Equivocation
Bertha Alvarez Manninen
And so my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.
John F. Kennedy
Patrick Hurley (2015) writes that the fallacy of equivocation “occurs when the conclusion of an argument depends on the fact that the word or phrase is used, either explicitly or implicitly, in two different senses in the argument” (168).
President Kennedy commits this fallacy in the famous quotation above by equivocating on the word “country.” When Americans ask, “What can my country do for me?” they typically mean, “What can my government, or my elected officials, do for me?” But when Kennedy implores us to ask what we can do for our country, he clearly isn’t talking about what we can do for our elected officials; rather, here the term “country” means something different - our homeland, or our nation, or providing services to our fellow countrypersons.Several air conditioning companies deliberately rely on equivocation in billboard advertisement campaigns. In big letters, a sign reads: “Your wife is HOT!” while right below this it reads, “Better get your A/C fixed.” The equivocation here is on the word “hot” being used to convey both physical attractiveness and a response to warm weather. As a child, I remember
going to a lecture on the perils of drinking and driving and then refusing to get into the car with my older sister because she was drinking and driving, even though what she was drinking was a Diet Coke. In my young mind, I equivocated on the term “drinking” - whereas the danger clearly refers to drinking alcoholic beverages and driving, I had interpreted it as meaning the act of drinking anything at all while driving. Consider, also, this example:
The sugar industry, for instance, once advertised its product with the claim that “Sugar is an essential component of the body [...] a key material in all sorts of metabolic processes,” neglecting the fact that it is glucose (blood sugar) not ordinary table sugar (sucrose) that is the vital nourishment.
(Kahane and Cavender 2006, 81)The ad in this example equivocates on the term “sugar” and relies on the general public’s ignorance of the differences (both chemical and health- related) between glucose and sucrose.
Philosopher Mary Anne Warren (1973) argues that pro-life activists commonly commit the equivocation fallacy when arguing against abortion rights. Typically, a common pro-life argument runs as follows:
(1) All human beings have a right to life.
(2) A fetus is a human being.
(3) Therefore, the fetus has a right to life.
Warren (1973) argues that an equivocation is made here with the term “human being.” In the first premise, the term “human being” is a moral term, denoting the kinds of beings who are “a full-fledged member of the moral community” (53). In the second premise, the term “human being” is a biological term, denoting a member of the species Homo sapiens. Warren calls this a “slide of meaning, which serves to conceal the fallaciousness of the traditional argument” (53). A useful tool for determining whether an argument commits the fallacy of equivocation can be applied here: replace the premises of the argument explicitly with the term having the same meaning and then gauge whether the argument is successful.
(1) All human beings (in the moral sense) have a right to life.
(2) A fetus is a human being (in the moral sense).
(3) Therefore, the fetus has a right to life.
Seen this way, Warren argues that the pro-life argument commits the begging the question fallacy in Premise 2 by assuming the very thing that needs to be argued; one of the main issues when debating abortion ethics is precisely whether the fetus is a human being in the moral sense of the term, whether it is the kind of being that should be the bearer of moral rights. That is not to say that the fetus isn’t such a being but rather that this is the very thing that needs to be argued rather than assumed. The same problem occurs if the term “human being” is used in the genetic sense in both premises.
(1) All human beings (in the genetic sense) have a right to life.
(2) The fetus is a human being (in the genetic sense).
(3) Therefore, the fetus has a right to life.
Here Premise 1 begs the question: Why assume that being biologically human is sufficient for moral rights? Again, it is not that the premise is false but rather than the premise is assumed rather than defended.
Therefore, the traditional pro-life argument, according to Warren, commits the equivocation fallacy, and when we rectify it so that the equivocation fallacy does not occur, the argument begs the question. Prolife activists have typically responded by refuting that the argument commits the equivocation fallacy by denying that there is a valid distinction between “human being” in the moral sense and in the genetic sense. All genetic human beings, all members of the species Homo sapiens, are human beings in the moral sense, that is, being genetically human is sufficient for having full and equal moral rights. Pope John Paul II (1995), in accordance with the accepted view of the Catholic Church, argues that “from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither the father nor the mother; it is, rather, the life of a human being with his own growth [... this new human being] is a person with his characteristic aspects well determined” (107). Pro-life philosopher Christopher Kaczor (2011) also argues that all genetic human beings are moral human beings (that is, that all human beings are persons) but emphasizes that this leaves wide open the possibility that other animals may also have moral rights (92). Kaczor doesn’t just assume this key premise, however; he presents arguments that are supposed to illustrate that this is the case. Pro-life philosopher Francis Beckwith (2007) also argues extensively that genetic humanity is sufficient for moral humanity. He argues that “the human being, as an organism, begins its existence at conception, that it is a unified organism with its own intrinsic purpose and basic capacities, whose parts work in concert for the perfection and perpetuation of its existence as a whole” (130).
If these arguments are successful, then the pro-life position can get out of committing the equivocation fallacy by asserting that the argument means to use “human being” in the genetic sense in both premises and that a right to life follows from being genetically human.
Ali Almossawi’s An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments (2013) contains several humorous examples of informal fallacies, including ones for equivocation, and is an entertaining source for further reading. As Almossawi notes, this fallacy happens often within discussions and debates concerning the alleged tension between science and religion. For example, one argument against the authenticity of Darwinian evolution is that it is “just a theory” - the use of the term “theory” here is meant to deride evolution as an unfounded idea or a mere speculation. While evolution is indeed a theory, this term has a very different meaning within a scientific context; in science, a “theory” is an explanation concerning phenomena in the world that has been subjected to multiple and rigorous instances of experiments and testing. By the same definition, gravity is also a theory. The website notjustatheory.com clearly explains why this argument against evolution is flawed and how it is guilty of the equivocation fallacy.
The best way to avoid the equivocation fallacy is to take care to ensure that key terms, especially ones with multiple meanings, in your arguments are being used consistently; that is, that the words retain the same meaning throughout the argument. It is also important, for the sake of lucidity, to ensure that it is clear which meaning you intend to be using throughout your argument. Here is an amusing example of the equivocation fallacy:
(1) Knowledge is Power.
(2) Power Corrupts.
(3) Study Hard - Be Evil.
The equivocation here is on the word “power.” In the first sentence, “power” means something akin to an expansion of your mental capacities and knowledge of the world. In the second sentence, “power” refers to something like political or authoritative power.
For this reason, the conclusion (that studying hard increases your capacity for corruption and evil) does not follow, and the “argument” is therefore flawed. The way to have avoided such a fallacy here would be to have ensured that the term “power” was being used in the same way throughout the argument (either to denote intellectual power in both instances or political/authoritative power in both instances).References
Almossawi, Ali. 2013. An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments. New York, NY: The Experiment Publishing.
Beckwith, Francis. 2007. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Hurley, Patrick. 2015. A Concise Introduction to Logic. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.
Equivocation 265 John Paul II. 1995. Evangelium Vitae. New York, NY: Random House.
Kaczor, Christopher. 2011. The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice. New York, NY: Random House.
Kahane, Howard, and Nancy Cavender. 2006. Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Notjustatheory.com. http://www.notjustatheory.com/index.html (accessed September 29, 2017).
Warren, Mary Anne. 1973. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” The Monist 57(4): 43-61.