Conclusions
Friendship, Law and Justice: The Epicureans and their Interest in Interpersonal Relations
How a philosophy is passed down from antiquity depends partially on the mediations of the indirect tradition.
This can be seen clearly in the case of philosophers (such as Plato and Aristotle) of whom we have a ‘complete' body of work preserved; but the situation becomes dramatically complicated in the case of authors whose work has been lost, with only ‘fragments' surviving. A decisive fact that must be faced when studying Epicurus and the rest of the Epicureans is how to properly reconstruct his original theories, theses and arguments from the indirect tradition, a tradition which remains the primary means by which we are informed of his sayings. The fact that Epicurus was an established figure in antiquity who was not only reviled but also praised should lead us to think that his theories and arguments convinced some - to the point of generating strong adherence - and produced repudiation in others who saw in them a threat to already established philosophical doctrines. There is no major philosophy (ancient or contemporary) that produces a ‘lukewarm' reaction in those who contemplate it. The case of Epicurus and Epicureanism is a clear example of a particularly ‘chastised philosophy', both by pagan and Christian writers. A central thesis of this book is that the view - already established in antiquity by the indirect tradition - that Epicurus and the Epicureans recommended not participating in politics (in the sense of not getting involved in the political and institutional life of their cities) and living apart from civic life in general is inconsistent with textual evidence referring to Epicurus' and the Epicureans' texts. Moreover, we argue that political theory was integrated into Epicurean philosophy and influenced the actions and lifestyle of Epicurus and the Epicureans. In fact, as we have proved throughout this book, the anti-Epicurean literature is mostly belligerent, and furnishes neither considerations on the political theory of Epicureanism and its connections with the way of life espoused by Epicureanism, nor reliable testimonies about the actions and lifestyle of Epicurus and the Epicureans.Cicero, Plutarch and Epictetus, as well as Lactantius, centred their objections to Epicurus around the fact that Epicurus' philosophy rejects the view that human beings are social by nature. Certainly, they seem to refer to Epicurean contractualism, even though they actually derive this refusal of human sociability from the egoistic hedonism that they attribute to rules of conduct of the Epicurean wise (‘the Epicurean sage will not marry, will not have children, will not participate in politics, and will live unnoticed'), an issue that we know especially from the indirect tradition. They are silent about the specificity of Epicurean contractualism. However, we have shown that the interconnection between the study of nature [φυσιολογ(α] and political philosophy is a crucial part of Epicurean philosophy. Such interconnection constitutes the framework of the Epicurean contractual view. The application of the Epicurean study of nature to the analysis of justice and laws is translated into a genealogical approach to these realities. Contrary to what might be expected, such an interpretative pattern does not presuppose a crude conventionalist stance of justice insofar as Epicurus and the Epicureans consider the just as a modality of the useful. As argued in chapter 1, the just is not conventional because it is constrained by conformity to the purpose established in the first pacts of human communities (said conformity always being determined by circumstances). We also stress that Epicureanism subjects the traditional opposition between the disordered and bestial primitive life and civilized life to an interesting reformulation.
According to their view the pre-social primitive life is not ‘Hobbesian', and the Epicureans contrast this primitive state of human beings not only with the arrival of human groups and justice but also with the subsequent stage in which it became necessary to establish laws and sanctions. Generally, neither Epicurus (PD 37) nor the Epicureans (Hermarchus, in Porphyry, Abs. 1.12, 3, and Polystratus) polemicize openly against the Platonic idea of justice. Rather, they consider those who derive their conventionality or non-existence from the geographical diversity and temporal variability of what is just. Furthermore, the Epicureans are not opposed to a view of justice that minimizes its variability, but recognize that this is inherent in the peculiar ontological status of the subject. We also prove that they maintain that the just represents conformity with a collective purpose established by human beings as a result of their evolution, as seen in the separate realms of language, family and technology.This genealogical approach would seem to be very far from the foundation of the Epicurean way of life, and especially from the imperturbability [αταραξiα] it advocates. We have shown that such an approach brings, contrarily, a substantial element: the category of security [ασφαλεια]. We emphasize the continuity that exists between the recognition that Epicureans give to the security provided by political communities and the considerations that ancient literature dedicates to security, safety [σωτηρ(α] and freedom from fear [αδεια, αφοβ(α] when dealing with topics like the origins of culture, civil war [στασις], and good order [ευνομ(α]. In the ancient literature security implies satisfaction of the necessary natural desires and a state of confidence [θαρρεtν ], or lack of fear and tranquillity [αφοβ(α, ησυχ(α], with respect to future satisfaction and to the danger of a violent death.
Epicureanism assumes both ideas and emphatically vindicates the value of laws and security. Hence, Epicureans oppose those who deny the existence of justice, maintain a crude relativism, or defend the cynical way of life. As such, Epicurean philosophy recognizes the security provided by the city as a necessary condition for the vita epicurea. However, it also attributes to the polis the promotion of vain fears and limitless desires, which can only be dissipated through the study of nature (i.e. ‘physiology', as Epicurus states in his writings). Epicureanism posits ‘the purest security' ( εiλικρινεστατη ασφαλεια; PD 14), that is, a way of life freed from irrational fears and unlimited desires that make human beings unhappy and anxious for spurious securities despite the valuable sanctuary provided by the polis. The Epicurean genealogy of justice and law is thus complemented by a genealogy of these fears and desires, as well as the security to which human beings moved by them aspire. Attention to necessary natural desires, friendship and philanthropy are, in the Epicureans' view, the main factors that provide the purest security to the Epicurean way of life. Their conflation reinforces the liberation from irrational fears and desires and establishes - in human beings - a permanent articulation of the pleasant memory of the past with the satisfactions of the present and reliable expectations regarding the future.Epictetus ascribes antisocial opinions [τα ακοινωνητα] to Epicureanism, but, like any other political paradigm, the Epicurean model has a compelling normative or regulative character expressed in the link between justice and utility. Just as Aristotle and Cicero connect justice with the ‘common advantage' [τo κοινη συμφερον], the Epicureans equate what is just with what is useful for the sake of the pact (vividly described in the saying ‘neither harming one another nor being harmed').
The Epicurean genealogical approach to justice and laws is the theoretical framework from which this normative component is derived. The normative or regulative function of the Epicurean political model is embodied in the preconception [πρoληψις] of the just, which operates as a canon of the usefulness of the laws, that is, of their suitability to the purpose of the pact (‘neither harming one another nor being harmed'). Epicurus applies his epistemology to the process of validating what is just, and thereby underlines the specific characteristics of its modes of confirmation. The practical consequences of certain convictions about justice, embodied in the laws, are examined as to whether they are convenient or useful as a result of not harming each other or being harmed. We reject the interpretations that instantiate the preconception of the just in the constitution ruling over the life of a community, or which distinguish a hierarchical and historical plurality of preconceptions of the just. By reflecting on this debate, we show that the Epicureans embedded the preconception of the just in the process of language learning, an ingredient of experience that is not usually considered when dealing with the empirical genesis of Epicurean preconception.The Epicurean genealogy of justice, irrational fears and unlimited desires, the relation between security and tranquillity, and the preconception of the just are not present in the works of Cicero and Plutarch. In chapter 4 we have shown in detail how the omissions, exaggerations and simplifications of the assessments of Epicureanism made in pagan antiquity (particularly by Cicero and Plutarch) constitute fundamental and repeated strategies of a broader anti-Epicurean polemic that reaches absurd extremes in the Christian writings of Lactantius. Cicero's and Plutarch's controversy with Epicureanism is a fundamental part of their defence of the assimilation of philosophy to the exercise of ordinary politics.
Discrediting Epicureanism and isolating it from later Greek philosophy contributes to this purpose. There is, however, another argumentative procedure more surprising from the perspective of today's methodologies: while Cicero and Plutarch absolutize the slogan ‘do not participate in politics' as a principle of Epicurean conduct, they do not dedicate a single line to the specification of its context or from which text of Epicurus it was derived. Both of them point out, with clear polemical intention, that the Epicureans acknowledge circumstances that imply exceptions to the slogan ‘do not participate in politics'. Nevertheless, their ‘documentary' contribution, like that of Cicero's and Plutarch's considerations of said slogan, is disappointing, for they do not provide information about the actions of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. They refer only sporadically to public performances of the Epicureans to try to show that they represent a hypocritical and unimportant mode of behaviour that is inconsistent with their doctrine.Since Cicero and Plutarch omit the political reflections of Epicureanism, it is entirely reasonable to wonder about the apoliticism and minimal social interaction that they attribute to Epicurus and the Epicureans. We have answered this question on two complementary levels: on the one hand, through the collection of testimonies and documents about the social interaction of Epicurus and the Epicureans, and, on the other hand, by reconstructing the model of the Epicurean sage derived from ancient literature. In this regard, we have presented heterogeneous testimonies of the lifestyle of Epicurus and of numerous Epicureans which refute the apoliticism traditionally attributed to them. We have also showed how the testimonies about Epicurus' life and his testament do not paint a picture of a person shut away in the Epicurean Garden and isolated from the life of Athens, but of someone who, while refusing to participate actively in contingent politics, respected the laws and institutions of the city, participated in its worship and piety, integrated family relationships into the exercise of philosophy, and cultivated numerous and heterogeneous friendships, including with influential politicians. Furthermore, based on several Epicurean texts and epigraphic documents from various Greek cities, we showed in chapter 6 how numerous Epicureans belonging to the upper classes served as advisers of kings, distinguished diplomats, ambassadors, priests of the imperial and local cult, and even as prophets, without their status as Epicureans being perceived to disqualify them from such functions. We have also included several examples of illustrious Roman Epicureans who were involved in the most important political events in Rome in the first century â c.
Contrary to what several indirect sources say, Epicurean sages were in fact interested in maintaining a link with their polis. An Epicurean sage lived in and contributed to the development and well-being of the political community where he was a citizen. In this characterization of the Epicurean sage, respect for laws and institutions as well as a friendly attitude towards his homeland, also play an important role. In order to deepen this characterization, we analyse an issue that Epicurus raised in his Puzzles [ Aιαπορ(αι]: whether the Epicurean wise person will carry out actions contrary to the laws if he knows that he will not be discovered. We suggest that this passage evokes the story of the Ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic, but that the figure of Gyges represents neither a challenge nor a fascination for the Epicureans. We stress the biased reading of Cicero in Offff. 3.38-39 of the Epicurean view regarding the story of Gyges and Plutarch's malicious interpretation of Epicurus' reply to the above-mentioned passage from the Puzzles. Both Cicero and Plutarch omit the role of the study of nature and prudence [ φρoνησις ] in the motivations and decisions of the Epicurean sage when analysing the aforementioned topics. They also suggest that the reason why Epicureans refrain from crime is the fear of being discovered and punished.
The Epicurean sage, though, does not act out of fear of punishment; on the contrary, he disregards behaviours authorized by the law and goes beyond what is required by law in social relations by cultivating friendship and philanthropy. We also note the importance of self-sufficiency for the Epicurean sage and state that, far from being an egoistic property of the sage, self-sufficiency involves a social dimension. In this vein, we show how those major communal ingredients of life, friendship and justice, occupy a central position in two fundamental doctrinal resources of the picture of the Epicurean sage: the biographical tradition of the ‘imitation of Epicurus' [imitatio Epicurei] and ‘becoming like god' [δμοfωσις θεω].
According to Epicurus, pleasant living not only implies living prudently and justly [φρονfμως καi δικαfωs], but also honourably (καλως; see LM 132; PD 5). Epicurus' interaction with Athens and that of the Epicureans with their political communities in general, was not restricted to actions dictated by living prudently and justly but was also framed by the activity of living honourably, a way of life that the Epicurean doctrine advocated through friendship and philanthropy. We therefore develop a picture of Epicurus' and the Epicureans' interactions with their political communities that is far more complex, varied, and interesting than the one that the anti-Epicurean tradition has largely succeeded in imposing on later readers and interpreters of Epicureanism.
It can always be objected to our overall thesis that Epicurus himself recommends freeing oneself from the ‘prison of general education and politics' (VS 58). But a deflationary way of reading the slogan ‘don't engage in politics' is, as we have suggested throughout this book, ‘don't engage in contingent politics of your city', in which people do everything, at all costs, to gain power without actually caring about the good of their citizens, their city and even themselves. It turns out to be relatively obvious why Epicurus and the Epicureans would recommend not engaging in contingent politics: the way in which the political practices of that time (which would probably not differ much from the political practices of today) were carried out would surely contribute nothing to the longed-for states of tranquillity and absence of pain [απονfα]. But that does not necessarily mean that the Epicureans recommended living in hiding in small communities of Epicurean friends. On the contrary, as we have argued in chapter 6, there is good reason to believe that Epicurus and his followers found in the legal and institutional system of their own cities the framework of security necessary to develop a reasonable human life following the basic Epicurean precepts.
The most obvious proof of this is the fact that Epicurus left a will, surely concerned with the preservation of his private and school property, carefully dated his works by the year of the eponymous archon in which they were written and deposited his texts in the city's archive, the Metroon. But the relevant point for our purposes is that these important details show that Epicurus believed that the political institutionalism of Athens provided him with the necessary security to live there as a citizen, not hidden away with a small group of Epicurean friends who abide by their own rules. Additional historical facts help to reinforce our point: Epicurus was born in Samos (341 âñ) and around 322 he was banished from Samos along with all the Athenians by Perdiccas, one of Alexander the Great's generals. Epicurus is likely to have been anti-Macedonian (see Us. 101); the Peripatetic Demetrius of Phaleron ruled Athens until June 307 âñ, when Epicurus most probably settled in Athens and bought the Garden. As can be seen in his will, Epicurus left precise instructions for his disciples to follow upon his death. Hermarchus, his successor, was to take care of the education of the son and daughter of Metrodorus and the son of Polyneus (DL 10.19-21). He also left instructions that the members of the Epicurean community should continue to care for the poor after his death. Epicurus ordered that Nicanor be taken care of, so that all his friends and companions in the love of philosophy should not go without support. He also requested that the practice of funeral rites be maintained, first in honour of his parents, his three brothers Neocles, Chaeredemus and Aristobulus, and his friend Polyneus, and that such rites and memorials should also be celebrated in his memory and that of Metrodorus. This feast, which was to be celebrated on the twentieth day of every month in honour of Epicurus and Metrodorus, was originally a feast of the god Apollo. Epicurus provided in advance for the expenses that these celebrations would demand, devoting some of the income from his property to finance these festivities. In an extraordinary passage - unfortunately rather corrupted - the spirit that was to reign at these festivals is detailed (Us. 190; cf. Plutarch, Col. 1117B).
All this, we hold, is a clear indication of Epicurus' confidence in Athenian political and legal institutions and therefore in the security that the polis of Athens inspired in him, so that, far from living unnoticed, he lived (and inspired his disciples and friends to live) as a citizen of Athens. Obviously, this is not to say that Epicurus and the Epicureans were prominent politicians or that they were interested in becoming so. As pointed out in chapter 5, the character Socrates in the Gorgias not only distinguishes himself from politicians (Gorg. 473e), but also defines himself as the true politician (521d). But, of course, the model of politician Socrates has in mind does not match with the politician acting in the domain of Realpolitik. Both Socrates and Epicurus were not professional politicians, but ‘political philosophers'.
If the arguments and evidence we have supplied in this book are reasonable (and we believe that they are), there are at least some reasons to think that, like the other ancient philosophers after the fourth century âñ, Epicurus and the Epicureans would not have been so interested in understanding the problems of law, justice and interpersonal relations if, at the same time, they were not interested in applying the results of their conceptualization of such problems to an actual, practical political life.