<<
>>

Let us say that “epistemic individualism” is the position that a person's epistemic standing (what she knows, what she reasonably believes, etc.) is ultimately up to her, and is in that sense independent of the epistemic standing of other people.

Let us say that “evidentialism” is the position that a person's epistemic standing is entirely determined by what evidence she has. Contemporary epistemology has moved away from epistemic individualism and evidentialism, in favor of anti-evidentialist views and views that stress the importance of “social-epistemic dependence,” or dependence on other persons for what one knows and reasonably believes.This paper explores how these movements in epistemology are related to the notion of intellectual humility.

The central idea is that, whereas intellectual pride is characterized by ideals and illu­sions of self-sufficiency, intellectual humility is characterized by a realistic estimation of one's own abilities and an appreciation of one's epistemic dependence on others. My contention will be that, in moving away from internalism (to be defined below), evidentialism, and individual­ism, contemporary epistemology is in effect rejecting ideals of intellectual pride in favor of the virtues of intellectual humility.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 23.1 characterises humility by contrasting it with the vice of pride. Intellectual humility and intellectual pride are then characterised accordingly. Sections 23.2 through 23.4 characterise epistemic individualism, evidentialism, and internal­ism, respectively, and consider how these are bound up with both ideals and illusions of self­sufficiency, as well as a conception of autonomy that juxtaposes individual autonomy with dependence on others. Section 23.4 also includes an analogy to the practical realm, where ideals of self-sufficiency have led to similar problems. Section 23.5 describes the externalist turn in epistemology. The central idea here is that an individual's epistemic standing in not entirely a function of what is internal to her own mind. Rather, it is a function of her own mind, together with how that mind is causally and otherwise related to the world. Section 23.6 argues that externalism motivates anti-evidentialism. Section 23.7 argues that externalism motivates anti­individualism. Section 23.8 describes an approach to testimonial knowledge that is externalist, anti-evidentialist, and anti-individualist. Such an approach, it is argued, illustrates how intellec­tual autonomy can be enabled by dependence on others rather than opposed to it.

23.1

<< | >>
Source: Alfano Mark, Lynch Michael P.. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Routledge,2020. — 514 p.. 2020

More on the topic Let us say that “epistemic individualism” is the position that a person's epistemic standing (what she knows, what she reasonably believes, etc.) is ultimately up to her, and is in that sense independent of the epistemic standing of other people.:

  1. Epistemic individualism defined
  2. Social epistemic dependence
  3. The core of humility: epistemic and ethical alignment
  4. Challenging the parliament's standing
  5. Intellectual humility and epistemic trust in others
  6. A Large Standing National Army
  7. Epistemic norms governing assertion
  8. THE SIXTEENFOLD PERSON
  9. Evidentialism defined
  10. CASE 15: Not Standing on Ceremony