Introduction
Though “humble” might not be the first character trait to describe philosophers, a case could be made that the practice of philosophy demands a certain humility, or at least an intellectual humility, requiring such traits as inquisitiveness, openness to new ideas, and a shared interest in pursuing truth.
All of these traits are markers of intellectual humility, and, while the pursuit of the truth may involve the practice of humility simpliciter, we feel that a volume on the Philosophy of Humility would be best served by a better understanding of intellectual humility and, as such, this will be the focus of this chapter.1Moreover, there are a few theoretical reasons for focusing on intellectual humility as opposed to humility more broadly. Of course, we typically and naturally (and reasonably!) assume that intellectual humility is a subset of humility; after all, it’s easy to assume that ifwe are talking about intellectual humility we’re talking about a specific kind of humility. But we might at least wonder if humility could be viably understood as a subset of intellectual humility; perhaps, for example, humility is just being intellectually humble about how someone conceives of themselves. If this is correct, then perhaps the most parsimonious way to understand humility is by way of intellectual humility. Indeed, in a seminal theoretical piece in the psychology literature,Tangney (2000) grounds the definition of humility in two realms: a proper understanding of the self (accurate assessment, keeping one’s abilities/accomplishments in proper perspective, low self-focus) and a certain intellectual disposition (acknowledging mistakes, intellectual openness).Various measures of humility have also reflected these dimensions (Davis et al. 2011; Landrum 2011; Rowatt et al. 2006).The honesty-humility dimension in the HEXACO, a trait assessment measure, assesses only accurate self-understanding (modesty,Ashton and Lee 2008).
Perhaps some of the problems that have been encountered in the measurement of humility could find resolution if humility was seen as a component of intellectual humility. But even if we fall understandably shy of this fairly radical proposal, a weaker thesis might nevertheless suit our purposes for this chapter: that our understanding of the philosophy of humility could be significantly informed and developed by considering the emerging literature on intellectual humility.We will begin with a discussion of intellectual humility as a character trait.The study of both humility and intellectual humility has been grounded in the methods and approach of personality psychology, specifically the examination of these virtues as traits. We will take a look at various well-known traits in the personality psychology literature, discussing the “Big 5” as they relate to intellectual humility, as well as other key traits related to cognition and the search for the truth. In this initial examination of intellectual humility as a trait, we use the terms “character trait” and “personality trait” interchangeably, though we recognize there is a case for making a distinction between the two (Miller 2014).We then examine the role of situations in the expression of intellectual humility, and for the interaction of “situation” and “trait.” In the final analysis, it is the interaction of trait with situation that provides the most robust understanding of the psychology of any virtue, including humility and intellectual humility.
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