Cognitively extended humility

One challenge facing any discussion of the relationship between extended cognition and humility is that the former, but not the latter, specifically concerns cognitive processes.

Nonetheless, we will begin by considering what bearing extended cognition might have for humility in general (we will be considering intellectual humility in its own right in the next section). Even though virtues in general, as opposed to intellectual virtues, are not specifically cognitive traits, they do employ cognitive traits. Being virtuous is not simply a matter of want­ing to be a certain way (having good motives, and so on), but rather also involves being reliable at attaining certain virtuous outcomes, at least in the right conditions. Accordingly, there are cognitive skills involved in manifesting virtues even if the virtues themselves are not geared towards specifically cognitive goals.With this in mind, we can ask whether the manifestation of the virtue of humility could essentially involve extended cognitive processes.

On the face of it, there seems no inherent reason why this shouldn't be so.

For example, accounts of humility characteristically regard this virtue as demanding, inter alia, that one doesn't regularly overestimate one's importance.There would thus be a cognitive trait underlying this virtue that involved making judgements about one's importance that don't inac­curately overstate that importance.⁹ On the face of it, technology ought to be useful in assisting subjects in this regard. One could imagine, for example, a subject employing a device that is designed to pick-up on the use of certain phrases (in the subject's speech and writing, say) that are indicative of non-humble attitudes (arrogance, and so on). The device could then be pro­grammed to remind the subject (in a suitably evocative manner) that one shouldn't overestimate one's importance. In this way, a general motivation to be humbler could be more effectively realised via the subject's continued employment of this technology.

Imagine now that this device is employed not as mere technology, but is instead cognitively integrated such that it becomes neuromedia. Perhaps, for example, rather than consciously using this device, such that one is aware of it as an external instrument, one is fitted with it in some unobtrusive way, such that on a day-to-day basis one is not even aware of its presence. Relatedly, the way that it works, on suitable occasions, to generate thoughts that stimulate humility is such that the thoughts engineered by the device are not noticeably different from the various thoughts that pop into one's head during a normal day.

Interestingly, one would think that this device, qua neuromedia, would be even more effec­tive at promoting humility than its unextended counterpart. One would simply find oneself becoming humbler without even being aware of the role of the technology in this regard. In contrast, being aware of the technology and its role in one's beliefs could serve to undermine its effectiveness, since it naturally prompts the subject to reflect on the input from the technology qua the bearer of ‘external' advice, rather than as ‘internal' monitoring. For example, one might be inclined to downgrade the external input when it comes to guiding one's actions (i.e., what one will say or write next) precisely because it is external, preferring instead one's own internal judgement. In contrast, if the ‘external' monitoring is not noticeably different from the ‘internal' monitoring, such that the two are seamlessly merged, then the potential for the kind of intel­lectual distance required to downgrade the former over the latter simply doesn't arise.

Should one then conclude that it would be better for the technology that we employ to promote humility to be neuromedia where possible? One reason why we might pause here con­cerns the fact that virtues seem to demand a high level of cognitive ownership on the part of the subject. One does not acquire and maintain one's virtues passively, but rather actively, through conscious effort, emulation of the virtuous, reflection on one's performance to cultivate that vir­tue, and so on.The reason why this is relevant is that it suggests that there is a limit to the extent to which one can thoughtlessly manifest a virtue, which means that there is a sense in which one doesn't want one's employment of the cognitive processes that underlies the virtue to be too seamless.

In order to see the import of this point, compare one's use of the unextended virtue-enhanc­ing technology with one's use of the corresponding extended virtue-enhancing neuromedia. When one uses the unextended technology, one is consciously taking responsibility for the development of one's virtue of humility. After all, one is actively employing the technology to enhance one's humility, and so there is a very real sense in which the technology is merely a tool for one's own cultivation of the virtue. Accordingly, one is able to take cognitive responsibility for the use of this technology in cultivating one's virtue. How does one's use of the neuromedia fare in this regard? The issue of cognitive responsibility is unclear when it comes to the use of neuromedia precisely because of how the technology is so seamlessly (and thus unreflectively) employed. Doesn't that suggest that one isn't now cultivating one's virtue at all, but is rather passively relying on the technology to engineer the relevant responses?

Another way of putting this point is in terms of where the causal attribution of responsibil­ity naturally flows in each case. Where one is simply using technology as (unextended) tech­nology in the usual way, then one's enhancement of the relevant virtue-associated behaviours naturally flows to the agent rather than to the technology, since the latter is merely being put into service by the former. But once the technology becomes neuromedia, then the relevant attribution of responsibility becomes much more muddled. In particular, if the responsibility for virtue-associated behaviours flows to the technology rather than to the agent, then it ceases to be straightforward that this behaviour is sufficiently creditable to the agent to qualify as the manifestation of virtue.

One could push back on this thought by emphasising that extended cognitive processes are simply parts of the extended cognitive subject, of her cognitive character.¹⁰ Accordingly, the idea that the virtue-associated behaviours are creditable to the technology rather than the subject is simply incoherent, as the technology is now part of the cognitive subject in the relevant sense. Whether this kind of push-back is credible depends on what counts as neuromedia.Where the subject actively incorporates neuromedia into her cognitive life with the expressed purpose of enhancing virtue, then it does seem very plausible to suppose that the Unreflective use of the technology later in time is no less creditable to her agency for being employed without any conscious awareness of its use on the part of the subject. After all, part of what is involved in developing virtue is ensuring that the relevant behaviours and associated motivations become second nature, and hence one can hardly impugn one's choice to employ neuromedia in this fashion on the grounds that it leads to unreflective behaviour, as manifestations of virtue are ideally meant to be (in the moment at least) unreflective.

The more interesting case, however, is surely neuromedia that doesn't essentially involve any original conscious deliberation on the part of the subject. Although more controversial as an example of extended cognition than the type of neuromedia just described (whereby the subject does consciously choose to extend their cognitive processes in this way), it nonetheless is a plau­sible variety of bona fide extended cognition. Imagine, for example, a future world where every­one is automatically cognitively augmented from birth with certain kinds of neuromedia. Now consider an agent who is unaware of the nature of this cognitive augmentation, but nonetheless unthinkingly employs it in her everyday life. Insofar as we are inclined to treat neuromedia as a genuine extended cognitive process at all, then wouldn't we likewise be inclined to treat this subject as exhibiting extended cognition?¹¹ But if the subject has never consciously endorsed this use of technology, then in what sense would it be appropriate to treat the virtue-apt behav­iours that result from the use of this technology as attributable to her agency (such that they could count as a genuine virtue)?

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