Humility and pride
Within the vast account of ST II-II.1-170, with its 815 articles, Aquinas devotes 5 questions (qq.161-165) comprising 22 articles on humility and its opposing vice of pride.Aquinas' principal treatment of humility is covered in the six articles of q.161, followed by pride in general in q.162, and pride in the special case of the first sin in qq.163-165.
In article q.161 Aquinas argues, first, that humility is a virtue (a.1); that humility principally moderates the movement of the appetite rather than the judgment of reason (a.2); that by humility, a person ought to be subject to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has that is of God (a.3); and that humility is part of the virtue of temperance since it suppresses impetuous tendencies (a.4). He then ranks humility, placing it after the theological virtues, intellectual virtues, and after justice, especially legal justice, but before all other virtues (a.5). Finally, he interprets and validates an ancient guide to humility, namely the 12 degrees of humility in the Rule of St Benedict (a.6).
Aquinas' descriptions of humility in itself do not seem to contain anything unusual or particularly insightful, but the broader context does present some surprises. For example, although Aquinas describes the virtue of humility in terms of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place (q.161, a.1), he argues in ST II-II.129-133 that there is also a Christian virtue of greatness, namely magnanimity, which he describes using language drawn largely from Aristotle.There is also, of course, a vice associated with certain attitudes toward greatness, namely pride, the details of which highlight the value of humility.
What is pride and why is it a problem, if it is a problem? The latter question is not rhetorical, given that there are at least some instances in which pride describes something commendable, as in the case of someone saying to parents who are watching their child excel, “You must be so proud!” Moreover, it has become standard practice to translate μεγαλοψυχiα (megalopsychia) in the Nicomachean Ethics IV.3 as ‘pride', in which context it is hailed as a virtue concerned with great things.7 In this context,Aristotle describes the proud person as someone who thinks himself worthy of great things, and who is, in fact, worthy of them (NE.IV3.1123b1-2).
The proud man, he states, although extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, does in fact observe the proper mean of virtue, insofar as what he claims is in accordance with his merits (NE.IV3.1123b13-15).On this account, pride is a virtue of greatness, and the proud man must be good in the highest degree, and the truly proud man must be good. Given that pride, in this context, is understood as a superlative good, in what sense or senses can it be a moral failing?
The task of shedding light on this question is made easier by considering what, precisely, is meant by pride when it is analyzed as a vice. Aquinas in ST II-II.162.4 defines four kinds of pride, drawing from a list set down in the patristic era by Pope St Gregory I. The following statements make use of these definitions but modify the wording slightly to highlight the connections of pride, relatedness and gift:8
P1 Ascribing an excellence to oneself that one does not possess.
P2 Thinking that one has acquired for oneself some excellence that one has received as a gift. P3 Thinking that some excellence that one has received as a gift is due to one's own merits.
P4 Thinking that some excellence that one possesses is greater insofar as others do not have it.
One striking point from this list is that there is nothing in these definitions that excludes one from actually being great, or from knowing genuinely that one is great.This consideration leads to a first and important conclusion, namely that being proud in the Aristotelian sense does not
Aquinas: humility and relational greatness necessarily mean that one is proud in Aquinas' sense of having one or more of the four species of pride listed above.
On what grounds, then, are P1—P4 to be considered as vices? On the basis that virtues conduce to flourishing and vices are defined as such as dispositions which impede that flourishing, it is important to examine in what senses, if any, the various species of pride might impede personal flourishing.
As a first example, P1 pride involves misjudging one's own excellences, which is itself a serious flaw insofar as it marks a lack of intellectual development. Moreover, choices made on the basis of an exaggerated and unwarranted estimate of personal excellence risk going awry. In extreme cases this may even prove destructive to one's person, family or society, as in the case of the skier who overestimates her ability on a dangerous ski slope, or the military general whose self-belief is exaggerated to the point of ignoring all views contrary to his own. More subtly, a person who thinks she already has some particular excellence will not strive for it for herself or from others.The person who believes erroneously he is already a great pianist or philosopher will not be ready to receive instruction from others and strive for improvement. One can therefore consider that P1 pride is unwise even from the point of view of enlightened self-interest, given that it will tend to impede personal flourishing.
The other species of pride have similar drawbacks. P2 pride involves a recognition of genuine excellence, but fails to recognize the correct cause. A person with P2 pride may actually consider himself the cause of a particular excellence, as when a person delights in a scientific breakthrough he has made when the seminal idea really came from someone else. More subtly, even when he does not actively think he has caused his own excellence, he may simply delight in the excellence but be forgetful of the person who has brought this about.Whatever else may be said, that kind of misattribution and forgetfulness makes it less likely that the person with P2 pride will be a recipient of further gifts in future which, once again, is detrimental to the attainment of further excellence.
The person with P3 pride acknowledges a personal excellence and its cause correctly but will tend to regard herself as at least the cause of the cause of her own excellence. Of course, for some kinds of excellence this assessment may be correct in part, as in the many kinds of sports and activities that require dedicated practice.
But there are also many kinds of excellences or causes of excellence that are more in the manner of undeserved gifts, such as the loving care that is usually given to children by their parents, or the divine gifts that are generally regarded as necessary for a successful outcome of the Christian life.9 In such cases, it is inappropriate to think of these gifts as things one deserves or that are owed to oneself. Indeed, if one persistently treats undeserved gifts as if they are owed to oneself in the manner of a contract, the person with P3 pride is once again unlikely to be the recipient of further gifts in future, which is once again detrimental to the attainment of greater excellence.P4 pride involves thinking that some excellence that one possesses is greater insofar as others do not have it, which is closely linked to what is today called schadenfreude, that is, taking pleasure, joy, or self-satisfaction from the troubles, failures, or humiliation of others. Schadenfreude is frequently described as a secret or guilty pleasure, implying an inherent awareness that enjoying this kind of pleasure reflects badly on oneself. But whatever else may be said about P4 pride, it does at least involve the misjudgment that one's own success, at least to some degree, is measured by the failures of others, like taking an extra-large slice of a shared cake. By contrast, if the good one seeks is a virtuous life, then the failures of others are in fact likely to be detrimental to this goal.After all, it is typically easier to be a virtuous person in a society of other virtuous persons, compared to being virtuous in a society of the vicious. On this account, the failures of others desired by P4 pride are, in fact, detrimental to oneself in an absolute sense, whatever the shortterm advantage one gains over others in a relative sense.
In summary, all of these species of pride involve some kind of misjudgment of truth, a misjudgment that is itself an anomaly in a fully formed life. But if the desired good of such a life is some kind of superlative greatness, then what is also striking is that all four kinds of pride will, in various ways, tend to frustrate the attainment of that greatness. On this account, it is not only possible to be great and to be aware of one's own greatness without being proud in the senses meant by Aquinas, but these various dispositions of pride will in fact tend to inhibit genuine personal greatness.What follows is not only the compatibility of pride in the Aristotelian sense with an absence of pride in Aquinas' sense, but that the absence of the latter may actually be a precondition of the former.
17.3