Pride as demanding, humility as permissive
We can better answer our question if we turn our attention away from what pride and humility are, and focus instead on what pride and humility do. In short, I want to argue that pride signals that one merits esteem and a raised social standing, in such a way that these are demanded or required from others.
Humility, conversely, does not. This is because the humble person's lack of concern with their enhanced public standing allows or permits the observer to be equally unconcerned. For if the humble person doesn't care about being esteemed, then it's difficult to see how esteeming her is required of others. Nevertheless, humility allows the observer to give a gift of esteem — to do something that isn't required, but expresses generosity on the observer's part.The basic thought is that we prefer expressions of humility to expressions of pride because the former allow us to be better, because more generous, people. Moreover, in allowing us to give the gift of esteem, humility also seems to express a valuable and virtuous motive — a form of respect, precisely for our freedom — and one that isn't expressed by pride, which demands our esteem.As a result, we don't just find humility more agreeable; it arguably embodies a more valuable and more virtuous motive.To see this line in more detail, let's look at a recent and plausible social-functionalist account of pride developed in a paper from 2010 by Jessica Tracy, Azim Shariff, and Joey Cheng.27 On their account, “pride is a psychologically important and evolutionarily adaptive emotion” that has “evolved to serve specifically social functions”.28 In particular, they argue that pride has evolved “to help individuals transform culturally valued achievements into higher social status”.29 Tracy and her colleagues note that pride enhances status through “its universally recognized nonverbal expression, which may function to inform observers (other social group members) of the proud individual’s achievement, indicating that he/she deserves higher status”30.
The authors support this with their own research: “Using the Implicit Association Test... we found that the pride expression is rapidly and automatically perceived as a signal of high status”.31 Such signals can be of value to the subject displaying pride, and thus who is perceived to be of high status as a result, since they then “receive increased resources, attention, and other status-related benefits”.32 But such signalling and display can also benefit observers: those who observe the high-status subjects can then “more effectively navigate the status hierarchy by showing appropriate deference, knowing whom to emulate, forming productive alliances, and facilitating their own status jockeying”.33 So there is practical pressure for us to automatically show deference to those who display pride. Of course, we might ultimately come to reject these automatic impulses; we might, for instance, reflectively reject the idea that the proud person merits esteem (perhaps they are basking in reflected glory), and/or decide not to show deference to such people. Our quick and automatic perceptions of our evaluative landscape might prove to be inaccurate, and our quick and automatic tendencies to esteem others and show deference might turn out to be unfounded. Nevertheless, it is not implausible to suppose that pride expressions instinctively call for a way of seeing the proud person — namely, as one who has high status — and equally a behavioural response to the proud person — namely, of esteeming and showing appropriate deference to them. Such evaluative and behavioural responses are, at least prima facie, demanded or required of us.It is plausible to think that humility can also play an important social role, via its facial and bodily expression. For there seem to be standard facial and bodily expressions associated with humility or modesty too: lowered gaze, turning away, blushing.34 And it might be argued that humility counts as virtuous as a result of these facial and bodily manifestations.
As Bommarito notes, humility is sometimes regarded as virtuous in “combating jealousy and making social interactions run more smoothly”.35 Whatever such things signal, it isn’t primarily that the person is associated with some achievement; nor are such expressions automatically taken to be a mark of high esteem and enhanced social standing. One reason for this is that similar expressions are associated, not with achievements, but certain forms of failure: those associated with shame, guilt, and embarrassment, for instance. As a result, facial and bodily expressions associated with modesty don’t seem to call for any particular response; at least, they don’t call for or demand the kind of evaluative and behavioural responses as those automatically elicited by pride expressions.If this is the case, then we can explain the difference in the aretaic status of humility and pride by appealing, not to anything central to the evaluative structure of these emotions, nor to differences in their valence or effects on attention, but instead to a difference in what expressions of these emotions demand of us as observers. For if the above is correct, pride expressions call for particular appraisals, viz. that someone merits esteem, and particular actions, viz. of esteeming that person. As noted, such requirements are only prima facie: they can be overridden by other considerations, and undermined if it turns out that the person isn’t suitably related to something of value or worth. But they are requirements nonetheless. As a result, observing someone displaying pride has mandatory costs, in terms of appraising someone as having higher standing, and in showing due deference to them. And the fact that paying these costs can nevertheless benefit us doesn’t mean that they are not demanded from us.The same is true of moral requirements, after all: although we benefit in the long run if we abide by the demands of morality, they are still demands.
Things are different when it comes to humility.
Expressions of humility call for neither appraisals nor behaviour on the part of the observer. Although humility requires a relation to something of value, and although we might recognize the relevant facial and bodily expressions for what they are, humility doesn't demand that anyone actually esteem the humble person in light of this relation, or show due deference to them.To see this, note that if the modest person seems indifferent or inattentive to her success or achievement — if she doesn't seem to take pleasure in this, but lowers her gaze and turns away, directs conversation elsewhere or to the achievements of others, as per the accounts of humility explained earlier — then it is clear that we are permitted to do likewise. Consider: if your neighbour, glowing with pride, shows you pictures of his grandchildren, then there is some normative pressure on you to respond appropriately. Even if you don't think that they are the most adorable children on the planet, you are required to make the right kind of noises in response. Failure to do so would be at best rude, but more plausibly unkind. If, on the other hand, your neighbour never draws your attention to valuable objects to which he's related — grandchildren, new car, holiday in Cuba — then it seems that you are under no normative pressure to esteem him for such relations, nor show any deference to him on this account.“If he doesn't care about these things”, you might well say to yourself, “then I'm not required to”. Humility, unlike pride, doesn't therefore demand or require some normative response.This doesn't mean that such a response wouldn't in fact be appropriate or fitting; if someone is related to some valuable object, and if this isn't (say) a source of shame to them, then it seems perfectly acceptable to mention this fact, to esteem them for it, and to show due deference to them as a result. Although such responses are not required, they therefore seem permissible. This means that if we do esteem or show deference to the humble person, it is something in our gift, rather than a cost that is demanded from us.There might be many reasons why we would want to esteem the humble person: as an expression of gratitude, perhaps, or because (in the case of public acknowledgement) we think it important that others are aware of the humble person's achievements, or because such esteem and deference accurately reflects their social standing.
Because of this, esteeming the modest or humble person is something that it is entirely fitting and appropriate to do. But this is something that humility allows us the freedom to do.This helps to explain why we are inclined to value expressions of pride and humility differently — and why, as a result, we might think that the latter express a virtuous motive whilst the former do not.We find expressions of humility much more agreeable than pride because they allow us the freedom to act in an appropriate way, rather than demanding this from us: they allow us to make a gift of esteeming and showing deference to another person. But because such expression gives us the freedom to esteem and show deference to another, we might think that humility also expresses a measure of respect for us: respect for our capacity to freely show esteem, to freely render unto others what they are due. So expressions of humility both allow us the freedom to esteem others, and thus strike us as more agreeable than expressions of pride; at the same time, they express respect for our capacity to esteem others, and thus strike us as expressing virtuous motives. It is not kindness that humility and modesty express, therefore, but respect for the freedom of others to show esteem and deference as they wish. And whilst pride can, as we saw, express kindness, pride nevertheless demands that others esteem or show deference to us, and so does not itself express respect for the capacity of others to give us the gift of esteem.As a result, expressions of pride strike us as less worthy or less valuable motives, because they fail to express respect for our freedom in this way.
We started with a puzzle — to explain the difference in our aretaic assessments of pride and humility. If I'm right, this puzzle can best be solved by reflecting on what pride and humility demand, or permit, us to do.This helps us to explain a difference in how agreeable we find these expressions and traits, and so helps to explain the difference in ranking along Humean lines.
But it also helps to explain a difference in the value of the attitudes expressed themselves: humility expresses respect for our freedom to esteem, in a way that pride does not. Because of this, we are inclined to think that the motives expressed in humility are more valuable, and more virtuous, than those expressed in pride.Notes
1 I will, throughout, treat humility and modesty as referring to the same kind of quality.This is, I take it, in line with what most philosophers think about this issue, although there are some dissenters. For this paper, I'll go with the majority view. It's not obvious that anything of importance rests upon this issue, given the arguments to come.
2 Alessandra Tanesini suggested to me that it's doubtful whether we can feel humble, as opposed to feel humbled — by one's situation, by nature, by some other person's qualities or performance, etc. I'm not so sure that we can't feel humble, however. I might enter my boss's office feeling humble, in a situation where I'm going to ask for a raise, without it being true of me that I'm feeling humbled by the situation. (I might, after all, think it likely that I'll get the raise I'm asking for.) So, too, in cases where I've achieved something great — I can feel humble without feeling humbled in such situations.
3 Many contemporary philosophers and psychologists regard emotions as clusters of components. For more on this, see Prinz, J. (2004), chapter 1.
4 Taylor, G. (1985), Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, NewYork: Oxford University Press, p. 41.
5 Fisher, J. (2017),‘Pride and Moral Responsibility', Ratio 30(2), p. 182.
6 Taylor, G (1985), p. 30.
7 Bommarito, N. (2013),‘Modesty as aVirtue of Attention', Philosophical Review 122(1), p. 94.
8 Bommarito, N. (2018).
9 See Tracy, J. L., Robins, R.W., and Schriber, R.A. (2009). Development of a FACS-verified set of basic and self-conscious emotion expressions. Emotion, 9, 554—559.
10 For this line, see Roberts, R., and Wood, J. (2003),‘Humility and Epistemic Goods', in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11 Oxford University Press (2001).
12 p. 13.
13 p. 63.
14 p. 20.
15 Adams, R. (2006), A Theory ofVirtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11.
16 Zagzebski, L. (1996), Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
17 Wilson, Alan T., 2014,“Modesty as Kindness”, Ratio, 29(1): 73—88.
18 p. 76.
19 p. 77.
20 p. 78.
21 pp. 78-79.
22 ‘Modesty as a Virtue of Attention', Philosophical Review (2013), 122(1), p. 93.
23 p. 95.
24 p. 99.
25 p. 103.
26 p. 115.
27 Tracy, J., Shariff,A. and Cheng, J. (2010),‘A Naturalist's View of Pride', Emotion Review 2(2): 163-177.
28 p. 164.
29 p. 168.
30 p. 169.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 pp. 169-170.
34 See Darwin, C. (1890/2009), The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-354.
35 Bommarito, N.‘Modesty and Humility', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition).
References
Adams, R. (2006), A Theory of Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bommarito, N. (2013),‘Modesty as a Virtue of Attention', Philosophical Review, 122(1): 93-117.
Bommarito, N. (2018),‘Modesty and Humility'. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/modesty-humil ity/.
Darwin, C. (1890/2009), The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fisher, J. (2017),‘Pride and Moral Responsibility', Ratio, 30(2): 181-196.
Hurka, T. (2001), Virtue, Vice, and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roberts, Robert, and Wood, Jay (2003),‘Humility and Epistemic Goods'. In: Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Taylor, G. (1985), Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, New York: Oxford University Press.
Tracy, J., Shariff,A., and Cheng, J. (2010),‘A Naturalist's View of Pride', Emotion Review, 2(2): 163-177.
Tracy,J. L., Robins, R.W, and Schriber, R.A. (2009),‘Development of a FACS-Verified Set of Basic and Self-Conscious Emotion Expressions', Emotion, 9(4): 554-559.
Wilson,Alan T. (2014),fModesty as Kindness', Ratio, 29(1): 73-88.
Zagzebski, L. (1996), Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.