Acknowledgments
In the process of writing this book, I have accumulated a number of debts, which I want to acknowledge gratefully here. Earlier iterations of many of the central arguments of the book were presented at the Conference on the Changing Face of Constitutional Interpretation at Hastings College of the Law in 1993; at the Symposium on Human Rights Protection in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, in 2001; at the Constitutional Theory Conference at Vanderbilt University Law School in 2003; at the Constitutional Law Conference at the University of Virginia School of Law in 2003; and at faculty workshops at Arizona State University College of Law, Hastings College of the Law, Loyola-Los Angeles Law School, and the University of San Diego School of Law.
Much of Chapter Eight was presented at the Conference on Religious Arguments Regarding Public Policy in a Liberal Democracy at the University of San Diego School of Law in 1992 and at the Conference on Liberalism and Illiberal Groups at the University of San Diego School of Law in 2001. I am grateful for the comments and criticisms I received at those events.Much of the material in this book was anticipated in my prior writings. Chapter Two draws heavily from “Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory,” 44 HastingsL. J. 921 (1993). Chapter Three draws heavily from “Rules, Rights, Options, and Time,” 6 Legal Theory 337 (2000). Chapter Four is drawn in part from “Freedom of Expression as a Human Right,” in Protecting Human Rights, T. Campbell, J. Goldsworthy, & A. Stone, eds. (2003). Chapter Seven expands on sections of “The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle” (co-authored with Paul Horton), 78 Northwestern University Law Review 1319 (1983), and “Freedom of Speech” in R. Chadwick, ed., Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (1997). Chapter Eight draws heavily from “Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology,” 30 San Diego L.
Rev. 763 (1993), and “Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions of Liberalism,” 12 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 625 (2002). I thank the publishers for their permission to draw liberally from these pieces.Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of San Diego School of Law and my dean, Dan Rodriguez, who provided intellectual help and moral and financial encouragement; Frederick Schauer, who, in this as in so many areas of common interest, has laid much of the foundation for my work, illumined many of the paths, and given his assistance as a good friend and intellectual companion; Elaine Alexander, Steve Smith, and Stanley Fish, each of whom has been influential in this project; my student research assistants, Robert Booher, Rebecca Byrne, Shauna Durrant, and Jacinda Lanum, who did excellent work; my secretaries, Sarah Moore and Justine Phillips, who rendered tireless and excellent stenographic assistance; and my excellent copy editor, Norrie Feinblatt, and indexer, Carolyn Sherayko. As always, one must stand on very tall shoulders in order to see above the trees.