Moralistic Fallacy

Galen Foresman

Since we all know that it’s wrong, it obviously is wrong.

John Doe

The moralistic fallacy occurs when one concludes that something is a particular way because it should or ought to be that way.

Formally:

(1) X is the way things should/ought to be.

(2) Therefore, X is the way things are or are going to be.

Or

(1) X is not the way things should/ought to be.

(2) Therefore, X is not the way things are or are going to be.

The moralistic fallacy is often described as the reverse of the is/ought fallacy, wherein one reasons fallaciously that because things are a particular way, they ought to be that way. For both fallacies, the systematic error in reason­ing occurs in assuming a relationship between normative or evaluative claims and reality, such that what is true of the world entirely explains what is good or ought to be, morally speaking (is/ought fallacy), or, alternatively, what is right, wrong, good, or bad in moral terms entirely explains the way the actual world is and will be (moralistic fallacy). While there are relation­ships between reality and morality, it is fallacious to deduce one simply based on knowledge of the other.

Variations of the moralistic fallacy occur whenever any normative claim is used to justify a factual claim about the world, and so the pattern of fallacious reason central to the moralistic fallacy can also be found in legal reasoning, prudential reasoning, or reasoning regarding proper etiquette, aesthetics, humor, or appropriate emotional responses. For example, in their paper “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000) argue, “to commit the moralistic fallacy is to infer, from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting,” because, as they contend, emotions may be fitting in particular situations, even if it is morally wrong or inexpedient to feel them.

More commonly, the moralistic fallacy occurs in everyday thinking when one assumes that what is right is what will be. If a teacher assumes students won’t cheat because it is wrong for them to do so, that teacher commits the moralistic fallacy. Similarly, the moralistic fallacy is committed when one assumes citizens will vote because they have a moral duty to do so. Fortunately, the flawed reasoning found in these examples of the moralistic fallacy is easily avoided. While norms of morality, prudence, or the law do not entirely determine the way things are or will be, they do often give us reasonable expectations for how things are or will be. It would not, for example, commit the moralistic fallacy to assume an honest person is unlikely to lie to you. And when a person promises to meet you for coffee, it isn’t fallacious to conclude that he will probably meet you for coffee. In both of these examples, avoiding the fallacy is a simple matter of relaxing the absolute claim that something is or will be the case to a moderate and qualified claim that something is likely to be the case.

Interestingly, many young drivers are taught to avoid a form of the moralistic fallacy when they are taught to drive defensively. When driving, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that other drivers will behave in ways that conform to standard legal norms of the road. Cars next to you on the highway should stay in their respective lanes and should check their blind spots before changing lanes, but all too often this is not the case. And so, learning to drive defensively is largely about assuming that other automo­biles on the road will not always act in ways that conform to the norms of good driving.

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Reference

D’Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson. 2000. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 65-90.