A critical balance of Epicurus' theoretical adversaries
From the passages just discussed, we can conclude that the works of the adversaries of Epicureanism contain important elements of doxography and relevant critiques. But when faced with what they call ‘Epicurean hedonism', their opposition, as the historian Green points out,37 adopts a kind of craziness or hysteria that to a great extent coloured the traditional interpretation of Epicureanism and supported interpretive procedures which would be considered unacceptable in the case of any other philosopher of whose writings only few fragments have been preserved.
We refer to the reconstruction of Epicurean approaches based on the absolutization of slogans extracted from doxography without support in Epicurus' texts, or decontextualized and mutilated from their original version. Such is the case of the famous slogans such as ‘live unnoticed' and ‘do not participate in politics' which circulated in antiquity (Seneca, Ep. 90.35) and which are still present today in several contemporary descriptions of Epicurean political philosophy, despite neither appearing in the P rincipal Doctrines.3sEpicurus' characterizations of the final end of human life are not easy to reconcile, since they indicate that the end [τελος] is constituted by the absence of pain [απονtα] in the body and of perturbation in the soul (αταραξtα; DL 10.136; see also DL 10.132).39 Now, ‘pleasure' seems to imply that absence of pain and imperturbability constitute the pleasure sought and that, in some way, Epicureanism posits certain qualifications of pleasure that allow this formulation. According to some scholars, this is the purpose of the distinction between kinetic [κατα κiνησιν] and katastematic [καταστηματικαi] pleasures (DL 10.136).
It is indeed a complicated task to describe a theory that makes absence of pain in the body and of perturbation in the soul the highest good from a hedonistic perspective: and this is so because it seems to be properly described, as Wolfsdorf has pointed out, as an ‘analgesic hedonism'.40This is partially so because we tend to identify hedonism with ‘crude hedonism' (probably influenced by Plutarch and Christian writers); but even in Plato (who attacks crude hedonism), certain kinds of hedonism which should be incorporated into the good life can be envisaged.41 The suggestion that there are different kinds of pleasure (first adumbrated by Plato in the Gorg. 495a1-2 and discussed later in the Resp. 505b-c; 561c) is clearly taken up by Plato in the Philebus, where the character Socrates argues that ‘the moderate person takes pleasure in his very moderation [...], the fool in his own foolishness, and likewise the wise person takes pleasure in his wisdom' (Phl. 12d; 13b-c). What is beyond doubt is that if one considers Epicurus' (presumed) distinction between stable and dynamic pleasure (as reported by DL 10.136 = Us. 2),42 Lactantius' remarks about Epicurean hedonism are entirely out of focus and somewhat mistaken (Div. Inst. 3.17, 2-5). If this is so, when Epicurus maintains that pleasure is the ultimate end of existence he cannot be thinking of mere sensual pleasure. He declares that, if he were to remove the pleasures of taste, of sex, of listening, and so on, he does not even know what he should conceive the good to be. But it is also true that such kinds of pleasures are not pursued for their own sake, but for the sake of removing both physical and psychological pain. Thus, the final end is again imperturbability and absence of pain. We suspect that Lactantius and other writers, who were concerned with discrediting Epicureanism, were aware of this simple fact. Still, their polemic reasons were stronger than a balanced and rational examination of the theory.
As said above, we are not suggesting that Lactantius never worried about ‘arguing'. But when he describes the requirements that the so-called ‘supreme good' must fulfil (i.e. it should be a property of human beings alone and thus cannot be shared with irrational animals; Div. Inst. 3.8, 3), he makes his reasoning depend on his own biases and shortcomings. Lactantius' interpretation is vitiated by his reliance on his own presuppositions, insofar as he seems to hold the view that the supreme good is a human property that belongs to the spirit, not the body (3.12, 1-8). Indeed, if a real supreme good belongs only to human beings, physical pleasure, or release from pain, must be ruled out as plausible candidates for a supreme (or real) good. But for Epicurus the hallmark of what exists is corporeality, and both the soul (or ‘the spirit') and the body are bodily items. Further, Lactantius also thinks that ‘living according to nature' (a typical Stoic injunction that should be practiced by the rational agent to be happy) must be removed from the conditions to attain the supreme good. But, of course, while stating that release from pain and living according to nature do not belong to what is really good, Lactantius is trivializing the Epicurean view of pleasure as well as the Stoic tenet that in order to be happy a person must develop his natural capacities, which are deeply linked to his rationality.As observed above, when describing Epicurus' theory as hedonistic and making absence of pain and imperturbability the highest good, one encounters difficulties that did not go unnoticed to the adversaries of Epicureanism in antiquity. Those adversaries highlighted these descriptions as one of the philosophy's fundamental inconsistencies. Cicero and Plutarch have the double role of being both the main sources of these controversial Epicurean formulations and, at the same time, their most famous critics, which has given rise to a broad debate about the objectivity, depth and completeness of their testimonies and the appropriateness of their critiques.43 However, within the framework of this debate, even the most benevolent interpreters of Cicero and Plutarch acknowledge that both made use of what, in our view, constitutes another fundamental tactic of the enemies of Epicureanism: opposing the intention and theory of Epicurus to its ultimate effect,44 that is, by emphasizing the hypothetical germs of danger that the philosophy encompasses and its repercussions at the level of social practice.45
Adversaries of Epicureanism used this strategy and the already mentioned absolutization of mere slogans to oppose Epicurean ethics, but their use is particularly virulent when they deal with the political approaches of the Epicureans, as can be seen especially in Cicero's and Plutarch's texts.
Both of them are Platonic in some way, active politicians, and illustrious members of their societies, and their critiques imply a peculiar approach to Greek philosophy which can be seen in Plutarch's idealization of ‘the ancients', and in the way that both integrate philosophy into the performance of real political activity. In Plutarch's view ‘the ancients' stand for excellence and constitute educational and moral models. ‘The ancients' are thinkers and authors prior to Hellenistic philosophy; he mentions Thales, Bias, Lycurgus, Anaxagoras, Pherecydes, Anaximenes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Melissus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Stilpon.46 It is obvious that the grouping of such heterogeneous and disparate characters and philosophical approaches under the normative figure of ‘the ancients' can only be sustained at the price of its complete levelling, which Plutarch carries out from a depleted version of Plato. Such levelling is particularly clear when compared, for example, to the meaning that the figure of Socrates had for Hellenistic ethics, who, as A. A. Long observes, represented a particular vision of the task of ethics more than a doctrinal inheritance: he stood for the questioning of conventions, the elimination of fears and desires that lacked rational foundation and a radical rearrangement of priorities around the notion of the health of the soul.47 This legacy is not recognized in the exaltation of Plutarch, directed against the Epicureans, of the contribution of Plato, his disciple Aristotle, and the Academy, which Plutarch practically presents as a school for the training of politicians to the political life of the Greek world ( Col. 1126B-D).48 The complex and problematic relationship between philosophical and political life (so clearly documented in comedy,49 in the life and death of Socrates, in Isocrates' speeches,50 in Plato's biography and work, and in Aristotle's considerations on the primacy of the contemplative life, on the true politician and the theoretical occupation of the philosopher with politics) are entirely passed over for the sake of a neat integration of philosophy into the exercise of real politics that Plutarch, like Cicero, projects onto the past of Greek philosophy.51 C. Levy stressed that in Cicero's case, such an integration is based on extremely vague modalities of philosophy.52 Like Plutarch, Cicero demotes the complex and problematic relationship between philosophical life and Greek political life (see chapter 6). However, he does highlight the defence of the pre-eminence of the vita activa in the heterodox Peripatetic Dicaearchus, though, according to Campos Darocca's view, Cicero does not fully understand its significance.53According to Cicero,54 Epicurean hedonism implies the collapse of the entire social system and even the impossibility of society itself, for, as he repeats in Fin. 2, if pleasure is made the supreme good then all virtue, all decency and all glory must be abandoned, since all action will be directed solely to usefulness and selfprofit, making impossible any bond of harmony among human beings (Fin. 2.37, 44, 58, 72, 76, 78, 80, 85, 109, 117. Off. 1.2).55 For Cicero the Epicureans are responsible for the abandonment of human society, with which they do not collaborate by lending their love, industry and talents ( Off. 1.9).
At the end of Against Colotes (1124D) Plutarch makes explicit his criticism of the political considerations of the Epicureans by referring to philosophical approaches that, in his judgement, bring about the destruction of laws and civilized life and the return to a primitive and bestial level of existence. Some interpreters have suggested that the target of the Colotes critique is Arcesilaus, although, as Roskam has indicated, the fact that Plutarch's reply is not mentioned, unlike numerous philosophers attacked by Colotes, seems to suggest that the critique was directed against non-Epicurean philosophers in general.56 Plutarch tries to show, through a traditional strategy of philosophical diatribes, that it is actually the Epicureans themselves who should be accused of destroying laws and the social system and encouraging a return to a wild life.
Plutarch wonders what would happen to the Epicureans and followers of other philosophers such as Heraclitus, Socrates or Plato if the laws were abolished. In his opinion, in the case of the latter, nothing would happen and there would be no return to animal life, because ‘we would fear the shameful and honour57 justice for its nobility, considering that we have good rulers in the gods [θεους αρχοντας aγαθους] and protectors of our life in the daemons' (δαtμονας... του βtου φυλακας; Col. 1124E).By contrast, in Plutarch's view, the Epicureans who do not believe in providence despise virtue if it is not related to pleasure and think that good is in the stomach; they need ‘law and fear and blows and some king or ruler who has in his hand justice, so that they do not devour their neighbours because of a gluttony emboldened by atheism' (1125A). In other words, those who abide by ‘the life of enjoyment' (βiος απολαυστικoς) cannot control themselves and therefore require laws and authorities. Without them their behaviour would be savage. The Epicurean only acts out of fear of laws and sanctions and, according to Plutarch, even the Epicurean sage will commit injustice if he is certain that his crime will remain hidden (see chapter 5). Further, Plutarch understands that the basis and cohesion of a society and of the legal order is the belief in gods, as Plato already emphasized in the Laws. In his view, the Epicureans destroy this basis and thus destroy every possibility of authorities, institutions and legal order. Interestingly, Lactantius repeats the same argument within the framework of Christian apologetics. For him, the Epicureans represent the synthesis of evil and pagan error. He sees in Epicurean hedonism the necessary consequence of the denial of providence, and, like Cicero and Plutarch, he maintains that it makes any community impossible except that of individuals dedicated to theft and pillaging (Div. Inst. 3.17 39-43).
Epicurean hedonism and atheism show, in Plutarch's opinion, the falsehood of the apology of the laws of Colotes. Plutarch also describes it as dishonest and hypocritical, since, as he holds, the Epicureans claim to defend laws and institutions but recommend abstaining from participating in politics, mock the most famous politicians and legislators of the past and cannot exhibit any feat or contribution by the members of their school to the benefit of society (Col. 1125C-1127C). The Epicurean, according to Plutarch, is incapable of humanity [αφιλανθρωπος]58 (Pleasant Life 1098D) and behaves like a profiteer, a parasite [ασυμβολος ], who benefits from the advantages of life in society without making the least contribution (Col. 1127A). Cicero (On the orator 3.64) and Epictetus (Diss. 2. 20, 6 20 and 17 19) repeat the same accusation.
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