Humility is an unlikely candidate for Iiberatory virtue.
It seems to be the last thing that could help an oppressed person, since humility in interacting with one's oppressors arguably reinforces and sustains, rather than subverts, one's oppression (Whitcomb et al.
2020). As Vrinda Dalmiya explains: “humility... is a peculiar resource to deploy for feminist purposes... one can argue that [epistemic] humility is a symptom of oppression, and its inculcation can only entrench exploitative structures that require deference to centers ofpower” (2016: 133). In short, humility seems to be a better candidate for liberatory vice than liberatory virtue.The chief aim of this chapter is to explore whether the above view is correct. Is humility a liberatory vice for oppressed persons, or is there space for it to be a liberatory virtue? The chapter ultimately argues that humility can be a liberatory virtue for oppressed persons, though this runs counter to our intuitions. Section 1 uses feminist virtue theory to sketch an analysis of liberatory virtue. Section 2 endorses the notion of humility as limitations-owning, distinguishing the virtue of humility from the virtue of pride and both of these from servility and arrogance (Whitcomb et al. 2017). It then explores what is needed to convert this notion of humility into a liberatory virtue. Section 3 evaluates the trail-blazing arguments ofVrinda Dalmiya (2016) and Robin Dillon (in press). Dalmiya offers an account of humility, what she calls ‘historicized relational humility,' as a liberatory virtue primarily for the privileged. Dillon argues that arrogance, specifically ‘unwarranted claims arrogance,' can be a liberatory virtue for the oppressed. Both warn against treating humility as a virtue for the oppressed in interactions with oppressors. I explore whether there might, nevertheless, be a role for such humility. I make a case for humility as a liberatory virtue in interactions with one's oppressors, on the assumption that liberatory virtues will ultimately aim at “flourishing-apt societies” (Silvermint 2017: 470)—at making flourishing more possible for all people, oppressed and oppressors alike.
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