PKR LEADERSHIP: STRUGGLING FOR MALAYSIAN PEOPLE’S SOVEREIGNTY
Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of PKR and the opposition coalition (Pakatan Rakyat), has argued strongly for the compatibility of Islam and democracy, drawing on Islamic ethical notions as well as ideas from Western intellectual history (Allers 2013, 2017).
The Islamic studies scholar Charles Allers demonstrates that over the course of his political career, Anwar has consistently recognized the resemblance between, and merged, Islamic theological and legal notions with Western ideas of freedom, civil society, and democracy. Similar to SIS, Anwar Ibrahim creatively interprets and applies the notion of maqāṣid al-sharī’ah to support his liberal democratic and pluralist model of Ketuanan Rakyat (People’s Sovereignty). In a PKR press release, Anwar stated, “I believe that the Maqasid al-Shariah (the higher objectives of the Shariah) are important principles of governance and are not inconsistent with the precepts of democracy. In this regard, Pakatan Rakyat will remain guided by the principles of universal justice, good governance, accountability, transparency and competency in order to achieve public good for the people” (Anwar Ibrahim 2012). He interprets that the maqāṣid al-sharī’ah are “principles of governance” directed toward achieving the maṣlaḥa or public good. This usage of the concept “higher objectives of sharia,” as with SIS, differs from Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) classic conception of a limited list of objectives: faith, life, intellect, lineage, and property. The Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Anwar Ibrahim, and many other contemporary scholars of various religious and ideological orientations accept Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 1328) revision of the maqāṣid to an open-ended list of values (Kamali 2006, 116–19). Al-Qaradawi argues that certain elements of democracy are obligatory for Muslims because they are the necessary means to the ends of sharia as derived from the revealed text (Feldman 2007, 112). In contrast, Anwar suggests that to apply these principles of governance, derived from the revealed text and foreign sources, within a liberal democracy instantiates the ends of sharia.In Anwar Ibrahim’s second public statement on the Lina Joy case, he claimed that freedom of conscience is one of the main elements of the maqāṣid al-sharī’ah. His position in support of a Muslim’s right to freedom of religion placed him in unison with many other liberal Muslim reformers and secular human rights organizations. However, his media statement was rather nuanced and exhibited a compromising stand, no doubt informed by his previous experiences as a leader of the Islamic civil society organization ABIM and as an UMNO ideologue and government official. After noting that Islam is designated as the religion of the federation and that other religions “can be practiced in peace and harmony throughout the country,” he addressed the polarizing passions on the topic of freedom of conscience and gave the UMNO-led government this advice:
The authorities must strive to strengthen the public confidence towards the Shariah court, and assure the Muslims that there is no attempt to belittle the importance of the existing system. As for the non-Muslims, they must be assured that the fundamental guarantees enshrined in the Constitution [are] protected. In essence, while we should preserve the current procedure via the Shariah court with regards to cases of freedom of conscience, there should be no recrimination involved. After all, freedom of conscience is one of the key elements of the higher objectives of the Shariah, the Maqasid Shariah. (Anwar Ibrahim 2007)
Anwar astutely recommends that the government adopt a compromising posture, assuring Muslims and non-Muslims that their respective concerns and interests will be respected. Moreover, he continues with this conciliatory stance, advising that the current sharia procedures be continued—in the example of counseling a Muslim who wants to change her religion, if she persists in her desire to convert out of Islam it should be allowed without accusation or punishment.
In contrast to government ulama, sharia court officials, and many Muslim activists who tend to interpret prohibiting Muslims from leaving Islam as fulfilling the major objective of sharia—that is, preservation of religion—Anwar interprets that protecting freedom of conscience is also a key objective of sharia. The leader of the opposition coalition proceeds to chastise the UMNO-led government for their failure to achieve a broad consensus on this issue, which could have been done by promoting more “dialogue, discussion, and deliberation.” This posture of negotiation and give-and-take on divisive issues was rarely adopted by other parties in these debates and was difficult for Anwar and PKR to sustain.In particular, PKR leaders were unable to navigate a conciliatory position with Malay and Islamic models of the Malaysian nation. Anwar and other PKR leaders’ concept of universal justice envision a transformation of UMNO’s model of a nation in which Malay Muslims reign supreme. Their idea of Ketuanan Rakyat projects a cosmopolitan image of the nation, delinking any racial or religious supremacy from the state and extending equal citizenship rights to all Malaysians. It seeks to replace the special position of Malays and Islam with a secular, pluralist political system. Unlike most other political parties, PKR comprises multiple races and religions, though it remains under Malay leadership. The party held a tenuous position between a democratic socialist, primarily Chinese DAP (Democratic Action Party) and the political Islamic party, PAS, in the opposing coalition, which had Anwar Ibrahim serving as its general head. Anwar Ibrahim’s background as a Muslim youth activist and a former deputy prime minister, and his present commitment to moving the political system away from the authoritarian, UMNO-led ruling coalition government and toward a liberal democratic vision, facilitates his role as a mediating force holding together the two divergent opposition parties (see Allers 2013).
However, his version of “religious secularity”—combining broad Islamic principles, aims, and objectives with pluralism, liberal democracy, and a vision of inclusive nation building—is seriously challenged by the growing push for Malay and Muslim forces to unite in order to preserve and solidify their dominant position. There was a firestorm of controversy stoked by the media following PKR president Datin Seri Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail’s statement at the Seventh PKR National Congress ridiculing the concept of Ketuanan Melayu. The PKR president and wife of Anwar Ibrahim said, “The concept of Ketuanan Melayu has to be eliminated because it is just a slogan of a small elite group of Malays that have the power to cheat Malays as a whole for their own interests.... This small group of Malays are the ones that commit acts of bribery and corruption and betray our trust and do all sorts of crimes without paying attention to the fate of their own race” (Sinarharian 2010c). For several days, Malay-language newspapers reported vociferous responses from UMNO politicians, UMNO-affiliated NGOs, and leaders of Malay rights organizations. Many demanded that Wan Azizah apologize for her comments. They claimed that PKR wanted to put an end to the special rights for Malays and the special position of the Malay rulers inscribed in the Federal Constitution. The sultan of Selangor expressed disappointment in Wan Azizah’s statement and claimed it undermined the role of the institutions of the Malay Rajas and the special rights of the Malay race. On the other hand, Anwar Ibrahim and Azmin Ali, the deputy president of PKR, articulated strong support for her statement and announced that PKR needed to elevate and disseminate their concept of Ketuanan Rakyat. While this event was still being circulated in media reports a related controversy emerged. Anwar Ibrahim had reportedly stated that if PR were to win in the upcoming election, they would appoint Lim Kit Siang, a prominent Chinese leader of DAP, as the deputy prime minister of Malaysia. Nik Abdul Aziz, the spiritual leader of PAS, told reporters that he did not think race should be such an important issue in a democratic country, and declared that he did not have a problem with Lim Kit Siang being appointed to this position. UMNO ideologues and the Malays rights groups saw this as a prime opportunity to substantiate their claims that Malays and Muslims would lose out if the opposition coalition were to win the general election and take control of Putrajaya. The president of PAS, Abdul Hadi Awang, and Nasrudin were quick to announce that they did not agree with Anwar’s statement and declared that the leaders of an Islamic state must be Muslim. These events demonstrate the widespread opposition of social forces, including PAS, their own coalition partner, to PKR’s efforts to realize a transformed, liberal, pluralist vision of the Malaysian nation. Nevertheless, they do have support from some other social forces that share many of their sociopolitical ideals.