Inappropriate Appeal to Authority

Nicolas Michaud

I was following orders.

Nazi General Anton Doster’s legal defense for atrocities committed during World War II

Inappropriate appeal to authority (IAA) has many different facets.

Logically, IAA is problematic because it means that we are using someone to defend our claims who doesn’t really connect with that claim or is not a good justification. Damer (1987) notes that it is an attempt “to support a claim by appealing to the judgment of one who is not an authority in the field, the judgment of an unidentified authority, or the judgment of an authority who is likely to be biased” (109). Notice, then, that there are a few different ways in which IAA can occur. It doesn’t necessarily mean following orders. What it rests on is the assumption that authority itself is a justification for action or a validation of truth.

IAA seems to be the result of a flaw in human thinking. Social cognitive theory, a theory that helps explain human action, notes that humans tend to act like each other. We mimic the behavior of those around us. We are, how­ever, far more likely to imitate the behavior of those who have the following qualities: perceived competence, perceived similarity to us, perceived status. That psychological tendency likely explains what I like to think of as “the Oprah and Dr. Phil effect.” Consider the fact that Dr. Phil became a hugely popular TV psychologist. Despite having questionable credentials, Dr. Phil was believed to be an appropriate authority to give advice to millions of viewers.

Similarly, Oprah’s book recommendations make guaranteed bestsellers. A university literary professor with four PhDs who has dedicated her life to reading and understanding books could make a book recommendation, and hardly anyone in the country would listen, but because of Oprah’s status, if she recommends a book, we buy it. In the same way, when she recommends that we watch Dr. Phil, we do so. The fact that Dr. Phil has “Dr.” in front of his name impacts us as well. Interestingly, according to social cognitive theory, perceived competence causes us to listen to others even when they are not competent in the field they are discussing. In other words, Dr. Phil could have his doctorate in basket weaving, and something about us would still want to listen to him about psychology and just about anything else he decided to talk about.

The tendency to listen to authorities who are not authorities explains why celebrities are able to sell us stuff. Consider Michael Jordan’s fabu­lously successful career selling underwear. The fact that he was amazing at playing basketball has nothing to do with selling undies. In fact, he is no more an underwear expert than you or I. However, the fact that he was a basketball god causes our brains to think, “Hmmm, I should listen to this guy even though he isn’t an underwear scientist or any other kind of underwear expert.”

What makes IAA particularly dangerous is the fact that there are, in fact, appropriate authorities. I may be in a discussion about black holes and reference Dr. Stephen Hawking as evidence that my claim is correct, or I might reference former president Bill Clinton when discussing domestic policy in the United States.

Simply, the best way to avoid committing this fallacy is to recognize that no one person is sufficient authority to make something true by herself. Even when the authority is appropriate and an expert in the field under discussion, this doesn’t mean that the argument stops with her. Just because I pull out Dr. Stephen Hawking’s book on black holes when arguing with someone about them doesn’t mean that he must concede my point. What really matters is what the book says. Are his arguments good? Do they make sense? Do they support the evidence? Just because it is Hawking’s book isn’t enough. It is the content that matters.

So, simply, the problem with IAA is that it ignores content in favor of credentials and power. If we are going to make well-reasoned arguments, we must look deeper than the identity of the people whose arguments we are espousing. Consider the following examples:

(1) How do I know that birth control is wrong? The Pope says so, that’s how I know!

Notice that this argument might work very well if talking with a Catholic. It is important, however, to realize it won’t get the same traction with some­one who isn’t Catholic. While the Pope is a moral authority to Catholics, he is not an authority to many other people.

(2) I think I should take that medicine for depression. I saw a doctor talking about it on a commercial.

It isn’t uncommon to see doctors selling product on TV commercials. Those commercials appeal to our belief that doctors are trustworthy authorities. The problem is that all of the other reasons to consider taking or not taking a medication are ignored. That TV doctor is not an authority on you, which is really the key problem. If the doctor does not know the patient, just because she is a doctor does not mean she can give good medical advice to someone she has never examined.

(3) Look, I just do what I’m told. I shoot when I’m told to shoot, and I march when I’m told to march. Whether this war is right or wrong isn’t up to me to decide.

On one hand, we certainly want soldiers to follow orders. If they don’t, they are a danger to themselves and the other soldiers they serve with. The prob­lem is, as in the case with the Nazis, and in numerous other examples, our tendency to defer our moral judgments to others, sometimes even vague and unnamed authorities, means we don’t feel the pressure to take responsibility for really important moral decisions. Sometimes, the result is soldiers and citizens who support truly horrific acts only because those in authority tell them to.

The important thing to remember about IAA is that it isn’t just a fallacy that comes up in arguments that don’t matter. Sure, at the end of the day, it may not matter that much if I appeal to Dr. Hawking a bit too much in my arguments about black holes. The problem is that if we are not careful, we start listening to people who really don’t have much expertise at all and as a result buy and believe things that are not in our best interest. It benefits the underwear company when we don’t ask ourselves, “What does Michael Jordan really know about underwear?” Worse, though, is the fact that this fallacy makes it so that we don’t have to hold ourselves responsible. The beliefs and actions that come from it we can blame on the authority. When that happens, we can justify just about anything, no matter how awful.

Reference

Damer, T. Edward. 1987. Attacking Faulty Reasoning. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.