MACHIAVELLI ON PHILOSOPHY AND IMITATION
Even though Machiavelli overtly hails the ancients for believing that “the honor of the world” is “the highest good,” and hence for celebrating the active over the contemplative life, he covertly raises doubts that the honor of the world truly is the highest good (D 2.2.2).
For example, Machiavelli appeals emphatically to his readers’ love of honor by speaking on a number of occasions in the Discourses of the possibility of everlasting political achievements and honor: making one’s state “perpetually happy” (2.30.2), establishing a “perpetual republic” (3.22.3; see also ³.20), acquiring “perpetual” honor or fame (1.10.1, 1.27.1), and leaving an “eternal” memory of oneself (1.27.2). Machiavelli thereby gives the impression that it is possible for human beings to devise a way that “after death renders them glorious” forever and hence that it is possible for them to satisfy their ambition - “which is so powerful in human breasts that it never abandons them” - with an everlasting glory (D ι.ιo.6, 1.37.1). However, in the fifth chapter of Book Two in the Discourses, Machiavelli briefly but powerfully calls into question whether there can be an eternal or even a lasting memory of anything. The chapter title itself affirms that the memories of things eventually perish: “That the Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things.” Furthermore, for the only time in either the Discourses or the Prince, Machiavelli argues explicitly on behalf of a thesis of “philosophers” - the thesis held by “those philosophers who would have it that the world is eternal” - and he does so by arguing that, even though the fact there is no historical memory dating back further than five thousand years might seem to call into question the thesis that the world is eternal, one must keep in mind that “the memories of times are eliminated by diverse causes” (2.5.1; see also P 2.17, 4.19). Machiavelli goes on to explain that the memory of things in the past, and therewith the glory of great individuals of the past, is eliminated by “the variations of sects and of languages” and by such natural phenomena as plagues, famines, and floods that cause the “oblivion of things [oblivione delle cose]” (D 2.5). Machiavelli argues here, therefore, on behalf of philosophers - of lovers of wisdom - and against lovers of glory, that eternal glory is simply illusory.[593] Moreover, precisely insofar as, in his account, glory is to be acquired through deception and force from gullible and self-serving human beings, Machiavelli demystifies the appeal of glory as a recognition and confirmation of one’s own excellence (see, for example, P 18.69-71, D 1.10.3). In these ways, Machiavelli quietly indicates that it is unreasonable to devote one’s life to glory.[594] Accordingly, Machiavelli’s own way of life, as he indicates in his private letter to his friend Vettori on December 10, 1513, seems to be devoted to a good he judges greater than honor, to wisdom and to communion with those, living and dead, who are wise: “where, received by them lovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for”; “I deliver myself entirely to them [tucto mi transferisco in loro].”Why does Machiavelli point to his philosophic life so covertly? Like Homer, Machiavelli hides his theoretical life behind a cloak, not of a singer inspired by the gods, but of one who is simply an adviser to political actors and a political actor himself. But, even though we know much more about Machiavelli the man than about Homer, Machiavelli is in a certain sense even more hidden. For while Homer’s tragic hero Achilles clearly points beyond himself and his political life and ultimately points to the life of the contemplative singer, Machiavelli’s superlatively successful and happy models of human excellence - Romulus, Cyrus, Theseus, Moses, Severus - do not clearly point beyond themselves and their lives at all and hence do not point to the philosophic life of Machiavelli.
Machiavelli hides himself - his philosophic self - as a model of human excellence from his readers for two interrelated reasons: his understanding of his times and his understanding of the role of imitation within a philosophic education. Machiavelli writes in a world that has been weakened by the overt celebration of the contemplative life, a life celebrated by the Christian religion but also by Plato and Platonism. The overt celebration of the contemplative life has weakened the world not only politically - by undermining the cause of political freedom and leaving the world a prey to criminals and tyrants - but also philosophically - by setting philosophy adrift in an imaginary world without the sobriety and clarity fostered by a focus on political life. Paradoxically, then, inasmuch as Machiavelli cares about philosophy as well as about political freedom, he wishes to celebrate the philosophic life only covertly, and to reinvigorate the world by restoring the active, political life to its former, ancient glory.
Machiavelli’s decision to hide himself or any philosopher as a model of human excellence to be imitated - in such sharp contrast especially with Plato’s presentation of Socrates - also reflects a certain caution on Machiavelli’s part concerning the role of imitation in the education of the best natures. As we have seen, Machiavelli repeatedly calls on his readers to imitate examples of virtue in both the Prince and the Discourses, especially in the earlier sections of each work (P 6.22, 7.29, 7.32, 8.34, 14.60; D ³ Pre.2, 2 Pr.3).[595] However, it is important to note that, especially in the later sections of each work, he also highlights the difficulties and limitations of imitation and even warns against the potential dangers of imitating even virtuous individuals. In the first place, Machiavelli observes, one must be mindful of one’s circumstances and beware of imitating virtuous individuals who flourished in very different circumstances from one’s own.
For example, as Machiavelli explains in his discussion of Roman emperors in Chapter 19 in the Prince, “to Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new princes, it was useless and harmful to wish to imitate Marcus, who was in the principate by hereditary right” (P 19.82). Pertinax and Alexander chose unwisely to model themselves on a hereditary ruler who did not face the challenges they, as rulers over an army that had freely chosen them and therefore felt free to dispense with them, faced. On the other hand, one must also be mindful of one’s own nature and hence one’s own capacity for virtue. For example, “for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was a pernicious thing to imitate Severus, because they did not have as much virtue as would allow them to follow in his footsteps” (P 19.82). They chose unwisely to model themselves on a ruler so much more virtuous - so much more prudent and astute - than they were. Machiavelli concludes his discussion by affirming: “Therefore, a new prince in a new principality cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor again is it necessary to follow those of Severus; but he should take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state and from Marcus those which are fitting and glorious to conserve a state that is already established and firm” (P 19.82). One must know not only whom to imitate, given one’s circumstances and one’s nature, but also which parts of those whom one imitates it is best to imitate. Machiavelli emphasizes at the end of Chapter ³9, then, in contrast with what he seems to say, for example, at the beginning of Chapter 6 (6.21-22), that one cannot simply model oneself on a great individual in order to become great oneself. One must first understand one’s own circumstances - one’s peculiar position in society and one’s peculiar times[596] - and one’s own nature - one’s peculiar talents and one’s peculiar limitations; one must understand the range of appropriate models for imitation and which it is best to imitate, given one’s circumstances and nature; and one must understand which aspects of those models it is best to imitate. One must therefore possess considerable understanding, prudence, and wisdom if one is not to harm oneself through imitation, as Pertinax and Caracalla harmed themselves. Although imitation of great individuals is a crucial part of the Machiavellian education - although “a prudent man should always enter upon the paths beaten by great men, and imitate those who have been most excellent” (P 6.22) - a prudent man should also always remember the need to imitate even the greatest figures prudently.[597] Prudence is therefore apparently a quality one must acquire apart from imitation and hence is a quality that one must acquire on one’s own. Just as one cannot rely on an adviser to supply one with prudence - for “good counsel, from wherever it comes, must arise from the prudence of the prince” (P 23.95) - so one cannot simply rely on a model for imitation to supply one with prudence.Machiavelli explains in the Discourses as well, especially toward the end of Book II and in Book III, how difficult it is to imitate the virtuous individuals of the past, how important it is to identify which specific aspects of individuals it is best to imitate, and how vital it is to imitate those aspects wisely. Machiavelli stresses, for example, that the “judgment” of Camillus and the Roman Senate in ruling over the Latins after suppressing their rebellion “deserves to be observed so that it can be imitated when similar opportunities are given to princes” (2.23.2). But therefore princes must wisely determine whether their own circumstances are “similar” to those of the Romans in this case and then prudently translate the judgment of the Romans into their own circumstances. Machiavelli warns against choosing as a model for imitation the example of Dion the Syracusan - the companion and follower of Plato - who foolishly trusted his companion Callipus and consequently lost “his state and his life” (3.6.20). Machiavelli also warns against misunderstanding the model of imitation one chooses, as “idle princes or effeminate republics” who foolishly and imprudently think they imitate “the prudence of Fabius Maximus” by ordering each of the commanders of their own armies “that above all he guard himself against fighting” (3.10.1).
Machiavelli discusses at length the question of whether it “is better and more useful to imitate” the severe Manlius Torquatus or the humaneHomer and Machiavelli on Education and Human Excellence 245 Valerius Corvinus, stresses the importance and difficulty of understanding the circumstances and nature of each and one’s own circumstances and nature, and highlights the dangers of imitating them unwisely (D 3.22). On the last three occasions in the Discourses in which he explicitly calls for imitation, Machiavelli calls on the reader to imitate certain specific modes or policies of individuals, not those individuals as a whole. Machiavelli explains that the mode of Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus “to make his army confident” was “wisely used, so it deserves to be imitated” (D 3.33.2). Similarly, after he observes that Marius, “as a very prudent captain,” contrived a way to reassure his soldiers before facing a ferocious enemy and make them “desirous of fighting,” Machiavelli concludes that, “[a]s that policy was wisely taken by Marius, so it ought to be diligently imitated by others” (3.37.4). Finally, Machiavelli argues that the “mode” of Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus in “judging a slow assault to be more useful” and “reserving his thrust to the last” is “more secure and more to be imitated” than the “mode” of Publius Decius Mus the Younger in assaulting the enemy “with every thrust and with every force of his” and then “in imitation of his father,” deliberately sacrificing his life in battle “so as to acquire with death the glory he had been unable to attain with victory” (D 3.45). Machiavelli here warns against the danger of imitating unwisely, as Decius apparently imitated his own father unwisely, but he stresses above all the importance of prudently judging for oneself what mode is best suited to one’s particular circumstances. For by saying that the mode of Fabius is “more” but not always to be imitated, he indicates that there may be circumstances in which the mode of Decius is the wiser policy. Machiavelli’s discussion of imitation in the Discourses, then, as well as in the Prince, points to the vital importance of wisdom and prudence in imitating the greatest, most virtuous, most wise and prudent individuals. He thereby points to the limitations of imitation. For, again, if one must acquire wisdom and prudence in order to imitate models of human excellence well, one must acquire wisdom and prudence apart from imitation.[598]
Now, what Machiavelli explains as the complications of imitating political actors would seem to apply even more powerfully to the imitation of philosophers. For the would-be imitators of such philosophers must understand their peculiar circumstances - their peculiar station in
society and their peculiar times - and their nature - their peculiar talents and limitations in living the philosophic life; must understand the range of appropriate models for imitation and which it is best to imitate, given their circumstances and nature; must understand which aspects of those models it is best to imitate; and must imitate those aspects of the philosophers’ lives wisely. The would-be imitator of philosophers must, then, acquire wisdom apart from imitation. And insofar as the very goal of philosophy is to acquire wisdom, it may be that imitation is especially limited in its role in the education of a philosopher or even altogether unsuitable to it. Therefore, rather than offer one vision of the philosophic life for imitation - in the form of Socrates - as Plato did with harmful results for both philosophy and politics, Machiavelli hides his philosophic life, while leaving certain indications pointing to that life, so that philosophic natures may follow those indications on their own and for themselves, according to modes that best suit their circumstances and their natures. In his singular but memorable account of his own philosophic life, in his letter to Vettori of December 10, 1513, Machiavelli describes himself, not as one who seeks primarily to imitate the philosophers of the past, but as one who seeks to learn from them by engaging in friendly but critical conversation with them:
I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them lovingly [amorevolmente], I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for. There I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions [domandarli della ragione delle loro actioni]; and they in their humanity [per loro humanita] reply to me. (Machiavelli 1998, no).
To imitate Machiavelli, and perhaps any philosopher, is to seek out wisdom, in loving and questioning conversation with philosophers past and present, but ultimately to follow one’s path to wisdom on one’s own and for oneself.