Introduction
The legal discourse on the maqasid al-Shari‘ah, commonly translated as purposes, objectives or intentions of the Shari 'ah, arises out of practical considerations of finding rulings for situations unprecedented in the textual sources of Islamic law as well as theological discussions over the nature of God and His revealed word.
The Qur'an contains numerous references indicating that God acts purposefully and provides wisdom (e.g. Q. 23:115; 4:113; 17:39; 2:32; 4:26). Yet, questions about whether, by which means and to what extent human beings are able to discern the divine wisdom and purpose in the revealed law occupied Muslim scholars of law and theology for centuries. The following exposition focuses on the role and historical development of the purposes of the law in Sunni legal discourse in the pre-modern and modern period.Since the earliest time of Islam, the limited legal material revealed in the Qur'an and available from the practice of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith, Sunnah) made Muslims look for principles to apply in the adjudication of matters not explicitly addressed in the scriptural sources of the law. Hence, articulations of the purposes of the law are closely tied to jurists’ efforts to resolve unprecedented cases within the parameters of the revealed law and apply scriptural rulings to changed circumstances. The notion that the divine law has been sent down for the good (saldh) of humankind found legal expression already in the early decades of Islam. The fourth caliph, 'Umar (r. 13—23/634—644), for example, suspended the hadd punishment for theft during times of famine and decided to keep the irrigated sawdd lands of Iraq under state control for the good of the community. Yet, in scholarly legal literature, articulations of general principles guiding the law-finding process appear rather late. First forays into formulating precepts that summarize the legal rationale behind a category of rulings, without yet providing large-scale systematization, are evident from the fourth/tenth century.1
A second impetus to the legal discourse on the purposes of the law came from theology.
Debates over God’s omnipotence, whether God only does what is of benefit (maslaha) for His creation, and the moral assessment of acts influenced jurisprudents’ interpretation of the maqdsid al-Shari 'ah. Questions of the intellect’s ability to determine something as good (hasan) or bad (qabdh) spurred interest in formulating what God intended by revealing His law to humankind. While members of the Mu'tazili school of theology, such as Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 370/980) and Abu al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 434/1044), favoured the position that God does what is in the best interest (maslaha) of His creation and that humans are capable of determining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ independently from the revealed law, their counterparts from among Ash'ari as well as traditionalist scholars insisted that God is not obliged to consider people’s well-being and that all value judgements derive from God’s words alone.2 The latter stance, which leaves no room for law unaided by divinely revealed guidance, fostered scholars’ search for the maqasid al-Shari‘ah within the authoritative texts. This discourse was articulated primarily in works dedicated to the foundations of law finding, usul al-fiqh, in which jurisprudents systematize the revealed law and formulate principles to apply in the law-finding process.1