First lesson: the importance of humility is limited
Contexts of disparity reveal that the importance of humility is limited in several ways. First, it is limited because it is limited for in-the-right parties in contexts of disparity relative to in-the- wrong parties in those contexts.The in-the-wrong parties in these contexts should be much more concerned with humility than the in-the-right parties.
Theirs are the thinking, sentiments, and behavior that blatantly manifest humility’s lack; theirs is the primary responsibility to increase humility’s exercise.1 Second, the importance of humility is limited because it is limited for in- the-right parties in contexts of disparity relative to other virtues for those parties in those contexts. More than humility, those parties should draw on self-respect, self-trust, courage, and perseverance.2 Perhaps most centrally, they should draw on pride: an attentiveness to and ownership of their strengths (Whitcomb et al., 2017, 528-532).Third, virtues in general, humility included, are plausibly at least sometimes less important than certain other things when it comes to contexts of disparity—less important in perhaps several senses, including (at least) the sense that our ameliorative efforts should focus on those other things before focusing on the cultivation of virtues. For instance, social structures—such as laws against slavery, or integrated educational systems, or social media content feed algorithms reducing the spread of false information—are plausibly at least sometimes more important when it comes to contexts of disparity than are any virtues, humility included. Our efforts should, at least sometimes, focus on improving such social structures before they focus on improving peoples’ statuses as virtuous.There is a fourth way, too, in which contexts of disparity reveal limits of the importance of humility. In order to explain this one, we’ll need to first explain our theory of the nature of humility.
In Whitcomb et al. (2017), we argued that the trait of intellectual humility consists in being both attentive to and owning one’s intellectual limitations, such as cognitive mistakes, gaps in knowledge, deficits in cognitive skills, intellectual character flaws, and so forth. On our view, the trait of humility per se consists in being both attentive to and owning a much broader range of one’s limitations, such as moral mistakes (e.g., breaking a promise), affective shortcomings (e.g., lacking a sense of humor), deficits in general skills (e.g., being a terrible cook or an awful driver), flaws in moral character (e.g., being cowardly or rash), and so on.For the humble to be attentive to their limitations is for them to be disposed in such a way that their limitations come to mind routinely, in contrast with being oblivious to them. So a person who is completely inattentive to their limitations cannot be humble. However, someone can be attentive to their limitations while also being flagrantly complacent about them, systematically attempting to conceal them from others, or responding defensively whenever they are brought to light.They would not be humble either.Accordingly, the humble also own their limitations.
For the humble to own their limitations is for them to be so disposed that, when their limitations come to mind, they respond in such a way that excludes flagrant complacence, systematic concealment, chronic defensiveness, and the like. More generally, owning one’s limitations characteristically involves dispositions to (i) believe and accept that one has them, (ii) admit and acknowledge them, (iii) care about them and take them seriously, and (iv) feel regret or dismay about them. Owning one's limitations tracks familiar ways of thinking and speaking, as when we tell a friend it is high time for them to “own their shit,” or when we encourage a loved one to “own their addiction,” or when a losing team “owns its poor play.”
That is our theory of the trait of humility, roughly.
If it is correct, then (among other things) the humble will be more likely than the non-humble to admit their limitations to others, defer to others, seek help from others, and have a low concern for status, and they will be less likely to set unattainable goals and disrespect others. (See Whitcomb et al., 2017, 13—26).Note that someone can possess the trait of humility while lacking the virtue of humility, for at least two reasons.
First, someone might be disposed to attend to and own their limitations but at the wrong time, toward the wrong people, or in the wrong way. If this disposition is entrenched in their psychology, they might be humble; however, their humility would not be a virtue since they might be excessively humble or foolishly so. For the trait of humility to be a virtue in someone, they must possessphronesis (or something similar), i.e. good practical judgment, whereby they know when, toward whom, and how to attend to and own their limitations.
Gary Watson makes a similar point about benevolence:“the word ‘benevolence' names both a general concern for others (which may be excessive, and lead to bad action) and the qualified and informed concern that constitutes the virtue” (1984, 68).Watson's point applies widely. Just as an excess of the trait of benevolence can cause one to donate without considering an organization's merit, an excess of the trait of open-mindedness can cause one to engage perspectives that aren't helpful in reaching the truth (Baehr 2011), an excess of the trait of intellectual perseverance can cause one to stick with projects that are ill-fated (Battaly 2017), and—pertinently— an excess of the trait of humility can cause one to defer without considering the epistemic or moral credentials of the view or person one is deferring to. More generally, an excess of the trait of humility can cause one to be overly attentive to, or to over-own, one's limitations. If you constantly attend to your limitations, or you routinely over-emphasize them, over-attribute negative outcomes to them, or care too much about them, or they regularly overwhelm you, then you lack the virtue of humility, even though you possess the trait.You are humble to a fault.
We call this excess servility, which tends to be vicious (see also Tanesini 2018). On our view, then, the virtue of humility lies in a mean between the vice of servility and a corresponding vice of arrogance, which involves deficient attentiveness to, and under-owning of, one's limitations.Second, someone disposed to attend to and own their limitations at the right time, toward the right people, and in the right way, might nevertheless be disposed to do so for the wrong reason, in which case they will have the trait but not the virtue of humility. For example, a power- hungry faculty member who aims to be elected department chair, but whose department values humility, might set out to cultivate a settled disposition to attend to and own their limitations at the right time, in the right way, and so on. Even if they succeed, they do not possess the virtue of humility since the motives that underlie their humility do not make them better as a person (Baehr 2011, chapter 6; Battaly 2015, chapter 3).
On our view, the virtue of humility is a disposition to appropriately attend to and own one's limitations. We can't emphasize strongly enough that the form this takes can vary significantly across situations. For instance, in some cases it may call for one to explicitly acknowledge one's limitations to someone else, e.g., when you've callously offended them, while in other cases it might call for one simply to admit the limitation to oneself, e.g., when you realize that you're not as gifted as you thought. Another example: compare owning one's struggle with abstract reasoning with owning one's tendency to irresponsibly gossip. If you can't do anything about the first but you can do something about the second, then appropriately owning the first might involve little more than accepting it, while appropriately owning the second might involve resolving to get rid of it.
Applying these views to contexts of disparity, we can delineate a fourth way in which the importance of humility is limited, to wit: if it is the trait we are talking about, then in contexts of disparity humility does indeed sometimes misadvise those who are in the right. Douglass was right about the trait that is humility. For the trait can be excessive, thus amounting to servility. In such cases, the trait can advise in-the-right parties to engage in such inappropriate acts as deferring to neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, or (in the slavery case) refraining from resisting one's owners. A trait that sometimes yields inappropriate actions such as these is thereby of limited importance.
To recapitulate: humility's importance is limited because it is limited for those in the right in contexts of disparity in at least four ways. Limitations-owning itself has its limits.
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