Introduction
The apparent pessimism emanating from theses verses of Omar Khayyam points to a fundamentally human, cross-cultural yearning for justice.[68] Within an Islamic context, this yearning is expressed in numerous discourses surrounding different conceptions of justice, extending back to the formative years of the religion, all the way into the present.
Although modern Islamic debates concerning justice enjoy more popularity today than they have done for several centuries,[69] it is important to look also to the pre-modern Islamic discourse concerning justice. For pre-modern ideas of justice have played a decisive role in the theological, legal, and socio-political conflicts of Muslims.Fundamental questions of grave theological concern, pertaining to matters such as freedom of will and theodicy,[70] were answered in different ways early on. Two broad schools of thought emerged from this process, the Mu'tazila[71] and the Ash'ariyya/ Maturidiyya.5 This theological differentiation, going back to fundamentally different conceptions of justice, is still maintained today. Within this scheme, Shiites tend to adhere more to the Mu'tazila school of thought, while the majority of Sunnis usually designate themselves as adherents of Ash ‘ ariyya/Maturidiyya.
Different conceptions of justice have been debated even within the field of jurisprudence. Thus, witnesses were not the only people expected to prove themselves just. This was also expected of persons practicing certain professions, such as medical men, scholars of jurisprudence, or prayer-leaders.6 Furthermore, procedural justice was a central theme in classical Islamic jurisprudence.7 There are numerous scholars, past and present, who perceive a fundamental connection between justice and Islamic norms.
In Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263 -1328) works, for example, we read that the shari'a is justice and that justice is the shari'a; whosoever judges in a just manner, judges in accordance with the shari'a.8 The modern Iranian scholar Murtada Mutahhari (1919 -1979) writes that justice is the principle by which religious dictates are to be judged.9On a socio-political level the importance of justice and the different conceptions of the term are most directly attested to by an extensive history of revolt. The long history of rebellion throughout different periods of Islamic rule is composed of different groups that more often than not framed their opposition to the ruling establishment in terms of unjust rule, or unjust social conditions. In early
see Anja Middelbeck-Varwick, ‘Uber gottliche Gerechtigkeit und menschliche Erkenntnis bei ‘Abd al-Gabbar (gest. 1024): Dialog mit einer mu’tazilitischen Rechtfertigung Gottes’, in Heil in Christentum und Islam, Erlosung oder Rechtleitung? Theologisches Forum Christentum - Islam, ed. Hansjorg Schmid, Andreas Renz and Jutta Sperber (Stuttgart: Akademie der Diozese Rotten- burg-Stuttgart, 2004).
5 The term Ash'ari refers to the name of the Iraqi scholar Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873 - 935), while the term Maturidi refers back to the central Asian theologian Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (853 - 944). Both scholars represent the same basic doctrine, placing great emphasis on the omnipotence of God. Human reason and the perception of God’s justice are subordinated to God’s omnipotence. Thus, according to this doctrine, all actions of God are necessarily just, even if humans do not perceive them to be so. On the Ash'ariyya, see George Makdisi, ‘Ash'ari and Ash'ar- ites in Islamic religious history’, in Islamic Philosophy and Theology: Critical Concepts in Islamic Thought, ed. Ian R. Netton (London: Routledge, 2007); on the Maturidiyya, see Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Maturidi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
6 Krawietz, ‘Gerechtigkeit als Leitidee islamischen Rechts’, 42- 43.
7 Ibid., 43.
8 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, Majmii' fatawa shaykh al-islam Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, ed. 'Abd ar-Rah- man Ibn Muhammad ibn Qasim and Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Qasim (Riyadh, Mecca, n.d. [1962- 7]), 35/366.
9 Murtada Mutahhari, Barrasi-yi ijmali-yi mabani-yi iqtisad-i islami (Qom, 1990), 14.
Islamic texts, the word ‘adl (justice) usually refers to worldly and social dimensions of justice. Whether used by Kharijis, Shiites, or even Mu‘tazilites, the term functioned as an expression of discontent towards what was perceived as unjust rule. In the same vein, the ideal and expected ruler (Messiah), was described as the Mahdi (the justly guided one) who will fill the earth with justice.[72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] In all these debates, however, justice was conceived in one of two ways. Either, it was a metaphysical characteristic (holy justice), or it was a human virtue one should aspire to (in cases of legal and political conflict).u Muslim scholars considered rarely justice as a normative and social conception. A notable exception, however, is the work of the jurist and political philosopher Abu al-Hasan al- Mawardi (972-1058). He does not discuss justice within the standard theological or juridical frameworks, but as a worldly (dunyawι) and comprehensive (shamil) matter that is essential for the functioning of society. This paper will present to the reader his concept of comprehensive justice, as introduced by himself in his ethical work, Adab al-dunya wa al-dm (The Ethics of Religion and of this World).