Justifications for the Authoritativeness of Certainty
As mentioned earlier, according to Khumaynr and Khu’r the remit of legal theory is exclusively concerned with evaluating and establishing the authoritativeness (or Hujjiyya) of certainty (or evidence that generate certainty) in the juristic process of ijtihad.
In Mabanlal-Istinbat Khh'i points out that some Usulrs mistakenly interpret Ansari's statement “There is no problem with regards to the obligatory nature (Wujub) of following certainty and acting upon it to indicate that, according to Ansarr, certainty is authoritative by the virtue of its existential nature. According to Khh'r, they fail to make a distinction between the realm of creation (calam al-takwlnl) and the realm of legislation (alam al-tashr∏). He explains that even if one accepts that in the realm of creation the existential nature of certainty consists of the properties of disclosure and correspondence and thereby it always accurately depicts objective reality, this does not mean that it is authoritative (or obligatory to follow) in the realm of legalisation.37 Indeed, if an omnipotent Lawgiver (or God) desires then He can choose to either affirm or retract its authority in the realm of legalisation. Considering this, Usulrs offer a variety of arguments to justify that certainty is35 Tab⅛t,ab⅛τ, TlieElementsof IslamlcMetaplιyslcs,i2⅛.
36 1.,12.¢..
37 KhP؛, MabtnalIstlnt e.A3. authoritative and obligatory to follow in the realm of legalisation. These arguments can generally be grouped into the following three categories:
ExistetalAuthotatieness OjCertalnty
According to most modern Ushlis, the property of authoritativeness is necessarily correlated to the existential nature or essence (lawazim al-dhat) of certainty.38 This means that whenever certainty exists, the property of authoritativeness comes into existence.
For instance, it is like the relationship that exists between the number four and evenness. Although the property of evenness does not define the existence of number four, whenever 'four' exists, it always exists with the property of 'evenness.' One of the first post-Ansari Ushlis to offer this justification was Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani, who in his Kiayatalul explafnstha.-.Rationally, there is no doubt in the obligatory nature (wujub) of acting in accordance with certainty, and the undoubted necessity of being impelled to act with it. It verifies the immediate duty (takllf), whereby it actualises the blameworthiness and chastisement for acting in contradiction with it, and [grants] excusability if you are mistaken [when acting in accordance with it]. This efficacy of certainty is necessary (lazim).39
With the aid of metaphysical jargoning, Khh'i also advocates that the property of authoritativeness is necessarily correlated to the existential nature or essence of certainty. He attempts to unpack Khurasani's above passage by explaining that the essence (dhat) of all things conceivable subsists through existence, irrespective of whether they exist in the realm of the physical external world or not. For instance, this can be demonstrated in the relationship that exists between the number four and its property of evenness. Even though the property of 'evenness' does not define the very existence of 'four,' whereby it is an integral part of its essence, the mind is able to necessarily comprehend 'evenness' every time it comes across 'four.' This shows that 'evenness' of 'four' is something that exists in the realm of the mind (or is something that is always rationally comprehended). Likewise, Khh'i explains that although the property of authoritativeness does not define the very existence of certainty (i.e., it is not an integral part of its essence), it does not mean that it does not exist at
38 For instance, see Khumayni, Tanqlh al-usul, 3:18; Khh'i, Mabanlal-Istinbat, 1:43-6; Diya' aCDin aCAr⅞q⅞, Nlityat af-Aj⅛, 277;, Nitny Fawtid al-U⅞tl, 3'∙τ, M∞za‰r, Ul aljiqli, 2:28.
39 Kharisini, Klfayatalustl, 25⅛.
all or is something that needs to be additionally created or postulated by God in the realm of legislation. Rather, it exists in the realm of the mind (or is rational), for every time one encounters certainty, their reason necessarily dictates that it is authoritative, insofar as its indication must be followed, and if not then one can be held liable.4٥ In Dirasatfi cIlm al-Usul, Khu’r further explains that, because reason necessarily dictates that certainty is authoritative, it rationally arrives at the notion that it is obligatory (wajib) to follow. This is because it naturally comprehends the praiseworthiness (husn), or the moral value, of following it; and the blameworthiness (qubh), or the moral reprehensibility, of acting contrary to it. Moreover, it also naturally comprehends that the Divine Master (or God) has the right to hold a believer accountable if they fail to follow certainty and thereby fail to enact a Sharia ordinance; and the impossibility of the Divine Master to hold a believer accountable if they do follow certainty, even if its indication contradicts that which is intended by God.41
Accordingly, if a jurist has access to definitive evidence that, for example, explicitly indicates that God ordains Friday congregational prayers, then even though such evidence (by its very existential nature) discloses (and may even correspond with) what God intends, it by itself does not suggest that a jurist is obliged to follow it and that it is authoritative. Rather, its authoritativeness, and the obligation of following it, is something that is necessarily comprehended by reason. As such, whenever definitive evidence exists, reason naturally judges that 1) it is moral to follow its indication, and 2) God can hold us accountable for not following it. Therefore, if a jurist fails to deduce the Sharia ordinance of praying Friday congregational prayers, then it is rational that according to most Usulrs that he would be deemed immoral and held accountable in the hereafter for not following something he knows certainly reveals that which is in the Mind of God.
PostulatedAuthor-ItativenessoJCertaty
In contrast to most modern Usulrs, Muhammad Husayn al-Isfahanr argues that authoritativeness is not an existential feature of certainty, but rather it is something that is additionally postulated to certainty by the convention of rational people (Jra a--'uqaa). Inhfs Nihayat afDiraya Sharh a--Kya,he asserts-.
It should be known that the actualisation of chastisement is not cau- sational or due to the necessary existential nature of acting contrary to a duty that is known with certainty. Rather, it is necessarily due to the
40 Khu'ι, Mabam al-Istinbat, 1:45; Abu Qasim al-Khu'1, Dirasatfi'Ilm al-Usul, 3:15.
41 I--,ah,os,ee, Khtrt,
postulation of rational people ('al-jacliyyat al-cuqala1). In a little while, by the will of God, it will become clear that the judgment of reason (hukm al-,aql) that actualises chastisement is not something that is dictated by proof (burhan) or axiomatic propositions (al-qadaya al-daruriyya); instead, it is dictated by popularly acknowledged propositions (al-qadaya al-mashhura) that are generally followed by the convention of rational people on a variety of issues. On this [conventional] basis, acting contrary to the command of the Master (Mawla) is doing injustice (zulm) to Him, and doing injustice is blameworthy (qablh), and thus rational people agree that it necessitates blame and chastisement.42
In this passage, Isfahan! makes a distinction between two types of rational judgments; those which are discerned by axiomatic propositions and those which are discerned by popular propositions. In the seminarian discourse of logic, axiomaticjudgments are self-evident (i.e., the mind can immediately assent to their truth-value or accuracy) and have an objective existence. An example of an axiomatic judgment is the proposition that ‘a whole is greater than a part' or ‘a thing cannot, at the same time, be and not be.' On the other hand, popular judgments do not have an objective existence, rather they are formed by the convergence of rational people who come to agree on (or assent to) their truth-value.
An example of a popular judgment is the proposition that ‘jeering at an animal serves no purpose.'43At this juncture, it is important to note that, according to Isfahan! and (his student) Muzalfar, another example of a popular judgment is ‘justice is praiseworthy, and oppression is blameworthy.'44 They explain that it is rational people who postulate the property of praiseworthiness (tahsln) to justice ('adl) and the property of blameworthiness (taqblh) to oppression (zulm). This opinion is in contrast with the more prevalent opinion amongst post-Ansar UsulIs, according to which the properties of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are intrinsic moral properties of justice and oppression and thus are necessarily a part of their existential nature. As such, whenever instances of justice or oppression exist (or are created), they are existent (or are respectively created) with the properties of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and it is not possible to ever separate them. In contrast, by upholding that these properties are
42 Isfahan!, Nihayat al-Diraya, 3:22.
43 For a thorough discussion on how axiomatic and popular propositions are understood within the seminary discourse of logic see Mul ammad Rida al-Muzaffar, al-Mantiq (Beirut: Dar al-Ta'arif li-l Matb at, 2006), 282-4 &. 293-5.
44 See Isfahan!, Nihayat al-Diraya, 3:18-23, 2:103; Muzaltar, Usul al-fiqh, 1:222. postulated by the convention of rational people, Isfahan! and Muzalfar imply that they are not necessary to the existential nature of justice and oppression, rather, if rational people choose to, they can collectively negate the properties of praiseworthiness to the essence of justice and blameworthiness to the essence of oppression. However, because they instead choose to affirm these properties, Isfahan! and Muzalfar opine that the convention of rational people judges that a person must always be just and must always refrain from being oppressive.
Nevertheless, with regards to certainty, Isfahan! explains that the convention of rational people affirms the property of authoritativeness to the essence certainty because this ensures, regulates, and preserves the proper functioning of social order (hifz al-nizam).45 If it is supposed that a person has full disclosure or certainty that their master (whether it is a Divine Master, a human master, or a form of government) ordains them to enact a particular duty (such as paying taxes or giving alms), then failing to enact it would have an adverse effect on society and can cause major social disruption.
According to rational people, causing such disruption is blameworthy and an extension of oppression (zulm), as it wrongfully prevents the society from receiving the proper right it deserves. Meanwhile, the enactment of such duty would ensure the safeguarding of society and social constructs of human life. This, according to rational people is praiseworthy and an extension of justice (radl), as it provides society with the proper right it deserves. Therefore, Isfahan! clarifies that rational people, and their convention, judges that whenever certainty is accessible it is required to be followed, insofar as if it is not followed then a person who has access to it is held accountable and subjected to chastisement for doing something that is considered as blameworthy, whereas, if it is followed then that person is granted with the right of excusability for doing something that is considered as praiseworthy. Isfahan! opines that this judgment (or convention) of rational people corresponds with the judgment of God, as 1) God is theologically accepted as the Head of all rational beings (ra,is al-cuqala1), and thus He too - by priority - judges in a rational manner, and that 2) there is no counter evidence to suggest that God disapproves of this rational convention.^ As such, Isfahan! concludes that the convention of rational people demonstrates45 Isfahan!, Nihayat al-Diraya, 3:18. It is important to note that for Isfahan!, praiseworthiness of justice and blameworthiness of oppression is also postulated by rational people to preserve social order.
46 Ibid., 3:344, 4:28. Please note that Isfahan's take on the property of authoritativeness being postulated to certainty by the convention of rational people is also discussed in detail by Haydar! see Haydar!, al-Qat‘, 129-32, 146-51. that it is obligatory (WaJib) to follow evidence that generates certainty and the Divine Master has the right to hold a jurist accountable for not following it.
RatiodAuthotatieness o∫c etalnty
Muhammad Baqir aladr, in Durusfb rilm al-usul, advocates that God, being the Divine Master, possesses absolute mastership and that it is incorrect to analo- gise his mastership to the mastership that is possessed by a normal human master. Considering this, he argues that God possesses an absolute right of obedience (haqq al-taca) and thus reason necessarily dictates that every possible ordinance (ihtimal) of His, whether it is conveyed by evidence that generates certainty or not, is authoritative and must be followed.47 In other words, if one accepts that God possesses absolute mastership and thus possesses an absolute right of obedience, then their reason immediately recognises that they are obliged to follow every ordinance of His and that His ordinance, irrespective of whether it is conveyed by definitive (qatT) forms of evidence or not, is authoritative.
In contrast to the abovementioned justification for the authoritativeness of certainty, Haydari in al-Qatr seems to favour and further expound his teachers Sadr's opinion. He clarifies:
The popular opinion (mashhur) amongst the Usulis is that they maintain a relationship between the authoritativeness of certainty (HuJJiyyat al-qatf) and the principle of the praiseworthiness of justice and the blameworthiness of oppression (husn al-’adl wa-l qubh al-zulm). The truth is that there is no such relationship between them. This is because it is obligatory to follow and act in accordance with certainty for the one who possesses certainty irrespective of whether one accepts that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness can be [existentially attributed to actions] by reason ('aql) or by [the stipulation of the] rational convention ('aqlf); or denies it, as is the persuasion of some theologians who claim that the praiseworthy [action] is that which is decided to be praiseworthy by God, and the blameworthy [action] is that which He decides to blameworthy.48
After clarifying how Sadr's justification for the authoritativeness of certainty, as advanced in his theory of haqq al-tara, differs from the other Usuli justifications, Haydari refers to a critical discussion found in Mahmud Hashimi
47 Sadr, Durus, 2:35-44.
48 Haydari, al-Qat', 136-7. al-Shahrudi's compilation of Sadr's lectures entitled Buhuth fi cilm al-usul.49 The discussion considers whether God's absolute right of obedience is something that is essential or something that is postulated by reason or the convention of rational people. This discussion is important because if God's right of obedience is postulated, then it necessarily implies that the authoritativeness of certainty is effectively also postulated, and thus it can fluctuate depending on how reason and rational people conceive God's mastership and His right of obedience. Conversely, if God's right of obedience is essential, then it necessarily implies that the authoritativeness of certainty is also essential, insofar as so long as certainty is existent, it is always authoritative. Shahrudi notes the following two prevailing arguments that Sadr expounds to establish God's absolute right of obedience:
1. The first argument is known as Wujub shukr al-muncim' (or ‘the obligatory nature of showing gratitude to the bestower').5٥ In accordance with this argument, reason or the convention of rational peoplejudges that it is obligatory to express gratitude to anyone who bestows favours or beneficence towards them. According to Sadr, God's revelation of Sharia ordinances is His great favour upon mankind and always leads them to benefit. Accordingly, he argues that reason and the convention of rational people judges that it is obligatory (wajib) to express gratitude to God, and that the best form of expressing gratitude is being obedient to Him and following anything He possibly ordains. According to this argument, God's right of obedience is therefore contingent on Him being a bestower. Consequently, if God does not bestow, or stops bestowing, then reason or the convention of rational people would not judge that there is a need to express gratitude towards Him and would not feel compelled to follow and act in accordance with His ordinances.
2. The second argument asserts that God possesses the absolute right of obedience because He is the Creator (khaliq) and Proprietor (malik) of all things.51 His creatorship and proprietorship cannot be compared to the creatorship and proprietorship of human beings. Moreover, because of His creatorship and proprietorship, He possesses absolute dominion and sovereignty over all things and His sovereignty cannot be compared to the sovereignty of a human being. To explain this further, Sharudi elucidates that, in the physical realm, human beings are proprietors of their body parts, and hence they have sovereignty over their hands, legs,
49 Ibid., 140-42; ShahrQdi, Buhuth, 4:27-30.
50 Ibid.., 4'.2⅞.
51 Ibid.., 4'.2⅛. face etc. However, since they do not create them, their sovereignty over their body parts is limited. For example, a human being can only partially rotate his/her wrist at 180° and is unable to fully rotate it at 360° without causing any damage. In contrast, in the realm of thinking, human beings can create thoughts and ideas and possess proprietorship over them. Accordingly, they possess absolute sovereignty, wherein they can modify their thoughts and ideas (or even cause them to not exist) at their will. Considering the limited scope of a human being's sovereignty and the absolute scope of God's sovereignty, according to this argument, God's right of obedience is essential, and thus His ordinances must be obeyed by His creation, irrespective of whether they are conveyed with full disclosure (or certainty) or not.
Both Sharudi and Haydari give the impression that their teacher, Sadr, preferred the latter argument over the former.52 As such, for him, God's right of obedience is essential and thus it can be said that for him, the authoritativeness of certainty (or for that matter any evidence that coveys any knowledge of Sharia) is essential and a jurist is obliged to follow it in the juristic process of ijtihad. Haydari interestingly also notes that the limitation of the first argument is that although it states that according to reason and rational convention it is blameworthy for a person to not show gratitude towards God, this does not imply that such a person becomes worthy of chastisement in the hereafter. According to Haydari, therefore, there is no rational correlation between failing to show gratitude and becoming worthy of chastisement and thus the argument is not sufficient in proving the absoluteness of God's right of obedience. In fact, Haydari expounds that the first argument is subsumed within the second argument. This is because, if one accepts God as the absolute Creator, Proprietor and Sovereign of all things, then they accept that He continually bestows benefit to mankind by nourishing and sustaining life, and thus, by priority, it becomes incumbent on them to express gratitude to Him.53
At thisjuncture, it is important to clarify that, although Sadr claims that authoritativeness is an essential property of certainty, this does not mean that it is necessarily correlated to its essence. This implies that it is theoretically possible (fi-l maqam al-thubut) for God - being the Creator and Proprietor of all things - to deny the authoritativeness of certainty and thereby issue an amnesty (tarkhls) that permits a believer to discard following and acting in accordance with full disclosure. However, as elucidated in chapter 2, in practice (fi-l maqam al-ithbat), it is only possible for God to issue such an amnesty by
52 See ½('d., 4:44, and Haydari, al-Qat", 152-53.
53 Haydari, al-Qat', 136.
revealing another epistemologically superior disclosure that undermines the authoritativeness of the disclosure that is already possessed by the believer. Indeed, if a person already possesses full disclosure, then it is practically impossible for God to issue an amnesty, as there cannot be a disclosure that is epistemologically superior to full disclosure (or cetainty).54 This highlights the critical difference between conjecture and certainty in Sadr's theory of haqq al-ta,a. Although he considers both as authoritative possibilities (ihtimal) that indicate that which is in the Mind of God, he accepts that when a person possesses conjectural (zannl) knowledge of Sharia, it is theoretically and practically possible for God to issue an amnesty that permits them to discard their conjectural knowledge. Whereas when a person possesses definitive knowledge of Sharia, then, while it may be theoretically possible for God to issue an amnesty that permits them to discard their certain knowledge, in practice such amnesty does not exist, as it is practically impossible to have anything superior to certainty that permits a person to discard their already-possessed certainty. Therefore, in both theory and practice a believer (or more specifically, a jurist) is obliged to follow certainty and if he does not, then he can be held accountable by God.
54 See Sadr, Durus, 2:40-2; also see Shahrudi, Buhuth, 4:31.