Ukraine and the Great Northern War

The Don Cossack and Bashkir uprisings were particularly threatening since they had broken out during the Great North­ern War, when Peter I was facing Charles XII of Sweden. Charles had become King in 1697 when he was 15, ten years younger than Peter I and a very different man.

Charles XIIs first confrontation came with Denmark, and following the defeat of King Frederick the young king switched his attention to the east Baltic coast, where Tsar Peter Is new style army was laying siege to the Swedish port of Narva (Es­tonia). The Muscovites were now dressed in European dark green coats, breeches, boots, and tri-corned hats, and armed with 40,000 modern flintlock muskets with the new ring bay­onets which Peter I had ordered when he was in England. The Muscovite army was also well supplied with artillery, which ironically included the 300 pieces which the Swedes had pro­vided for the Turkish war. The 18-year-old Charles landed in Livonia in the autumn of 1700 with 10,500 infantry and cavalry, and set out to relieve the siege proceeding across difficult marshy terrain with all human habitation destroyed by the Tsars orders. Narva was being besieged by a Muscovite army four times the size of that at Charles XIIs disposal, commanded by the Duke de Croy, Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, while Peter I remained at Novgorod, expecting the fall of Narva at any time. The besiegers had dug a defensive 6-foot deep trench behind their positions, protected by 140 artillery pieces mounted on a 9-foot earthen mound some four miles long which surrounded the besieged city.

Duke de Croy s position had a flaw. His 40,000 man army was strung out along the mound and although Charles XII was badly outnumbered, the initiative Iaywith him. Not much action was expected from the tired Swedish army after its long and difficult march. On 20 November Charles unexpectedly formed his infantry and cavalry before the Muscovite earthworks and supported by concentrated artillery fire, generals Rehnskjold and Vellinck began to advance towards the dry moat that was quickly filled with bundles of wood carried by each Swedish soldier. The two forces began to exchange heavy musket fire, as the Swedes advanced up the mound at several pre-selected locations. Charles XIIs Strategywas to use infantry to penetrate the thin Muscovite line followed by cavalry as the besieging army found itself attacked from the rear. Just then an early un­foreseen snowstorm began to blow into the Muscovite ranks and blinded the infantry as, covered by the storm, the Swedes poured volley after volley of musket fire into the enemy’s ranks. The Muscovite infantry gave way and the Swedes charged through the breach, attacking the Muscovites inside their own defenses, which now became a trap. De Croy’s Cavalryfailed to intervene and the Muscovite infantry began to break and flee towards the bridge spanning the Narva River, except for six bat­talions and the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky Guards reg­iments which maintained discipline and fought back. By 8:00 p.m. it was all over as the princes Alexander of Imertia, Dolgo- ruky, Golavin, and Buturlin surrendered their swords to Charles XII, who apparently received them with one boot, having lost the other when his horse was shot from under him during the attack. The 18-year-old king had won a great victory in the face of overwhelming odds, demonstrating his courage and ability for military strategy.³³ It was also clear that the serfs forced to serve in the Tsar’s new army were poor military material, even though Peter I had endowed them with the trappings of a mod­ern European army.

... (the troops) think only how to return to their homes. They pray God will send them a light wound... for which they will re­ceive a reward from the Sovereign (the Tsar). In battle they hide in thickets; whole companies take cover in a forest or a valley, and I have even heard noblemen say: “Pray God we may serve our Sovereign without drawing our swords from their scabbards.”

Charles XIIs Swedish army and the German contingents with him began to suffer from hunger and illness as Peter Γs scorched earth policy took effect, and by spring of 1701 only half of the army was fit for duty. A force of 10,000 fresh troops arrived, bringing his army up to a strength of24,000 men, which allowed Charles to march on Riga, where he crushed his cousin KingAugust IIs Saxon army which was besieging the port, cap­tured another fortress on the Neva River, and in April 1701 in­vaded Poland. The four regiments Peter had sent to support Augustus II fled at the first sight of the enemy without firing a shot. On 14 May, Charles reached Warsaw and towards the end of the month was joined by a smaller contingent that had taken the route through Brest-Litovsk, to ensure it was not in enemy hands. InJulywith 12,000 men Charles XII confronted Augus­tus IIs 16,000 Saxons and a Cossack corps under Colonel Mik- Iashevsky at Kliszow, and in a deft maneuver he led his men in an attack on the enemy’s right flank, capturing most of the ar­tillery and forcing Augustus II to retreat. InJanuary 1702 the Swedes suffered their first defeat of the war. A 7,000 man Swedish force under General Shlippenbach had gone to winter quarters at Eresfer near Dorpat in Livonia, and was attacked by General Sheremetev’s corps which had 7,000 Cossacks under Colonel Apostol. Supported by fifteen cannons mounted on sleds the Cossacks attacked the Swedes’ quarters and drove them out into the winter cold, inflicting serious casualties. The much-needed supplies the Cossacks had captured were confis­cated by Sheremetev who as a result of the victory was promoted by Peter I to Field Marshall.

Following Charles XII s victories against Augustus II many Polish nobles rebelled, electing the wealthy noble Stanislaw Leszczynski on 5 October 1705 as the rival to August II. On 8 November a military and a trade agreement was signed between the new pro-Swedish king and Charles XII, which recognized all right-bank Ukraine as part of the Polish Commonwealth. In 1703 Peter I had signed a military alliance with King Augustus II in Narva in which right-bank Ukraine was also recognized as part of the king’s Polish domain, as both sides sought Polish support. The Cossacks, however, had other plans. The regi­ments on the right bank were still intact, and following Au­gustus IIs defeat in July 1702 by Charles XII at Kliszow, and the occupation of Warsaw and Kracow, Colonel Simon Paliy with 12,000 Cossacks began to clear right-bank Ukraine of Pol­ish and Lithuanian troops. A 4,000 man Polish corps had already been defeated two years previously, and Polish garrisons began to fall one after another until virtually the entire right bank was liberated.

King Charles XII had committed his first strategic error. The treaty with Leszczynski brought him Polish military support of dubious quality, while losing an alliance with the far superior Cossack regiments. With Charles marching into Ukraine rather than through marshy Belarus, and Paliy and Mazepa on his side, the combined Swedish-Ukrainian armies would easily have driven Peter Is Muscovites out of left-bank Ukraine. Additional support would also have been available from Bulavins Don Cossack and peasant forces, and Peter I would have presided over the collapse of a despotic tsardom.

The freedom, however, was short lived. With Peter Is tacit agreement, Augustus IIs Poles invaded the right-bank Ukraine supported by Muscovite troops, and after bitter fighting the Cossack strongholds of Nemiriv and Ladizain fell into Polish hands, followed by thousands of executions and mutilations.

To the west, in Poland and Galicia confusion reigned. In the spring of 1704 before Stanislaw Leszczynski could be crowned as the second King of Poland, Peter I sent an army to support King Augustus II which included 17,000 of Mazepas Cossacks, to whom the war with Charles XII was a foreign con­flict that did not really concern them.³⁴ Charles in the meantime had moved to the southeast away from Warsawwhich enabled Augustus II with a Saxon-Muscovite-Ukrainian force of 12,000 to occupy the city, as Leszczynski s Poles withdrew without a fight. The young Swedish king in the meantime advanced into Galicia, and in August occupied Lvivwhich also did not offer much resistance. Peter I, however, captured Narva in July, and in the same month the Swedish General Lewenhaupt with Prince Sapihas Lithuanians defeated Wishniowieckis Commonwealth-Muscovite-Cossack troops at Jakobstadt. Stanislaw Leszczynski was elected on 12 July 1704 as King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania-Rus, and crowned by the Swedes in Warsaw on 5 October 1705. On 28 November 1705, Leszczynski signed the Treaty of Warsaw by which Poland-Lithuania became Swedish vassal states.

On 15 January 1706, leaving Rehnskiold with 10,000 men to guard Warsaw against General Schulenburg, Charles ad­vanced with his main 20,000 man Swedish army on the Muscovite-Saxon-Polishpositions at Grodno, Commandedby Augustus II and Peter Is General Ogilvie.

Charles XII had terminated the campaign in the east to secure his rear in Poland—particularly in Saxony—to be able to strike at his main enemy. The Tsar of Muscovy was challeng­ing Swedish supremacy in the Baltic Sea and in the provinces on the eastern shore which were held by Sweden, and Tsarist Muscovy was the only power which could potentially replace Swedish rule and destroy its lucrative trade in the region. More­over, the young Tsar’s intentions had also been made clear with the radical modernizing of the Muscovite army on European lines and the beginning of what would become his capital on the Neva—St. Petersburg. The bottom line was that both the Swedish and the Muscovite empires could not both be domi­nant in northEastern Europe.

News of social unrest and the revolt in Astrakhan in 1705 had reached the Swedish king, who realized it would occupy much of the Tsar s attention. During 1706-07 while in Saxony at Augustus’ expense, Charles raised and trained new Saxon troops in Swedish tactics to supplement his veterans, and re­ceiving fresh Swedish reinforcements he stood at the head of a powerful 45,000 man army; 7,000 cavalry, 9,600 dragoons, 14,000 infantry, 150 pieces of artillery and other foreign units. The infantry was reissued with the lighter, pointed Carolinian sword, and all cavalry was issued flintlock pistols, Cossack style. Charles could also rely on 11,500 men under Lewenhaupt in Livonia and 14,000 men in Finland. During his campaign in Volin and Belarus in the previous year, Charles had been con­tacted clandestinely by Hetman Mazepa, who could no longer bear the Tsar’s military and economic impositions to which he had no treaty right.³⁵ Word was reaching the Swedes that the Don and the Terek River Cossacks were also ill-disposed towards Peter Γs despotism. The sleeping giant that was Mus­covy was awakening and Charles and his advisors knew that any attempt to capture Moscow could not wait much longer.

While Charles XIIwas raising his army, Galicia and Poland had been occupied by Muscovite and Ukrainian troops, and on 7 September 1707, the Swedish-Saxon army entered Poland and began to advance eastwards. Charles also received 9,000 recruits from Sweden and Peter s commander Menshikovbegan to retreat, leaving behind a burnt wasteland with wells and streams poisoned with corpses. Charles’ strategy was not to waste manpower in Poland but to outflank the main Tsarist forces under Field Marshall Sheremetev and force him to with­draw. The first encounter took place at Grodno on the Nieman River, where to secure the only available bridge Charles led 600 of his Guards horsemen in a charge against the 2,000 Muscovite cavalry that were guarding the crossing. The Muscovites were thrown back in confusion, and carried by the momentum of the attack, the Swedes charged into Grodno. Unknown to Charles the Tsar and his boyhood friend Menshikovwere also in Grodno, and on hearing of the Swedish attack they staged a hasty escape to avoid imminent capture. When they learned how small the Swedish force was, Peter turned back with 3,000 men and attempted to re-take the town, but without success. Three days later the main Swedish army arrived and the Mus­covite army retreated from the Nieman River and took up new defensive positions behind the Berezina.

Peter I had ordered all human habitation to be destroyed as he was retreating, and short on forage and food, Charles de­cided to halt in the triangle between Grodno, Vilno, and Minsk for the approaching winter. The main enemy forces had retreated to the east, and the Swedes had only to contend with harassment by Cossack and Kalmick cavalry, which broke some of the monotony of camp life. In May 1708 with the arrival of spring Charles resumed his advance towards Moscow. He had 40,000 Swedes and Saxons with him, there were 12,000 in Riga with General Lewenhaupt, and 12,000 men in Finland whose job was to attack Peter’s new city on the Neva, St. Petersburg. There were also 8,000 men in Poland under General Krassow who could reinforce Charles XII if the need arose—in all, some 75,000 men. Opposing him was Peter Γs force of 57,000 men, 24,000 left to defend St. Petersburg, General Bauer’s 16,000 man army at Dorpat to keep an eye on Lewenhaupt, and 12,000 under General Golitsin near Kyiv to cover approaches into Ukraine—a total of 110,000 men. Morale in Charles’ army was high; the men were volunteers, well trained, and were led by competent officers. Their confidence had also received a boost when they experienced the poor quality of Peter’s modern army, who were mostly serfs drafted to serve for 25 years! Also in May word came of the Don Cossack revolt led by Bulavin which greatly cheered Charles and his men.

As the Swedish army left Minsk, Charles XII realized that the time had come to meet Peter I’s army head-on rather than depend on the outflanking strategy that he had employed up to now. The relatively open terrain of Poland was behind him, and he had entered the great Pripet Marsh where maneuvering was more difficult, particularly with the unseasonably heavy rains which had turned the roads into deep mud. The Muscovite- Ukrainian army, some 38,000 strong, was dug in along a six- mile north-south defensive position behind the shallow and swampy Babich River near the Belarus village of Holowczyn (Holovzin) and felt secure, as the Swedish army still had to cross the wider Berezina River guarded by strong Muscovite forces. In a coordinated series of maneuvers, however, Charles succeeded in drawing the enemy away from the sites where his bridges were to be built, and before the Tsar’s commanders re­alized it the whole Swedish army was across the Berezina and was heading towards the Babich River.

The Muscovite-Ukrainian positions, defended by three divisions, were under the overall command of Sheremetev, whose division (18 battalions) was positioned in the center with Hollarts division (16 battalions) to his right, and Prince Repnins division (24 battalions) dug in on his left flank. Taking a detachment of cavalry on a reconnaissance, Charles detected a flaw in the enemy’s position. Prince Repnins division was sep­arated from Sheremetev’s men by a marshy tributary of the Babich River and by a thick wood, considered to be impassable, and was left undefended. Thus, once attacked Repnin s division could not be reinforced. On 3 July, at the break of dawn 20,000 of the kings men were ready for the assault. It had rained all night and pontoon bridges could not be dragged through the thick mud as Charles led the Lifeguard and Dalcarian Regi­ments in the first wave across the Babich River and into the un­defended swamp, the men wading in chest-deep water with muskets and powder held high. Other waves of Swedish infantry followed as each side poured volley after volley into each others ranks. Prince Repnin moved a number of battalions to reinforce his right flank but kept the bulk of his division in place to meet another Swedish crossing across the Babich. In danger of being rolled up onto themselves Repnin ordered his men to retreat and take cover in the woods, from where they continued their fire. Abrigade of Sixbattalions of Sheremetev s division arrived to support Repnin but could do no more than cover his retreat. The Cossack and Kalmick cavalry which was fighting the Swedish Household dragoons were attacked by the elite Dra­bant Household and elements of the Smaland cavalry and also retreated into the thick forest, leaving Charles in possession of the battlefield. Sheremetevs attempt to take the pressure off Repnin by crossing the Babich River with a brigade-sized force and attacking the Swedish camp had also failed when it was stopped by the newly arrived West Bothnian Regiment. Sheremetev had lost some 1,600 men and the battle cost Charles 1,200, many from the Guards.³⁶ The road to Mohilev and the Dnipro River lay open, and on 9 July the Swedish army entered Mohilev to rest and to wait for supplies and reinforce­ments.

Before setting on the campaign, Charles XII had left in­structions with General Lewenhaupt to assemble a supply train with provisions for three months since to avoid being slowed down, Charles would only take enough provisions to last his men for six weeks. Having experienced Peter^,s scorched earth policy, the king realized his army would have to be self-sufficient, and not depend on foraged supplies. Lewenhaupt was to leave Riga in early June with 2,000 wagons pulled by 8,000 horses, escorted by 7,500 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, to rendezvous with Charles in Mohilev. It was estimated that it would take two months to cover the distance of 400 miles, but the gathering of supplies took longer than expected. It was also an unusually wet summer and the roads were becoming almost impassable as the wheels of the heavily laden wagons sank into the mud. Averaging only five miles per day, Lewenhaupt s column was still on the road in mid-September.

Charles XII waited for a month for Lewenhaupt s arrival but impatience soon got the better of the young king, and on 5 August he vacated Mohilev and began to cross the Dnipro River. Bythe IOthAugust the entire Swedish army had crossed to the east bank and skirmishes broke out, with a minor battle at Moly- atichi, but in the main Peter I avoided a pitched battle and Charles halted at Tatarsk on the Smolensk-Moscow road. But the supplies Stillhad not arrived, the Swedish army was running low on provisions, and winter was approaching. Consulting with his commanders, Charles belatedly decided to activate his secret agreement with Hetman Mazepa and head south into east-bank Ukraine, into what the Swedes were told was a land of milk and honey.

In the meantime, Lewenhaupt was finding himself in a dangerous situation. There was still a 90-mile stretch of muddy road between himself and Charles, much of it through thick primeval forest, and Peter decided to attack and destroy the slow moving column. Assembling an army of ten battalions of his best infantry and ten battalions of dragoons and cavalry, the Tsar took overall command of the 11,60 Î-man force and began to move against Lewenhaupt. The supply train had already reached the Dnipro Riverwhen on 18 September Lewenhaupt received fresh instructions to turn south and head for Ukraine. He was also informed by his reconnaissance that a large Mus­covite force was moving against him, and he sent 3,000 cavalry to secure the crossing of the Sozh River at Propoitsk. With his main force he advanced towards the village of Lesnaya, where he drew up his men in battle order at the edge of the woods north of the village. On 28 September in the early afternoon, with Menshikov s seven dragoon regiments and three battalions of infantry to his left, Peter took command of the right flank and ordered to attack. A fierce firefight broke out as Menshikov s advance was brought to a halt by a Swedish counterattack, which in turn was blocked by the Semensky Guard Regiment. The fighting raged all day when just after 4 p.m. General Bauer s dragoons arrived and were launched on the Swedish right flank, forcing Lewenkaupt to order a retreat to the earthworks which had been thrown up around Lesnaya. The infantry around the village was reinforced by the 3,000 cavalry that had been sent to Propoitsk, and as dusk fell an early snowfall put an end to the hostilities.

Lewenhaupt, however, was no Charles XII, and with his battle lines still intact he ordered a retreat. The supply wagons were set on fire and the artillery was buried to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Morale and discipline plummeted as men tried to retrieve supplies from the burning wagons (par­ticularly the barrels of officers’ brandy) while others sought refuge in the thick forest believing all was lost. Some 6,000- 7,000 men, however, kept order and succeeded in reaching Propoisk only to discover all bridges across the Sozh had been burned. Disorganized fighting between Swedish units and Kalmick and Cossack cavalry squadrons continued for several days in which 500 Swedes were killed, but not wishing to sustain further losses Peter called off the pursuit.

Deprived of supplies and facing a severe winter, Charles headed south towards left bank Ukraine, which was bearing a heavy burden of the war. Forced contributions were on the in­crease and the local population was being abused by Muscovite garrisons, who raped women. Thousands of Cossacks had been killed, often fighting under foreign commanders but with un­familiar methods and tactics, and increasingly Cossacks were being used for northern construction projects such as St. Pe­tersburg, where hundreds died of disease in the unhealthy swamps. Ukrainian peasants were also forced to build fortifi­cations, taking them away from harvests. Foreign trade on which many Ukrainian towns depended had also ground to a halt.³⁷ The final blow for Mazepa and his officers came in 1705 when Tsar Peter I betrayed his agreement (and obligation) to support the Hetman against the Polish army, which was being gathered by King Stanislaw Leszczynski to occupy right-bank Ukraine. In the Tsar’s words Mazepa was told to “defend yourself as best as you can.” It seemed as if the time was ripe to renew Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s pro-Swedish policy, but this time there was a difference.³⁸ Both Charles XII and Peter I had treaties with the Polish kings and recognized right-bank Ukraine and Volin to be an integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, depriving Cossack Ukraine of half of its territory and any future independence from the two superpowers. Hetman Mazepa un­derstood the situation when he addressed his senior officers with the words: “We stand now, brothers, before two chasms, each ready to swallow us....”³⁹ There were similarities between the Swedes and Ukrainian Cossacks in that neither had serfdom and both enjoyed relative liberty in stark contrast to the servi­tude found in Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Common­wealth.⁴⁰ Charles XIIs grandfather had been Khmelnitsky s ally and besides the Swedish Imperial holdings of the King were sit­uated without common borders with Ukraine. Mazepa would wait for Charles XII s arrival, and throw in his lot with the Swedes.

Charles’ arrival on the border of left-bank Ukraine, how­ever, was badly timed and not one of Mazepas choosing. Many Cossack regiments were abroad, and those in Ukraine did not all support the Hetmans sudden pro-Swedish stance, and were unsure of abandoning their loyalty to Peter. In October 1708 Charles received a messenger from the Ukrainian Colonel Ivan Skoropadsky who volunteered to lead Charles to Starodub, an important Ukrainian center. Instead he took the long way, which enabled Peter’s commander Menshikov to reach the city first and deprive Charles of a strong base of operations. Bypassing Starodub the Swedes crossed the Vablin Riverwhere they were joined by 7,000 survivors of Lewenhaupt s column. Halting in Panurivka, Charles received a message from Mazepa promising support and winter quarters, but the Swedes still had to cross the wide Desna River before they could join Mazepa. On 31 October, having prepared several rafts and covered by artillery fire, Charles’ men began to cross at Mezin, and by the evening a beachhead was established by 200 Swedes and 400 Finns.

More troops followed and when Peter’s General Patrick Gordon attempted to throw them back into the river his Muscovite grenadiers suffered almost 2,000 dead and wounded with simi­lar casualties on the Swedish side, but by the next day all of Charles’ men had crossed the wide Desna and on 5 November Hetman Mazepa declared his support for Charles XII.⁴¹ Their meeting in Panurivka has been described in a diary by the Pruss­ian envoy to Charles XII David von Siltman:

Mazepa marched in to the accompaniment of trumpets and drums; also Colonel Hielm received him not far from the quar­ters with music.... In the morning Mazepa arrived before the King in the general headquarters; he brought with him a great number of officers; some of them rode before him, others behind him. Immediatelybefore Mazepa there rode an officer who car­ried a staff (the “bulava” mace) decorated with precious stones and gold; a detachment (Mazepas own 2,000 man regiment) of the Kozaks followed. In the King s headquarters he was re­ceived by count marshal von Diefen; Mazepa dined with the King, and at the table there were only seven of the most impor­tant Kozak officers. The Hetman was seated at the right of the King.⁴²

Peter I had been informed of Mazepa’s secret talks with Charles XII several months before in March by the Cossack Colonel Kochubeywho resented the love affair which had bro­ken out between his young daughter and the 63-year-old het­man. Moscow had been unable to penetrate Mazepa’s secret service and his dealings with foreign powers, and in the absence of evidence—Peter I was also aware of the personal enmity be­tween the two men—Kochubeywas arrested and handed over to Mazepa, who had him executed for treason. Now, with the confirmed reports of Mazepa’s support of the Swedish King, Peter I ordered Menshikov and a large force to advance on Mazepa’s capital. Golitsinhad already arrived on 31 October at the Seim River facing Baturin, but found all the bridges de­stroyed. He was joined by Menshikov, and crossing the Seim on newly built bridges the 20,000 combined Muscovite army surrounded Baturin.

Baturin was a formidable fortress, which had recently been strengthened on the Hetman’s orders. Ukraine was Peter I’s principal supplier of gunpowder and Baturin was a storehouse of ammunition, supplies, and weapons. The stronghold was garrisoned with four hired “serdiuk” regiments (men paid by the hetman), and the Mirhorod, Prilutsk, and Lubni Cossack regiments, in all 6,000 men. The walls were defended by 100 pieces of artillery including a 50-pounder mortar cast on the premises a few years before. The main fort was surrounded on three sides by a wide moat and an earthen mound except on the side facing the Seim River, and as Menshikov’s army ap­proached the Cossack commanding officer Colonel Chechelia issued an order to block the gates with mounds of earth. As was standard with fortifications of Baturin’s size there were several secret tunnels leading out from the central stronghold to receive messengers, stage sorties against the enemy, or to effect an escape when all was lost.

As recorded in the ^aIstoria Rusîv” by an anonymous Cos­sack chronicler, and confirmed later by a 100-year-old Cossack, Peter s commander Menshikov upon arrival on 1 November ordered an attack on the stronghold followed by several assaults, but all were beaten back with a heavy loss in manpower. The fortress was virtually impregnable, even to a large force, and Menshikov was threatened to be cut off from Peter Is main army by the advancing Swedes and Cossacks who were only 40-50 miles away. Then the unexpected happened of which every commander dreams. A Cossack acting colonel, Ivan Nis, with a few other officers had voiced the opinion that the gates of the fort should be flung open and loyalty declared to the Greek Orthodox Tsar, Peter I. Colonel Chechelia had Nis and his supporters arrested for treason and chained to cannons to await trial when the siege was over. However, word was gotten to Menshikov by Nis’ agent as to the secret locations of the tun­nels, and Menshikov ordered a halt to the withdrawal.

On the next day at 6 o’clock in the morning of 5 September Muscovite grenadiers began to make their way through the darkness and the fog which had enveloped Baturin and entered the underground passages, while at the same time an assault was ordered on the fort s walls. Disorganized and taken by sur­prise by the unexpected emergence of enemy troops inside the fortress, the defenders fought back for two hours but were over­whelmed by the Muscovite tide. Most surrendered, others fled as Baturin was set ablaze, and the slaughter of prisoners and civilians began with the troops reinforced by alcohol. In all, some 12,000 Cossacks and civilians were killed in the fighting or massacred as prisoners. Fearing the advance of Charles XII s army and Mazepas Cossacks, Menshikov quickly withdrew to join Peter I and Skoropadsky s forces. Hetman Mazepa arrived soon afterwards and it is said he burst into tears when he saw the great pools of dried blood and the ruins of the city. News of the massacre spread throughout Europe, and provided further confirmation of the Tsar s barbarity bordering on mental instability. Todayverylittle is available in Russian archives deal­ing with Baturin s destruction, and it is only recently that some of the main events have been reconstructed in some detail.⁴³

The rapid fall of Baturin played a key role in the Ukrainian theater of the Great Northern War. Charles XIIs weakening forces and reduced artillery were casting doubt amongst Cossack commanders as to a Swedish victory over Peter Γs re­inforced army, and with the fall and total destruction of Baturin influential colonels such as Skoropadsky, Apostal, Halahan, and Sulyma decided to support the Tsar. Many right-bank Cossacks, Colonel Paliy and others who were forced to retreat to the left bank by Polish and Muscovite forces, also saw little choice but to side with Peter—they were still angered at Hetman Mazepa for failing to support Paliy against the Polish-Muscovite inva­sion. Factors such as language and culture played a subordinate role when deciding on loyalty and a ruler s legitimacy. Rarely acknowledged, the Ukrainian Cossack regiments played a key role by tipping the balance in Peter s favor.

Not all sided with the Tsar, and towards the end of De­cember Mazepa and Charles received news that the Zaporo- zhian Sich with “koshovy ataman” Hordienko was leaning to­wards joining the allies. They were realizing Tsar Peter I intended to suppress their democratic system, which served as an example for the enslaved serfs of Muscovy. Alreadywith the Treaty ofKarlowitz in 1700 Peter I had agreed to punish by death any Zaporozhian attacks on the Muslim Tatars and Turks, and to forbid Cossack settlements to the south of the Sich along the Dnipro River. Now two forts were being built in the vicinity of the Sich at Kameny Zaton and on the Samara River.

By March, gathering his supporters, Hordienko set sail up the Dnipro River to meet Mazepa at Perevolochno on the left bank, picking up more Cossacks on the way. His force of 8,000 Cossacks was blocked by three regiments of Muscovite dragoons under Brigadier Campbell at Tsarichanka, where the dragoons were crushed in a total defeat. The victory impressed Charles XII, a feeling which was reinforced when Hordienko addressed the linguistically gifted Swedish King in good Latin. Charles was presented with 115 Muscovite prisoners, Hor- dienko received 10,000 Florins from the King, and Mazepa dis­tributed money to each “kuren.” On the following day on 8 April 1709 the Zaporozhian Army took an oath of allegiance to King Charles XII, in return receiving an affirmation their freedom and democratic “ancient privileges” would be pro­tected.

The Tsar reacted by sending three regular regiments to destroy the Sich, but without success as all assaults were repulsed by the 1,000 man Cossack garrison, until he resorted to treachery. One of Mazepa s officers, Colonel Halahan, had been a member of the Sich before switching sides to enter the Tsar’s service. Appearingbefore the Sich in early May, Halahan was recognized and allowed to enter with some of his men. The defenders were taken by surprise as they were attacked with half of the Cossacks perishing in the fighting and the rest taken prisoner with 156 summarily executed. The Sich was burned to the ground and Halahan was richly rewarded with honors, estates, and money.

With King Charles’ entire army quartered in Ukraine a more formal agreement was drawn up between the Swedish king and Hetman Mazepa, by which King Charles recognized Ukrainian independence on the left bank but still refused to give up support for KingAugustus II on the right-bank Ukraine. The Zaporozhian Cossacks under “Koshovy Ataman” Hordi- enko signed a separate treaty with Charles XII, by which the Sich and its territory “Down Under” was recognized to be in­dependent but with a special relationship to Ukraine. Peter I had occupied the Starodub region, and to confirm control among the local regiments the Tsar called a meeting of Cossack officers, who elected Colonel Skoropadsky as Mazepas rival hetman. To secure their loyalty all officers who attended were rewarded with land grants at the expense of Mazepas sup­porters. With the overwhelming Muscovite forces, for the Cos­sack officers to have acted otherwise would have brought a crushing defeat and an outright occupation of their regimental territories.

The Swedish army settled into winter quarters between Priluky, Romny, Hadiach, and Lokhvitsia, just to the south of Peter Is forces which were being concentrated in the north­eastern part of left-bank Ukraine. The winter saw limited action but Muscovite cavalrywas routed in Sloboda Ukraine and 8,000 Zaporozhians who arrived defeated two Muscovite divisions commanded by generals Nekhvoroscha and Schaumburg, in the process capturing hundreds of prisoners. The Cossackfort OfVeprikwas in enemy hands and just a few miles from Swedish- held Hadiach, and Charles decided to capture it and remove a potential threat. The fortress was under the command of a Scot­tish officer called Fairbairn who was in Peter’s service and gar­risoned by two Muscovite battalions and four Ukrainian com­panies, 400 Cossacks and two pieces of artillery. In typical style the Cossacks had poured water on the earthworks which quickly turned into ice and on 7 January 1709 when the demand of Surrenderwas rejected, Charles ordered the attack with six infantry and two dragoon regiments 3,000 men in all, supported by artillery. Ladders and men slid off the frozen ramparts as the precise Cossack musket fire took a heavy toll on men and offi­cers, and in the two-hour attack the Swedes lost 400 dead and 600 wounded, including the commander Field Marshal Rehn- skiδld. The fort Onlyfellwhen on the following day the defend­ers ran out of ammunition and accepted surrender with honor.

In March 1709 Charles XII moved south to new positions between the Psiol and Vorskla rivers where the Swedes found themselves better supplied especially when the local population and the Cossacks went on an Orthodox fast. Peter s strategy was to trap the Swedish and Cossack armies in left-bank Ukraine and to this end he had stationed strong forces on the right-bank territories to block a Swedish retreat to the west. He had also succeeded in capturing and destroying the Zaporo- zhian river fleet, in effect trapping Charles and the Cossacks on Mazepa’s territory. The only way out was along the Poltava- Kharkov-Smolensk road leading to Moscow, but Poltava to the south was garrisoned by Muscovite troops and Skoropadsky s Cossacks.

To contain Charles in east-bank Ukraine was no easy mat­ter, for despite shortages of supplies the allies still had a power­ful force. The 25,000 Swedish army, 8,000 Zaporozhians, 4,000 ofMazepas Cossacks, and 1,000 Wallachians were outnum­bered by 47 Muscovite regiments totaling 50,000 men, 5,000 Kalmik horsemen, tens of thousands of left-bank Cossack in­fantry and cavalry, not counting the 4,000 Muscovites and Cos­sacks who were defending Poltava. Peter I was also reinforced by several thousand of Paliy’s right-bank Cossacks. The situation did not improve when Peter I arrived from Azov on 4 June with 8,000 men so that Charles and Mazepa were now outnumbered two-to-one. The ally’s greatest disadvantage lay in artillery since Charles’ thirty field guns were overwhelmed by Peter’s 102 cannons.

With the coming of spring Charles and Mazepa broke camp and headed towards Poltava, which lay behind Charles’ position on the strategic road leading to Kharkov and Moscow, and was a natural location to establish a springboard for further operations. On 1 May 1709 the Swedish artillery began to bom­bard the earthen and wooden ramparts surrounding Poltava, and Sheremetev and Menshikov watched with unease as the Swedes and Ukrainians advanced towards the city. The posi­tions of the antagonists lay on opposite shores of the marshy Vorskla River with the Muscovite camp on the eastern side and the allies on the west. Several attempts at reinforcing the Poltava defenders had failed, and a decision was made by Peter to cross the Vorskla some ten kilometers to the north of the city, at a natural ford near Petrovka, and establish a fortified camp. The crossing at Petrovka would be the second (and probably the last) attempt by Peter to cross the river, since a major crossing during the night of 14-15 June had already been repelled by Field Marshall Rehnskiold, and with the Muscovite army on the wrong side of the river it would be a question of time before Poltava fell to the Swedes and Cossacks. With the fall of Poltava Charles and Mazepa could concentrate all their forces on the Vorskla River crossing and place Peter’s army at a disadvantage.

The 17 th of June was Charles XII’s 27 th birthday when one of these random events occurred which can change history. As the Kingwas inspecting the Swedish and Cossackpositions by the banks of the Vorskla near the village of Nizhny Mliny just to the south of Poltava, several anti-Mazepa Cossack sharp­shooters who had made their way undetected to one of the small islands on the Vorskla waterway began to open fire. A horseman was killed and Charles was hit in the left heel by a bullet, but in typical fashion he ignored the wound and completed the in­spection. Returning to camp he fainted and was immediately attended to by his physicians, but the wound had become in­fected and he began to develop a fever. The news that the King had been wounded spread quickly amongst the men—he who had led them into battle many times and had emerged un­scathed. The wound would prove to be the undoing of the Swedish and Cossack allies.

Command passed to the cavalryman Field Marshall Rehn- skiδld who, just like Lewenhaupt, was no Charles XIL The cross­ing at the Petrovka ford was neglected, and learning of Charles’ wound Peter realized that no tactical trap had been set, and between 19 and 21 June the entire Muscovite army crossed to the western side. For the next few days Muscovite attacks to re­lieve Poltava were beaten back as the city was expected to fall any day. The Swedish and Saxon troops were still receiving Cos­sack provisions but the Orthodoxfast was ending at the end of June and Paliy s Cossack cavalry was raiding the surrounding villages and expropriating the food supplies. While Field Mar­shall Rehnskiold was hesitating as Charles lay in a coma the Muscovite infantry entrenched itself on the open field between the marshes of the Vorskla River and the forest near Semenivka. Anticipating an attack, Peter s men had constructed six redoubts some 200 meters apart and parallel to the main camps earth­works, defended by infantry and artillery.⁴⁴ Peter had also moved his main camp near Jacovtsi closer to the Swedish and Cossack positions and only five kilometers from Poltava but was showing no signs of mounting an attack.

Seeing the Tsar was not budging from his defensive posi­tions, Rehnskiold decided to take the initiative and launch an all-out assault on the Muscovite camp. On 28 June at 4:00 a.m. before sunrise the Swedish and Cossack regiments were drawn up into six attack columns, with Charles carried on a stretcher strapped between two horses. Without conducting proper re­connaissance Rehnskiold now discovered that the Muscovite infantry had built four more redoubts perpendicular to the pre­vious six, and any assault force would have to be split into two groups to bypass them. The attack formations were duly reor­ganized into five columns, two to bypass the redoubts on each side, and a middle column under General Roos to attack and destroy them after which he was to join the other four columns on the assault on the remaining six redoubts and the Muscovite camp. The position of the redoubts was such that the advancing Swedish battalions would also be exposed to artillery fire on both the flank and the front ranks as they went by. King Charles dressed in his royal uniform was placed at the head of the left column with the Guards battalions. The advance on the Mus­covite positions thus began with an initial flaw. By ordering a change in the original Swedish formations Rehnskiold had lost the element of surprise, so important to the success of an attack on a superior force. A second major error was to leave most of the artillery behind, and only four cannons were brought to support the infantry. Also, the two Swedish commanders were lackluster when it came to strategy and tactical leadership. Swedish morale was also affected by the king s wound, since it was widely believed that during his youth Charles had been made invincible against gunfire by a witch.

The Cossacks were also ready for battle, and to indicate they were Swedish allies they Aewblue and yellow banners, the colors of the Swedish uniforms. Mazepas men were divided into three groups: one was to remain before Poltava and con­tinue the siege, the second was left to defend the baggage train and the camp, while the third group joined the Zaporozhians under Hordienko on the left flank with the elite Swedish Guards. The Zaporozhians had already been attacked by the Kalmick cavalry on the same day which had forced them into a confused retreat before they rallied and drove them off, causing heavy losses. Although the fighting styles and techniques of the free-wheeling Cossacks and the regimented Swedes were different, the Cossacks soon earned the Swedes’ respect. Even before the march towards Poltava, Von Weihe had observed that the Cossacks

... are equally good foot soldiers (compared to their cavalry) and aim well with their muskets, and have therefore won a reputation as the best fighters.... Our Zaporozhians with their precise mus­kets inflicted heavy losses on the Muscovite infantry, so that the latter was forced to retreat through he marshes, which enabled the King to make a circle towards Poltava.⁴⁵

A similar observation about Cossack marksmen was re­corded in a diary by another Swedish officer, R. Petre, who no­ticed that they “had good wrought muskets, which they fired from a sitting position at the enemy in the woods, inflicting considerable losses.”⁴⁶ Although Russian and Swedish historians make little mention of them, we know from the Prussian envoy Von Siltman that the Cossacks took part in the final battle of Poltava on 28 June, where “Hetman Mazepa was present and also led his Kozaks, who together with the Zaporozhians held the enemy on the right and left flanks.”⁴⁷

Attacked by General Roos’ column of2,600 men (six bat­talions), the first two redoubts fell with ease to Swedish fire and bayonet charges, but the third refused to fall in spite of repeated assaults. Incredibly, Field Marshall Rehnskiold had failed to communicate to both Generals Lewenhaupt and Roos the over­all plan of the attack so that Roos failed to realize that in case of resistance all five Swedish columns were to bypass the first four redoubts, neutralize the remaining Sixguarding the camp, and attack the main Muscovite camp. As it was, following what he thought were his orders Roos was Iosingvaluable manpower as the Swedish and Cossack advance was met by Muscovite in­fantry. Peterhad also stationed Menshikovwith 10,000 cavalry behind the six parallel redoubts, but when Menshikov led an attack he was met by a similar force of Swedish and Cossack cavalry, and after hand-to-hand fighting was driven back. The time was about 4:30 in the morning.

In the meantime as Lewenhaupts right wing was ad­vancing with six Swedishbattalions and the Zaporozhian Cos­sacks, he came under heavy artillery and musket fire from the redoubts and with Roos’ column nowhere to be seen. Having lost more than half of his men in the assaults on the redoubts and the Guards battalions, which had split off to join the right wing columns, Roos had called off the attack and withdrawn to regroup in the SwampyYakovetskywoods where he lost his way. Lewenhaupt was bypassing the heavy fire from the redoubts and with Menshikov’s cavalry driven back he was now before the Muscovite camp, where he was ordered by Rehnskiold to wait for the arrival of the remaining infantry and Cavalrybefore attacking the heavily fortified enemy position—although the Swedes and Cossacks were outnumbered they had an advantage due to cramped conditions in the enemy camp. Unknown to Lewenhaupt, General Roos had been attacked by enemy infantry and with 500 men left he retreated to an abandoned redoubt where, running out of ammunition, he accepted the offer of surrender.

Hearing of Roos’ defeat and with no other movement coming from the Swedes, who were still waiting for reinforce­ments, at 9:00 a.m. Peter I decided to come out of the camp and attack the enemy with a force of 18,000 infantry, and 9,000 dragoons with 8,000 of Skoropadsky’s Cossacks posted some two miles to the north, since many were willing to join Mazepa.⁴⁸ Lewenhaupt had only 4,000 men, and adjutants sent to Mazepa at the main camps to bring up reinforcements with artillery failed to get through.⁴⁹ Rehnskiolds poor Strategywas now becoming evident. Facing a danger of being surrounded, the Swedes decided to pull back towards their camp, and fol­lowed by the Muscovite infantry and mounted dragoons, by 10:00 a.m. Rehnskiold called a halt to meet the enemy with the Budyschenskywoods behind them although the Cossacks had informed him that a better location was available.⁵⁰ Instead Lewenhaupt s infantry and the Cossacks were ordered to attack the advancing Muscovite infantry, and without artillery they began to take heavy casualties. The Swedish Guards regiments and the Zaporozhian Cossacks broke through the first rank of the Muscovite infantry and succeeded in capturing several guns, which they turned on the enemy. There was now a break in Sheremetev’s infantry battle formation and this was the time to send in the cavalry, but it was nowhere to be seen. For the first time in the Great Northern war Tsar Peter I took overall command of a major battle, as a break developed in the Swedish- Cossack formation between the left and right wings of the line. Muscovite infantry poured through the gap and attacked the left wing as Peter rode into battle at the head of the Novgorod regiment.

The left wing collapsed first, and unable to make the troops stand, Lewenhaupt managed to get away with some of the men. Menshikov’s cavalry had attacked the Swedish cavalry behind their lines, and finding themselves on unfavorable terrain and without cavalry support the right wing also gave way. By 11:00 a.m. the battle of Poltava was over. General Lewenhaupt man­aged to get away with some of his men and Field Marshall Rehn- skiδld was taken prisoner. Charles XII was still on his stretcher, which had several bullet holes, and at the head of his Guards and the Zaporozhians he was trying to rally the right wing with cries of ^aSwenskar, Swenskar” (“Sweden, Sweden”), but to no avail. Protected by a line of men he mounted a horse which was promptly shot from under him, and with his bandages ripped off he barely escaped beyond musket range on another mount provided by an officer of the Guard. Seeing their King on horse­back the Swedish regiments ceased the headlong flight and began an orderly retreat with the Cossacks providing rear guard action and the defense of the Swedish camp, as was noted by VonWeihe in his diary: “Strong detachments of the enemy dra­goons appeared in the morning, but they did not dare to attack (the camp) so soon, as they were confronted by the Zaporo- zhian cavalrymen and infantry.”⁵¹

The Swedish and Cossack casualties were heavy, 6,900 dead or fatally wounded and 2,760 Swedes taken prisoner, in­cluding Field Marshall Rehnskiold and four Major Generals. Some 16,000 of Charles’ troops, however, survived the battle and the panicked rout that followed and were able to reach the camp at Pushkarivka. There they were joined by the regiments who were besieging Poltava with the 6,000 Zaporozhians, and by Mazepa’s Cossacks, who had survived the battle placed in defensive positions around the camp. The Muscovite losses were lighter, supposedly only 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded, very low casualties for such a long and bloody battle. The de­mise of the Swedish army was not yet over. Together with the Cossacks they still remained a potent fighting force, but a deci­sion was taken by Charles not to stand and fight but to beat a hasty retreat towards the Dnipro River some 80 miles away, following the Worskla River where it emptied into the Dnipro at Perevo- Iochna. All supplies and a part of the royal treasury were dis­tributed amongst the troops, the wagons were burned, and the infantry mounted the wagon horses to hasten the withdrawal.

The retreating Swedes and Cossacks reached Perevo- Iochna in the evening of 29 June, but with the Zaporozhian river fleet destroyed not everyone could get across the Dnipro before the arrival of the Muscovite cavalry, which was in hot pursuit. There were still some fishing boats left and on the following day Charles and Mazepa were ferried across the Dnipro in their carriages, each placed on two boats lashed together. With them came the wounded and 1,000 of the king’s best men—800 cav­alry and 200 infantry accompanied by 2,000 Zaporozhians who crossed in the Cossackwayby swimming and holding on to the horses’ tails, much to the amazement of the Swedes. The rest of Charles’ troops were to continue along the east side of the Dnipro River and, escorted by Cossacks, seek refuge with the Crimean Khan. Charles and Mazepa, in the meantime, would seek asylum with the Turkish Sultan in Moldavia as their way to Sweden was blocked by Peter’s Muscovites and Ukrainian Cossacks who had already occupied west bank Ukraine, Volinia, and Podilia.

Menshikov was held back by Cossack rear-guard action and was unable to prevent Charles and Mazepa from crossing the Dnipro. Charles had appointed Lewenhaupt to be in com­mand of the army with the promise that there would be no sur­render. By 1 July at the head of 6,000 Muscovite troopers and 2,000 Cossack CavalryMenshikovhad caught up with the main Swedish and Cossack army which had remained on the east bank, and proceeded to offer the Swedes terms of surrender. Lewenhaupt was still in command of about 18,000 seasoned Swedish troops and Cossacks, all fit to fight and twice the strength of Menshikov s force, but once again he demonstrated poor judgment and leadership and accepted the terms of sur­render. No doubt the low morale of the Swedish troops who thought their King had abandoned them played a role, but not only was this a direct disobeying of the Kings instructions, it was also a shameful betrayal of the faithful Cossacks, who had rescued the Swedish army a number of times, and had probably saved Lewenhaupt from capture during the great battle. As Lewenhaupt knew, the Cossacks would not be spared by the terms of the surrender.

Many Cossacks slipped away and vanished into the vast steppe, but those not fortunate to get away were tortured and executed on Menshikov s orders, their mutilated bodies hung on trees as a warning of what happens to those who would dare oppose the authority of the Tsar. The killing represented pure murder, since having sworn allegiance to Charles XII the Cos­sacks were no longer in the Tsar^,s service. Later in a letter Charles XII would sum up the surrender by indicating his trust in Lewenhaupt was misplaced:

I was guilty of an oversight in that I forgot to give the other gen­erals and colonels who were there the orders of which only Lewenhaupt and Kreutz had knowledge. But for this, nothing would have happened as it did; for all the colonels who were at a loss, not knowing what orders had been given, nor which way they were to take with their regiments, nor where I myself had gone (my emphasis).⁵²

Once across the wide Dnipro River the 70-year-old Mazepa took charge of the retreat, throwing the pursuing enemy off their tracks to gain time. He and his Cossacks knew the tall grass prairie which stretched away as far as the eye could see, something which struck the Swedes and the Saxons with awe. Charles was still incapacitated by his wound and Mazepa had become ill and was also confined to his carriage. The Swedes and Cossacks reached the Boh River on 7 July and most had successfully crossed to the safety of Ottoman territory when General Volkonsky s pursuing cavalry was sighted a short dis­tance away. Some 300 Cossacks and the same number of Swedes had still not crossed and were now trapped on the wrong side of the river. The Swedes surrendered without firing a shot, but knowing what lay in store the Cossacks formed a fir­ing line and as the Muscovite troopers charged they were mowed down with volleys of musket fire. When their ammu­nition ran out the Cossacks leveled their pikes, drew sabers and went down fighting to a man, as their Brothers watched help­lessly from across the river. The casualties of the Muscovite cavalry were not reported but they were certainly considera­ble in what was the last battle in Charles XII s Ukrainian cam­paign.

Elsewhere in Ukraine Cossack uprisings lasted until 1715. Following the victory at Poltava Peter I inaugurated his usual repression, as was described by a German participant in the campaign, Frederich Weber, in his memoirs published in 1720: “The Muscovite General Menshikovbrought to Ukraine all the horrors of vengeance and war. All sympathizers with Mazepa were disgracefully tortured. Ukraine was flooded with blood and devastated by looting, and presents a frightful picture of the barbarity of the victors.”⁵³

Following Mazepas death on 22 September 1709 in Bender (Moldavia), his SecretaryPilip Orlykwas elected Het­man on 5 April 1710, and was recognized by Charles XII and the Turkish Sultan Ahmed III. At the head of 16,000 Cossacks, Tatar allies, and a detachment of Polish supporters of the de­posed King Stanislaw Leszczynski, Hetman Orlyk invaded west bank Ukraine, which was under the occupation of Augustus II, who had been placed once again on the Polish throne by Peter I. Orlykwas supported by the Zaporozhian Cossacks and allied with the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan when on 20 November 1710 Sultan Ahmet III declared war on Tsar Peter I and King August II. Pilip Orlyk was attacked by a large Muscovite army under Peter I and 20,000 Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Hetman Skoropadsky. His Tatar allies fled, and Orlyks Cossacks were forced to retreat to Moldavia. Peterwas no strate­gist, however, and in July 1711 he was surrounded in Bessarabia by the Turkish army and Orlyks Cossacks. Facing total annihila­tion, he succeeded in bribing the Sultan s Grand Vizier who was in command of the Ottoman army. Before being allowed to withdraw from the trap Peter had to sign the Treaty of Pruth, by which, among other concessions, he was forced to hand over to King Leszycynski the right-bank Ukraine.

Following the Battle of Poltava, Peter I had sent Skoropad­sky ^,s Cossacks and Muscovite troops to destroy the Zaporo- zhian Sich on the Dnipro River. Part of the Zaporozhian Army which had not joined Pilip Orlyk moved down the river to a new stronghold at Kaminsky Zaton, where they would be out of reach of the Tsar s men and turncoats such as Ihnat Halahan who was hunting down, torturing, and executing every Za- porozhian who fell into his hands. As Orlyk advanced into right­bank Ukraine, the Zaporozhians of the new Sich with a Tatar force penetrated deep into the left-bank up to the Kharkiv region. Outnumbered by Skoropadsky and General Buturlins eight Muscovite regiments they were pushed back and Sko­ropadsky issued the shameful order that every IOth adult male from the population that supported the Zaporozhians be exe­cuted. The Zaporozhians continued to retreat to the new Sich which was again captured and destroyed, and sailing down the Dnipro into Tatar territory they were given permission by Khan Devlet Giray II to build a Sich at Oleshky at the mouth of the

Kardashinska tributary from where they continued to raid the occupied Ukrainian territory.

During the continued fighting on the west-bank, Volinia, and Podilia, Charles XII had become stranded in Moldavia, un­able to return to his kingdom. He used his two-year stay to work on publications, describing Swedish military drills and tactics some of which he himself had invented, and to study Ottoman life. His most interesting acquisition was a copy of a manuscript by the Greek Emmanuel Timani (the Sultans physician and one of the leading men of medicine in Europe) which describes vaccination to control smallpox epidemics !⁵⁴ Charles left Mol­davia on 6 February 1713 and eventually arrived in Sweden. An uprising broke out in Norway, and while he was in the trenches besieging a castle, on 11 December 1718 he was shot in the head and died instantly. The Great Northern War continued for the next three years, which ended with Peter Γs victory and the Treaty ofNystadt signed on 1 May 1721. The Victorybroke Sweden’s monopoly in the Baltic region and was the occasion for the announcement of the Russian Empire with “Muscovy” being Officiallyrenamed as “Russia” (“Rossiya,” the Greekword for Rus). Peter I was “prevailed” upon to accept the title “Peter the Great, Emperor of all Rus, Father of the Fatherland.” Fol­lowing the Commonwealths example of classifying Poland as “Greater Poland” and “Lesser Poland” Muscovy became “Greater Russia” (Russia Major) and Ukraine was renamed as “Lesser Russia” (Russia Minor), which eradicated the name “Ukraine.”⁵⁵

Tsar Peter Is new title and the adoption of the name “Rus­sia” for his realm, with the new capital at St. Petersburg, signaled a shift in imperial expansion, made possible with the control of left-bank Ukraine and its Cossack regiments. Ukraine became the gateway to the Russian imperial expansion towards the Crimea, the Caucasus region and other Muslim territory in Central Asia, and in fact was the key to the Russian Empire. As observed by the Russian Nationalist A.I. Savenko in 1911: “[The] Mazepist injures Russia at the origin of its existence as a great power.... Poland, Finland and other borderlands did not give Russia her greatness, Ukraine did.”⁵⁶

The two monarchs, Peter I and Charles XII, soon entered the history books beginning with Voltaire s volumes in 1731. But it was the Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa who captured the imagination of first Europe and then North America, to become a prominent figure in European Romantic poetry.⁵⁷ An epic poem by the great English Romantic poet G. Byron entitled “Mazeppa” appeared in 1819 in London, and Simultaneouslyin Byrons collected works in Paris. Henceforth an idealized Ro­mantic version became well known in France, such as Victor Hugos poem also entitled “Mazeppa” and the paintings by Delacroix and Vernet. Four operas were dedicated to Mazepa, including one by his countryman Tchaikovsky, and Franz Liszt composed a piano concerto in the name of the Ukrainian het­man. Repins great painting of the Zaporozhian Cossacks writing a letter to the Turkish Sultan—intended to depict Cos­sack democracy—has Mazepa s blue and yellow banner hidden in the background, today the flag of the independent Ukrainian Republic.