê N. V. Gogoliu (Predislovie),” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:246, n.

88. Drahomanov, Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu, 17 ff.

89. Ibid., 18.

90. Ibid., 22.

91. Drahomanov, ¹¹Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 108.

92. Drahomanov, ¹¹K voprosu î natsionalnostiakh,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:866.

93. Drahomanov, ¹¹Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 112.

94. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky, 94.

95. Ibid., 102.

96. Drahomanov, ¹¹K biografii A. I. Zheliabova,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:418.

97. Drahomanov, ¹¹Terrorizm ³ svoboda,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:287.

98. M. P. Drahomanov, ¹¹Vidpovid M. Drahomanova na iubileini pryvitannia,” in Vybrani tvory, 92.

99. Cited in Drahomanov, ¹¹Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:213.

100. Ibid., 215.

101. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 147.

102. Ibid., 138.

103. Ibid., 125.

104. Drahomanov, Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu, 16.

105. Cf. Drahomanov, “Political and Social Ideas in Ukrainian Folk Songs,’’ in My- khaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 209—13.

106. M. P. Drahomanov, “Kozatski spomyny ³ hromadski potreby v Kubanshchyni,'’ Hromada 5 (1882):225 ff.

107. Drahomanov, “Vidpovid M. Drahomanova," in Vybrani tvory, 91.

108. Ibid., 89-90; Arkhiv M. Drahomanova, 240, 331.

109. ArkhivM. Drahomanova, 271.

ÏÎ. I. Franko, “Peredmova,” in M. Drahomanov, Lysty do Iv. Franka ³ inshykh, 1887-1895, ed. I. Franko (Lviv 1908).

111. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:297-9.

112. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 139.

113. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky, 20.

114. ArkhivM. Drahomanova, 245.

115. Cf. Drahomanov, “Shevchenko, Ukrainofily ³ sotsiializm.”

116. Drahomanov, Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu, 64-5.

117. ArkhivM. Drahomanova, 315.

118. Ibid., 32.

119. Franko, “Peredmova,” in Drahomanov, Lysty do Iv. Franka ³ inshykh, 1887-1895.

120. Drahomanov, ^tTstoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:253.

121. Cf. Drahomanov, “Free Union: Draft of a Ukrainian Political and Social Program (Part 2, Section 3),” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writ­ings, 202.

122. Not to be confused with the present Soviet administrative unit of the same name.

123. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz —Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:314 ff.

124. M. Weber, “The Condition of Bourgeois Democracy in Russia,” in Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 22 (Tiibingen 1906), 267.

125. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 142.

126. Cf. Drahomanov, “The Centralization of the Revolutionary Struggle in Russia,” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 181 — 92.

127. Drahomanov, “Pismo V. G. Belinskago," in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:248.

128. Drahomanov, “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:344, n.

129. Perepyska Drahomanova z Buchynskym, 14.

130. M. P. Drahomanov, “Do chego dovoevalis,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:121.

131. M. P. Drahomanov, “Liberalizm ³ zemstvo v Rossii,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:787-857.

132. Drahomanov, “Shevchenko, Ukrainofily ³ sotsiializm,” 202.

133. Drahomanov, ^tTstoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:259.

134. Drahomanov, Lysty do Iv. Franka ³ inshykh, 1881—1886, 66.

135. Zaslavsky₅A/. P. Dragomanov, 48.

136. Drahomanov, “Evreiskii vopros na Ukraine,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:525 ff.

137. Zaslavsky, M. P. Dragomanov, 113.

138. Drahomanov, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:253.

139. Drahomanov treated the Polish question in detail in his capital work, “Istoricheskaia Polsha,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:1-272.

140. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Okunevskym, 217.

141. M. P. Drahomanov, “Vnutrennee rabstvo ³ voina za osvobozhdenie,” InSobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:88.

142. Cf. Drahomanov, “Germany’s Drive to the East and Moscow’s Drive to the West,” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 161 — 74.