Markan faith and humility in the intellectual domain
Earlier we asked whether Thomistic faith as a trait could be an intellectual virtue and how it would relate to the virtue of humility in the domain of inquiry. We now ask, and answer, the same two questions about Markan faith.
Markan faith as a trait can be an intellectual virtue since anyone who values epistemic goods will be well-served by it, provided they use good judgement in its exercise.
In this connection, consider the project of human inquiry, which aims to gain truth, knowledge, and understanding about the world, ourselves, and our place in the world.We participate in this project well only when we work together.That's because it is no easy task to achieve its aims, especially regarding matters we care about deeply, matters related to the STEM disciplines as well as the human sciences, the humanities, the arts, and the law, among other things. Inquiry is demanding. Success is more likely if we work together—learning from each other and our predecessors, teaching the next generation, collaborating on projects, critiquing and improving each other's work, and so on—all of which requires a disposition to rely on each other as fellow inquirers. Of course, our fellows can let us down. But unless we are at least somewhat disposed to stick with them even when they let us down, we will be less likely in the long run to achieve our goal. This does not mean that if a researcher, research group, or even an entire discipline regularly lets us down, e.g., by routinely falsifying data or routinely excluding feasible viewpoints, we should stick with them come hell or high water. We need to exercise good judgment. But absent any disposition to appropriately overcome challenges to relying on our fellow inquirers, we will be less likely to achieve the epistemic goods at which we aim by participating in the project of human inquiry.
Of course, we care about epistemic goods in domains other than the project of human inquiry.
Take, for example, journalism. We want to know the truth about important current affairs, at home and abroad. Clearly enough, we rely on others to be informed—editors, investigators, reporters, photographers, eyewitnesses, technicians, etc.—and, clearly enough, absent any disposition to overcome challenges to relying on them for information, we will be less likely to achieve the truth we seek.This does not mean that we should ignore challenges to the reliability of certain journalists and media outlets; rather, it means that we should exercise good judgement in deciding who to stick with, for what, and for how long. Something similar can be said about governmental administrations, healthcare, the judicial system, the military, meteorology, finance, real estate, wilderness management, and many other domains of human life.As for the second question, it seems that Markan faith as a virtue would relate well to the virtue of humility in the domain of inquiry.
First, in general, Markan faith as a virtue facilitates the successful exercise of other intellectual virtues. Consider curiosity, for example, a disposition to wonder, ponder, and ask questions with an eye toward gaining understanding. Or consider intellectual autonomy, a disposition to think things through for oneself; or fairmindedness, a disposition to consider the merits of opposing views with equanimity; or intellectual carefulness, a disposition to avoid errors and foster accuracy; or intellectual thoroughness, a disposition to investigate broadly and deeply in the quest for understanding. For each of these virtues, you can exercise it only if you rely on the cognitive abilities that constitute it; furthermore, unless you are appropriately resilient in the face of challenges to relying on those constitutive abilities, you will be less likely than you otherwise would be to gain the epistemic goods at which the virtue aims.
And the same goes for humility. You can exercise humility only if you rely on the cognitive abilities that constitute it, both the ability to perceive your limitations and the ability to own your limitations.
Furthermore, unless you are appropriately resilient in the face of challenges to relying on those abilities, you will be less likely than you otherwise would be to gain the truth, knowledge, and understanding at which humility aims. Having faith in yourself, as an intellectually humble person, facilitates the successful exercise of humility. More generally, having faith in yourself, as an intellectually virtuous person, facilitates the exercise of your intellectual virtues.Next, consider two other ways in which Markan faith as a virtue would relate well to the virtue of humility in the domain of inquiry. First, humble people will be aware of their intellectual limitations and, for some of them, such awareness will reveal many limitations. If they have faith in themselves, as inquirers, it can help buck them up in the face of an otherwise daunting host of limitations; it can help direct their minds to their many strengths as inquirers and past successes in inquiry; it can help invigorate an “I can do this!” attitude. Second, when you put your faith in someone, it's typically someone else you put your faith in. Thus, when humility reveals your limitations, faith would typically direct you to rely on others with resilience to help you fill in the gaps in your knowledge, to lend a technical hand, to add or hone a skill, and the like.
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