Religious values and secular politics
The emotional commitment to Islam as a normative and abstract political framework can be clearly seen in the range of survey data undertaken since the early 1990s. For instance in the 1992 FAFO survey, ‘Islam’ was cited as the most important attribute the overwhelming majority (60 per cent) of respondents wanted to see in a future Palestinian state; ‘democracy’ came in a poor second at only 20 per cent of respondents claiming it as the main attribute they wanted to see in a Palestinian state (Heiberg 1993: 266).
However, once again when issues are made more concrete, the outcome is not as clear. Wdien respondents were asked for whom they would be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice, the Islamic Umma came third after the Palestinian people (see Table II.2).Table II.2 For whom would you be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice? (% of total)
The family 45
The Palestinian people 33
TheIslamicnation 17
The Ai ab nation 4
Source: Heiberg 1993: 272
Similarly, in 1995, the CPRS survey showed that while respondents might put a high priority on abstract religious values, these readily coexist with a high concern for more mundane and practical issues. Table II.3 shows how respondents ranked major priorities in Palestinian society..Although the need to raise God’s word came number one, this was the only religious issue that ranked among the top ten.
Table II.3 Major priorities for Palestinian society
| Critical social problem | West Bank | Gaza | Total (%) |
| The need to promote God’s word | 77 | 85 | 80 |
| Employment/standard of living | ⅛ | 75 | 69 |
| Security and order | 64 | 69 | 66 |
| Equality before the law | 63 | 73 | 67 |
| Free higher education | 61 | θ9 | 64 |
| Qualifications | 61 | 67 | 63 |
| Getting rid of wasta* | 57 | 70 | 61 |
* wasta is the popular referent for patronage. In action it means securing a position or accessing a privilege through personal connections
Source: Hammami 1996
As Table II.3 shows, issues of social and economic well-being also ranked very high.
Additionally, what stands out from this table is the level of priority given to ‘equality before the law’ which here, given the context, seems to be predominantly about general social equality and rule of law, rather than necessarily being about the equality of men and women before the law.Clearly, ‘religiosity’ in a society cannot be taken at face value, but needs to be understood as part of a complex array of beliefs and dispositions which are embedded in concrete but changing social, political and economic circumstances. Religious beliefs and attitudes coexist with a complex array of mundane needs and priorities, as well as other sets of non-religious ideas and commitments. Talal Asad’s notion of Islam (or any religion) as a discursive tradition is useful in this context. He distinguishes between theological discourse (discourse about religion) and liturgical utterances, ways of speaking employed in prayer, sacrifices or preaching (Asad 1983: 243). While the latter induces religious dispositions in worshippers, the former attempts to put those dispositions in a larger intelligible framework about religion, society and politics. Liturgical utterance is the domain of dispositions (piety) that is much less changeable, while theological discourse is the domain of religion that is more public, where attempts to sanctify social or political practice as pious are carried out. Thus, on the one hand, the inner core of religious belief is often at odds or in tension with larger social and political discourses about religion, while, on the other, theological discourse exists within a wider social world of secular thought and political ideology - and, in the Palestinian context, nationalism is a powerful discursive and practical field with which all other cultural meanings must interact.