Relational greatness
The considerations above underline how pride, understood in terms of the four species listed by Aquinas, has the potential both to inhibit any greatness that one would want for oneself and is toxic for one's relationships with others.
But the dangers of pride are compounded when these two sets of goods coincide, in other words when the greatness that one seeks consists principally in the flourishing of a relationship.The coincidence is central to Aquinas' own account of human flourishing, outlined in ST II-II.1-170, which is entirely ordered by and toward caritas or divine love, which Aquinas describes in terms of friendship (ST II-II.23.1), first and principally with God but also with other persons.Given that pride is toxic to friendship, for the reasons highlighted above, pride is wholly antipathetic to human flourishing in Aquinas' account. Moreover, pride will also tend to impede even the first steps toward the goal of flourishing since, as I have argued extensively elsewhere, Aquinas' entire account of virtue ethics is built around what psychologists today have called ‘joint attention', in which one permits oneself to be moved by a second person to align psychologically with that second person.13 Given that, in a state of pride, one resists being moved at all to align with another person, pride not only inhibits friendship but also the second-person relatedness14 that is a precondition of and oriented toward friendship. On this account, pride leaves one cold, isolated, and unable to grow in virtue.
Given the toxicity of pride for flourishing in Aquinas' highly relational account of virtue ethics, one can perceive why humility has a natural and important place in his account of virtue ethics, given that humility specifically protects the second-person relatedness that is the means to continue and develop in virtue as well as the friendship or divine love that is the goal or fruition of virtue.
What, then, does Aquinas think about the Aristotelian virtue of μεγαλοψυχiα (megalopsγchia) often translated today as ‘pride'? As noted previously, nothing in the four species of the vice of pride prevents persons from being great or knowing that they are great. Moreover, as noted previously, in ST II-II.129-133,Aquinas specifically defends this virtue of greatness, not under the name of ‘pride' but ‘magnanimity' from the Latin magnanimitas, from magna “great” and animus “soul, spirit”, which is a transliteration of the Greek word megalopsγchia (μεγαλοψυχiα). It is this Greek word of which Aristotle writes in NE.IV3.1123b1-2, “Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much” (δοκεt δη μεγαλoψυχος εiναt î μεγaλων αυτoν aξtων aξtος ων).
The introduction of a good pride, magnanimity, helps to avoid some linguistic confusion and it is notable that Aquinas follows Aristotle in describing magnanimity as being about honor (ST II—II.129.1), and specifically about great honor (129.2). He further argues that magnanimity is a virtue (129.3), and since honor is a reward of every virtue, magnanimity is about doing great deeds in the actions associated with every virtue. On this account, magananimity pertains to every virtue, making their actions greater and worthy of great honor (129.4 ad 3). Hence Aquinas can and does defend the disposition to greatness, using descriptions drawn largely from Aristotle, while also opposing the fourfold vice of pride.
Despite this apparent resolution, however, it must be admitted that there is some reluctance to translate megalopsychia as magnanimity today, and to deny that the Christianized virtue of magnanimity captures what Aristotle meant by megalopsychia.The reason, I think, is that some of the characteristics of Aristotle’s great-souled person, which are also defended by Aquinas, do seem to clash with Christian ideals, including in particular: being unmindful of favors; being remiss and slow of action; employing ‘irony’ (eironia) toward many; being unable to associate with others; holding on to barren things rather than to those that are fruitful;15 considering oneself worthy of great honors, and yet despising such honors; not being cast down by dishonor, and despising such dishonor, because it is undeserved;16 having complete confidence in achieving greatness; being perfectly free from fear; making use of goods of fortune, but neither being uplifted much by having them, nor downcast much by losing them.17 At first glance, such characteristics convey the impression that the magnanimous person is aloof, disdainful and arrogant, contrary to humility and love.
The Aristotelian attributes of megalopsychia as described above could, it must be admitted, be ascribed to someone who is viciously proud.
Such a person, with a distorted assessment of the first person at the heart of his or her world, may well act with aloofness, disdain, and arrogance. But at the heart of Aquinas’ virtue ethics is the relationship with God in the manner of a second person, and it is this second person who is at the heart of the Christian life. On this interpretation, many of the Aristotelian attributes of megalopsychia can be given an alternative reading, not in terms of isolated arrogance but in terms of confident second-person dependence, as I have written elsewhere as follows,a child that is confident in her parent is not going to be over-anxious about what she possesses herself in order to complete some difficult task, and can afford to hold to ‘barren’ things, for their own sake, rather than those that are ‘fruitful’. Such a person can also be free from fear and make use of goods of fortune, but neither being uplifted much by having them, nor downcast much by losing them. Being remiss or slow of action and ‘irony’ can also be understood in terms of confidence that is second- personal, rather than a first-personal confidence that depends on one’s own resources, efforts and time. With regard to honor, such a person can consider herself worthy of great honours while treating the actual bestowal of such honours, or dishonours, lightly, since the approval sought is not from civic society but God. Similarly, ‘being unable to associate with others’ can be interpreted as a different mode of relationship with God which may set a person apart, at least from certain other associations. Even being ‘unmindful of favours’ can be accommodated within a second-personal account, if being mindful of favours is interpreted as implying a balance sheet approach to giving and receiving favours, an approach that is pertinent to a third person or contractual approach to favors rather than freely given gifts.18
In other words, while one can read Aristotelian megalopsychia in terms of first-person arrogance, which is perhaps a typical reading today, one can also interpret it in terms of the second-person
Aquinas: humility and relational greatness confidence of a beloved child with a parent, stemming from the security of a relationship with God made possible through love, humility, and the divine gifts of grace. On this account, whatever Aristotle’s own views on this matter, it is possible to incorporate his claims into an account of magnanimity that is both compatible with and dependent upon humility with respect to the divine source of all that is good.
17.5