In a culture increasingly shaped by the conviction that high self-esteem is unquestionably valua­ble, advocating humility might seem hopelessly old-fashioned and misguided. In an age increas­ingly dominated by narcissistic self-absorption, egotistic self-promotion, and arrogant disregard of other persons, humility might seem to be precisely what is needed to counteract self-valuing gone awry.

Contemporary philosophical accounts of humility take the second position, holding that by opposing “vices of pride”² such as arrogance, humility both rectifies the tendency to make too much of oneself and is appropriate self-valuing.

Yet few of these accounts discuss humility in relation to what are arguably the most impor­tant perspectives on self-worth and the morally appropriate relation to other persons, namely, self-respect and respect for others.³ If self-respect is morally proper self-valuing, then it would seem that it, and not humility, is what is needed to correct misguided self-valuing. Indeed, humility seems to be in tension with, if not opposed to, the self-respect one morally ought to have in virtue of being a person equal in dignity and moral status with all other persons. If that is the case, perhaps humility is itself a form of misguided self-valuing.

Most contemporary accounts assume, however, that humility is a virtue,⁴ a trait that it is good for all persons to have, that makes whomever possesses it a good person, that contributes to individual and collective flourishing, that every person has the strongest reason to develop in ourselves and encourage in others.Yet few accounts consider the value of or need for humility in contexts of oppression. Few ask whether arrogance is actually a vice afflicting all humans for which a universal prescription of humility is apt, whether humility actually is a virtue for sub­ordinated people as well as for members of dominant groups.⁵

For Kant and feminist theorists, self-respect and respect for other persons are morally cen­tral and enormously powerful, both theoretically and motivationally; they shape a distinctive approach to understanding and evaluating humility that is critical of both contemporary and traditional accounts.The aim of this chapter is to employ insights from Kant and feminist ethics to explore connections between humility and self-respect, and assess claims about the virtuous­ness of humility.

Kant regards arrogance as a serious vice.

At best, humility is a servant of self-respect; at worst, it is as serious a vice as arrogance, indeed, an aspect of it. In contrast to both the unjustified and inordinate self-valuing of arrogance and the possibly justified but potentially agency-undermining self-valuing of humility, self-respect is the commitment to appropriate self-valuing that precludes some forms of humility, includes but constrains other forms, properly opposes arrogance and all other forms of misguided self­valuing, and makes possible and expresses vibrant moral agency.

Feminist ethics draws attention to ways in which character traits, attitudes, beliefs, and stances can take on differential moral valences in contexts of oppression.⁷ Thus, what might be a virtue for members of dominant groups can be a vice for members of subordinate groups, and vice versa.⁸ From a feminist perspective, arrogance is not a vice that afflicts all humans; it is a vice of only some humans, especially members of dominant groups.⁹ While humility can be useful in dislodging arrogance in dominants, it is not something that is good for all persons to develop. Indeed, calls for subordinates to develop humility are morally objectionable inasmuch as humil­ity reinforces subordination. Self-respect and respect for all other persons are the morally valu­able stances that inform the identification of traits as virtues or vices, that constrain liberatory activity, and towards which such activity ought to aim.¹⁰

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