Epicurean security
Although Epictetus rebukes Epicurus for denying the natural sociability among human beings (Diss. 1. 23), some interesting parallels can be drawn between Epictetus' treatment of imperturbability [αταραξiα] and Epicurus' analysis of the same topic (in addition to the examination one can make regarding the connections between imperturbability and the issue of security).
Of course, imperturbability is a stable (or ‘katastematic') pleasure for Epicurus, but it sometimes also plays an important role in late Stoicism. In D iss. 2.2, when discussing the issue of αταραξ(α, Epictetus states that when someone goes into court then that person will have every security and facility and no troubles if she wishes to maintain a will conformable to nature. The secret to doing this is to keep to what is up to oneself and is therefore naturally free; if one is happy with that, what else does one need to watch out for? Epictetus says that this is enough and that one does not need anything else since no one can take these things away from oneself. In the same vein, in his Handbook chap. 38, Epictetus argues that the only real concern one should have is with her ‘commanding principle' [τo ηγεμονικoν]; more precisely, one should be careful not to damage her guiding ruling principle. Otherwise, one will not be able to engage in affairs with greater security [ ασφαλεστερον]. These passages show an interesting difference between late Stoicism and Epicurus: unlike the way in which Epicurus and the Epicureans seem to have posed the problem of security (i.e. both at the level of the inner state of one's soul and at a socio-political level, which would guarantee one's preservation), Epictetus anchors the issue of security solely in the agent's internal state. As is evident, for Epictetus one's security is attained when one admits that her well-being is entirely independent of external things. In the case of the Epicurean, her internal psychological state is undoubtedly highly relevant, too. Certainly, in PD 14 Epicurus argues that the purest security [εiλικρινεστατη ασφαλεια] is that which comes from tranquillity and withdrawal from the many; as we have already pointed out, though, he also recognizes that a certain degree of security from other people comes by means of power and prosperity [ ευπορiα]. There is a sense in which the adequately established political organization, based on the golden principle of ‘neither harming one another nor being harmed', guarantees the survival and physical conservation of the agent. To be sure, for the Epicurean, this ‘guarantee' is not trivial; in a way, it seems to be a necessary condition to allow the agent to work on her psychological states and achieve the purest security of Epicurean life.The Epicureans consider security from three perspectives: the contractual security provided by the polis; the security achievable by wealth, power and fame; and the security attributable to Epicurean life. The first is a necessary condition for the other two; the second is not a necessary condition of the third since greed and ambition are incompatible with Epicurean life, though that does not mean that wealth and fame are also incompatible. It would certainly be absurd for Epicureans to subtract from the purest security that they postulate positive attributes that recognize contractual security. As we have shown, the contractual security provided by the polis makes possible the satisfaction of the necessary natural desires and a state of confidence [θαρρεtν, αφοβ(α, ησυχ(α] with respect to future satisfaction and to the danger of violent death.
The Epicureans recognize in the community a reality which is not restricted to what is useful for the present, but which looks at life as a whole and offers human beings confidence in the future satisfaction of their needs and ways to avoid a violent death.It might be interesting to point out that in the Symposium (200b-e), Plato indicates that desire is always prospective because it is inherent to its nature to want to achieve its object in the future. Epicurus, conscious like few philosophers of the disturbing effects of fear, assumes the application of this principle to the necessary natural desires and maintains that their full satisfaction is not exempt from prospective components. In VrS 33 Epicurus presents this idea in an exaggerated or deliberately provocative tone,40 which is not unusual: ‘The cry of the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For if someone has these things and is confident [ελπiζων] of having them in the future, he might contend even with for happiness’.41 One can also notice the provocative tone in a parallel fragment apparently coming from the work On the end (Plutarch, Pleasant Life 1089D; Us. 68): ‘For the stable condition of the flesh [τo γαρ ευσταθες σαρκoς καταστημα] and the reliable expectation [τo πιστoν ελπισμα] concerning this contains the highest and most secure joy, for those who are able to reason [τοις επιλογiζεσθαι δυναμενοις ]’. Epicurus’ adversaries in antiquity cited this statement to show the baseness of the Epicurean’s ultimate end and its inconsistencies.42 But, like Epicurus in VS 33, such a statement does not seem to propose a definition of the ultimate end, but rather underlines the pleasant attitude towards the present and the future that is derived from the Epicurean ‘comparative appreciation’ [επιλογiζεσθαι],43 which makes such an attitude possible by welcoming the necessary natural desires.
On the one hand, it implies rejecting procrastination (μελλησμoς; see VS 14). Moreover, it shapes a confident disposition towards the future44 which constitutes an essential element of Epicurean security.45 Epicurus emphasizes that what will happen is neither unconditionally within our power nor unconditionally outside our control (LH 127). The satisfaction of necessary natural desires, as Epicurus and the doxography (especially Porphyry; Us. 464, 466, 470) state, is easy to obtain ευπoριστος; PD 15, 21; LM 130). For this reason, it is in some way in our power; that is, it concerns the future in a way that can be trusted (LH 127; LM 131). VS 33 and the fragment of On the end already quoted express this idea. A confident disposition towards the future implies a concern for the future that seems to cloud peace of mind. It is precisely this objection that derives from the position of the Cynics, whose daily living, lack of foresight, shamelessness, wandering life, and begging Epicurus strongly rejected (DL 10.119).46 Philodemus reports (On Property Management xii 25-14.9) that Metrodorus quarrelled with the Cynics, who claimed to have chosen a way of life that was by far the lightest and easiest, and, in general, the most devoid of disturbances. Metrodorus objected to them that whoever has to worry permanently and on a day-to-day basis about their subsistence is subject to greater penalties and disturbances than those generated by the possession of the property that insures it. In O n the Stoics, Philodemus tries to assimilate Cynics and Stoics and, by taking advantage of Zeno's Republic, insists that both approaches imply losing the condition of Greeks in general and thereby excluding humanity from civilized life.47 The Stoics, however, included wealth and good reputation among the preferred indifferents (DL 7.105-107). The Epicureans claim that concern for good reputation and care without anguish for one's heritage and future is a legitimate means of strengthening tranquillity and minimizing fear (DL 10.120; VrS 41). This treatment of goods, which looks at life as a whole [πρoς δλον β(ον ] and is not limited to the present day, constitutes one of the central ideas of Philodemus' On Property Management (Col. xiii 3638, xxv 1-14).48At this point, Epicurus' position also unexpectedly aligns with Aristotelian approaches; he uses the expression ‘wealth of nature' (o της φυσεως πλουτος ; PD 15) and suggests that ‘natural wealth' is required to satisfy the necessary natural desires, so it must be limited. Vain desires, on the other hand, lead to an endless path ( απεραντος oδoς ; DL 10.12; PD 15). In Politics Book 1, Aristotle distinguishes the management of goods required in the domestic and political administration from the chrematistics directed to the accumulation and increase of goods, and especially of money. The first has a limit, as it is directed at the provision of the needs of the house and the city. Aristotle talks about ‘real wealth' (δ γ' αληθινoς πλουτος: Pol. I 1256b30-31) and ‘natural wealth' (o κατα κατα φυσιν πλουτος; Pol. 1257b19-20).49 The latter has its goal in accumulation and increase, which makes it unlimited and insatiable. It shows an unlimited desire to live and presupposes excessive pleasures that unnaturally turn all the faculties of man into chrematistics, as if the end of all of them was the accumulation of money (Pol. 1258a12-14; EN 1096a5-7). Aristotle sees an unnatural, forced character in the life dedicated to profit (β(αιος; EN 1096a6); though, like Plato in the Republic, he links it to the search for pleasure, he does not consider it specifically among the ways of life in relation to which the philosophical tradition used to consider happiness.
As can be seen, the Epicureans' approach to security and wealth is similar to that of Aristotle,50 although they adopt two different treatments of the relationship between security (ασφαλεια; or ‘preservation’, σωτηρ(α, in usualAristotelian terminology) and political community, whose meaning for Aristotle is to live well [ευ ζην]. At any rate, they are an example of the continuity of Epicureanism with ‘the discourses of the ancients' which, as we will show later, Plutarch ( Col. 1107D) opposed so rhetorically and forcefully to the Epicureans.
Although the possession and care of assets contribute to security, Epicurus considers that by far the most significant endowment that wisdom procures for the blessedness of one's whole life is the possession of friendship (PD 27). Once again, the focus is on confidence in the future: ‘We do not need utility from our friends so much as we need confidence [ελπiς] concerning that utility' ( VrS 34). The benefit of friendship is not only about trust regarding the satisfaction of the necessary natural desires,51 but also about irrational fears. At this point, Epicurus argues that there is no eternal or ever-lasting terrible or bad thing to fear.52 We can have confidence about that since our mind has also realized that security is most easily achieved through friendship (PD 28).53
This Principal Doctrine is rarely cited, though it qualifies the security provided by friendship [η ασφαλεια φιλ(ας] as security achieved to the highest possible degree [μαλιστα συντελουμενη], especially concerning such fears. This interpretation, we hold, helps clarify the meaning of the adjective ‘pure' [εiλικρινες] in the PD 14 expression ‘the purest security' [εiλικρινεστατη ασφαλεια], apparently referring to the Epicurean life. This adjective, in a superlative degree, seems to underline security free from suspicions and irrational fears. Epicurus maintains, in effect, that irrational suspicions and fears neutralize security (PD 13), just as they make it impossible to receive unmixed pleasures ( ακεραιοι; PD 12). As Cicero witnesses, Epicurus' view is that ‘of all the things which wisdom procures to enable us to live happily, there is none greater, richer or sweeter than friendship' (Fin. 1.65, 80; Us. 539). In On Ends (Fin. 2.82; Us. 541), Cicero is even more emphatic about the close relationship between friendship and security: while friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, it deserves to be cultivated, as people cannot live secure and free from fear without it, and therefore cannot live pleasantly. In other words, friendship guarantees the security of people as well as the preservation and attainment of the ultimate end of human life: pleasure. Seen from a slightly different perspective, one could argue that friendship, understood as a means to obtain and preserve security, contributes additionally to the elimination of fear and all those affective states that plunge human beings into turmoil and cause their lives to cease to be truly human. This certainly helps us understand why Epicurus would have held that friendship is pursued for the sake of usefulness; in fact, friends are a form of mutual protection for people, and that is why ‘friendship is sought for utility' (utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita; Cicero, Fin. 2.84). Thus, friends are helpful for providing protection and, thereby, security. But of course, this must be a reciprocal feeling: everyone in the Epicurean community must make an effort to strengthen their feelings of friendship towards their fellow citizens. This must be the meaning of Cicero's argument when he ascribes to ‘some Epicureans' the view that the wise make a pact among themselves in order ‘to adopt the same attitude towards their friends as they have towards themselves' (Fin. 2.83). Interestingly, within the dramatic context in which this tenet is recorded, Cicero reminds us (through one of his characters) that ‘this is possible and has actually occurred'. Maybe his intention (or the intention of his Epicurean sources) is to emphasize that this proposal was not utopian or entirely absurd (at least not for Epicurus and Epicureans, though no evidence is provided for that). But, of course, Cicero does not miss the opportunity to present an objection to the Epicurean approach to friendship: if it is for utility or advantage that the Epicureans cultivate friendship, and no bond of affection exists to make friendship desirable in its own right, then we should prefer land and buildings to friends. No doubt the objection is not unreasonable. Since friendship is only a means to something else but never something choice-worthy by itself, why should it be preferred to anything else? The Epicurean, though, might reply that although it is a means to something else (that other thing being, say, a ‘greater good'), friendship is not necessarily a feeling or disposition towards other people that is completely lacking affection or value. Friendship is highly relevant to strengthening trust, or, as put by the Epicureans, ‘if there is mistrust there is no friendship' (DL 10.11; Us. 543).
Moreover, if, as Epicurus states, the greatest blessedness by far of one's whole life is friendship (PD 37), it cannot merely be a means whose importance should be understood in a basic instrumental character. Finally, there is some evidence to think that Epicurus would actually accept a kind of objection such as Cicero's. Epicurus argues that ‘every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake' (δι'εαυτην αtρετη; VS 23); although this statement seems to be at odds with the view that friendship is sought for the sake of utility, he clarifies that friendship takes its origin from the benefits it eventually confers on us (Epicurus appears to suggest that this is actually the way ‘utility' should be taken). Furthermore, the merely instrumental character of friendship is, to a certain extent, neutralized by Epicurus himself when he argues that a friend is not in every case one who searches for utility, nor one who never links friendship to utility. The former becomes a merchant of favours, while the latter ‘cuts off all good hope for the future' (αποκoπτει την περi του μελλοντος ευελπιστtαν; VS 29). This being so, Epicurus envisages friendship not just as a mutual and utilitarian exchange of favours but as a risk; however, as he states in VrS 28, it is a risk that the wise person is willing to take. Ultimately it is, as Armstrong affirms, a risk inherent in our mortal condition, which is in need of mutual support and defence. Friendship, as Philodemus recalls (On the Gods 3), also belongs to the lives of the gods.54 In this aspect, too, the example of divine life inspires the sage to assimilation to god. PD 40 states that those who could have the greatest confidence [τo θαρρεtν μαλιστα ] from those around them lived together most pleasantly with the surest guarantee [τo βεβαιoτατον πfστωμα εχοντες] and experienced the fullest sense of belonging. Security, usefulness, friendship, trust, pleasure and affection are realities that, in the opinion of the Epicureans, are combined in the optimal condition described at the end of the Principal Doctrines.
Although Epicurus and the Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, do not explicitly assume that their society should be a ‘society of wise people, some of their texts seem to suggest a similar position.55 Epicurus emphatically states that ‘the purest security' stems from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many ( PD 14), with this ‘many' being those who have not yet been able to practice and internalize the Epicurean prescriptions for a good life. The Epicurean requirement of living prudently, honourably and justly (LM 132; PD 5) does not respond to the fear of the punishment of laws, as happens to the ‘many', but results from his abiding by natural desires that not only do not promote unjust actions but may not even endorse the performance of actions that the law authorizes (see VS 43). This is so because their origin is in vain desires that are disregarded by Epicureans. The combination of the adverbs prudently, honourably and justly (LM 132; PD 5) qualifies the life of the Epicureans in more restrictive terms than those dictated by attachment to laws. The life of the Epicureans requires the security provided by ‘contractual' justice, but also promotes the reduction of the causes of harm and being harmed ( VS 79), to the avoidance of which, as is known, the pact and justice is oriented (PD 33).
However, contempt, envy and hatred are permanent causes of damage for human beings (theses damages stem from ‘men', Epicurus states, these men presumably being ‘the many' see DL 10.117, Us. 536; VS 67). The Epicureans certainly count on the laws and penalties of the city against these threats. Still, they also recognize good reputation, wealth and proximity to power (on this see chapter 6) as a means to minimize them. Although Plutarch accused Epicurus of being incapable of philanthropy (Pleasant Life 1098D), philanthropy seems to have been integrated into the Epicurean conception of a pleasant life (see DL 10.9 and Philodemus, On Property Management xxiv 29-31).
The Epicureans understood the development and propagation of their philosophy as a task that provided pleasure, affection and utility while offering serenity to human beings. As De Sanctis has shown, Epicurus' philanthropic vocation is evident in his letters; the personalized tone is intertwined with a clear intention of universality that Epicurus assumes to be a presupposition of his mission as a sage.56 Centuries later, the same philanthropic disposition can be seen in the monumental Epicurean inscriptions that the wealthy Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda placed at the service of his fellow citizens and outsiders. Philodemus explicitly includes living with goodwill to the whole human race [φιλανθρωπως] among the people who live pleasantly (On Choices and Avoidances xiv 1-4). In Epicurean philanthropy, as in friendship, the goods, utility, security, pleasure and affection are combined. Donation is pleasant (Us. 544), just as it is pleasant to experience the recipient's benevolence. In addition, minimizing the causes of damage from human beings strengthens and increases the personal security of those who act philanthropically.57
Restricting oneself to the necessary natural desires, friendship and philanthropy are fundamental elements of the Epicurean security. Since security and contingency go hand in hand, the relationship between security and temporality appears, as we have shown, to be explicitly focused on the temporal modes of the present and the future. However, various considerations of Epicurus about the past, centred on memory and gratitude, converge with those collected around the present and the future in underscoring the link between the unity and stability of the Epicurean way of life and the purest security that Epicurus attributes to it.
Diogenes Laertius collects some well-known and commented-on lines from the letter that Epicurus sends to Idomeneus as he is about to die. After referring to what is happening as a ‘blessedly happy day', he tells him that he is suffering from very acute pain and adds: ‘But against all these things are ranged [αντιπαρεταττετο] the joy in my soul [τo κατα ψυχην χαtρον] produced by the recollection of the discussions we have had' (επι, τη των γεγονoτων ημtν διαλογισμων μνημη; DL 10.22). The scene, as Erler interestingly underlines, responds to the topic of the death of the sage and evokes the death of Socrates. It is exemplary and contributes to the genre of Epicurean commemorative texts.58 The day is unique: the last day of Epicurus; the conflation of ‘scenographic' elements is also unique: it is a ‘blessedly happy' day, as the pleasant memory of past conversations is opposed to intense, excruciating pains. The scene elicited Cicero's biting irony (Fin. 2.94-95), while Plutarch commented on it with disbelief (Pleasant life 1099D). But perhaps the singularity of Epicurus' personality
prevents us from seeing that it represents a picture of the Epicurean way of life. In fact, the passage does not speak of the memory of a conversation, but of the memory of conversations - presumably, conversations about Epicurean philosophy.59 As is known, Epicurus recommended the practice of recollecting the principles of his philosophy on all occasions. Attitudes towards pain and death are two of its fundamental areas of application. There is nothing exceptional, therefore, in the fact that Epicurus kept his philosophy in mind and applied it with pleasure (a natural upshot of the exercise of philosophy and his memory; see VrS 27)60 to the circumstances described in the letter to Idomeneus. Furthermore, as we shall now show, the attitude regarding the past and the present of the Epicurean old man who is close to death constitutes a specific theme of the Epicurus texts.
Lucretius describes the figure of an old man who precisely reflects the antithesis of this attitude: he fears death, he laments, he has always lived discontented with the present and with constant thoughts of the future. He feels that his life has been incomplete, and that death comes prematurely and will deprive him of what he could still yet obtain (RN 3.955-963; see also 3.931-942 and 1003-1010). Lucretius highlights a fundamental feature of such an attitude: ingratitude towards the past. One might perhaps think that this idea represents a contribution of Lucretius to Epicureanism. Surprisingly, gratitude and ingratitude towards the past have a notable presence in the Epicurus texts.61 The first characterizes the Epicurean old person. Gratitude anchors him in a safe harbour. But the old man has let down anchor in old age as though in a harbour, since he has secured the goods about which he was previously not confident by means of his secure sense of gratitude (see Epicurus, VS 17: των αγαθων ασφαλεt κατακλεfσας χaριτι). The old man who cultivates philosophy, notes Epicurus, may stay young in good things owing to gratitude for what has occurred (δια την χαριν των γεγονoτων ; LM 122).
However, gratitude or ungratefulness to the past is not an issue that Epicurus restricts to old age. It concerns both the young and old because, in his opinion, the attitude towards the past is a mirror of the attitude towards the present and the future. If gratitude keeps young the one who becomes old, ingratitude can also make one old ( VS 19). Furthermore, as Epicurus points out, the misfortunes that occur in life must be cured by a sense of gratitude for what has been (τη των απολλυμενων χαριτι; VS 55). Epicurus, like Lucretius, links ingratitude towards the past, discontent towards the present, and anxious expectations of the future to the prevalence of unlimited desires ( VS 69; Us. 491).62 Aristotle had indicated that memories and expectations of good people are pleasant because they harmonize with their moral character and their desires (EN 1166a23-29; see also Cicero, Fin. 2.57). It is not difficult to note that the Epicurean wise person can nourish grateful and pleasant memories concerning the past by restricting himself to the necessary natural desires, friendship and philanthropy, to which his philosophy exhorts.
The grateful memory of the past, satisfaction regarding the present, and the reliable expectation regarding the future harmonize and endow Epicurean life with unity and stability.63 Its security is based on these two properties, which are not alien to the traditional imagery of the polis.
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