Need for closure
Another extensively studied motivational characteristic that could have bearing on the psychology of intellectual humility is the need for closure (Kruglanski 1990; Kruglanski et al.
2009;Webster and Kruglanski 1994).“Closure,” in this conception, means the need to make a decision, to have an issue closed.The concept is part of a general framework for the formation of all kinds of knowledge called lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski et al. 2009).This theory has as a fundamental assumption that knowledge is derived from evidence. Evidence can come from all sources, but a special category of evidence in lay epistemic theory comes from the testimony of other people (other people's opinions). Lay epistemic theory has noted individual differences in the process of hypothesis testing and evidence gathering. Individuals high in need for closure will take in and process less information before making a judgment and give preference to information met early in the decision-making process. Because of the early closure in the epistemic process they also have higher confidence in their judgments than those with a high need to avoid or postpone closure. They tend to be influenced in their judgment of people and their actions by preexisting stereotypes and prejudices, paying less attention to situational or individuating information. People high in need for closure will, for the most part, look to compare to those of similar mind and to reject or devalue others who do not share their perspectives and judgments (Kruglanski 1990).These attributes hold for what lay epistemic theory calls “non-specific” closure, which is a need for a firm answer to any question in order to avoid confusion and ambiguity. This need to avoid confusion and ambiguity may lead to a preference to “seize and freeze” early in the judgment process on information that is easily accessible and affords closure. A search for “specific” closure, by contrast means a person is looking for a particular answer to a specific question. A person high in this need (for specific closure) may actually postpone closure until a desirable answer that might bolster self-esteem or be more positive or optimistic can be found (Kruglanski et al. 2009). By closing off the gathering of evidence too early (non-specific closure) or by searching only for evidence that yields a desirable answer (specific closure) those who are high in need for closure are more susceptible to numerous cognitive biases (such as the availability heuristic or the confirmation bias). Using virtue language, they may be more susceptible to intellectual arrogance (and therefore less intellectually humble).Lay epistemic theory affords a unique look at the issue of the self-centered nature of heuristics and biases. Heuristics and biases are those mental shortcuts we all make in order to navigate the world in order to not waste precious cognitive resources on processing routine or previously known experiences, or simply to reduce our cognitive load in everyday life (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Stanovich 1999; Evans and Stanovich 2013). While both the need for closure and the use of heuristic rules that preference easy to process evidence favor the self as a source of knowledge (i.e. figuring things out for oneself), as opposed to sources external to the self (e.g. relying on other people), the theory introduces another influence on the judgment process: epistemic authority. Kruglanski et al. (2009) define the concept of epis- temic authority as “encompassing a combination of perceived expertise and trustworthiness... it addresses the extent to which an individual is prepared to rely on a source's information and to accept it as evidence for the veracity of the source's pronouncements” (p. 175).The key to the function of epistemic authority is in the comparison of the self to another.The decision to rely on the authority of another may depend in part on the perceived gap in epistemic authority between the other and the self. In combination with a need for closure, this could either lead to an over-reliance on the self as epistemic authority (intellectual arrogance) or a denigration of the self as an epistemic authority and an over-reliance on others (gullibility or “group think”). Intellectual humility in the context of lay epistemic theory may lie in a proper balance of a need for closure with an openness to new information and a tolerance for ambiguity, along with a capacity to discern when the self is enough of an epistemic authority or when others need to be sought out and relied upon.
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