The Theory of Insidad

Insidad (or dalll al-insidad) is a rational theory that conveys that in the era of the occultation of the Twelfth Shi'ite Imam, a wide range of conjecture (or evidence that generates conjecture) is authoritative because there is limited, or no, access to certainty (or evidence that generates certainty) that conveys Sharia knowledge.

Apart from the necessities of religion (daruriyyat al-dln) and [the neces­sities of] the School of Ahl al-Bayt, definitive knowledge (dm al-qatl) of Sharia precepts in our era is closed [or inaccessible] (munsad). For, that which is found in the evidence [of Sharia] only generates conjecture... if it is granted that the door of [definitive] knowledge is closed (insidad bab al-4lm) regarding Sharia precepts, then [Sharia] duty (takllf) must be based on conjecture (zann).⁵

Ibn Shahrd al-Thani affirms that the only Sharia knowledge that is known with certainty in the absence of the Prophet and the Shi'ite Imams is that of the necessary aspects of religion (daruriyyat al-dln) that are unanimously agreed by all Muslims; and the necessary aspects of the Shi'ite School (daruriyyat al-madhhab). These include, for instance, the belief in One God, the prophet­hood of Muhammad, the obligation of performing daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan etc.; or the belief in the Divine appointment of the Twelve Imams, the Divine justice of God, the rational intelligibility of praiseworthy and blameworthy actions (husnwa-lqubh al-^,aqll) etc.

In Fara^lId al-usul, Ansari alludes that in their bid tojustify the authorita­tiveness of conjecture (or evidence such as the isolated reports), many of his predecessors used various forms of the theory of insidad. Amongst these, he critically analyses three different theories.? His analysis leads him to conclude that the theories presented by his predecessors are not conclusive in them­selves or coherent and hence they do not convincingly justify or substantiate the authoritativeness of conjecture. Instead, he proposes that the authoritative­ness of conjecture can only be substantiated if all such theories are combined

4 This is something that is clearly noted by the student of Bihbihani, Shaykh Mulammad 'Ali al-Ansari (d. 1889), see 'Ali al-Ansari, al-Mawsua al-fiqhiyya al-muyassara, 5:469: also see j,itv⅛ Sktischolarsof nineteenth-century Iraq, 62..

5 Ibn Shahid al-Thani, Ma^ralim al-dln, 192.

6 1.,192.-¾.

7 As mentioned, see Ansari, Fara’id al-Usul, 1:368-383: also see Bata, 'Towards the Utility of a Wider Range of Evidence,' 262-82.

under the banner of a single theory, which he terms dalil al-lnsldad.8 Ansari demonstrates this by formulating his version of the theory of Insldad upon four fundamental premises (muqaddlmat). Each premise is reminiscent of the individual arguments that were presented by his predecessors. Although, as I discuss near the end of this section, it is rather difficult to decipher what Ansari's actual take on lnsldad is, we find that his successors have continued to present, comment on, and at times even formulate their own versions of it in their works on legal theory.

1.1 The First Premise OfInsidad

According to Ansari, the first premise of the theory of lnsldad is that in the era of occultation the door of knowledge and substantiated knowledge of Sharia is closed (insldad bab al-^cilm wa-l Um،). Ansari explains that when the advocators of lnsldad say that the ‘door of Sharia knowledge is closed,' they mean that 1) there is no access to the infallible Prophet or Shi'ite Imams who can directly convey Sharia knowledge, and 2) there is no access to definitive forms of evidence, such as explicit verses (nass) of the Quran, widely recurrent reports (mutawatlr) of the sunna, definitive consensus (ijma^f) of scholars etc. that provide adequate knowledge or guidance on Sharia. Moreover, he clarifies that when the advocators of lnsldad say that the ‘door of substantiated knowl­edge is closed,' they mean that there is no definitive evidence that conveys that God affirms the authoritativeness (or sanctions the utility of) some forms of conjecture-generating evidence, such as the isolated reports.“ Ansari men­tions that:

This is the most important premise of the theory of lnsldad, rather some have explicitly mentioned that the establishment of this premise is [in itself] sufficient in proving the authoritativeness of a wide range of conjecture (zann al-mutlaq). This is because there is a consensus that if the door of definitive and substantiated knowledge is closed (insldad bab al-^cilm wa-l ’llmi) then a wide range of evidence is considered as authoritative.“

8 Anfi FaiAdalUl, 1:382.

9 For instance, see Khurasani, Klfayat al-usul, 311-5; Na’ini, Fawatd al-usul, 3:225-94; Ifhι⅛nι Niyat a--dtι⅛ya, 3.270307; ‰⅛⅛ Maqdiat a!u⅞td, 2-.127-30; KhiIi Mtsbali al-usul, 1:215-35; Muzaitar, Usul al-fiqh, 2:32-34; Sadr, Durus, 2:170-1.

10 Ansari, Faratd al-Usul, 1:386-7.

11 Ibid.

In this passage, AnsarI elucidates that there is a consensus amongst his UsulI predecessors that if there truly is no access to any definitive or substanti­ated knowledge of Sharia, then a jurist has no choice but to deduce Sharia knowledge from evidence that generates mere conjecture. As I will show later, this premise demarks a major theoretical divide between preAnsar and postAnsari UsulIs. Nevertheless, at this juncture it is important to note that for the advocators of Insldad, this premise serves a central role, as the rest of the following premises are contingent on its correctness.

ThesecondPremiseoJInshdaA

If it is accepted that the door of Sharia knowledge and substantiated knowl­edge is closed, then according to Ansaris second premise of lnsldad there is only access to ambiguous knowledge (dm al-jmalτ) of Sharia that is emanated from conjectural forms of evidenced One possible solution to deal with this ambiguous knowledge is to take recourse to the principle of exemption (asalat al-bara^,a). The application of exemption would rule that a believer is excused from performing Sharia duties (takalτf) that they have inadequate knowledge of and hence they would not be held accountable or subjected to chastisement in the hereafter for discarding them. AnsarI explains that although his prede­cessors, including QummI and ibn ShahId al-ThanI, theoretically proposed the suitability of taking recourse to the principle of exemption as a possible solu­tion, in practice they abstained from applying exemption to discard ambigu­ous Sharia duties.13 He clarifies two reasons for this abstention:

Firstly, AnsarI mentions that there is a definitive consensus (al-ljma^, al-qatτ) amongst Shritejurists (or his predecessors and contemporaries) that relays the impossibility of discarding Sharia duties just because they are known in a conjectural manner. He explains that this consensus can be acquired from a detailed examination of their works on juristic deductions (fiqh) wherein they categorically demonstrate that they deduce most Sharia knowledge by taking recourse to conjectural forms of evidence, such as isolated reports.

12 1.,1388,.

13 Ibid. It important to note that the second premise is built upon two parts. The first part explicates that in the era of occultation there is only ambiguous or conjectural knowledge of Sharia precepts. The second part considers the viability of applying the principle of exemption to deal with (or to dissolve) the ambiguous knowledge of Sharia. Considering this, some modern UsQlIs opine that the theory of lnsldad is built on five premises, and as such they present both parts of this premise as individual premises. Whereas others (like AnsarI), combine both parts together and present them as one premise. For example, KhurasanI in al-Kfayat al-usul constructs his version of the theory of lnsldad upon five fundamental premises and upholds the inappropriateness of AnsarI amalgamating the abovementioned two parts into one premise. See KhurasanI, Klfayat al-usul, 311-315.

Ansari asserts that the majority of Shi'ite scholars (^culama^{[12] [13]) explicitly uphold that in cases where a jurist cannot access definitive evidence, he must deduce Sharia knowledge from evidence that generates conjecture.” Therefore, in the absence of certainty conjecture becomes authoritative.}

Secondly, Ansari elucidates that according to “all great teachers," anyone who takes recourse to the principle of exemption, and thereby discards acting in accordance with all ambiguous or conjectural knowledge of Sharia, neces­sarily exits the folds of religion (khuruj 'an al-d!ri). Such a person cannot be considered a Muslim or as belonging to Shi'ism.]5 According to Ansari, since there is no explicit evidence (or scripture) that explicitly supports this notion, it shows that the great teachers arrived at it because they acknowledged that only a handful of Sharia precepts can be known with certainty, whilst most of them are only known in an ambiguous conjectural manner. To support his claim that “all great teachers" agree with this notion, Ansari surveys the works of prominent Shi'ite scholars, including Shaykh al-Saduq, Sharif al-Murtad Shaykh al-Tusi, 'Allama al-Hilli, Muhaddith Yusuf al-Bahrani and others.]® For instance, he highlights:

And amongst them is 'Allama [al-Hilli], who in Nahj al-mustarshldm, in the topic of establishing the infallibility ('⅛ma) of the Imams, mentions that: Indeed, they [i.e., the Imams] are the guardians (hafiz) of Sharia precepts (ahkam).

(bara^,a) leads to nullifying all Sharia precepts.]?

Through integrating the discourses of theology and legal theory Allama attempts to put forward the notion that there is a lack of evidence that suf­ficiently conveys definitive knowledge and details of Sharia. As such, a per­son must accept the infallibility of the Shi'ite Imams and appreciate them as legitimate lawgivers, for only after doing so can they utilise their traditions, which are mainly transmitted in a conjectural manner via isolated reports, to deduce details of Sharia. If a person objects to this and instead applies exemp­tion to discard most Sharia knowledge, then such a person exits the folds of the religion of Shi'ite Islam, as it is impossible to identify anyone who rejects the authority of the Imams as a Shi'ite Muslim.]«

15

16

17

1.,1392..

TheThid-PemiseoJInsdfd

After accepting that the door of knowledge and substantiated knowledge of Sharia is closed and that ambiguous or conjectural knowledge of Sharia cannot be discarded by taking recourse to the principle of exemption, Ansari's third premise of Insldad^w conveys that a believer can either:

1. Choose to imitate (or do taqlτd of) a jurist who denies the notion of Insldad, and instead insists that during the era of occultation the door of Sharia knowledge is open (‘infitah bab al-^,ilm^,). Such ajurist would uphold that in the absence of the Prophet and Shi'ite Imams, Sharia knowledge can be deduced from, or accessed through, definitive or sub­stantiated forms of evidence.

2. Choose to take recourse to the principle of precaution (asalat al-lhtlyat) and thereby enact all ambiguously or conjecturally known Sharia ordi­nances and prohibitions, to an extent where they have utmost conviction that they have performed every possible Sharia duty that may be required by God.

Ansari explains that a believer cannot choose to act with the first option. This is because reason necessarily dictates that a person who possesses certainty that the door of knowledge is closed cannot follow a person who possesses certainty that it is open, because the former knows that the latter is episte­mologically flawed in upholding such a belief. As such, it is irrational for any­one to follow or imitate a person (or a jurist) who they know is fundamentally wrong.20 In addition, Ansari also claims that there is a definitive consensus (al-ljma' al-qatτ) that demonstrates that Shi'ite scholars unanimously concur that it is impermissible for a person who believes that there is no access to Sharia knowledge to imitate a person who believes there is.21

Ansari then moves on to discuss that a believer cannot also resort to the second option, as taking recourse to the principle of precaution brings about immense hardship (al-haraj) and difficulty (al-Usr).22 He explains that one of the first UsulIs to argue this was Bihbihans student Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali alTabatabai (d. 1816), who is famously acclaimed for his work on fiqh entitled Rid al-masalfi. bayan à³-ahko^m bit dedal. An⅞arr explains that, according to Tabataba'!, the nature of conjecture is such that when a person possesses it, they also possess doubt (shakk) of its opposite.23 For example, if one has conjecture (or 70% surety) that God ordains the performance of Friday con­gregational prayers (salat al-jumu^ca), then this necessarily implies that they also possess doubt (or 30% probability) that He does not, and instead ordains believers to pray the daily noon prayer (salat al-zuhr). Considering this, if one takes recourse to precaution and thereby performs the maximum duty, they will need to pray both the Friday congregational prayer and the daily noon prayer. Only by performing both the 'conjectural' and the 'doubtful' duties, would they be convinced that they have performed the Sharia duty that is required by God. Tabataba'!, however, mentions that due to the vastness of ambiguous or conjectural Sharia knowledge, in practice it is not possible to take recourse to the principle of precaution and enact all possible duties, as this brings about immense hardship and difficulty. He justifies this stance by referring to juris­tic maxims (qawa^cid al-fiqhiyya), such as 'there is no hardship in religion' (la harajfi-ldin) or 'there is no difficulty in religion' (la ^cusrfi-ldin), which are nor­mally derived from scripture.24 Moreover, he elaborates that legal maxims are always preferred over practical principles (such as the principle of precaution) because they stem directly from God (i.e., from scripture) and hence convey that which is in the Mind of God (or al-hukm al-waqiT).25 Whereas the practi­cal principles are only resorted to to deduce apparent outcomes (or al-hukm al-zahiri) when that which is in the Mind of God is unknown. Accordingly, for Tabataba'!, juristic maxims that condemn hardship and difficulty super­sede and override the application of the principle of precaution. In any case, after asserting that it is not possible to act in accordance with precaution and thereby enact all possible Sharia duties, Tabataba'! opines that during the era of occultation a believer is left with no choice but to follow and act in accor­dance with a wide range of conjecture and consider it to be authoritative.

It is important to clarify that, although Tabataba'! proposes the above argu­ment as a standalone argument to prove the authoritativeness of a wide range of conjecture, according to Ansar!, whilst the argument is conceiving, it only holds weight if it is presented as one of the fundamental premises of the the­ory of Insldad. As such, we find that Ansar! and his successors usually present Tab aba 's argument of the impracticality of taking recourse to precaution as a fundamental premise in their formulation of the theory of insidad.26

Nevertheless, in addition to Tabatabars argument, Khurasanf, in his formu­lation of the theory of insidad in Kifayat al-usul, asserts that taking recourse to the practical principle of precaution to deal with ambiguous knowledge of Sharia is outright dismissed by reason, not only because it leads to hardship and difficulty, but also because it negatively impacts and disrupts social order. He elaborates that if believers are always preoccupied with being cautious and making sure that they enact every possible Sharia duty, then this inevitably disrupts their day-to-day social life.27

TheFourthPemiseoJInsdfd

The fourth and final premise of Ansari's theory of insidad concludes that a believer (or more precisely a jurist) has no choice but to rely on conjectural forms of evidence to deduce Sharia knowledge.28 It only becomes active when the first three premises are accepted. Therefore, if one accepts that dur­ing the era of occultation there is 1) no access to definitive or substantiated evi­dence of Sharia, 2) the ambiguous or conjectural knowledge of Sharia cannot be discarded by taking recourse to the principle of exemption, and 3) it is not possible to enact Sharia duties by either taking recourse to another jurist or to the principle of precaution, then they are left with no choice but to accept the authoritativeness of a wide range of conjecture.

As mentioned earlier, the nature of conjecture is such that when a person possesses it, they also possess doubt (shakk) at the same time. Considering this, Ansari asserts that conjecture has two sides (atraf); a more preferred (rajih) side and a less preferred side (marjuh).29 For instance, if one possesses conjecture that God ordains the performance of Friday congregational prayers, then this naturally implies that they also possess doubt that He may instead ordain the performance of the daily afternoon prayer (zuhr). Their possession of conjecture is epistemologically superior to their possession of doubt, inso­far as from amongst the two possibilities, there is greater possibility that God ordains believers to perform the Friday congregational prayers over the daily afternoon prayer. As such, the former is considered as the more preferred side of conjecture, whereas the latter is considered as the less preferred side of conjec­ture. Ansari emphasises that a believer cannot - with precaution - follow both sides of conjecture. Moreover, he explains that reason judges that it is morally reprehensible to ever give preference to something that is less preferred over something that is more preferred (tarjlh al-marjuh ^cala ×-rajih qablh). He there­fore concludes that ambiguous knowledge of Sharia can only be dealt with by always taking recourse to the more preferred side of conjecture.30

Although Ansari's fourth premise rules that a jurist must follow a wide range of conjecture to deduce Sharia knowledge, he clarifies that some forms of con­jecture are excluded from this general rule. He explains that this is because there is access to certainty or definitive evidence that conveys (through the teachings of the Prophet and Shi'ite Imams) that God disallows or abhors thejuristic utility of some forms of evidence, such as qiyas (analogical rea­soning), istihsan (personal juristic preference), Istislah (social interest) etc. that are normally used by Sunni jurists.3i Accordingly, Ansari's formulation of insidad upholds that except for forms of evidence that are definitely excluded by God, all other Sharia conjecture-generating forms of evidence are deemed as authoritative in ijtihad. Ansari further clarifies that in situations where there is a lack of conjecture or mutually conflicting conjecture, and thus a jurist can­not deduce Sharia as it is in the Mind of God (or al-hukm al-waqil), he must take recourse to practical principles (usul al-’amaliyya) to deduce apparent Sharia knowledge (or al-hukm al-^ahirl).32

In their presentation of the theory of insidad, modern Usulis, including Ansari, concede that if its fundamental premises are all proven to be correct, then it ultimately leads to justifying the authoritativeness of a wide range of conjec­ture in ijtihad. However, the dominant position amongst them is that the first premise of insidad is incorrect. Most modern Usulis uphold that in the era of occultation the door of knowledge and substantiated knowledge is not closed, but rather is open.33 This signifies that they believe there is enough access to definitive evidence that can disclose Sharia knowledge and can substantiate God's approval of some forms of conjectural evidence.

Amongst modern Usulis, Musa Shubayri al-Zanjani (b. 1928) is perhaps the most influential orthodox cleric who contrastingly expounds that in the era of occultation, the door of Sharia knowledge and substantiated knowledge is closed. In his criticism of the modern orthodox position, he asserts that there is a lack of scholastic effort amongst seminarians in critically discussing the theory of insidad and most of them assume that Ansari only constructed his version of it as an intellectual exercise so that he could present the opinions of predecessors in a clear and coherent manner. In Zanjanfs opinion, however, Ansari's personal take on insidad, particularly its first fundamental premise, remains unclear and under researched. He opines that a thorough reading of Ansari's work, including his juristic deductions in Kitab al-Makasib, gives the impression that he more than likely upheld that the theory of insidad was the only appropriate means by which the authoritativeness of some forms of con­jecture, such as the isolated reports, could be substantiated.34 Nevertheless, barring the eccentric opinion of Zanjani,35 it is clear that the one significant point of difference between pre-Ansari and post- Ansari Usulis is that the for­mer predominantly advocates that in the era of occultation the door of (or access to) Sharia knowledge is closed, whereas the latter predominantly advo­cates that it is open.

2