Conclusions
The above analysis of ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s interpretation of ethical and legal norms shows that his commitment to God’s justice influences the way he conceives normativity as well as the function of the rilla in legal reasoning.
Being just, God only acts for the beneficence of His creation. God cannot not act for the benefit that He knows results from the act for other than Him. Such an act, for ‘Abd al-Jabbar, is the standard of what is ‘good’ and deserves praise. Assuming a continuous universe, ‘Abd al-Jabbar applies the same standard to human acts, though he has to adapt his criteria to account for all of people’s actions. In contrast to God, human agents are able to intend and perform bad acts, namely those that are senseless (without purpose of benefit) and inflict undeserved harm (injustice) on somebody else, which gives rise to the category of bad acts that are blameworthy. In addition, since people are not self-sufficient, they do not only act for the beneficence of another but also for their own benefit. Hence, ‘Abd al-Jabbar modifies the criteria for good acts by determining them primarily in terms of absence of blame. Acts that lead to beneficial consequences without harm, even if only for oneself, are good and do not deserve blame, yet only those good acts in which the benefit is directed toward another deserve praise. Acts that intend undeserved harm are bad and blameworthy.Although the consequentialist perspective seems dominant in ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s theory of ethico-legal normativity, it also displays deontological considerations that are born out of rights. God’s beneficence toward His creation gives Him a right that needs to be restituted - namely by gratitude and obedience on part of His creatures. Obedience to divine rulings is good, praiseworthy, and leads to benefit in form of reward in the Afterlife. Disobedience is bad, blameworthy, and punishable.
Looking at obedience in terms of rights also means that punishment for disobedience, i.e., for violating a right, despite inflicting harm, is ethically good and deserved.Blame is also the criterion to understand people’s obedience to God’s Law. The prospect of reward and fear of punishment in the Hereafter motivates human obedience to the revealed Law.[295] Being obedient to the Law, humans take advantage of the opportunities to attain self-benefit and avert self-harm. The divine Law has to be obeyed not only because it is the right thing to do, in the sense that it is a deontic obligation, but also because disobedience leads to harmful consequences and, thus, is blameworthy. God's justice ensures that His Law is a benefit (reward) for humans. Any otherworldly harm that comes to people is but retributive, born out of God's right to restore the balance of justice.
The same consequentialist considerations are at work in the assessment of the legal status of acts. Acts that overwhelmingly lead to beneficial outcomes are permissible (mubdh); and gratuitous (tafaddul) when directed toward another, or commendable (mandub) when self-benefitting. Whereas those that inflict harm greater than its benefit are prohibited (mahzur, muharram). When assessing the legal status, the deontological dimension comes into play. Obligation to perform or to omit an act is related to the rights of another, namely by giving due to another's right or by not violating it. An act is legally obligatory (wajib) when thereby the claim of another is fulfilled; and it is legally prohibited (mahzur) when it infringes upon another's right. This scheme applies to humans and God alike, with the difference that God's justice precludes the possibility that He would fail to fulfill an obligation. The interplay of benefit and obligation, of consequentialist and deontological considerations, informs all legal norms and allows tAbd al-Jabbar to include into the scheme also self-benefitting acts.
The teleological dimension in tAbd al-Jabbar's thought also comes to the fore in his discussion of the ratio legis (cilla) of divine rulings. He understands the rilla as a motivating factor (ddci) for an effect or assessment (hukm). It informs about and provides the incentive to act. Again, this applies to both God and humans. As we saw in the examples of prayer and wine, God lays down a ruling for a good reason, and without it, it would not be obligatory or prohibited. In light of tAbd al-Jabbar's ethical theory, it is fair to say that this reason or motivation is the beneficial consequences, i.e., the goodness, that comes from the ruling - either by commanding or prohibiting an action. From the perspective of the human agent, the benefit, which is the motivating factor for complying with the law, are either its mundane consequences or the promised reward for obedience to God's impositions, i.e., taking advantage of the opportunity (lutf) God provides to attain otherworldly maslaha.
This motivating factor is also operative in the practice of legal analogy (qiyas) in form of the 'illa. It is the factor based on which the ruling is transferred to another situation that is not addressed in Scripture but that displays the same motivating factor. However, despite tAbd al-Jabbar's affirmation that God lays down the ruling for the beneficence of His creation, he does not directly connect the 'illa to the ethical dimension of God's Law or to the purpose of the Law, as we see later in al-Ghazali's work. While tAbd al-Jabbar seems to conceive of the ratio legis in terms of benefit, it is not a criterion in determining its correctness. The ratio legis is primarily identified semantically. If at all, the ethical dimension of the rilla is vaguely implied by ‘Abd al-Jabbar when saying that the efficacy of the ratio legis is based on being connected to motivating factors. He no further elaborates on this in a manner that overtly connects the ratio legis to the mundane benefit resulting from the ruling, i.e., its goodness.
For ‘Abd al-Jabbar, knowing that God lays down His Law out of the goodness and beneficence resulting therefrom for His creation is sufficient reason and motivation to obey. One does not have to scrutinize Scripture to find out whether the goodness is a mundane benefit or an otherworldly maslaha. The ratio legis is the motivating factor for God to impose a ruling and the incentive for the believer to obey. Through obedience on part of the believer the ratio legis is connected to benefit, namely to otherworldly maslaha and possibly also to tangible mundane benefits, which is why God imposed the action. The ratio legis does not have to be justified in terms of God's legislative purpose and, conversely, its goodness plays no role in analogizing the divine Law to unattested instances. Rather, since one knows that God always acts with justice and, thus, in the best interest of His creatures, one just has to look for the signs associated with the ruling to extend it; its beneficial consequences are a given and no further explored by ‘Abd al-Jabbar.