Proving Too Much
Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least.
You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.Blaise Pascal, Pensees, #272
Quoted above is what is infamously known as Pascal’s wager, an argument that was intended to demonstrate that it is in one’s own best interest to behave as if God exists even if it cannot be absolutely proven: if He doesn’t exist, no harm done in believing He does; however, if He does exist, then you either have eternal bliss for being good or eternal damnation for being sinful. Pascal’s argument is pragmatic in nature as it states that the benefits of believing that God exists (even when there isn’t any proof for it) outweigh those of not believing; the possibility of eternal punishment in hell outweighs any advantage had in believing God doesn’t exist. However pragmatic it may seem, Pascal’s wager contains the fallacy of proving too much,
202 Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray and that calls into question its logic. This fallacy has been committed when an argument can be used to also prove something false or leads to contradictory conclusions. An argument that proves too much demonstrates a lack of soundness, since sound arguments can only establish true conclusions, and thus when an argument can be used to prove false conclusions, it becomes evident that there is a flaw in its reasoning.
For example, Pascal’s wager can be used to prove that it is beneficial to believe in an almighty demon, or a spaghetti monster, or even Bigfoot. It also advocates that you force yourself to believe in something you don’t take to be true, and even if it is somehow possible to force yourself to do this, what the wager demands amounts to living a lie (living in sin). Won’t that get you into trouble? Is it really better in the eyes of God that you lie to yourself and pretend you believe in Him rather than to live truthfully not believing? The contradictions just pile up.There are a few forms this fallacy can take on such as when an argument leads to multiple contradictory conclusions. Pascal’s wager, once again, fits the bill. If the wager successfully proves we should believe in a benevolent god, then we can also use it to prove the benefit of believing in a sadistic god, or a god that contradicts the existence of all other gods. Another form of this fallacy occurs when an argument leads to a conclusion known to be absolutely false. Great examples are any of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, whereby a person, object, or creature must cross an infinite number of points to get to a destination: if Homer wishes to walk to the end of the pathway, before he can get there he must get halfway, but before he can get halfway he must get a quarter of the way, but before he can get a quarter of the way he must get one-eighth of the way, and so on. These paradoxes end with the conclusion that motion and change - the evidence provided by one’s senses - are illusory and thus false, a conclusion that is obviously contradictory. The problem found in the paradoxes of motion is that we have been tricked into thinking about space and time in the wrong way: Hans Reichenbach, for example, proposed that the paradox arises because space and time are considered as separate entities rather than a single space-time continuum (i.e., theory of general relativity). Nick Huggett accuses Zeno of committing the fallacy of begging the question.
Regardless of the solution, whether it be that of Reichenbach, Huggett, Aquinas, or Aristotle, the contradictory conclusion reached tells you there’s something rotten in the premises - you just need to sniff!The fallacy of proving too much is not really a single fallacy so much as a great tool for detecting faulty reasoning, since any argument that leads to a contradiction cannot be sound: if the premises are all true, but the conclusion false, then we know something has gone amiss and what is wrong with it is a more specific fallacy. In the case of Pascal’s wager, once you notice the contradictions that occur, you can go back through the premises and find the other fallacies at work such as the fallacy of false dilemma
(see Chapter 81), and then you notice also the appeal to emotion (see chapters 13 and 14), inappropriate appeal to authority (see Chapter 32), and genetic fallacy (see Chapter 29). As to preventing this fallacy from happening, the best assurance is to make sure your argument has TVS: truth, validity, and soundness. If the premises of the argument are all true, and the conclusion logically follows and is also true, then the argument has TVS. Having TVS means you argue just enough, never too much, and there is a less likely chance other fallacies are at work. Another tip is to understand the far- reaching consequences and implications of what you argue, in other words, consider and critically assess what you are trying to argue: ask yourself, can the argument I’m advocating be used to argue something contradictory, even ridiculous, or can it be turned around to contradict itself? If Bigfoot, demons, or a spaghetti monster start creeping into your argument possibilities, you might need to reconsider some things.