Theological Worldview and the Logic of Ethical and Legal Reasoning
In order to trace the rise of ethical legal reasoning, this study asked how tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri, al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi, and al-Juwayni relate ethical norms to the legal status of acts and whether and how they apply the ethical content of divine rulings in the procedure of analogy when extending the Law to new circumstances.
Scrutinizing their definitions of good and bad in relation to the five legal norms brought to light the limits of dividing these scholars' ethical theories into deontological and teleological to capture that God's laws are good and should be obeyed. It showed that their norm constructions are often a mixture or combination of deontological and consequentialist considerations. This was most apparent in tAbd al-Jabbar's thought. His understanding of what makes an act ‘good' displays both dimensions - it is good as an act of beneficence and/or as an act of restitution of a claim upon the agent. Such combinations of consequentialist and deontological calculations were also noticeable in the other jurists' definitions of ethico-legal norms, in particular with regard to the status of obligatory and recommended acts. Of the jurisprudents here presented, al-Basri was probably the one who most consistently applied a teleological perspective when describing the grounds on which he assesses human acts. While the previous chapters, like the work of Reinhart, Eissa, and others, underscored that a scholar's approach to ethics does not completely overlap with his theological school affiliation, the latter still influenced the dominant outlook of a scholar and explained some of his arguments. Our two Muttazilis tended toward a teleological framework in why obedience to divine laws was good, since a just God keeps His promise of reward, and they constructed the ethico-legal norms accordingly. Whereas our Maturidi and Ashtari protagonists emphasized the deontological aspect of humans being in servitude to God, with any prospect for reward a secondary consideration, which often came to the fore in the category of recommended acts.The way thesejurists construct ethical and legal norms, however, did not translate into their conceptions of legal analogy and the ratio legis of rulings. Here we noticed quite the opposite of what one would expect. Even though tAbd al-Jabbar and al-Basri held that God's rulings are imposed for the benefit of His creation and found the grounds for good and bad acts in their beneficial and harmful consequences, this had no impact on the way in which they determined the correctness of religious rationes legis. And, counter-intuitively, it was the Ashtari and Maturidijurists who, to varying extent, drew on this-worldly benefit and harm to identify the ratio legis. While theological commitments did not directly impact the way our jurisprudents went about the procedures to identify the ratio legis, theology, nevertheless, set the stage for the way they thought about the methods to identify the ratio legis.
The Muttazili commitment to God's justice imparted on tAbd al-Jabbar and al-Basri the confidence that a just God would not leave His creatures without clear guidance of His legislative intent and how to be rewarded. The language of Scripture is interpreted according to the consequences of the acts imposed, namely the reward God promises and the punishment He threatens in the Hereafter, as well as fulfilling the rights of another. Hence, only what is clearly indicated in Scripture to be the ratio legis of a ruling is extended to unaddressed situations in analogy, though, of course, some rational contemplation is necessary in that process. Overall, both tAbd al-Jabbar and al-Basri relied on a fairly narrow semantic analysis of the scriptural evidence - one does not have to investigate the purpose of rulings, because that is already known from God's justice. That for our two Muttazilis the relevance of the divine Law extends primarily to its otherworldly consequences was also noticeable in their use of the term maslaha. Maslaha is connected to a person's reward in the Afterlife by obediently acting upon the divine rulings.
It is not a criterion by which to recognize their rationes legis. Hence, both Abd al-Jabbar and al-Basri followed in the procedure of analogy the sign model of the ratio legis. Mundane notions of benefit and harm only play a role when assessing worldly matters that are outside the scope of the Law.For our Maturidi and Ashtari scholars, God's omnipotence was a stronger commitment, to the point that they denied any inherent connection between the ratio legis and its ruling. God is at liberty to choose a sign for indicating its ratio legis. While al-Dabbusi understood God's divine plan reflected in His wise legislation, and allowed for a modicum of rational assessment independent of revealed knowledge, al-Shirazi and al-Juwayni pointed to the utter dependence of humans on Revelation.[813] The insecurity in knowing what the omnipotent God truly wants from His creatures, however, has to be stabilized by counterbalancing factors. The divine signs, thus, have to be scrutinized much more than with a Muttazili confidence that God indicates His laws clearly. Reliance on the sign-model of the ratio legis was not sufficient to apply God's laws to all of human experience.[814] Unless one could find consistent grounds that allowed to extend the Law to new circumstances, the claim to an all-encompassing Law (and thereby the supremacy of the Islamic Revelation in ordering society) was severely compromised and would lead to legal plurality that belied the uniqueness and uniformity of the divine Law.
One mechanism to do so was the procedure of legal analogy (qiyas).[815] For al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi, and al-Juwayni the function of analogizing was to generalize the applicability of divine rulings outside of the revelatory setting.[816] [817] [818] By contrast, as mentioned above, tAbd al-Jabbar limits the generalizing function of qiyas? In order to provide stability, our Maturidi and Ashtarijurispru- dents turned to the meaning (macna) and the purpose (maqsad) of the Law.
We saw that, in contrast to our Muttazilijurists, al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi and, in particular, al-Juwayni revert to a complex and in-depth analysis of the linguistic setting of the ruling to arrive at its ratio legis. While al-Dabbusi and al-Shirazi approached the revealed word common-sensical and according to the lexical and semantic meaning of the scriptural wording,[819] al-Juwayni relied on the contextual setting (qartna) in which the meaning was embedded to understand the intention behind divine rulings. Al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi, and al-Juwayni, to varying degrees, took recourse to the ‘purpose’ behind laws when analogizing, irrespective of denying any purpose in God’s actions from a theological point of view. The purposivist approach to the ratio legis is, one may say, a counterbalance to an inscrutable and omnipotent God, which arises out of His wisdom. The Maturidi commitment to God’s wisdom was explicitly voiced by al-Dabbusi; and even in Ashtari circles at that time, it was acceptable to deem God’s actions, like those of a benevolent Master, to not be foolish (cabath) but purposeful. The divine purpose was interpreted consequentialist, namely as being beneficial to humans. In contrast to the Muttazili focus on God’s Law being beneficial, or a maslaha, for people in the Hereafter, al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi, and al-Juwayni direct the benefit toward this world - the realm of the divine remains unknown. Hence, they look for the good consequences of following God’s laws in this life, as evident in their comments about the goodness of the divine rules for marriage, contracts, and guardianship.Yet, as we saw in the work of al-Dabbusi, al-Shirazi, and al-Juwayni, a similar commitment to God’s omnipotence and legal universality did not translate into the same interpretation of language and application of analogy, even though all three exhibit a conception of the ratio legis that fits the motive model. Their commonality in this regard, I believe, is driven by their desire to provide legal answers to the constantly evolving needs of society.
If one espouses an all-encompassing Law, then one has to be able to address all situations - which is possible by looking for broader meanings and purposes behind the revealed laws and generalizing these. Their differences are much harder to explain. Why al-Shirazi understands command and prohibition quite differently from al-Juwayni remains unanswered - we only know that he did and that it impacts how he assesses the legal status of acts, as evident in his endorsement of the counter-implication.The way in which al-Ghazali drew upon concepts and arguments made by his Muttazili, Maturidi, and Ashtari predecessors from among Hanafis and Shafitis is reminiscent of the synthesis between traditionalists and rationalists in the aftermath of the mihna, as argued by Hallaq.[820] The Muttazili view that God's legislation aims at attaining benefit and averting harm from His creatures is taken out of its otherworldly dimension and pulled into this world. The terminology used is from the Muttazili concept of God doing always what is best (aslah) for His creation, providing them with opportunities for maslaha. Once outside of Muttazili circles, this maslaha, however, was imbued with concrete benefit and harm for people's necessities and needs in this world, and applied as a standard to identify the ratio legis of divine rulings. Although this line of argument was already hinted at in al-Dabbusi's and al-Juwayni's work, al-Ghazali's feat was to take it one step further and argue that maslaha is the purpose/ratio legis of the divine Law. Hence, something that attains maslaha, by definition, is congruent with the divine legislative intent. When applied to circumstances unaddressed in Scripture, considerations of maslaha enable legal universality.
The shift in understanding maslaha from an abstract otherworldly reward to tangible beneficial purposes in this world does not depend on a hitherto undiscovered ‘missing link' figure between al-Ghazali and previous jurisprudents, but rather emerges out of an intellectual milieu in which a variety of interpretations were proposed and debated. They constituted the building blocks of al-Ghazali's articulation. The presence of similar ideas also explains the success of his theory of the maqasid al-sharia in subsequent centuries. It continued existing ideas, yet was more precise, textually substantiated in its definition, and provided a more applicable method of law-finding than those proposed by jurists like al-Dabbusi or al-Juwayni.