Women's image

The situation of women is tough indeed, but it may be that even more dangerous is the image formulated by society of women’s roles and character. The danger here may lie in that fact that women themselves are not unaffected by this image, and may indeed themselves adopt it.

The image of women in religious thought Some conservative religious thought presents an image of women as inferior, at worst devils, at best a tool for the sexual gratification of their husbands. Ibn al-Gouzi’s book Rulings on Women (n.d.: 62-95), f°^r example, has an entire section dedicated to ‘Deterring women from wrong-doing and letting them know that they are more likely to go to hell’. Al-Buti (n.d.: 43-4) also articulates a conservative understanding of marriage, to the effect that it is not in a woman’s nature to look for a husband herself, and since God has created her psychologically and physically in a way that makes her appealing and desirable to men, her own joy is to be found in the feeling that she is desirable. For this to remain the case, the man should be the breadwinner and the maintainer, and women should not go out to work for an income, except in the most straitened of circumstances and in cases of necessity (ibid.: 48). In such views, marriage is a framework in which women are a means of reproduction and of entertainment for men. Certain views from jurists are cited to the same effect (Hatab 1976: 45).

Al-Maududi (n.d.: 132—3) takes these sex-related views further, and provides a basis for positions taken on women’s affairs by some contemporary political Islam groups, particularly since the rise of radical political Islam groups in Egypt around the mid-1970s.

The promotion of these views has led to their becoming part and parcel of the educated middle classes’ convictions, emphasizing men’s role and social power while promoting an image of women as silent followers. These concepts are legitimized inter alia through the prevailing culture, popular and religious heritage, the law and the media.

The only roles for women recognized by the dominant culture among members of the middle classes are those of wife and homemaker. A woman is allowed to get an education and go to work in order to enhance her chances of a better marriage, provided that her career and education do not clash with her role of serving her husband and bringing up the children. Regardless of what she may have achieved by way of university degrees or professional status, a woman without a husband or male children is seen as an object of pity in society. Families bring up their girl children to play the role of wife and homemaker, encouraging them to show off their femininity while simultaneously prohibiting them from mixing with their male counterparts. This contradiction, which sets the exaggerated sexual aspect in a woman’s character (woman as a tool for sex, for entertainment and for reproduction) against suppressive social, cultural and religious values, has added to a disempowerment of women even more severe than their economic disempowerment, though closely connected.

The image of women in popular culture At first glance it appears that popular discourse is in line with the limits set by dominant culture and religious thought, but a closer examination of this discourse reveals that it is not totally subordinate to these ideologies. Public discourse reflects a variety of positions, differing from class to class and sector to sector, with significant differences between rural and urban areas, as sub-sectors of the overall social set-up. On the one side, the urban middle class, whether in the capital or other cities, tends to be closely linked to the central governing institutions, and has been exposed to pervasive and highly intensive ideological input from institutions such as schools, local media and prominent mosques, presenting women as taboo and adding to women’s alienation in the collective and popular psychology of the urban petite bourgeoisie. On the other side, people in rural areas and the poor districts in the cities seem to be less controlled by the input of ideological institutions and not seriously committed to the religious rhetoric of the local media. Their discourse is in a process of interaction with the others, but is nevertheless different from that of the urban middle class and of radical Islamists. In the rural areas women represent a major sector of the workforce, and the children they bear and raise are, for the farmer, his major source of well-being. Talk of sex is more straight­forward - the taboo of the urban middle class does not apply — and is enhanced by the educative role of the extended family. Nevertheless, we cannot claim that the popular and rural image of women is essentially different from that of the middle class; naturally, the latter view has found its way also through to other classes and sections of society, and the economic deprivation of the popular classes has led them in turn to suppress women.

Due to its above-mentioned contradictory nature, popular heritage includes a number of concepts that entrench and legitimize systems and values that advocate the suppression of women and reduce their role to a minimum within the family and the societal framework.

There is also evidence among the popular classes of practices that may not accord with the constraints of the shar^,i rulings. By way of example, among the poor, it is reported to be commonplace for a man to employ the phrases of ila' or zihar,¹ or to pronounce an oath of talaq, but being unable financially to make the required expiation that would remove the effect of the pronouncement, returns to marital intimacy with his wife anyway, in violation of the shar^,i rules. Hence the externalities of awareness of the law, of what is permitted {!ιalal') and what is prohibited (Aaram), become confused (Abdul Fattah 1991: 252-63, as cited in Shukri et al. 1995: 126).⁸

There are also several ways of circumventing the text of personal status law applied in the courts. 'Ashmawi (1996: 50) notes one particularly well-known form of circumvention of the rules of the marriage contract in Egypt, the muhallal, a person who marries a woman who has been divorced in the ‘greater finality’ {baynuna kubra, the third of three divorces) and is thus no longer lawful to the man who has divorced her, until she has undergone marriage to another man.

The image of husband and wife The sexual relationship of a married couple in Egyptian society is not balanced. There is a common belief that men are more sexually motivated than women and thus take the lead. Unlike men, women’s sexual activity usually starts with marriage; society approves a man’s right to have sex before marriage but firmly rejects the same right for women. This stand reflects the social concept that virginity is closely related to family honour and to the woman’s future fidelity to her husband. In this regard, social values are at odds with the religious rulings that approve sex only within the marriage frame­work for both sexes.

As for divorce, this is generally not considered a feasible option even by women wishing to end their marriage, particularly if they have children and are faced with the uncertain future of an unmarried woman and society’s disapproval. These considerations tend to place women in the position of accepting their inferior status, and although education has a major role to play in empowering women to strike a balance here, even those who have had a good education tend to view marriage as a means of protection, as well as bringing mental and moral harmony.

To close this consideration of the perceptions of the marital relationship we will summarize some of the findings of a 1973-74 study carried out by Dr Sayyed 'Awais (1977) among urban Egyptian youth. Unmarried young men and women were questioned on the choice of their future spouse wives and husbands, reveal­ing the following positions:

1. Of the male respondents in this study, 71.4 per cent wanted their future bride to be younger than them, while 28.6 per cent wanted a wife of the same age; 68.5 per cent of the female respondents wanted their future husband to be older than them, while 28.5 per cent wanted him to be the same age.

2. That the future wife should be an Egyptian non-relative was the preference of 62.8 per cent of male respondents, while 28.6 per cent preferred an Egyptian relative; the female respondents’ choices were '71.4 per cent and 22.9 per cent respectively.

3. When asked about the preferred educational level of a future wife, 68.6 per cent of male respondents wanted the wife to have an education equal to theirs, while 31.4 per cent preferred a wife educated to a lower standard than them­selves. Among the female respondents, some 60 per cent wanted a husband educated to a higher standard than themselves, 34.4 per cent looked for the same educational standard, and 5.7 per cent expressed a preference for a husband with a lower educational level than themselves. There is a particularly significant difference here between males and females in regard to those ex­pressing a preference for a future spouse of the same educational level.

4. All of the male respondents and 97.1 per cent of the females said that their ideal future spouse would not have been previously married.

5. Among both male and female respondents, 94.3 per cent aspired to their own private dwelling in their family life.

6. Almost 28.6 per cent of the male respondents agreed that divorce should take place in court, while 71.4 per cent disagreed; the female respondents were split evenly (50:50) in their response to this question.