Conclusion

Debates about humility and modesty have been ongoing and vigorous. I have offered no more than a selective theoretical overview, but it is clear that, like our historical forebears, our con­temporaries continue to be engaged with these virtues, and even point to new and exciting directions for further research.

Notes

1 Snow (1995, 203).

2 This is due in no small part to the efforts of the John Templeton Foundation, which has funded three major initiatives to stimulate research on humility: at the Thrive Center of the Fuller Theological Seminary (http://thethrivecenter.org/science/); at St. Louis University (on “The Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility (http://humility.slu.edu/); and at the University of Connecticut on “Humility and Conviction in Public Life” (https://humilityandconviction.uconn.edu/).

3 Religious and psychological conceptions of humility, as well as humility from non-Western perspec­tives, are discussed elsewhere in this volume. On humility and environmental ethics, see Gerber (2002) and Hill (1983). For work on humility in political science, see Rushing (2013), Keys (2008), and Button (2005). For work on humility from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, see Wright (forthcoming).

4 See Newman (1982, 227); but see also Roberts and Cleveland (2017, 38—39), who argue that humility is exemplified by Socrates in the Apology (28b-d) and the Theaetetus, and is found in a passage in Plato’s Laws (4.716a-b).

5 For helpful discussions, see Wielenberg (2019), Nadelhoffer, et al., (2017), Nadelhoffer and Wright (2017), Roberts and Cleveland (2017, 38-41),Trakakis (2014), Roberts (2007, chapter 6), and Newman (1982).

6 Nadelhoffer, et al. (2017), 172; see The Cloud of Unknowing, trans. James Walsh (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1981), chapter 32, 181.

7 Richards (1988, 253); see Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 42 on Canticle 6, trans.

8 Nadelhoffer, et al. (2017), 172; see Maimonides (Moses Ben Maimom), A Maimonides Reader, ed. I. Twersky (NewYork: Berman House, 1972).

9 See Newman (1982) and Button (2005).

10 Newman (1982, 275); see Baruch Spinoza Ethics, part 4, prop. 53; and David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, part 3, section 2.

11 Newman (1982, 277); see Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1966), sect. 260.

Richards (1988, 253); see Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Chicago, IL:The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 334—335.

Newman (1982, 281); see also Grenberg (2005).

Lippitt (2017, 98).

Sinha (2012, 266); quoted material from Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1907), 204.

Sinha (2012, 266); quoted material from Rashdall (1907), 207.

Space considerations preclude discussions of some very interesting views on humility. E.g., Kupfer (2003) argues that humility is a realistic understanding of ourselves and our relation to the world. Milligan (2007, see especially 217, 221,224, and 226) develops a conception of humility based on Iris Murdoch's work, according to which humility is the just discernment of one's competences, includ­ing our limited moral competences, that avoids overestimation. Kellenberger (2010, 234) maintains that humility is a “polythetic” concept; that is, it “has one meaning, but that meaning allows different expressions of humility in different contexts.” Different contemporary conceptions of humility, he argues, are different expressions of humility or ways of being humble. Murphy (2017, 19—32) offers interesting reflections on humility as a moral virtue. Nadelhoffer, et al. (2017) and Nadelhoffer and Wright (2017) is a collaboration between a philosopher and psychologists that advances empirical evi­dence for the view that humility is low self-focus and high other-focus.

Taylor (1985, 17); quoted in Richards (1988, 253).

Richards (1988, 253).

Taylor (1985, 51).

Taylor (1985, 51).

Richards (1988, 254); see also Richards (1992a, 578).

Richards (1988, 256).

Richards (1988, 257).

Snow (1995, 206-207).

Snow (1995, 207).

Snow (1995, 209).

Snow (1995, 210).

Richards (1988, 259).

Snow (1995, 214).

Roberts and Wood (2003), Roberts and Wood (2007); see also Roberts and West (2017), Roberts and Cleveland (2017), and Gulliford and Roberts (2018). Roberts and Wood (2003, 2007) investigate moral humility in order to apply their insights to intellectual humility. See Roberts (2007, chapter 6) for his work on Christian humility.

Roberts and Wood (2003, 258; 2007, 236).

Roberts and Wood (2003, 259-271; 2007, 237-250).

Roberts and Wood (2003, 261; 2007, 239).

Roberts and Wood (2003, 261-262; 2007, 239-240).

Roberts and Cleveland (2017, 33).

Roberts and Cleveland (2017, 45).

Wielenberg (2019, 42; 2005, 102-112).

Wielenberg (2005, 112).

Wielenberg (2019, 49).

Grenberg (2005, 161). See chapter 6 more generally for her discussion of humility; see also Grenberg (2007a, 622-623), and Grenberg (2007b, 645-666).

Though Ben Ze'ev (1993, 240) has interesting things to say about modesty, he regards humility and modesty as distinct, asserting that: “The crucial difference is that modest people do not overrate them­selves, whereas humble people underrate themselves.” He relies on dictionary definitions of humility to support this contention. Similarly, Nguyen (1998,101) has interesting things to say about modesty, but distinguishes it from humility: “Without further argument, I take it that humility involves an underes­timation of one's achievements, or worth, taking it to a suitably low level. By contrast, I shall give an account of modesty that does not involve any underestimation.”

See Grenberg (2005, 139-141) for a discussion of Schueler and Ben Ze'ev.

Garcia (2006, 418; italics his).

Garcia (2006, 418).

Garcia (2006, 418).

Sinha (2012, 260).

Sinha (2012, 261).

Sinha (2012, 269; italics his).

I have included accounts that are novel or that overlap with themes found in the humility literature. Other work engaging with Driver's view includes: Statman (1992, 436), who argues that modesty involves having proper respect for other human beings and a firm disposition to act accordingly; Maes (2004, 489), who contends that a self—other asymmetry in what one can say and think of oneself and others can say and think of one is essential for modesty; Sandler (2005 269), who maintains that modesty is excellence in responding to one's self-evaluations; Raterman (2006, 228), who believes that modesty is the reluctance to evaluate one's goodness, underpinned by the right normative reasons; Brennan (2007), who draws on Adam Smith's work to argue that there are two standards involved in modesty: comparison to an ideal and comparison to other people; Smith (2008), who offers an account of modesty as an Aristotelian virtue; McMullin (2010), who looks to Sartre to develop an account of modesty; Allhoff (2010, 177), who argues that modesty is not bragging or being disposed to brag; and Winter (2011,533), who contends that modesty is having and knowing one has genuine accomplish­ments, yet being disposed not to put them forward.

Blind charity and a certain kind of refusal to hold a grudge are two others. See Driver (1989, 381—383). Driver (1989, 374-375).

Driver (1989, 377).

Driver (1989, 378).

See Driver (1989, 378-379); Slote (1983, 61ff).

See Slote (1983, 61-62).

Williams (1985, 10), quoted at Driver (1989, 379).

Driver (1989, 379-380). On p. 375, she remarks on the oddity of the claim,“I am modest.” Flanagan (1990, 423) points out contexts in which this statement would not be odd (see note 66).

Driver (1989, 382-383.)

In addition to the views listed in note 52, see Flanagan (1990), Schueler (1997), Grenberg (2005, 166- 167),Wielenberg (2005, 103-106), Garcia (2006, 422; 427-428), Raterman (2006, 222-226), Brennan (2007, 111-118), Sinha (2012, 268-270), and Roberts and Cleveland (2017, 42). See also the Driver (1999)-Schueler (1999) exchange. For a more sympathetic approach to virtues of ignorance, see Slote (2004).

Flanagan (1990, 423).

Driver (1989, 376, italics hers), quoted at Flanagan (1990, 423).

Flanagan (1990, 423).

Flanagan (1990, 424-427).

Flanagan (1990, 425).

Driver (1989, 381), quoted at Flanagan (1990, 426).

See Driver (1989, 382-383), where she contends that cultivating modesty would require self-deception and that when cultivated, it cannot be considered a moral virtue.

Flanagan (1990, 426).

For a critique of Flanagan (1990), see Raterman (2006, 226-227).

Schueler (1997, 483; see also 476-477).

Schueler (1997, 474). Note the similarity of focused and global modesty to Garcia (2006).

Schueler (1997, 477).

Schueler (1997, 479).

Schueler (1997, 479, including note 23).

See, for example, Grenberg (2005, 139-141), and Sinha (2012, 270-272).

Schueler (1997, 484); Grenberg (2005, 139-140).

Schueler (1997, 480).

Williams (1985, 10), quoted at Schueler (1997, 477).

Ridge (2000, 282, note 13) contends that Schueler (1999) changes his view on modesty. I am not sure this is true, though Schueler (1999, 839) does claim that “modesty is a virtue... because of what it reveals about the person who has it, namely, that her goals and purposes come from herself, not from others” He arrives at this by asking us to imagine a person on the extreme end of immodesty, who cares so much about impressing others with her accomplishments that she adopts whatever goals and purposes they most value. It seems to me that this goes wrong in two ways.

81 Ridge (2000, 281).

82 Ridge (2000, 277).

83 See Ridge (2000, 280-281).

84 See Snow (2003, 2004, 2015). Raterman (2006, 221—222) raises similar concerns in connection with modesty's status as a virtue. He offers a more general critique of Ridge (2000) at Raterman (2006, 227-228).

85 Bommarito (2013, 103).

86 Bommarito (2013, 103).

87 Bommarito (2013, 108).

88 Wilson (2014, 78).Wilson (2014, 84-85) raises the possibility that humility and modesty are distinct, writing that “it is possible that more work needs to be done to clarify the precise relationship between the trait of modesty and the trait of humility. It is often assumed that the two traits are one and the same” (84).

89 Wilson (2014, 86-87).

90 Wilson (2014, 81).

91 Wilson (2014, 87).

92 Bommarito (2013, 103);Wilson (2014, 81).Wilson (2014, 86-87) goes quite far in the direction of Driver's view.

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