An analysis of humility
In order to consider how ubuntu morality and epistemology may be understood to prescribe humility, one first needs some sense of what humility is.This section does not presume that there is an essence to humility, although it also does not reject that possibility (unlike Kellenberger 2010: 323—324).
Instead, it advances features that are typical of a humble orientation, whether in the domains of ethics or epistemics. In emphasizing similarities between ethical and intellectual humility, the following does not strive to mark out the finer points of either one considered in isolation from the other.The introduction spoke of making a ‘claim’, where one might make a claim on others' resources such as their time, or make a claim to know something about the world. Humility may be understood in these contexts to prescribe tempering claims (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2003: 258, 265—267; Kellenberger 2010). A humble person neither makes unreasonable demands to possess what others have, nor unreasonably maintains that she is in possession of certain kinds of truth. A humble person does not grasp for what is not hers to receive.
Talk of ‘assumption’ and cognate terms, and specifically the lack of it, is a second recurrent feature of humility. In the ethical realm, a humble agent is unassuming, relatively unconcerned that her status be greater than others (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2003: 259—261) and not wanting to impose on others without giving their interests at least due consideration (if not greater consideration than what is owed, on which see Kellenberger 2010). With regard to epistemology, a humble enquirer questions her assumptions, perhaps even when she is entitled not to doubt. She does not suppose that she knows with certainty or with too much confidence, or she accepts that there are certain topics about which she cannot know (e.g., Whitcomb et al.
2017). She judges herself to need evidence, perhaps seeking more than is sufficient. Whereas the humble agent does not take things for free from others, the humble enquirer does not take things for granted about the world. Neither is presumptuous; both accept limits.A third term frequently associated with humility is ‘extravagance’, specifically the avoidance of it. An agent who is not humble might make excessive demands on others, or spend lots of resources on herself in respect of a party or an abode, perhaps ascribing to herself a value that is disproportionately great (e.g., Garcia 2006). An enquirer who lacks humility might extravagantly posit entities for which there is insufficient evidence, such as a multiverse or angels.
Putting these ideas together, a person is humble insofar as she tempers her claims, avoids being presumptuous, and eschews extravagance. It is natural to think of humility as a virtue, whether practical or intellectual (for just one instance, see Battaly 2019).1 It is a disposition not to think too much of oneself, whether that is in relation to what goods one takes from the world or what one takes oneself to believe about it.
Of particular salience when it comes to ethics is the idea that others matter and must be given their due (and perhaps more). A proverbial Robinson Crusoe alone on a deserted island without humans or animals probably could not exhibit the moral virtue of humility, surely not to its full extent. Relatedly, the ‘anti-humble’ vices of arrogance, vanity, attention-seeking, selfishness, and the like could not be manifest in the absence of others.
As this volume illustrates, there is of course much more one could discuss about the nature of humility. For example, the above description has roughly focused on avoiding ‘too much’, but presumably humility, insofar as it is a virtue, also involves avoiding ‘too little’.And any ‘too’ talk, as well as mention of what is ‘unreasonable’ and the like, beg for specifics. However, the analysis given here will be enough to make sense of certain important features of ubuntu as a widely shared African philosophy.
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