INTRODUCTION

Mark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch and Alessandra Tanesini

Philosophical research on the virtue of humility has blossomed in the last decade or so after years of relative neglect.The history of the philosophical study of humility is also characterised by intermittent interest initiated, at least in the West, by Christian traditions.

In this introduction we outline the structure of the volume, provide an overview of its contents and draw attention to some of the common themes and questions linking the varied contributions within each section.The volume consists of seven parts. Part 1 includes essays that describe theories of humility and raise questions about its classification as a virtue. Part 2 consists of chapters highlighting the moral dimension of humility, its relation to flourishing and to the moral emotions. Part 3 locates humility within a political context and addresses the contribu­tion humility can make to public life.The chapters in Part 4 explore the role played by humility in various philosophical and religious traditions. Part 5 concerns the place of humility in peo­ple's intellectual lives.

Part IcTheories of humility provides a systematic overview of humility, the various theo­retical approaches that have been taken to it and the central problems that any such theory must confront. Nancy Snow's magisterial opening chapter provides a state-of-the-art guide to many of the debates in subsequent chapters.A particular focus is on the relationship between the con­cepts of humility and modesty, and the literatures that have examined them respectively. Readers seeking a map of the intellectual territory with regard to humility are advised to start here.

The next two chapters focus on two central issues facing any theory of humility. The first such issue, examined by Brian Robinson, is the so-called “paradox of humility”: declaring (even correctly) you are humble seems to mean that you are not. Robinson argues that this apparently single problem actually turns out to be multiple problems, and theories of humility have divided over how to handle them. One kind of theory, Robinson argues, sees humble people as taking a low opinion of themselves; the other kind of theory, which Robinson champions as being able to resolve the various paradoxes of humility, sees humble people as simply not over-focussing on the self or being less ego-centric.

In the final chapter of this part, Paul Bloomfield confronts another central issue facing any theory of humility: whether or not it is a virtue.As illustrated by chapters throughout this book, many philosophers writing on the topic have assumed that it is. But drawing on certain ancient Greek philosophical conceptions of virtue, Bloomfield argues forcefully that it is not, and sug­gests instead that humility is better understood as a “corrective” for arrogance.

The question of whether humility is a virtue raises its connection to morality. Part 2: The ethics of humility confronts the central moral questions regarding humility, collecting chap­ters that examine the historical roots of these questions, their contemporary relevance and the relationship that humility bears to other concepts of ethical concern.

The first two chapters focus on understanding the connections between humility and two of the most central ethical concepts: flourishing and respect. In his contribution, Robert Roberts argues that humility can come in both virtuous and vicious forms.Arguing that virtuous humil­ity is opposed to the vices of pride—and associated diagnoses like narcissistic personality dis­order—Roberts claims that virtuous humility can contribute to human flourishing by way of allowing the humble person to better exemplify the virtues of love and respect for others.

In contrast, Robin Dillon concentrates on the relationship between humility and self­respect. Drawing on Kantian and feminist philosophy, she argues that theories of humility—like Roberts'—can often overlook the serious question of whether humility can be a virtue for the oppressed or marginalised in society. In Dillon's view, the upshot of paying careful attention to these issues is that the proper opposition to arrogance is not humility but self-respect, and that humility, far from being a central virtue, can sometimes act as a vice, as when someone is inap­propriately humble in the face of oppression. Similarly, in their own contribution,Whitcomb, Battaly and Howard-Snyder raise the puzzle of what they call “the puzzle of disparity”—the question of whether one should be humble in the face of those who are espousing flatly wrong or unjust views. Like Dillon,Whitcomb et al. argue that the importance of humility is limited. Nonetheless, they conclude that humility continues to have some value even in cases where one is facing someone who is clearly in the wrong.

The issues of love and self-respect continue to play a central role in the next two chapters. Nietzsche remains the most important critic of the moral value of humility in Western culture. In his chapter, Nickolas Pappas unravels Nietzsche's concern that humility essentially involves an inauthenticity in self-presentation (like the contemporary notion of the “humble-brag”); moreover, humility, Pappas argues, is fundamentally opposed to Nietzsche's own central theo­retical principle of the will to power. In contrast, Aaron Ben-Ze'ev drills down into the rela­tionship between romantic love and humility. Both are positive attitudes to other people, and both reduce the amount of what Ben-Ze'ev calls comparative concern; both encourage us to see each other non-comparatively—that is, to consider others in themselves or in virtue of their own properties.

The final two chapters in this part deal with the relation between humility and two other major ethical concepts: pride and shame. Michael Brady argues that many recent accounts of humility fail to properly understand the difference between these two attitudes. He suggests instead that the real difference lies in how pride and humility are expressed. Eva Dadlez and Sarah Woolwine, on the other hand, and in contrast to Roberts, don't see narcissism or van­ity as failures of humility; rather they are manifestations of unjustified pride. Like Dillon and Whitcomb et al., Dadlez and Woolwine explore the possible downsides of humility, drawing on David Hume's classic account of the subject.They develop aspects of Hume's account and apply them to contemporary scholarship concerning epistemic injustice and disability.

As we've already seen, many of the ethical issues raised by humility have political dimensions. Part 3:The politics of humility, addresses these dimensions directly.

Echoing themes suggested in Part 2, the first two chapters of this part examine the question of whether, and to what extent, we should be humble about our own beliefs and convictions.

In her chapter, Casey Johnson argues that intellectual humility can encourage empathy and curiosity—traits, she suggests, that tend to promote the toleration of diverse ideas, a core demo­cratic value.Where Johnson explores the relation between toleration and humility, Carl Stauffer looks at the relation between humility and restorative justice, with particular attention paid to the social dimensions of humility, both at the individual and group level.

Heather Battaly's essay ends this part of the book by addressing the question of whether humility could be a “liberatory” virtue, or a virtue that is particularly helpful to people who are oppressed or marginalised. As such, this essay serves to bring together many of the themes explored in Parts 2 and 3. Employing her own landmark work on the “limitation-owning” account of humility, and interacting with the work of other authors in this volume, Battaly argues that there is kind of liberatory humility that involves being appropriately attentive to one's own liberatory limitations, and which is aimed at liberatory ends.

Part 4: Humility in religious thought contains chapters that, when taken together, intend to give the reader a panoramic overview of humility in diverse philosophical and religious tra­ditions.

In her contribution, Sophie Grace Chappell argues that there are sustained considerations and motivations in Greek ethical thought that are related to humility, even though common lists of widely recognised virtues do not include a single virtue that would clearly correspond to humility. For Chappell, humility, or something similar to it, is an archaic Greek value that is associated with godfearingness. It involves a disposition of restraint in the face of gods prepared to punish human hubris. In the Classical period, as fear of the gods diminishes, new values of cunning and greed emerge and are championed by the Sophists. In response to these, a new ver­sion of humility that is not driven by a fear of godly punishment is developed in the philosophy of Socrates,Aristotle and Plato.What emerges is a plurality of virtues, including justice, wisdom and compassion that include elements related to humility.

The chapter by Andrew Pinsent offers a defence of the Thomistic conception of humility in contemporary secular settings. He provides a detailed analysis of Aquinas' views of humility as a virtue opposed to the vice of pride which, in all of its incarnations, inhibits flourishing. Pinsent also presents Thomistic humility as a virtue that promotes good relationships and greatness in oneself.

While Pinsent provides a defence of Aquinas' views of humility, Dan Howard-Snyder and Daniel McKaughan focus in their contribution on Aquinas' notion of faith.They argue that it is not the conception of a virtue and, further, that it is be incompatible with humility, given a plau­sible notion of the latter which they endorse. As an alternative they propose an older Markan conception of faith, whose compatibility with humility they also defend.

In her chapter on humility in the Islamic tradition, Sophie Vasalou details the self-regarding and other-regarding nature of humility as it is conceived by a number of key Islamic philoso­phers. One noteworthy aspect of her account is the focus on the backward-looking nature of humility as self-evaluation and its forward-looking character as an attitude of moral commitment.

The importance of the connection of the self to humility as this is understood in the Buddhist tradition is the topic of Nic Bommarito's chapter. He argues that, in this tradition, humility could be understood as consisting in the denial of the existence of the self or at least in the adoption of an attitude of not being invested in it. So conceived, humility would involve not making oneself the focus of one's own attention.

A similar theme of humility as the adoption of an attitude to the self that is not invested in its self-importance can be found in Alexus McLeod's chapter on humility in Confucianism and early Chinese philosophy. It is this character that gives humility its foundational nature in Confucian thought. Humility would not be a virtue alongside others but instead it would be a propaedeutic for the acquisition of other virtues and an enabler of harmonious social relations.

Thaddeus Metz finds a role for humility in his chapter on the normative ethics of the Southern African philosophy of Ubuntu. He argues that humility is involved with appraisals of what we can claim from others, of our knowledge of morality and in evaluations of our own virtues.

Part 5: The epistemology of humility includes several chapters dedicated to the study of the role of humility in inquiry. Some of these chapters draw attention to how humility can contribute to good inquiry, but also to how it can be faked. Others refer to humility as the acceptance of the limitations to human knowledge in general and as drawing attention to the crucial role played by contingency in our relation to the world.

The chapter by John Greco is the first of four chapters addressing the contribution of humil­ity to an appreciation of the limitations of one's own intellectual abilities and to the establish­ment of proper relations with other epistemic agents. Greco in particular contrasts humility as an appreciation of our epistemic dependence on others with intellectual pride that would be characterised by ideals of self-sufficiency.

In her contribution, Alessandra Tanesini tests the adequacy of various theories of humility by considering whether they can account for its relation to self-knowledge. She concludes that humility involves self-appraisals that are not self-centred. In this picture, hope emerges as a virtue that accompanies humility and that inoculates it against pessimism and despair.

Katherine Dormandy argues in her chapter that humility enables and supports trust in one's own abilities, but also promotes in testimonial contexts proper trust in the abilities of other epistemic agents. Finally, the chapter by Ian Church that immediately follows segues from these considerations to argue that at least some cases of testimonial injustice can be understood as failures of intellectual humility on the part of the hearer.

The chapter by Allan Hazlett explores how intellectual humility can be faked by means of insincere expressions of ignorance. These are fake forms of fallibilism and scepticism that are adopted for instance by conspiracy theorists and cause much damage to collective inquiry.

The role of humility when debating is the focus of Andrew Aberdeins chapter, which pro­vides a detailed analysis of humility as a virtue of good argumentation. He also describes its relation to the deliberative virtues and its role in reducing the prevalence of informal fallacies.

J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon in their contribution analyse the impact on the practice of asserting of intellectual humility as a disposition to own one's intellectual limitations. In par­ticular, they argue that intellectual humility would reduce the prevalence of assertoric misfires and promote forbearance in assertion to avoid dominating the conversation.

The final two contributions to this part consider the role played by humility in scientific knowledge. In his contribution, Ian James Kidd explores the connections between humility and the importance of notions such as contingency and pluralism in scientific inquiry. Overall, this chapter explains the numerous ways in which humility is, or ought to be, instantiated in science.

Finally, Jan Van Cleve offers an account of Ramseyan humility as the view that any conceiv­able world must include non-relational properties, even though we can never know what these are.This position is compared to Humean humility and contrasted with Russellian monism.

Part 6: The psychology of humility comprises chapters on themes such as personality variables, measurement and calibration that might be especially helpful to philosophers with an interest in the psychological literature on humility.

Peter Samuelson and Ian Church provide an overview of conceptualisations of humility in positive and personality psychology. In particular, this chapter addresses the relation of humility to the so-called Big Five. It proposes that psychological accounts of the nature of humility, as of other virtues, must think of them as involving the interaction of personality and situational variables.

In their chapter on the measures of humility, Rick Hoyle and Elizabeth Krumrei Mancuso present the whole array of current approaches to psychological measures of humility, whilst highlighting the overreliance on self-reports in this literature. Their chapter also includes pro­posals for new ways in which humility could be measured.

Several of the chapters included in this volume (e.g., Bommarito, McLeod,Tanesini among others) highlight the role of humility as a corrective for self-centredness and self-importance. This theme is also prominent in Jen Cole-Wright's chapter, which shows how humility is a cor­rective for the ethical and epistemic biases caused by prevalent egocentric biases.

On a similar note, Phil Fernbach and Nick Light argue in their contribution that overcon­fidence and knowledge miscalibration are major obstacles to intellectual humility. Finally, they present potential interventions to increase intellectual humility.

Part 7: Humility: Applications to the social world comprises papers that reflect on social issues such as terrorism, the judicial system and education to offer an analysis of the poten­tial offered by the cultivation of humility to address these issues.

The chapter by Quassim Cassam returns to the theme of false humility already explored by Hazlett to highlight its prevalence in studies of Middle Eastern terrorism.The chapter concludes with a discussion of what true humility would amount to.

The focus of Lani Watson's contribution are those features of education that function as obstacles to humility. She notes the pervasive negative effects of answer-oriented approaches that dominate in education and details a question-oriented alternative which, in her view, would promote more humble attitudes.

The chapter by Amalia Amaya focusses on the judiciary. She offers a detailed account of why judges serve their function better when they display attitudes that are consonant with humility.

The final three chapters in the collection consider external devices and networks in their relation to humility as an individual character trait.The contribution by Duncan Pritchard anal­yses the role of extended cognitive processes, including external devices, in enabling humility in general and intellectual humility more specifically. In his conclusion, Pritchard raises a word of caution about the possibility of the virtue of extended intellectual humility.

The contributions by Levy, Sullivan and Alfano raise questions about the epistemic value of intellectual humility.Thus, in his chapter Levy argues that, in on-line environments, behaviours and attitudes that are characteristic of arrogance and servility are often knowledge-conducive. Hence, if our concern is epistemic we should not promote humility as a corrective for these traits.

Sullivan and Alfano raise related concerns in the context of collective deliberation. In the context of inter-group disagreements, they argue, humility might promote tribalism. Thus, whilst humility might reduce my-side biases, it can actually increase our-side partisanship. If this is the case, humility could deepen rather than resolve inter-group conflicts.

References

Driver, J. (1989).The Virtues of Ignorance. TheJournal of Philosophy, 86(7), 373—384. doi:10.2307/2027146. Driver, J. (1999). Modesty and Ignorance. Ethics, 109(4), 827-834. doi:10.1086/233947.