Subjectivist Fallacy

Frank Scalambrino

This question brings us to the heart of the problem of the feeling of reality [...] the real, or what is perceived as such, is what resists symbolization in language absolutely.

Jacques Lacan

The subjectivist fallacy (SbF) occurs when one concludes that something is true for one person (a subject) but not true for another person (another subject), when, in fact, it is true objectively for all persons. SbF is a fallacy of relativism. Relativism, in general, means the truth-value of a judgment is neither necessary nor universal; however, there are multiple kinds of relativism. To hold that the truth of a judgment about some event or thing is relative to the subject making the judgment is to espouse a kind of subjective relativism.

We say judgments may be characterized as either objective or subjective. On the one hand, the truth-value of an objective judgment is understood to be necessary and universal, that is to say, not relative. For example, the claim that Immanuel Kant was 5 feet tall is supposed to be objective. On the other hand, the truth-value of a subjective judgment is understood to be neither necessary nor universal. For example, the claim that, when walking around his neighborhood, Kant walked quickly is supposed to be subjective.

The truth of the judgment that Kant was “5 feet tall” is supposed to be true for everyone; the judgment that Kant walked “quickly” may be deemed true or false relative to one’s own walking pace.

Thus, importantly, not all instances of subjective relativism are logically fallacious. We should ask if that which is being relativized to the subject is objective or subjective; the latter will not be logically fallacious and the for­mer will. However, since the term objective may involve some degree of vagueness, the following clarification should render the SbF more distinct in regard to relativism in general and non-fallacious subjective relativism in particular.

The possible vagueness regarding objectivity may be emphasized in the following question. Since it may be objectively true that someone is expe­riencing some particular subjective state, why must the subjective state be considered “subjective” rather than “objective”? Yet, at the same time, consider how the world, or put more precisely mind-external reality, is independent from whatever we may believe about it. Were this not true, then tree limbs could change into cheeseburgers simply by a hungry per­son believing that a tree limb is a cheeseburger.

In the Enchiridion, Epictetus (c. 50-130 ce) famously espoused, “It is not things that upset people but rather ideas about things” (§5). Again, “Remember that it is not the man who curses you or the man who hits you that insults you, but the idea you have of them as insulting [...] try not to be carried away by impressions” (§20). Referencing such an insight, then, psychologists can legitimately make the claim that one’s reaction to an event or thing may be relative to something other than the event or the thing. That is to say, the impressions and ideas of things and events, because they are mind-internal, are subjective. While at the same time, the event of a person’s subjective reaction may be considered an objective event, for example, it may be objectively true that a person is sad or angry in response to some event.

The problem comes when the psychologist attempts to push this insight too far, that is, suggesting the mind-external reality of the thing or event is also relative to the subject. This usually happens in one of two ways. The first is when a psychologist claims a thing or an event cannot be character­ized universally and necessarily in language because to use language would only be to talk about our impressions or to characterize our ideas. The sec­ond is when a psychologist claims that because we will all have different impressions and ideas regarding some particular mind-external thing or event, the truth of claims made regarding the identity of the thing or the event is subject relative, that is, subjective.

Regarding the Epictetus quotations, then, the truth-value of judgments made regarding the subjective outcomes of objective events is, of course, subjective, that is, relative. However, if we were to direct the judgment espoused in the Epictetus quotation toward objective, rather than subjec­tive, outcomes, we would have a judgment regarding objective outcomes in relation to objective mind-external events, and the truth-value of such a judgment could not be made relative to a subject. For example, it would be fallacious to say of someone who has a physical disease that whether he has the physical disease depends on how he feels or thinks about the disease. Therefore, claims with this latter structure, that is, treating the truth of objective judgments regarding mind-external reality to be relative to sub­jects, commit SbF.

Moreover, SbF is not only a fallacious depiction of relativity; it is also self-refuting. For if some subject were to claim that the fallacious subjective relativism on which SbF stands were not fallacious, a different subject could simply judge differently and the different judgment would, per the logic of the first subject, necessarily be true. In fact, were subjective relativism capa­ble of being extended to mind-external reality, it would seem to eliminate error altogether. That is to say, a person could only judge incorrectly by judging that she had judged incorrectly; suddenly all humans would be on the verge of infallibility.

To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that are objective or that hold universally. When the claims on which an argument is based are objectively verifiable or pertain to a set of individuals universally, then the logical necessity of the argument’s conclusion may be determined. Thus, the argument would not be subjectively relative.