Western Scholarship

The events dealt with in detail in the remainder of this book have all been subjected to research by scholars resident in the West. This brief survey will be limited to works that have appeared in English over the past 20 years, a period roughly equivalent to the time span of the interpretations cited in Ukraine in subsequent chapters.

Applying nationalist theories directly to the former Soviet Union, Ronald G. Suny examines inter alia the case of the non-Russian peoples in tsarist Russia, including the Ukrainians. He perceives a gap between national and class consciousness among many groups. Ukrainian nationality often over­lapped with membership of the peasant class, and in the 19th century, Ukrainians developed a distinct culture and language. By the early 20th cen­tury Galicia had become the center of Ukrainian popular nationalism, but national discourse had not yet surfaced. Suny notes the lack of agreement in assessing Ukrainian nationalism in the revolutionary period of 1917-18, with some authors maintaining that events in Ukraine reflected the initiative of the middle class, others focusing on the peasantry, and a third view being that the elite in Ukraine was supported by nationally conscious peasants in a single class movement. Suny's view is that the peasantry was not prepared for a sus­tained political movement and eventually went over to the side of the Bolshe­viks. He maintains that the common dichotomy between class and nationality, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, and town and country do not apply here as the categories were intertwined, fluid, and situational. The chances of success for the nationalist elite were enhanced when they could combine social reform with programs of self-definition, autonomy, or independence.³⁶ In the later Soviet period, under Gorbachev, Suny writes that the formation of nations occurred as a direct consequence of state-building through a pseudo-federal system or policies of nativization. He sees Soviet policies as being a direct cause of the rise of nationalism—as opposed to the idea that primordial na­tions were waiting to be emancipated.³⁷

How do these post-Soviet states, involved in nation-building, view the past? In an article that focuses primarily on the question of whether Ukraine has a history, Mark von Hagen also pays attention to the issue of Ukraine's situa­tion, caught between two powerful and dominant historiographies: that of the Germans and the Russians (Soviets).

Von Hagen's comments sparked several responses in the pages of the same issue of Slavic Review, two of which merit citation here as relevant to the topic under review. Yaroslav Isayevich (Iaroslav Isaievych) writes that he was edu­cated in an environment in which “the term ‘nation' meant exclusively an eth­nic nation mostly... with a territory and not necessarily with a state.” He feels that Von Hagen's implicit condemnation of party historians is too sweeping because they included a variety of people, some of whom have managed to combined patriotism with the duties of a historian.

Plokhy notes the portrayal of Ukraine as the main victim of the Soviet re­gime through events such as the Famine of 1932-33 and the nuclear accident at Chornobyl in 1986. The most important aspect of such depictions has been their all-inclusiveness, i.e., the view that all citizens of Ukraine, no matter what their background, were victims of the Communist government. However, after 1991, it became very difficult to develop an all-inclusive model of his­torical mythology. Nationalistic myths, such as the feats of the Ukrainian In­surgent Army, could not penetrate Eastern Ukraine, and the attempt by Ukraine's first two presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, to in­clude the Great Patriotic War in an official conception of history did not meet with favor in Western Ukraine.

Andrew Wilson has written two books that deal with similar questions and are extensive in their scope. The first, published in 1997, was the more con­troversial because it deals with Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s and argues that an ethnically based nationalism will never hold sway in many parts of Ukraine. It is a fairly negative view that attempts to incorporate historical events dating from the period of Kyivan Rus' to the present state, and posits that modern Ukraine is a deeply polarized society that may well face insuper­able problems in the future if it tries to found the state on a conception of ethnic nationalism. Like some other scholars, Wilson attributes a large role in state-building to the issue of language, and he doubts whether the large group of Russian speakers in Ukraine (both Ukrainians and Russians) can ever be persuaded to adopt “modern ethno-nationalism.”⁴² This line of argument raises the question of whether state-building is exclusively the privilege of Ukrainian speakers or ethno-nationalists, and also leads to the question, whether, what can be termed rightist political thought in Ukraine today, is as pervasive as integral nationalism was in Western Ukraine in the 1930s and the war years.

Turning to more specific studies, early works on the Famine of 1932-33 were commissioned by the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University (HURI) and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS). In the case of the former, Robert Conquest, a senior scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, produced the book (cited above) Harvest of Sorrow, a careful study of the Famine based mainly on documents available in libraries of the West,⁴⁴ with the assistance of James E. Mace, who had recently com­pleted a PhD and published a book on a related topic.⁴⁵ Conquest argues that the Soviet leadership, and specifically Kaganovich, Molotov, and Stalin, were well aware of the severity of the Famine, even if it cannot be proved defini­tively that it had planned such an event.⁴⁶ Conquest estimates 11 million peasant deaths in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1937, with a further 3.5 million arrested and dying in camps, or a total of 14.5 million victims. Of this figure, he writes, 5 million died in the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine.⁴⁷ The Ca­nadian production was a volume of essays on the famine, edited by Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, which also included Duranty's cover-up.⁴⁸ The US Commission on the Ukraine Famine also published several volumes of analysis and eyewitness testimonies upon the completion of its work in 1990. Thereafter there was little work that focused on the Famine specifically. Notably it was the US Commission, rather than Conquest, that first sought to establish that the Famine constituted an act of genocide.

A new study by Swedish scholar Johan Dietsch offers a very critical look at writings on the Famine. Specifically he uses the phrase “making facts fight” and argues that scholars such as Robert Conquest and James E. Mace have expanded the traditional role of the historian, which Dietsch describes as “es­sentially a scientific scholarly one, whereby the past is recorded as it hap­pened by establishing historical facts.” Once that job is completed, however, the historian takes on a new role of making moral judgements, and in the case of the new interpretations by Conquest and Mace the task was to use the Famine to illustrate the victimization of Ukrainians by the Soviet regime with explicit comparison with the Jewish Holocaust. In Dietsch's view, the descrip­tion of Ukraine by Conquest as “one vast concentration camp” led others “engaged in the struggle” [!] to make a direct analogy with the Holocaust, which in turn undermined the image of Ukrainians welcoming German troops in the summer of 1941. He also maintains that the purpose of the new atten­tion to the Famine that began among Ukrainian groups in the West from 1983 was, first of all, to make the subject known to a wider audience, but secondly, to strengthen the notion that the third-wave of emigrants had departed from Ukraine because of “political and cultural persecutions.” Dietsch editorializes that “such an existential use of history simply confirmed an understood image of victimhood.” Dietsch also believes that within Ukraine, the Holocaust and Jewish victimization per se has never received due attention, and he points out that this crucial event of 20th century Europe is mysteriously absent from

Ukrainian textbooks, which often provide a narrative on Ukraine in the Sec­ond World War without mentioning the assault on Jews. He attributes this omission not to some inherent anti-Semitism, but rather the issue of “oppos­ing martyrdoms” and the fact that Ukrainian suffering would thereby be over­shadowed by its Jewish counterpart.⁴⁹

Two other works merit citation for their analysis of the Famine. The first is Orest Subtelny's Ukraine: a History, which first appeared in 1988, and was widely distributed in Ukraine in its Ukrainian translation.⁵⁰ It is discussed in context in Chapter 2, as is Terry Martin's The Affirmative Action Empire.⁵¹ Nei­ther work lays great emphasis on the Famine as an act of genocide, though Martin conducts a long discussion concerning the national element of the Famine, and the extent to which Stalin's campaign against peasants coincided with a campaign against Ukrainians as a national group. Those who reject the theory of genocide, overtly or implicitly, are led—at least in terms of output— by the aforementioned Mark B. Tauger, a historian at the University of West Virginia, who believes that the famine (he refers to it as the “famine of 1931­33”) arose mainly from environmental factors.⁵² The lengthy series on the economic history of the Soviet Union by E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, and more recently by Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, has included a recent volume entitled The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, which emphasizes both food shortages and distribution problems as the main factors behind the famine.⁵³ The article on the topic published in 2005 by Michael Ellman, an economist based at the University of Amsterdam, declines even to engage the literature on the Famine as genocide (though he takes a more critical stance than Davies and Wheatcroft vis-a-vis the Soviet regime), and should be considered in the same category of genocide-rejection theory. It also extends the famine period from 1931 to 1934.⁵⁴ Thus from the field of aca­demic historians working specifically on the Famine and basing their findings on former Soviet archives, only Conquest's work (indirectly) supports the genocide theory among the works that have appeared in English. Clearly there is a significant split between those who rely on eyewitness testimonies and those who prefer to focus on Soviet documents or Politburo correspondence from the period.

One can find similar disputes in English-language scholarship when it comes to OUN-UPA, a topic that covers a much longer period and a plethora of events, including a world war, a civil war, and a nationalist insurgency over a time span of more than 15 years. One of the earliest works in the field has retained its importance despite the passage of five decades since its first ap­pearance, namely John A. Armstrong's book, Ukrainian Nationalism.⁵⁵ He focuses on the origins and structure of the OUN in a difficult period faced by a Ukrainian minority under Polish rule. Based primarily on OUN-M newspa­pers, he provides a detailed account of the collaboration between the two branches of the OUN and the Germans during the period of occupation. Concerning the nature of OUN's ideology, Armstrong notes how it modeled itself on German National Socialism and Italian Fascism, and that the leader­ship principle remained intact even after the Third OUN Congress (which some sources maintain resulted in the democratization of the organization with the adoption of more moderate views), and that its origins were funda­mentally anti-democratic.⁵⁶ When the third edition of the book appeared in 1990, archives in the Soviet Union, as well as those of OUN leaders such as Mykola Lebed', were still unavailable to Western researchers. The most nota­ble addition to the earlier editions was a postscript on the development of the OUN in the Diaspora since 1960. Perhaps the most glaring omission from Armstrong's magisterial book is a detailed discussion of the Volhynia massa­cres of 1943. A different perspective is offered by Taras Hunczak, who main­tains that the OUN-B was in opposition from the very beginning of Operation Barbarossa. On June 30, 1941, its leaders were arrested following the declara­tion of an independent Ukraine in L'viv. The OUN was “a vibrant force which played a most important role in the Ukrainian resistance movement against the German occupation.”⁵⁷

Two younger scholars have offered new perspectives on the issues under discussion in this book. Timothy Snyder's The Reconstruction of Nations offers a fairly detailed account of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA in 1943. The author is very scathing about UPA, and in attempting to bring the story into his narrative, he offers several critiques of the way its members op­erated. He states, for example, that UPA insurgents killed as many Ukrainians as they did their opponents, particularly members of the OUN-M. Through the UPA, ethnic cleansing was established, and its policies inspired Stalin, who completed the process that was begun during the war years to bring about states that were ethnically homogeneous. Since the UPA considered the Poles agents of both Hitler and Stalin, it felt justified in its attitude. Snyder indicates that Mykola Lebed' was one of the main architects of the policy of ethnic cleansing. He also depicts OUN-UPA as an organization that was far from popular among native Ukrainians—with the UPA a repository for many former collaborators with the German occupants. These emanated from an estimated 12,000 Ukrainian auxiliary police who reportedly assisted 1,200 German police in the destruction of the Volhynian Jews. Snyder estimates that 40,000-60,000 Poles were killed by UPA, which also conducted massa­cres of Jewish citizens who had survived the Holocaust.⁵⁸ The Dutch scholar, Karel Berkhoff, generally concurs with Snyder's interpretation, though his concentration is primarily on the German occupation regime. Berkhoffs documentation of the Volhynia massacres is drawn from a wide variety of sources, including UPA, Soviet, and German accounts. He emphasizes that both wings of the OUN sought out and killed Poles, and that few Ukrainians seemed willing to assist Poles or Jews. He also notes the internal conflicts of August 1943, when the internal security force—the Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB)— executed hundreds of UPA members. Like Snyder, he maintains that neither the Communists nor the Nationalists had mass appeal among the Ukrainian population.⁵⁹

German scholar Frank Golczewski has also focused on the “incompatible pasts” of Poland and Ukraine from the perspective of historical narratives. He notes that “different discourse groups create their own reality.” After 1991 in Ukraine (as elsewhere) it was theoretically possible to have a pluralism of po­sitions. However, he feels, in reality what has occurred is adhesion to the view that there is only one possible “truth.” Whereas Western historians dealt with a variety of approaches from Benedict Anderson's “imagined communities” and Eric Hobsbawm's “invention of traditions,” in the new countries of Europe, more often, it was a case of making black white and white black. But the Second World War has proved particularly problematic in terms of pro­ducing new and “correct” narratives. It is manifested in new textbooks in Ukraine (see Chapter 7), which tend to combine Soviet triumphs along with the resistance of UPA, even though the two seem mutually contradictory. Since OUN-UPA is now identified with a liberation struggle of Ukrainians, Golczewski maintains, its collaboration with the Germans is either ignored or concealed. He focuses in particular on efforts to present the SS Division Ha- lychyna as a Ukrainian movement that did not have close links with the Ger­mans, commenting that historian Taras Hunczak portrays its members as he­roes at the time (1943) when even the OUN felt obliged to moderate its views from its more rigid integral nationalism. He finds that the deconstruction of historical narratives is more advanced in Poland. In Ukraine, because of the difficulties entailed in combining the historical positions in Western and East­ern Ukraine (the former with a tendency to a nationalist perspective and the latter Soviet), negative aspects of the war years are omitted and some collabo­rationist acts are interpreted as “nationally positive.”⁶⁰

From the opposite perspective, political scientist Peter J. Potichnyj has au­thored or edited numerous works on UPA, including the multi-volume Litopys UPA series, which is widely available today in Ukraine. In an article written more than two decades ago, Potichnyj makes the case that the approach to the question of the Ukrainian underground in the West has been oversimpli­fied. Its members were depicted as Fascists because of its creation by Nation­alists, many of whom had been placed in military units linked to the Germans. Another thorny issue is UPA membership, because in Potichnyfs view, UPA members derived from “all organized nationalist groups.” They included members of the Ukrainian police who had deserted, as well as members of the SS Division Halychyna defeated at the Battle of Brody by the Red Army. Consequently, “uninformed writers” in the West as well as Soviet propaganda organs worked to create the impression that the Ukrainian underground was a German-created body, intended for fighting the Soviet Union, and made up of numerous war criminals. In fact, Potichnyj writes, UPA's membership in­cluded even Red Army soldiers, and its leaders came from the regions that were controlled by the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of war in Septem­ber 1939. He cites the memoirs of former political prisoner Danylo Shumuk, who recalled that members of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine also found their way into UPA ranks. Few Ukrainians in German military units, Potichnyj reflects, were sympathetic to German racist ideology and most Ukrainian nationalists had one overriding goal: the creation of an independent Ukraine.⁶¹

In a later article on UPA and its relations with the German authorities, published in 1994, Potichnyj depicts the army's actions as independent from those of the Germans and downplays any links with the occupation regime. If there were such contacts, which developed during the final months of the German occupation, they were “sporadic and tactical in nature.” Accusations of collaboration derived mainly from members of the OUN-M who attempted to denigrate the image of the UPA.⁶² A collection of articles on the political thought of the Ukrainian underground, edited by Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera and issued in 1986, contains essays highly critical of Fascism, in­cluding one by an anonymous UPA publicist from 1946. There are no state­ments in this volume that could be identified as anti-democratic, and thus the impression gained of the Ukrainian underground is that it operated according to democratic principles. In one essay, for example, Ukraine as a whole is de­scribed as the “most dangerous opponent of Germany's imperialist plans.”⁶³ This position is also emphasized in Volume 17 of the Litopys UPA series, which reiterates that there was no UPA collaboration with the Germans, but rather a determined struggle against them. The Akt of 30 June 1941 marks the beginning of this struggle and was an expressly anti-German declaration.⁶⁴ Potichnyj's position is explained by his McMaster University colleague, How­ard Aster. Writing in 1996, Aster comments that Potichnyj adheres to the Di­aspora view that there was a genuine democratic transition in the OUN-UPA in 1943-44. By studying the Litopys UPA, he adds, “one can secure the sources of the genuinely pluralistic, democratic Ukrainian society that [Potichnyj] values.”⁶⁵

John-Paul Himka, an historian based at the University of Alberta, has au­thored several articles that focus on what he has called a “blank spot in the collective memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora,” i.e., the denial of war crimes, anti-Semitism among Ukrainian nationalist groups, and the anti-democratic nature of the OUN and UPA. In the case of the OUN, Himka does not believe that its nature changed in this regard, even after the end of the war. He argues that among the Ukrainian Diaspora, there is a marked preference for victimi­zation, and the perception of Ukrainians as sufferers rather than as perpetra­tors of some of the misdeeds that occurred. In an examination of the wartime newspaper Krakivs 'ki visti, Himka claims that this source exhibited a callous disregard concerning the maltreatment of Jews. The three main trends of the newspaper, in his view, were in fact a profound animosity toward Jews; the abnormality of their moral and political universe; and a failure to comprehend the magnitude and horrors of the Holocaust.⁶⁶ In a later article, he comments that the anti-Semitic stereotypes were particularly central to the ideology of the OUN-M, and that Volodymyr Kubiiovych and other leading nationalists published anti-Semitic materials and were well aware of the Holocaust. Again he focuses on the way the Ukrainians were consistently portrayed as victims within the Diaspora narrative, and that the perpetrators of crimes were Rus­sians and Jews.⁶⁷ The central tenet of Himka's recent studies appears to be aptly represented in the following statement:

I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim of generating po­litical and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when “our own” evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others' dead is not held sacred.⁶⁸

Himka's case is an unusual example of a modification of earlier views and a rejection of what might be considered accepted views within the Ukrainian community of North America. Not surprisingly his articles and letters engen­dered a sustained debate on the pages of The Ukrainian Weekly.

Wilfried Jilge's study of the politics of history and the Second World War in contemporary Ukraine observes how the nationalist version of history is developed through discourse, rituals and symbols, using the past to establish political legitimacy and as a foundation for future actions. He discusses how the Soviet collective myth of the Great Patriotic War was rivaled by new na­tional symbols after 1990, particularly in Western Ukraine where Lenin monuments were swiftly replaced by nationalist equivalents and streets were renamed after the heroes of the OUN and UPA. In July 1991, he notes, Viktor Koval' published a “sweeping apologetic view” of the history of the OUN and UPA, which linked national history with a correct version of the memory of the people of Ukraine. In similar fashion, the Grade 10 textbook for schools by Fedir Turchenko, Novitnaya Istoriya Ukrainy, also portrayed the OUN and UPA as the only true standard bearers of Ukrainian culture and identity. In Jilge's view the issue of regional attitudes toward the OUN and UPA—which have always been very hostile in the east and south of Ukraine—are simply dismissed. He also takes issue with the view that OUN-B turned against the German invaders of Ukraine immediately after the German refusal to counte­nance an independent Ukrainian state in June 1941. He points out that the OUN-B's part in the pogroms that took place in Western Ukraine against the Jewish population in the summer of 1941 is excluded from the new textbooks, as is the fact that in 1940-41 anti-Semitism was a prominent part of the OUN platform. He maintains that in today's Ukraine there is a “fixation” on the state, which has rendered it feasible to include military formations that fought alongside the Germans within a tradition of a Ukrainian national army and as part of a nation-state perspective of history. UPA, for example, is depicted as maintaining the traditions of the Ukrainian Cossacks and is regarded as the “third force” in the war that equally fought both the Germans and the Soviet occupiers. Jilge acknowledges, however, that the Kuchma regime has tried to resurrect some of the traditions of the Soviet era, particularly with regard to the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War. This was linked to a watered- down version of the national-state view of the Ukrainian past. The Partisan movement was deployed in an attempt to unite the two polarized views of the war, but with limited success to date.⁶⁹

This book is focused in part on the notion of creating a collective memory based on historical narratives, a topic that is dealt with in the now classic work of Catherine Wanner.⁷⁰ In a pioneering article devoted to the 1997 his­tory textbook by Viktor Mysan, Nancy Popson remarks that this survey, pro­duced for fifth-grade schoolchildren in Ukraine, reflects the version of events that is accepted by the Ukrainian elite: one that provides a vision of a nation that is broader than simple ethnicity, but which nevertheless assigns priority to the past of the leading ethnic group, i.e., Ukrainians.⁷¹ Ukrainian history is taught earlier than world history, and in Popson's view will be perceived by pupils as “one's own” history. She notes that the textbooks in use in Ukraine have to be approved by the Ministry of Education, which along with several other agencies—including the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine— runs annual competitions for new textbooks. Therefore regional variances do not have a major influence.⁷² Popson discusses how Mysan's book, Opovi- dannya z istorii Ukrainy, discusses Kyivan Rus' (according to Hrushevsky's interpretation), the Cossack period, and then jumps immediately to the twen­tieth century, thereby omitting the pivotal nineteenth century and Ukrainian development under the empires of Russia and the Habsburgs. Popson main­tains that in this way, the textbook is permitted to avoid the debates over the various types of nationalism. While the text reveres Ukrainian heroes such as Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and highlights Bolshevik tyranny, it omits the treatment of non-Ukrainian populations such as the Jews: “The history of the non-Ukrainian nationalities is not woven into the historical chronology.”⁷³ While the history of other groups is not excluded, it is secon­dary. The author therefore sees this representative text as corroboration for her claim that the Ukrainian elite seeks to establish a “civic nation” along the lines suggested by the model of British scholar Anthony D. Smith, that is in­clusive of all ethnic groups living in Ukraine, but in which the decisive role is played by ethnic Ukrainians:

[As] long as Opovidannia continues to be used in fifth-grade classrooms across Ukraine, we can conclude that the message of the Ministry of Edu­cation stresses two characteristics of “nation”: inclusiveness and the lead­ing role of Ukrainian ethnic history, culture, and language.⁷⁴

This brief survey of recent, as well as some older writings on the Stalin years in Ukraine reveals the disparate and widely conflicting views that have not been diminished with time. Indeed, the debates if anything seem more bitter and sustained today than in the past, despite—or perhaps because of— enhanced access to the archives and more detailed information. But through­out the polemics, it is possible to discern with ever more clarity the connec­tions between the discussions and the nature and world-view of the current independent state in Ukraine. The link between the demands of the OUN in the 1930s, for example, the quest of UPA insurgents, and the more recent Rukh, as well as the onset of Ukrainian independence is stressed repeatedly. The conflict and differences of opinion lie in the legacy of the past, and the role played by people who on one hand are regarded as freedom fighters and on the other as collaborators and agents of the German occupation regime. Similarly, the Ukrainian Famine might be regarded as the pivotal example of the Soviet persecution of Ukrainians, as a nation, but is regarded by several Western scholars as reflective of difficulties in the countryside without refer­ence to any national dimension. Just as the modern Ukrainian state's histori­cal past was welded together ingeniously by nationalist historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, so there is a need to link the most recent past—the crucial and tragic events of the Stalin years—in the makeup and the conception of the modern state. It is a form of nation-building, and historical and political narra­tives are a critical component of that process. At the time of writing, about 18 years had transpired since the Gorbachev regime permitted new investigations into the Stalin years as part of an official program of de-Stalinization. These years can provide a profound reflection of the changing historical narratives, the differences in approach and conclusions, and an examination of how far Ukraine has come in its self-examination and construction of a national iden­tity.

Notes

1 Mariya Bazelyuk, “Chy bude v Ukraini Nyurnberg-2?” Ukraina moloda, 12 May 2001, p. 4.

2 S. Kul’chyts’kyi, “Istoriya i chas: Rozdumy istoryka,” Ukrains’kyi Istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 4, (April 1992): 4-6.

3 Ibid., p. 7.

4 Ibid., p. 8.

5 Petro Vol'vach, “Kudy ta homu znykayut' ukraintsi na neosiazhnykh prostorakh imperii?” Istoriya i natsiya, 17 June 1993, p. 5.

6 The reference is to the last major Ukrainian peasant uprising against Polish lords. See, for example, Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 192-193.

7 The author is presumably referring to both the Famine and the mass purges in Ukraine in the 1930s, which resulted in the elimination of the republic's cultural elite.

8 Ibid., 22 July 1993, p. 3.

9 S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, “Nerozv'yazani problemy vykladannya istorii u seredni shkoli,” Istoriya Ukrainy, No. 11 (1998): 1-2.

10 Yaroslava Muzychenko, “Pidruchnyky: istorychni chy isternychi?” Ukraina moloda, 18 Sep­tember 2002, p. 12.

11 Ibid.

12 S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, “Vitchyzniana istoriya v shkolakh i VNZ Ukrainy: stannie desyatyrich- chya,” Istoriya Ukrainy, No. 15, (2003): 1-6.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

Kost' Bondarenko, “Istoriya, kotoruyu ne znaem ili ne khotim znat’?” Zerkalo Nedeli, 29 March-5 April 2002; [http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/index/387/].

Serhiy Makhun et al, “History as Taught in the Schools: Time to Decide,” Den', The Day Weekly Digest, 14 October 2003; [http://www.day.kiev.ua/261121/].

Ibid.

Ibid.

Vasyl' Plyushch, “Genocide of the Ukrainian People: Artificial Famine in the Years 1931­1933,” ABNCorrespondence, Vol. 24, No. 3 (May-June 1973): 31.

Mykhailo Horan, “Chyya pravda, chyya kryvda? Publitsystychnyi rozdum,” Literaturna Ukraina, 15 January 2004, p. 1.

Ibid.

Myron B. Kuropas, “UPA and the Ukrainian Identity Problem,” The Ukrainian Weekly, 19 June 2005, p. 7.

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 28 October 2003, [http://ucca.org].

James Mace, “A Historic Motion,” Den'; The Day Weekly Digest, 24 June 2003; [http:// www.day.kiev.ua/260728/].

James Mace, “Remembrance and Justice,” Den'; The Day Weekly Digest, 28 October 2003; [http://www.day.kiev.ua/261177/].

James Mace, “Is the Ukrainian Genocide a Myth?” Den'; The Day Weekly Digest, 25 No­vember 2003; [http://www.day.kiev.ua/261343/].

Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly, 14 July 2002, p. 6.

Taras Kuzio, “Denial of Great Famine Continues a Decade after the Collapse of the USSR,” The Ukrainian Weekly, 7 July 2002, [http://ukrweekly.com/Archive/2002/270203/shtml]. Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly, 7 July 2002, p. 6.

James Mace, “A Historic Motion,” The Day Digest, 24 June 2003.

HRES 356 EH, 20 October 2003.

Morgan Williams, “Ukrainian issues joint declaration at the United Nations in connection with the 70th Anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933,” The Action Ukraine Report, 11 November 2003, http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/ukr_un_decl.htm. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of National­ism (London: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Pro­gramme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 49-50.

Hugh Seton-Watson, Language and National Consciousness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 13.

Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 79.

Ibid., especially pages 124-126.

Mark Von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995): 658-673. The comments cited are mainly from pages 660-666.

Iaroslav Isaievych, “Ukrainian Studies—Exceptional or Merely Exemplary?” Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995): 702-708. The citations are from pages 704-705.

Serhii M. Plokhy, “The History of a ‘Non-historical’ Nation: Notes on the Nature and Cur­rent Problems of Ukrainian Historiography,” Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995): 709­716. This citation is from page 711.

Ibid., pp. 712-715.

Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: a Minority Faith (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1.

Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The citation is from page 193.

Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983). In this same year, 1983, Mace delivered the Shevchenko Lecture at the University of Alberta in Edmon­ton to commemorate the Famine's 50th anniversary.

Recently, Conquest has distanced himself from the “genocide” school of thought on the Famine of 1932-33. In a letter of September 2003 to R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheat­croft, he wrote that he did not believe that “Stalin purposely inflicted the 1933 famine. No. What I argue is that with resulting famine imminent, he could have prevented it, but put ‘Soviet interest' other than feeding the starving first—thus consciously abetting it.” Cited in R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Re­ply to Ellman,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4 (June 2006): 629.

Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, pp. 306, 326. For a recent debate on the intent and the origins of the Famine, see Michael Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 6 (September 2005): 823-841; as well as a response in R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: a Reply to Ellman,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4 (June 2006): 625-633. In the latter article (p. 628), the two authors state: “We have found no evi­dence, either direct or indirect, that Stalin sought deliberately to starve the peasants.” Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, ed. Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).

Johan Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture (Lund, Sweden: Department of History, Lund University, 2006), pp. 136-139, 144, 232.

Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Mark B. Tauger, “The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933,” Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1990); Mark B. Tauger, “Natural Disaster and Human Action in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933,” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No. 1506, 2001.

R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931­1933 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Michael Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 6 (September 2005): 823-841. In a book re­view in a later edition of the same journal, Ellman writes in parentheses: “The notion that Ukraine was uniquely victimized by Soviet famines is just a nationalist fantasy.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 6 (September 2006): 986.

John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd ed. (Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Aca­demic Press, 1990).

Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 163.

Taras Hunczak, “OUN-German Relations, 1941-1945,” in Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka, ed., German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1994), pp. 178-186. The quotation is from page 183.

Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569­1999 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 201, 203.

Karel Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 286, 305, 312.

Frank Golczewski, “Poland's and Ukraine's Incompatible Past,” Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2006): 37-49.

Peter J. Potichnyj, “Ukrainians in World War II Military Formations: An Overview,” in Yury Boshyk, ed. Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1986), p. 65.

Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the German Authorities,” in Himka and Torke, German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective, pp 168-171.

Peter J. Potichnyj and Evhen Shtendera, ed. Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground: 1943-1951 (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1986), p. 50.

Peter J. Potichnyj, ed. English Language Publications of the Ukrainian Underground: Litopys UPA, Volume 17 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1988), pp. 140, 144.

Howard Aster, “Reflections on the Work of Peter J. Potichnyj,” Journal of Ukrainian Stud­ies, Vol. 21, No. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1996): 226-227.

John-Paul Himka, “Krakivs'ki Visti and the Jews,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1-2 (Summer-Winter, 1996): 89-92.

John-Paul Himka, “Ethnicity and the Reporting of State Violence: Krakivs'ki Visti, the NKVD Murders, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation,” paper presented at the Holocaust Work­shop, University of Alberta, 15 January 2005.

John-Paul Himka, “War Criminality: a Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrain­ian Diaspora,” Spaces of Identity, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005): 13.

Wilfried Jilge, “The Politics of History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine,” Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2006): 50-81 (my com­ments here pertain mainly to pages 51-67).

Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), pp. xxiv-xxv.

Nancy Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the ‘Ukrainian Nation',” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2001): 325-350.

Not all scholars agree with this assessment of local variations. See, for example, Peter Rod­gers, “Rewriting History in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Contestation and Negotiation of Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands,” Paper presented at the International Graduate Student Syposium, Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto, 17 March 2006. Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook”, p. 342.

Ibid., p. 346.