Justice, utility and the ‘Justice of Nature'
The extant texts of Epicurus contain few considerations about the notion of preconception.4 The three most noteworthy passages refer to the preconception of the gods (LM 123-124), to that of the just (PD 37 and 38), and to the recommendation stating that we should not investigate time by referring to the preconception that we have in ourselves.
What we have to do, Epicurus contends, is to pay attention to the ‘clear datum of experience' [αυτo τo εναργημα], according to which we utter expressions such as ‘for a long time, ‘for a short time', that is, interpreting the issue in a way closely related to our experience (LH 72). Moreover, one should add the preconception of cause or rather of ‘responsibility' (Epicurus, On Nature 34, 26-30).5 The remaining references are highly controversial.6 The testimonies in the doxography are not abundant either; they are also burdened by subsequent non-Epicurean reworkings. In our view, therefore, Epicurus' considerations about the just in PD 37 and 38 turn out to be particularly valuable since, despite having been the least studied by those interested in the Epicurean neologism πρoληψις, they provide two illustrative references. As a matter of fact, in these passages they play the role of criteria to determine what is really just. Diogenes Laertius reports that in his Canon, Epicurus stated that preconceptions (along with ‘affections' or ‘feelings' and perceptions) are the criteria of truth (DL 10.31). This is particularly clear in PD 38, where Epicurus reminds us of the fact that things taken to be just must be in accordance with the preconception of justice.As already observed, the presence of the term πρoληψις is rather scanty in the Epicurean texts.
We do not intend to suggest that it had a secondary role in the Epicurean theory of justice, but rather to emphasize that its clarification must begin by considering the precise aspect of the theory within which the term appears. The analysis of PD 31 allows us to begin our journey on that path; the expression ‘the wealth of nature' [o της φυσεως πλουτος] in PD 15 has a certain paradoxical character that is even more evident in a similar expression, ‘the just of nature' [τo της φυσεως δ(καιον], contained in PD 31:T1 The just of nature [ τo της φυσεως δtκαιον ] is a pledge of usefulness [ συμβολον του συμφεροντος], to neither harm one another nor be harmed.
trans. Inwood and Gerson, modified
As we have already pointed out, some of the principles that an Epicurean should adopt regarding the satisfaction of desires, self-sufficiency and freedom have much in common with Cynic precepts. Nevertheless, unlike the Stoics, Epicurus explicitly denied that an Epicurean wise man should practice Cynicism (DL 10.119; Us. 14). Moreover, the Epicurean Philodemus, following Metrodorus, rejected the Cynic lifestyle and, especially, Cynic poverty (on this point see chapter 2, section 3). Of course, this does not mean that he is in favour of wealth (as if it were something good in the strict sense); instead, he is in favour of limited wealth.7 Thus every possession is wealth when it can satisfy nature (i.e. a natural desire) and the greatest wealth is poverty when it comes to unlimited desires.8 The correct use of wealth must be what Philodemus calls ‘natural wealth' (o φυσικoς πλουτος; col.
xiv 19) and what Epicurus calls (in PD 15) ‘the wealth of nature' [ o της φυσεως πλουτος ], (on this see also Porphyry, To Marcella 27; Us. 202). In this Principal Doctrine, Epicurus contrasts ‘the wealth of nature' with the wealth defined by groundless opinions [o δε των κενων δοξων ]. As we are going to show, both Epicurus and the Epicureans develop a similar contrast between ‘the just of nature’, on the one hand, and justice such as it is defined by ‘foolish wisdom' and ‘vain and stupid' opinions, on the other.But let us return to PD 31, where the meaning of ‘nature' in the expression ‘the just of nature' is undoubtedly decisive. Although what we have argued so far (chapter 2, section 3) should suffice to show how we think that phrase ought to be understood, allow us to present a general account of why this sentence cannot be read from a ‘naturalistic' approach.9 First of all, it must be recalled that the expression ‘the just of nature' is not an Epicurus innovation. As we show and discuss below, it is already found in a remarkable passage from Plato's Gorgias. But before we focus on that passage, let us briefly consider how the Epicureans understand nature. There is good reason to suspect that the expression ‘the just of nature' must be seen in a primary and easily understandable sense of what human nature is. To be more precise: if, in fact, for Epicurus the just should be conceived only along with the notion of usefulness (such usefulness being the one that guarantees that people neither harm one another nor are harmed in political organizations), the word ‘nature' in the expression ‘the just of nature' must refer to human nature. As indicated in chapter 1, section 1, Demetrius of Laconia underlines a semantic connection between nature and utility that complements the remarks of Epicurus, Hermarchus and Polystratus about what is useful and just.
According to Demetrius, one of the meanings of the adverbial dative φυσει is συμφερoντως, which might be rendered ‘by usefulness' (PHerc. 1012, col. lxvi-lxviii). Moreover, unlike what the Stoics believe, Epicurus maintains that there is no finality or providence in nature.10 Therefore, nature cannot be understood as an entity that deliberates or acts in any understandable sense of acting or deliberating.Let us now turn to the remarkable passage of Plato's Gorgias mentioned above. Here, the character Callicles employs expressions such as ‘according to the law of nature' (κατα νoμον τoν της φυσεως; 483e3), and ‘the just of nature' (τo της φυσεως δfκαιον; 484b1) with the explicit intention of underlining, as Dodds observes in his commentary on the dialogue, the paradox that represented linkage through the expression ‘of nature' opposed concepts such as ‘nature' and ‘law'.11 We do not know whether Epicurus knew the Gorgias, a dialogue against which his disciple Metrodorus seems to have dedicated a text. However, we know that Epicurus reformulated proverbs of traditional wisdom, as well as Democritus' and Solon's expressions, to develop his doctrine and thus facilitate its reception and memory.12 It therefore cannot be ruled out that in PD 31 Epicurus had the shocking expressions of Callicles in mind, and that he presented his own doctrine through a reformulation (no less surprising, incidentally) of their content.13
Epicurus does not introduce the expression ‘the just of nature' to oppose it, like Callicles, to the laws, nor does he maintain that ‘taking advantage' (Plato, Gorg. 483c3-4: τo πλεονεκτεtν), inherent to human nature in Callicles' view, is the foundation of the supposed law of nature, i.e.
the law of the strongest.14 Nor does Epicurus cite in his support, like Callicles, the actions of human groups in international relations, or animal behaviour. In Epicurus' view, it is not possible to speak of justice with regard to irrational animals since they cannot make pacts. The same applies to peoples who were unable or unwilling to establish such agreements (PD 32).15 Some interpreters, such as Philippson 1910: 292-5, proposed to include Epicurus' expression as a form of iusnaturalism. However, as we have shown, in Epicureanism justice implies a pact, a contract, which rules out both the iusnaturalistic link (between nature and justice) and Calliclean immoralism. It is clear to us that the genitive της φυσεως, ‘of nature', is not orientated to highlight, as in Callicles' immoralism or in iusnaturalism, a normativity of nature, but to qualify the effective ontological status of a phenomenon such as justice and, implicitly, the methodology that must be followed in its explanation. Epicurus and the Epicureans certainly oppose empty substantive formulations revealing ‘foolish wisdom' (μωροσοφfα; POxy. 5077col. 2, fr. 2, l. 9), such as those represented by expressions like ‘justice in itself' (PD 33) or ‘natural law.' However, they also reject the ‘vain and stupid' opinions of those who claim that there is no such thing as the just (Polystratus, Contempt col. xxii 23-24, xxiv 3-5, xxv 9-10, xxvi 22-5, xxvii 10) or that it only exists according to individual assumptions (κατα τας iδfας υποληψεις ; Abs. 1.12,2). The heterogeneity of the views that the Epicureans oppose offers a critical clue to analysis of the expression ‘the just of nature' (PD 31). Indeed, ‘the just' does not possess the substantial mode of existence characteristic of things like a piece of gold, for instance (called καθ, εαυτας φυσεις by Epicurus and the Epicureans; Epicurus, LH 68; Polystratus Contempt col. xxv 18-24: καθ, αυτα, κατα την iδfαν φυσιν λεγoμενα). It does not follow, though, that its existence is conventional; the just (like other modalities of usefulness, such as ‘producing health'; Contempt col. xxiv 24-xxv 16. Abst. 1.12 2) represents, as we have shown in chapter 1, real properties and not mere opinions.Thus, when Epicurus talks about ‘the just of nature', he does not refer to what nature prescribes as just; the expression seems to point to the ontological and epistemological reference of the phenomenon constituted by justice to our nature, for which the security, the purpose of the pact that founds justice, is, in accordance with PD 7, the good of nature [τo της φυσεως αγαθoν] and ‘what is naturally congenial' [τo της φυσεως οiκεtον]. This being so, ‘the just of nature' must be framed in the liberating investigation of nature that Epicurus often advocates (LH 37; PD 1).16 Therefore, it is not wrong to make it equivalent, as Strauss and Goldschmidt17 suggested, to the expression ‘the nature of the just', used by Epicurus in PD 37 as opposed to representations of the just grounded in empty words that, unlike the ‘science of nature' (φυσιολογfα), deeply disturb those who try to give an account of reality through them.
Plato makes the character Glaucon say (with evident irony) ‘the nature of justice' (η φυσις δικαιοσυνης; Resp. 359b6) to refer to the conventionalist genealogy of justice. Such a conventionalist genealogy of justice is exposed as an expression of a merely instrumental assessment of justice, which, according to Plato, would make it impossible to speak of the ‘nature of justice. One of the fragments of a ‘doctrinal' letter of Epicurus contained in the POxy. 5077 (col. ii, fr. 2, l) includes the same expression of Glaucon [η φυσις δικαιοσυνης]. According to the interpretation proposed by Angelli,18 Epicurus is developing in the fragment an antithesis between the hypostatization of an absolute and universally justice (perhaps the mathematical-geometrical resolution of justice developed by the Pythagoreans as well as by Plato) and the several forms of justice dependent on the geographical, historical and ethnic setting. Epicurus states in the fragment that the nature of justice corresponds to the clear datum of experience regarding its forms (κατα τo επt των σχηματων εναργημα; POxy. 5077 col. 2 of fr. 2, l.), i.e. to the evidence of the diversity already indicated.
One of the tasks of Epicurean ‘physiology' is precisely to clarify the ontological status of instances such as justice. PD 31 contains compelling indications to start the analysis of the notion of the preconception of what is just, and through it to clarify the ontological and epistemological status of the just. Indeed, it recognizes a regulatory imprint in the phenomenon of justice. Such an imprint neither derives from the idea of natural right (as shown by the examination of T1 above) nor from the reduction of justice to legality, but through the proper predicate ‘pledge of usefulness for the sake of neither harming one another nor being harmed'. In fact, even though justice and usefulness are not directly linked to each other in the text, they are connected through the notion of συμβολον, ‘pledge', which allows us to glimpse the view - so clearly expressed through the use of the preposition εiς plus τo μη βλαπτειν... βλαπτεσθαι - that suggests understanding the whole expression as a distinction between guideline and realization or formal determination and content. The two Principal Doctrines that introduce the term πρoληψις confirm this distinction:
T2 PD 37: Of what is sanctioned as just [των νομισθεντων εiναι δικαiων], that which is confirmed [τo μεν επιμαρτυρουμενον] to be useful in the necessities of mutual associations [εν ταις χρεtαις της πρoς aλληλους κοινωνtας] has its existence in the domain of the just [εχει τo εν του δικαiου χωρa εiναι], whether it is the same for everyone or not. And if someone establishes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is advantageous [κατα τo συμφερον] in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of what is just [ουκετι... την του δικαiου φυσιν εχει]. And if what is advantageous in the sense of being just changes, but for a while fits our preconception [of justice] [εiς την πρoληψιν εναρμoττη], nevertheless it was just for that length of time, [at least] for those who do not disturb themselves with empty words [φωναiς κεναrς] but simply look to the facts.
transl. Inwood & Gerson, modified and adapted to Dorandi's text 201319
T3 PD 38: If new circumstantial facts did not arise [μη καινων γενομενων των περιεστωτων πραγμaτων], it was evident [aνεφaνη] that the things sanctioned as just [τα νομισθεντα δiκαια ], while not matching [ μη aρμoττοντα ] anymore in the fact themselves with the preconception [i.e. of what is just], these things are no longer just [ουκ ην ταυτα δiκαια ]. But if circumstantial facts are new and the same things established as just are no longer advantageous [ουκετι συνεφερε], they were just at that moment, when they were advantageous for the mutual associations of fellow citizens, but later, when they were no longer just [υστερον δ' ουκ ην ετι δiκαια], they were not advantageous [μη συνεφερεν].
our translation
It is not hard to see that in the two mentions of preconception included in these passages, preconceptions work as criteria of truth. The Epicurean passages conveyed by Diogenes Laertius (10.31; Us. 36) do not deny this statement. Each of these instances is said to be ‘evident' or ‘clear'20 [εναργης], and consequently they are a canon of truth insofar as such evidence constitutes a manifest truth that does not require proof and which allows for the further verification of opinions. Sextus Empiricus seems to ascribe the introduction of the technical term εναργεια, ‘evidence, to Theophrastus (M 7.218). Several late testimonies reveal that Theophrastus would have made εναργεια and its correlate, conviction, [π(στις], the fundamental ground of his philosophical expositions. Indeed, he recognized the foundation of knowledge in the evidence of perception and the first principles.21
Sextus Empiricus also maintains that Theophrastus referred evidence to the sensible and the intelligible (or rather, Sextus ascribes to Aristotle, Theophrastus and the Peripatetics in general that the criterion is twofold, sense perception and thought, but common to both, he says, is τo εναργες; M 7.218).22 However, even accepting that such testimonies are reliable, it is almost impossible to determine to what extent Theophrastus' expositions about evidence influenced the Hellenistic philosophers. Thus, today we tend to accept instead that it was Epicurus who introduced the technical term εναργεια, since his writings and the doxography manifestly prove that he not only used the term frequently (sometimes even as a synonym of perception), but that he also explicitly made εναργεια the cornerstone of his philosophy, which represented an innovative approach in Greek philosophy. Epicurus thus witnesses the beginning of a linkage between evidence, truth and praxis that the Hellenistic culture will cover from multiple perspectives.23
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