Politics and the formalization of sharia

Aceh is one of the many provinces in Indonesia that has introduced legal regulations based on Islam. Research shows that, as of 2008, there are more than a hundred districts and provinces throughout the country that have introduced selected precepts of sharia in their bylaws.¹ The moves taken by these districts were made possible by the enactment of Law No.

Aceh and West Papua are the two provinces most affected by the enactment of Law No. 22/1999.⁴ This law gave Aceh’s provincial government the authority to implement Islamic law. Following this, the Special Status of the Province of Aceh was recognized by Law No. 44/1999, which granted the provincial government the power to implement precepts of Islamic law in religious, cultural and educational matters. It also granted Ulama (Islamic religious leaders) the right to play a role in the implementation of regional policy (Abubakar 2006, 43). There was also a widespread view among the Acehnese that offering Aceh the right to implement Islamic law was a carefully calculated strategy to win over a number of conservative Ulama in Aceh (personal communication, Michael Leigh, 28 April 2010). Likewise, Hefner (2009, 196) observes that giving a concession to the Acehnese on Islamic law was, in fact, the result of influence from officials at Ministry of Religion, who were of the view that Aceh’s religious establishment would welcome it. Hefner also says that compared to other national offices, the Ministry of Religion enjoys more respect in Aceh, compared to, for example, other branches of the national bureaucracy or the Indonesian military.

The local government began the application of sharia-based bylaws in the province in 2000 with enactment of PERDA No.5/2000. The enactment of this PERDA on the implementation of Islamic law demonstrated the willingness of the local government to support the implementation of Islamic law. This PERDA regulates issues not only related to Islamic faith and worship but also other matters, such as regulating economic transactions and providing guidance on moral character, including regulation of Islamic dress codes. It also provides guidelines on Islamic education, donations, defence, criminal justice and inheritance. During the course of its implementation, however, it was realized that Law No. 44/1999 did not offer a sufficiently strong or detailed basis for the region to fully implement Islamic law and so the central government replaced it with Law No.18/2001 on ‘Special Autonomy for the Special Region of Aceh’.⁵

This new Special Autonomy Law marked the beginning of a more rigorous attempt to implement Islamic law in the province, since it gave the provincial government enhanced legal authority. The adoption of the new law also led to the changing of the name of the province from ‘Daerah Istimewa Aceh’ to ‘Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’ or the ‘Abode of Peace’ and allowed the provincial government to re-establish sharia courts (Mahkamah Syari’at) to strengthen the application of Islamic law. The implementation of Islamic law was later consolidated by the enactment of Presidential Decree number 11/2003, which led to the establishment of the Office of Islamic Sharia (or Kantor Dinas Syari’at Islam). This office is principally responsible for the drafting regional regulations (Qanun) based on Islamic Law, which are then enacted by the local parliament. The implementation of Islamic law became even more rigorous with the ratification of Law on Governing Aceh or LOGA on 11 July 2006 (which replaced Law 18/2001).

The Acehnese were divided in their responses to this political development, with some perceiving it as a new beginning that could help bring the ongoing military conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian military forces to an end.

Many Acehnese believe that the decision of the central government in Jakarta to grant the Acehnese the right to implement Islamic law was based on the central government’s hope it would help end the conflict between the Acehnese and Indonesian military forces, which had been ongoing since the 1970s. Many Acehnese also believe that Jakarta’s decision was based on the understanding that the continuing resentment of the Acehnese towards the central government in Jakarta has been driven by religious sentiments.⁶ During the war against the Dutch, for example, Islam was a strong factor that turned the Acehnese fight against Dutch colonial powers into a religious war, a struggle against infidels or unbelievers (Sjamsuddin 1985; Ricklefs 2001; Reid 2006). Islam is again used as the basis for the Acehnese to fight the Indonesian government in the 1950s, when many Acehnese resented the dissolution of the province of Aceh.

Rightly or wrongly, however, the central government in Jakarta has for some time perceived that the resistance movement in Aceh has been largely driven by Islam.⁹ This has been the primary reason for the Indonesian government’s belief that to appease the Acehnese they needed to allow the Acehnese to live under Islamic law. In fact, the resistance of some Acehnese who joined the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in the early 1970s was not driven by so much Islam, but by economic exploitation the province suffered at the hands of Jakarta (Aspinall 2007; Kell 1995; Robinson 1998; Sukma 2004). Siapno (2002, 1) argues that:

The Indonesian government has framed the struggles for social justice in Aceh as a religious conflict, about ‘syari’at Islam’, rather than a structural conflict about the re-organization of the nation-state, economic capital and redress of grievances of human rights violations, among many things.

The expectation that allowing Aceh to apply Islamic law in 1999 would deliver peace fell flat at first. Military conflicts continued and hundreds of civilians were killed during the period 1999 to 2004 (Aspinall 2006; Sulistiyanto 2001; Schulze 2006).¹⁰ Changes to the political regime in Jakarta between 1999 and 2004 affected political developments in Aceh, as transition between four different administrations during the period 1999 to 2004 opened room for peace talks between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian military.¹¹ In 2000, a temporary halt to the military conflict was achieved as peace talks, facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre,¹² ended with the signing of the Humanitarian Pause.

Following the failure of COHA, and the outbreak of further conflict, the Indonesian government, through Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Presidential Decree No. 28/2003, declared Aceh to be under Military Emergency Status on 13 May 2003 and attempted a crackdown on GAM (Aspinall 2005; Aspinall and Crouch 2003; Hedman 2004b).¹⁵ With this development, many Acehnese became convinced that the granting of the right to apply Islamic law was not the same thing as a genuine willingness on the part of the Indonesian government to end the war and to appease Acehnese anger over long-standing massive economic exploitation and centralized administration.¹⁶ It was only the devastating ‘Boxing Day tsunami’ of 26 December 2004 that finally led Yudhoyono’s administration to end the conflict by agreeing to return to peace talks and, finally, sign a peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement in Helsinki on 14 August 2005.¹⁷ The Helsinki peace agreement was achieved after GAM declared that it set aside its goal of independence for Aceh in February 2005. GAM then accepted that Aceh would be granted autonomy based on ‘self-government’, on the proviso that Aceh would remain part of Indonesia (Aspinall 2005, viii).

An interesting development occurred when the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), which was the transformation of GAM, won the local parliamentarian election in 2009, followed by the election of Irwandi Jusuf, a former GAM leader, as the first Aceh governor elected from in direct local leader election. Since the Aceh Party is publicly known to have no religious platform and that Irwandi Jusuf was understood to have no interest in supporting the implementation of Islamic law, the conservative Ulama fear the administration will not support the total implementation of Islamic law (pelaksanaan syariat Islam secara kaffah) (Salim 2009). However, many women activists have, in fact, had different views as they are concerned that the local parliament would create policies that lack gender sensitivity.

The debate

In contemporary Aceh, the term ‘sharia’ is popularly rendered ‘syari’at’. The common understanding among Muslims is that syari’at comprises the rules and regulations derive from the Qur’an (Islamic Holy book believed to be the literal word of God) and the Hadith (documented sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) for all believers to look at and to live with (Keddie 2007; Hefner 2011). To be a true follower of Islam, many believe they have to live according to syari’at. From my conversations with the people of Aceh it is clear that they believe that their ancestors have lived under syari’at continuously since the Acehnese Islamic kingdom of the fourteenth century. Some of them expressed their understanding of syari’at as religious obligations, such as praying five times a day, performing fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, paying religious alms, and conducting pilgrimage to Mecca. Performing all these religious rituals will, they believe, prevent Muslims from perpetrating unlawful acts. The spirit to live by the syari’at led many Acehnese to consider that Qur’an and Hadith must be the only normative sources to regulate Muslim lives and thus need to be formalized into a living law.

Many Acehnese also see syari’at as a set of regulations issued by the rulers and religious leaders, based on the sources of Islamic teaching. Many Acehnese argue that it was during the period when Aceh was an Islamic kingdom that it became so powerful and managed to expand its territory in Southeast Asia (see also Riddell 2006, 38–51). Historical accounts suggest that under the leadership of Sultan Iskandar Muda, certain elements of Islamic law were introduced, including stoning for adulterers and the amputating of the hands of thieves (Riddell 2006, 43).¹⁸ Proponents of the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh continue to refer to this period and stories to support their argument that if Aceh was under Islamic law the Acehnese could regain their economic prosperity.¹⁹

It is interesting to note that although the majority of Acehnese have a positive view of syari’at,²⁰ Acehnese society is divided in its response to the formalization of Islamic law. I categorize these different views in two groups. The first believes that Islamic legal regulations that derive from sharia principles need to be formalized in the form of public legislations, while the other argues that formalization of sharia will only result in the politicization of religion.²¹ Those who are of the second view argue that the implementation of Islamic law is part of an attempt by the central government in Jakarta to pacify the Acehnese over socio-economic and political grievances. They argue that Islamic law in Aceh is not a divine law that comes from God, so it is open to criticism. They believe that the current sets of Islamic legal regulations are merely political decisions that can be amended. There is also a view amongst activists that the granting of Islamic law in Aceh is the result of a top-down evaluation made by the authorities in Jakarta. This is because there was never any formal consultation made with the Acehnese as to whether or not they wanted to live under Islamic law.²² This group therefore believes that the granting of Islamic law was a political compromise aimed at blocking demands for a legal solution to past human rights abuses.

At an international conference organized by the BRR (the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) and the Asia Research Institute of National University of Singapore (NUS) in Aceh on February 2007, a female activist, who was aligned with the Free Aceh Movement, Maryati, bluntly said that the implementation of Islamic law was just another political strategy adopted by Jakarta to appease the anger of Acehnese without addressing the real problem of ‘unjust economic distribution’.²³ She went further, saying that the implementation of Islamic law should be seen as a new episode in Jakarta’s occupation of Aceh because, to her, the new law that is being introduced is not based on Acehnese understandings of Islam. That is, it is mainly based on the interpretations of people in Jakarta and so is not in line with the expectations of many Acehnese. Another leading women’s activist, Suraiya Kamaruzzaman (2004), has similarly argued that ‘Islamic law is not the answer to the war in Aceh’. She contends that although the implementation was linked to government efforts to resolve the problem in Aceh, it does not actually address the root cause of the conflict, Aceh’s socio-economic grievances and Aceh’s political relationship with the central government.

Despite the perspectives of some activists, there is a growing perception among Acehnese that Islamic law might be a possible source of better social, economic and political policies that could help end social and economic problems.²⁴ The belief is that once the system of governance is based on Islam, there will be no more injustices, as Islam teaches only about justice. This confirms what Lindsey and Hooker (2007, 217) state, that the resurgence of sharia and the support of proponents of sharia to the implementation of Islamic law should be seen in the context of Aceh being economically, socially and politically marginalized within Indonesia’s national development. This argument has it that Islam ‘is seen not only as an assertion of Acehnese identity, but also as a mean of re-emphasising perceived traditional Acehnese values and, thereby, it is hoped that Aceh will regain its past prosperity’ (Lindsey and Hooker 2007, 217).

In 2006, a local NGO, Yayasan Insan Cita Madani (YICM) conducted a survey to discover the response of the Acehnese to the implementation of Islamic law using short message service (SMS) polling to generate public responses. In-depth interviews were also carried out. YICM also wanted to know how society assessed the contribution of Qanun or the provincial regulations to the creation of good governance in the province. The result of the SMS-polling showed that only 9 per cent of the 804 respondents agreed that the current implementation of Islamic law has fulfilled the expectations of Acehnese, and 81 per cent said that they do not think the current implementation has met their expectations. The in-depth interview showed that less than 25 per cent of 354 respondents were happy with the current implementation, more than 30 per cent were disappointed, and the rest remain ‘unsure’ (YICM Report 2006, unpublished document). Another survey was carried out in the same year by Yayasan Keumala, which revealed that the implementation has generated discrimination, for example, because the sharia police or Wilayatul Hisbah (WH) checks women’s clothing but not men’s. It recorded that most women respondents also resented practices that targeted women and, in particular, women who rode motorbikes, while ignoring women who are driving cars. Of 1,800 respondents, 572 agreed that the implementation of Islamic law has only focused on certain groups, such as women and the poor. The other 488 respondents said that they were satisfied with the results of enforcement, and about 395 said that Qanun should be reinterpreted based on the current situation (Serambi Indonesia 2006a).

The results of these two surveys were resented by local authorities and critiqued the work of local NGOs. The results of the survey soon became headlines in the local newspapers and the head of MPU (Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama or Aceh’s Ulama Consultative Council), Professor Tgk Muslim Ibrahim, made a strong statement that the surveys were only meant to disturb the process of sharia implementation (Serambi Indonesia 2006b). Despite this, the survey made it clear that the Acehnese are not satisfied with the implementation of Islamic law in general, regardless of the argument that it allows Acehnese to express their cultural and religious identity.

A local intellectual, Bustamam-Ahmad (2007, 159), argues that the Acehnese are divided into two groups in terms of how they respond to the implementation of Islamic law. The first supports the formalization of Islamic law and the way it has been implemented. The other group is critical of the way Islamic law has been formalized and implemented. The first group views Islamic law as a healer of rampant socio-economic, moral and political illnesses, such as corruption, collusion and nepotism that have severely damaged the province and its society. The other group perceives that the process of the implementation of Islamic law is merely focused on formalizing and symbolizing Islamic teachings, without paying enough attention to the process. As a result, the issues of veiling, Muslim dress and the use of Arabic writing have become important. To the second group, Islamic law will neither be able to act as an effective tool to solve conflict, nor be useful as a panacea to solve moral ills in society.

Many Acehnese women have voiced concern over discriminatory practices in the implementation of Islamic law, through activities in local women’s groups and women’s NGOs. Some Acehnese women activists see the implementation of Islamic law as only giving attention to the regulation of women’s religiosity, including women’s dress and women’s sexual mores.

Despite this debate, the local government continues its efforts to maintain Aceh as the sole province in a secular Republic of Indonesia that lives under Islamic law. The local authorities rely on Islam not only to mark their ideological difference from the Republic of Indonesia but also to symbolize their cultural identity and integrity.²⁵ This is in line with Benda-Beckman (2009, 219), who argues that ‘the population and its leaders use Islam to distinguish themselves from the central government and other regions’.